Policing, Race, and Politics in Chicago by Pihos, Peter Constantine
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
1-1-2015
Policing, Race, and Politics in Chicago
Peter Constantine Pihos
University of Pennsylvania, peter.pihos@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the African American Studies Commons, Public Policy Commons, and the United States
History Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1948
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pihos, Peter Constantine, "Policing, Race, and Politics in Chicago" (2015). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 1948.
http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1948
Policing, Race, and Politics in Chicago
Abstract
Policing, Race, and Politics in Chicago asks how local political institutions structured the relationship
between race and policing in Chicago. It follows Renault Robinson, the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League,
and their allies, as they challenged both a political order in which black politicians and voters played critical
roles and a Police Department that had the most black officers of any in the United States by the early 1960s.
Their activism impelled recognition that Richard J. Daley’s Democratic Party and city government
simultaneously incorporated and subordinated black urbanites. Daley’s political monopoly forced the League
to seek leverage outside of local electoral politics, through tactics that included citizen monitoring, legal
challenges, alliances with state and federal political actors and institutions, and, ultimately, political revolt. The
rise of “law and order” among police officers in the mid-1960s was only half of a more complicated story in
Chicago. League members challenged their colleagues and the blue wall of silence by working with black
communities and police reform activists. They participated in the creation of a network of organizations, the
institutionalization of which increased the capacity of citizens to monitor police behavior. They also engaged
the federal government, whose transfer of federal funds to state and local criminal justice agencies was more
than a catalyst for punitive policies. The League’s efforts to use Title VI to compel civil rights compliance
produced more robust federal civil rights enforcement and this, in turn, transformed local personnel practices.
Finally, their struggle over policing provided a wedge issue for black politicians to break from the regular
Democrats. Robinson and the League facilitated this transition from politics to protest, playing key roles in
forging an insurgent movement to defeat the machine. Despite their success in Harold Washington’s epic 1983
mayoral victory, their experience tracked growing intra-racial stratification. Even as the Mayor sought to
deliver greater public safety to his constituents, federal fiscal hostility and local white intransigence, limited his
options. His reliance on more intensive policing of drugs as a vehicle to stem gang-motivated homicides began
a local war on drugs with devastating consequences for black communities.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
History
First Advisor
Sarah B. Gordon
Keywords
Afro-American Patrolmen's League, Black Politics, Chicago Police Department, Chicago Politics, Harold
Washington, Renault Robinson
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1948
Subject Categories
African American Studies | Public Policy | United States History
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1948
 
 
POLICING, RACE, AND POLITICS IN CHICAGO 
Peter Constantine Pihos 
A DISSERTATION 
in 
History 
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania 
in 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
2015 
 
Supervisor of Dissertation       
 
__________________________      
Sarah Barringer Gordon 
Arlin M. Adams Professor of Constitutional Law and Professor of History     
      
Graduate Group Chairperson 
 
__________________________ 
Benjamin Nathans, Ronald S. Lauder Endowed Term Associate Professor of History 
 
Dissertation Committee 
Walter Licht, Walter H. Annenberg Professor of History 
John MacDonald, Professor of Criminology and Sociology 
Thomas J. Sugrue, Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis and History at New York University  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POLICING, RACE, AND POLITICS IN CHICAGO 
COPYRIGHT 
2015 
Peter Constantine Pihos 
 
This work is licensed under the  
Creative Commons Attribution- 
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 
License 
 
To view a copy of this license, visit 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-ny-sa/2.0/
  
    iii 
To  
Michael B. Katz  
(April 13, 1939 – August 23, 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
    iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
 
 
 
In the fall of 2006, Bill Novak was kind enough to spend an hour or so discussing 
history graduate school with me. Among the other things he told me was that I would not be 
able to find a better committee anywhere than Michael Katz, Tom Sugrue, and Sally Gordon 
at the University of Pennsylvania. Bill Novak is a smart guy.  
I have many lasting memories of Michael B. Katz, to whom this dissertation is 
dedicated. The one that I cherish most comes from the last time I had lunch with him, in a 
Vietnamese restaurant off Baltimore Avenue in West Philadelphia on December 23, 2013. 
While Michael was already undergoing treatment for the cancer that would take his life, he 
showed the same zest to be out in his city, listening carefully, and sharing freely of his 
knowledge and experience. Michael was a critical scholar in the best tradition and yet, one of 
the most important lessons he taught me was the priority of understanding over critique. He 
believed that criticism is often the easy way out; scholarship, like life, is messy and imperfect. 
His question always was what can we learn from it and what can we do with it? It is this 
lesson, above all else, that I hope comes through in this dissertation, in my teaching, and in 
my life.  
Even before Sally Gordon took over my committee, I felt a profound debt to her as 
a scholar and a person. That’s not exactly right, though, for Sally effaces the common 
distinction that we make between the work and its human embodiment. Her extraordinary 
empathy crosses these boundaries. Sally’s moving work on how religious outsiders have tried 
  
    v 
to make a place for themselves in the American constitutional order speaks to the broader 
ethical ordering of her life. I feel privileged to be a part of it. 
One of the great pleasures any 20th century American historian can have is an hour 
or two talking history with Tom Sugrue. It is not merely that few people know as much 
about things that interest me as Tom; rather, it is his infectious joy and curiosity, and his 
ability to see things as few others do. Tom’s example as a scholar asking vital questions 
about race, power, and cities has profoundly shaped what I do and how I think. 
I consider myself quite lucky for the various ways in which Walter Licht showed up 
in my academic career as a teacher: first, schooling me in American capitalism; then in a 
wonderful semester as his teaching assistant; critiquing and challenging the proposal on 
which this dissertation was based. Thank you, Walter, for your unceasing enthusiasm for my 
work and for the way in which you have supported countless others. We notice.   
John MacDonald was gracious to join this committee in its final stages. I look 
forward to a continuing dialogue with him as I try to continue to master some of the 
complex questions about crime and policing at the heart of this dissertation.  
None of this work would have been possible without funding from the University of 
Pennsylvania, including a dissertation completion grant from the School of Arts and 
Sciences. I also benefitted from a fellowship at Harvard Law School during 2012-2013, and 
from the tutelage of Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Ken Mack, Jed Shugerman, and Bruce Mann, 
among others. Librarians at the Chicago Public Library Municipal Reference Collection and 
Special Collections, the University of Illinois at Chicago, and the University of Chicago, 
offered repeated assistance.  
  
    vi 
Many friends and colleagues assisted me throughout the process of writing this 
dissertation. Early on, I met a quartet of women also writing about the history of criminal 
justice in New York City. Elizabeth Kai Hinton, Jessica Neptune, Meghan Stubbendeck, and 
Logan McBride, all provided friendship, encouragement, and inspiration. Special thanks goes 
to Rachel Guberman and Sean Dempsey, who helped me to keep focused in the dog days. 
Julilly Kohler-Hausman has offered invaluable wisdom and good cheer on a number of 
occasions, as has Anne Fleming. My debts to Adam Goodman cannot be repaid, since I 
continually run up a tab on his extraordinary bigheartedness.  
My students and their curiosity are the reason that the life I have chosen is 
meaningful. Thanks are due to many and, in particular, to the men of DS12 and DS13. Over 
the past three semesters, many Duke freshman have enlivened my days and deepened my 
appreciation for the privilege it is to try and convince young people that doing history can 
change their understanding of the world.  
Though they may not see their influence directly in these pages, this dissertation 
begins and ends with my families, who have supported me in all ways. I continually marvel at 
great good fortune I had in acquiring the Heims and Franceschettis, who have been such an 
important part of the last 16 years of my life. Tante grazie a voi. My own family seems to 
multiply with big men and little men each year: John, Cary, Kosta, Markos, Nikitas, and 
Dean—can I say more than this list of names does? As to you who have been there for all 
time, Mom and Dad, Deanna and Andria: As Marilynne Robinson has said, we intimately 
know from the death of our beloved brother and son, Michael William Pihos, “All love is in 
  
    vii 
great part affliction.”1 And, it is so much more. The six of us have shared both the joys and 
sorrows. No adequate thanks are possible.  
Stefania and Michela: only you two know what has brought this project to fruition. 
Perhaps it speaks well of me that I managed to locate the single being who could make it 
possible for me to live this life and we created a second who is equally game.  
 We are what we can be together never enough  
 Though without each other we don’t know our selves  
 And would spend the rest of our days looking over our  
 Shoulder where we thought we saw ourselves  
 Crossing another street.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1 Marilynne Robinson, The Death of Adam: Essays on Modern Thought (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 246. 
2 Amiri Baraka, “Note to Sylvia Robinson From When I Saw Her Walking Through the Projects in 1966,” in 
SOS: Poems, 1961-2003, by Amiri Baraka, ed. Paul Vangelisti (New York: Grove Press, 2014), 513. 
  
    viii 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
POLICING, RACE, AND POLITICS IN CHICAGO 
Peter Constantine Pihos 
Sarah Barringer Gordon 
Policing, Race, and Politics in Chicago asks how local political institutions structured the 
relationship between race and policing in Chicago. It follows Renault Robinson, the Afro-
American Patrolmen’s League, and their allies, as they challenged both a political order in 
which black politicians and voters played critical roles and a Police Department that had the 
most black officers of any in the United States by the early 1960s. Their activism impelled 
recognition that Richard J. Daley’s Democratic Party and city government simultaneously 
incorporated and subordinated black urbanites. Daley’s political monopoly forced the 
League to seek leverage outside of local electoral politics, through tactics that included 
citizen monitoring, legal challenges, alliances with state and federal political actors and 
institutions, and, ultimately, political revolt. The rise of “law and order” among police 
officers in the mid-1960s was only half of a more complicated story in Chicago. League 
members challenged their colleagues and the blue wall of silence by working with black 
communities and police reform activists. They participated in the creation of a network of 
organizations, the institutionalization of which increased the capacity of citizens to monitor 
police behavior. They also engaged the federal government, whose transfer of federal funds 
to state and local criminal justice agencies was more than a catalyst for punitive policies. The 
League’s efforts to use Title VI to compel civil rights compliance produced more robust 
federal civil rights enforcement and this, in turn, transformed local personnel practices. 
Finally, their struggle over policing provided a wedge issue for black politicians to break 
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from the regular Democrats. Robinson and the League facilitated this transition from politics 
to protest, playing key roles in forging an insurgent movement to defeat the machine. 
Despite their success in Harold Washington’s epic 1983 mayoral victory, their experience 
tracked growing intra-racial stratification. Even as the Mayor sought to deliver greater public 
safety to his constituents, federal fiscal hostility and local white intransigence, limited his 
options. His reliance on more intensive policing of drugs as a vehicle to stem gang-
motivated homicides began a local war on drugs with devastating consequences for black 
communities. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Policing, Race, and Politics in Chicago follows Renault Robinson, the Afro-American 
Patrolmen’s League, and their allies, to ask how local political institutions structured the 
relationship between race and policing in Chicago. Robinson and a handful of other young 
black patrolmen founded the League in 1968 to address hostility between black communities 
and black policemen. Their remarkable challenge to the city’s Police Department and 
political order over the succeeding fifteen years provides this dissertation’s ark. These men 
were middle class strivers, whose places in policing were secured through reforms made 
possible by Mayor Richard J. Daley. Through their efforts to change the Police Department 
they sacrificed this career advancement. For many, League membership resulted in exile, 
either off the force or to the worst and most humiliating jobs, such as the Transit Authority’s 
“burial detail” or watching an alley behind Police Headquarters for eight hours a day. From 
the margins, they struggled to end racial discrimination within and by the Police Department 
and to transform its role in the social order. This journey took them out of their precinct 
stations and into community meetings, the homes of brutality victims, to political rallies, into 
courtrooms, and before Congress. By 1983, they had forced the Police Department to 
institute affirmative action, revitalized administrative enforcement of civil rights law, and 
shaped the independent black political movement that defeated Chicago’s regular 
Democratic organization. 
 The primary obstacle that Robinson, the League, and other police reformers faced 
was the unified political party and city government under the control of Mayor Richard J. 
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Daley. Beginning in the 1930s, the Chicago Democratic machine had an enigmatic 
relationship with black voters. Black people secured greater representation within electoral 
politics in Chicago than almost anywhere else. The high numbers of black officers within the 
Police Department evidenced that the power of this representation was more than just 
symbolic. Indeed, it was presence of the members of the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League 
as insiders within the political system that made them simultaneously powerful and 
vulnerable. Yet the presence of black people within politics and government did not always 
serve the cause of black advancement. League members often squared off with other black 
people, who by virtue of their affinities, histories, and interests, advanced policies that 
simultaneously allowed their participation and perpetuated structural black inequality.1 
Making headway against the Daley regime’s political monopoly required the League 
to use whatever avenues were available. While its principle goal was to organize black 
officers, League members worked with public housing residents on community safety, ran a 
police brutality intake service, and networked with public interest lawyers and black 
legislators in Washington, D.C. As Robinson fought to save his job in the early 1970s, he 
also hectored the federal government to investigate racial discrimination in police hiring and 
promotions. The League’s biggest victory was in the federal courts, and yet this owed as 
much to Robinson’s networking as it did to legal strategy. The men found allies when and 
where it could, among organizations and individuals who by position, principle, or interest 
could (or desired to) act against the interests of the regular Democrats. This entailed 
                                                 
1 This formulation comes from Michael B. Katz, Mark Stern, and Jamie J. Fader, “The New African American 
Inequality,” Journal of American History 92 (2005): 75–108. 
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partnering with the Black Panthers and future Republican governor James R. Thompson, 
and anyone else who sought to rework the relationship between policing, race, and politics.  
By following the activism of these insiders-turned-outsiders, this dissertation offers a 
new perspective on the relationship on policing and black activism over more than two 
crucial decades. Law enforcement prerogatives did not displace civil rights in the mid-1960s 
at the moment of their enshrinement in federal law. Rather, concerns about the extension of 
civil rights law into local police forces made the federal government’s initial steps into 
funding local police tentative. Over the course of the 1970s, the League worked to make 
effective civil rights enforcement just as likely an outcome of federal funding as repressive 
policing. Nor did the politics of policing benefit only conservatives. Rather, the League’s 
history demonstrates the paradoxical nature of those politics. During the 1970s, police 
brutality powerfully signified the subordination of black Chicagoans by the local state and 
played a crucial role in shaping black political subjectivity. It provided the leverage for long-
time machine politicians, such as Ralph Metcalfe and Harold Washington, to move outside 
the machine and garner sufficient support to survive the efforts of their former associates to 
defeat them. This trajectory, from politics to protest, represents a fundamental reworking of 
narratives central to our histories of black politics. 
* * * 
Policing, Race, and Politics in Chicago proceeds chronologically and thematically. The first 
three chapters explore the changing relationship between black Chicagoans and the Police 
Department as the city’s politics evolved from machine competition, to a dominant, though 
decentralized, Democratic machine from 1931 to 1955, and, finally, to the centralized party-
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state of the Richard J. Daley years. If Daley’s consolidation of power restricted opportunities 
for African-Americans elsewhere, it enabled black inclusion and advancement in policing 
from 1960 to 1966. The rise of law and order policing thereafter reversed these gains and 
exacerbated racial divisions among police officers, leading to the creation of the Afro-
American Patrolmen’s League in 1968. The Department repressed the League, demoted and 
humiliated its founders, and even attempted to have them fired. If these actions discouraged 
new members, they also gave civil rights and black power activists a reason to identify with 
the League and made the organization a credible witness to police racism. 
The dissertation’s middle three chapters demonstrate how Daley’s political 
monopoly shaped efforts of activists to democratize policing in Chicago between 1970 and 
1974 through citizen activism, black politics, and federal administrative enforcement of equal 
opportunity law. The murders of Black Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark Clark by police 
officers working for State’s Attorney Edward V. Hanrahan in 1969 spurred the 
institutionalization of anti-brutality activism in a network of organization. Working in parallel 
and in concert, they challenged the methods used to ignore or cover up police brutality. The 
politicization of police brutality remade black political subjectivity. By 1972, one of Chicago’s 
leading black machine politicians, U.S. Congressman Ralph H. Metcalfe, found himself 
becoming a central figure in independent black politics, working to unseat his party’s 
candidate, State’s Attorney Edward Hanrahan. Efforts to enlist the assistance of federal 
agencies in enforcing civil rights law to the Police Department more egalitarian ran into the 
institutional structure of the new federal agencies created to fund local policing. 
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The final four chapters of Policing, Race, and Politics in Chicago examine the 
development and consequences of these efforts at democratization between after 1974 and 
1987. The successes of police reformers in Chicago during this period were hard won, as 
they came in the teeth of continued racism and brutality within the Chicago Police 
Department, as well as an increasingly punitive shift in the national politics of policing. 
Robinson and the League succeeded in their legal quest. A federal court found the Police 
Department’s hiring and promotion practices discriminated, and cut off federal law 
enforcement and General Revenue Sharing funds, until the Police Department complied 
with its ethno-racial and gender-based hiring quotas. The League also played a pivotal role in 
the elaboration of a stronger federal agency administrative enforcement regime.  
The frustrations of pursuing change through the courts and citizen action led League 
members to become more directly involved in electoral politics over the second half of the 
decade. At first, these efforts produced little. When Frank Lee and Howard Saffold, two 
League founders, ran for Aldermen, they lost handily. Robinson efforts to bring Chicago a 
black mayor, including serving as Harold Washington’s campaign manager in 1977, were no 
more fruitful. Nonetheless, Robinson and the League became important actors within 
Chicago politics. When surprise mayoral victor Jane Byrne sought to shore up her credentials 
with black Chicagoans after defeating the machine in 1979, she turned to Robinson, naming 
him to the Board of the Chicago Housing Authority. Her failure to live up to her promises 
of reform led Robinson to be a constant thorn in her side.  
By the time that Harold Washington defeated Mayor Byrne and Cook County State’s 
Attorney Richard M. Daley four years later, Renault Robinson and the other men who made 
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up the long-time core of the League, had moved from being outcasts in the Police 
Department to being at the very center of Chicago politics. By virtue of his position as 
supervisor of Washington’s security detail, Howard Saffold became one of the highest-
ranking officers in the Department. He recruited Washington’s entire security detail from the 
League’s ranks. Yet, illustrating the broader paradoxes of racial inequality in the post-civil 
rights age, the success of some did not translate into the betterment of all. In the mid-1980s, 
Mayor Washington’s police force, led by the city’s first black Superintendent, responded to 
legitimate concerns about gang violence by launching a bureaucratically driven war on drugs 
that would disproportionately target black youth. In policing as elsewhere, black political 
success was intimately linked to processes that reinforced the structural subordination of 
large segments of black Chicago. 
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CHAPTER 1: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND POLICING 
 
 
 
 
On the night of Monday, September 27, 1971, three Chicago Police officers entered 
the Third District (Grand Crossing) Police Station, in the heart of the city’s South Side. They 
wore the black jackets of the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, affixed with a Black Power 
fist inside a police star. The officers, Renault Robinson, Howard Saffold, and Bill Bixby, 
were amongst the League’s most stalwart members. Since the Police Department’s publicity 
unit downtown lost or destroyed their materials when they tried to use the internal mail 
system like other police organizations, they passed out monthly meeting notices by hand at 
district stations. The opposition of police leadership to the organization meant that such 
excursions were almost never uneventful. Travelling in a party of three might not be 
efficient, but it meant there would be witnesses.  
 While talking to other black police officers inside the station, they overheard the 
sounds of an interrogation going on in a nearby room. “What’s your name Mother Fucker?” 
The suspect mumbled his name. Slap. “I said what’s your name Mother Fucker?” Slap. 
Laughter. The League officers maneuvered themselves to view the interrogation room and 
found a black suspect who “appeared to be under the influence of alcohol” and two white 
officers. One “watched with a smile on his face,” while the other “continuously slapped and 
struck the black suspect.” About to enter the room to intervene as they had done on other 
occasions, the three League officers noticed Lieutenant Lynch, one of the Third District’s 
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command personnel, watching. “We asked him to stop the beating; he refused and walked 
away, stating he was not going to get involved.”1  
 Robinson, Saffold, and Bixby pressed their complaint to the watch commander, the 
on-duty officer in charge of the station. He assigned a black sergeant to investigate, who 
“complained bitterly to us stating that we had put him in the middle and he did not want to 
get involved.” When they pressed the sergeant to file a complaint against the two patrolmen 
and Lieutenant Lynch with the Internal Affairs Division, “he did everything he could to 
discourage us.” During his reluctant call downtown, he “attempted to embarrass 
[Robinson].” After the three patrolmen reminded the sergeant that Department rules 
protected whistleblowers by keeping the names of the complaining witnesses from the 
officers named in the complaint, “he aided the white police officers in seeing our report … 
That’s a Soul Brother for You.”2  
From the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s, the officers of the Afro-American 
Patrolmen’s League and their radical, liberal, and even (on occasion) conservative allies 
fought an epic struggle to transform the role of the police in perpetuating racial domination 
in Chicago. This was not quite what the men expected when they took the police exam in 
the mid-1960s. They were not activists who decided to become policemen, but policemen 
who became activists. They joined the Department when reform Superintendent Orlando 
(O.W.) Wilson was in charge and actively recruiting black officers as part of his quest to 
transform the relationship between policing and politics. As they developed their craft on 
                                                 
1 Renault A Robinson, “Black Watch,” Chicago Defender, October 9, 1971, 27. 
2 Ibid. 
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the street, they also immersed themselves in the rising currents of Black Nationalism that 
reshaped social politics in Black Chicago during this period.   
“Chicago is a divided city,” Robinson argued in 1970 his weekly column, “The Black 
Watch,” in the Chicago Defender, “[d]ivided racially, socially, economically, and politically.”3 
The officers of the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League felt these divisions intensely. They 
were part of the establishment, insiders with municipal jobs that provided a foothold into 
the middle-class; yet, they were subordinate within their Department and the city’s 
geography of power. During the latter years of the 1960s, as police repression of black 
youths and radical political figures intensified, so did their political consciousness. They 
came to question whether they were being used as tools of their own subordination. 
Robinson and his partner Frank Lee were working on the West Side during the uprising that 
followed the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr. In big squads, “maybe 50 of us at a time,” he 
recalled, “we’d just sweep down a block and grab everybody and fill up the police wagons. I 
mean everybody.”4 As many Chicago police officers came to identify “law and order” as a 
way of maintaining their authority, the League embraced Black Power, a perspective that 
allowed them to see their role as patrolmen central to the reproduction of inequality within 
the city. They imagined, instead, using their positions to transform the relationship between 
black Chicagoans and the Police Department. They self-consciously framed their goal as 
achieving Black Power through law.  
                                                 
3 Renault Robinson, “What We Are Up Against …” Chicago Defender, April 30, 1970, 10. 
4 Robert McClory, “16 First Person Accounts of the Rioting: Renault Robinson,” Chicago Reader, August 15, 
1988, http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/they-were-there/Content?oid=872636. 
  
    10 
  This dissertation begins with the central contradiction raised by Robinson’s slant 
view on policing brutality in the opening vignette.5 This interaction, between white officers 
and a black arrestee, has occurred with such unvarying frequency and uniformity that its 
cumulative weight seems to collapse time and space, rendering the history of race and police 
power flat. This scene took place on one early autumn night in Chicago, but it could have 
been almost any city at almost any time across many decades. Except, it was not. In Chicago, 
in 1971, in a South Side Police District, three black patrolmen confronted the Lieutenant 
who let police brutality continue. And not just that: the on-duty commander responded by 
fobbing them off onto a black sergeant, leaving him to deal with the disgruntled patrolmen. 
A story that might be read as eternal recurrence reveals itself as something else: a miniature 
of the complex and multi-faceted possibilities for black subjectivity on questions of race, 
policing, and politics, in action. 
* * * 
 Policing, Race, and Politics in Chicago recounts how a network of rebellious black 
patrolmen, activists, lawyers, and even (on occasion) politicians contested and remade state 
power on a local level. They sought to change police behavior by transforming the 
relationship of the local state to its denizens. “In the eyes of a great many persons, whose 
economic status is similar to that of the great mass of Negroes,” Harold Gosnell concluded 
in Negro Politicians (1937), “the police officers are the local government.”6 This bears 
emphasizing: Local police are the visible agents of state power. Regardless of how parochial 
                                                 
5 As in, “Tell all the truth but tell it slant — / Success in Circuit lies.” Emily Dickinson, “Tell All the Truth but 
Tell It Slant -- (1263),” in The Poems of Emily Dickinson: Reading Edition, ed. Ralph W. Franklin (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/247292. 
6 Harold F. Gosnell, Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1935), 246. 
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or remote from purposeful rationality officers on the beat might have seemed, they made 
administrative policy in their everyday interactions in urban spaces.7 To miss this is to fail to 
recognize the essential reality of the historical development of local governance in the 
United States. We Americans entrust police officers with the authority to affect lives in 
profound ways, and we do not systematically constrain their behavior. Instead, such controls 
vary dramatically by jurisdiction. This is not a simple artifact of the U.S.’s republican 
heritage: it is a system continually re-forged as disputes over race, crime, and law 
enforcement are contested through the many-layered legal and institutional architecture of 
American federalism.  
Much of the best recent scholarship on criminal justice looks to how Americans have 
remade state power across criminal justice institutions over the last five decades. Some go 
further to integrate these changes with shifts in American political economy or social 
structure.8 Since 1970, long-term processes appear to have been “thrown into reverse,” 
David Garland writes, with “punitive sentiments and expressive gestures that appear oddly 
archaic and downright anti-modern” emerging in public discourse and official policy.9 The 
statistical dimensions of this change are well-known: a quadrupling in the rate of 
imprisonment, from its historically stable level of around 100 persons per 100,000; more 
than two million people incarcerated, and some six million more under other forms of penal 
                                                 
7 This idea was most famously expressed in Kenneth Culp Davis, Police Discretion (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 
1975). Davis call for police to engage in administrative rulemaking, particularly in the realm of non-
enforcement, has not been heeded.  
8 Examples include David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001); Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in 
Globalizing California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Nicola Lacey, The Prisoner’s Dilemma: 
Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democracies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Loïc 
Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009). 
For a cross-national perspective, see Michael Cavadino and James Dignan, “Penal Policy and Political 
Economy,” Criminology & Criminal Justice 6 (2006): 435–56. 
9 Garland, The Culture of Control, 3. 
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supervision; and vast racial and class disparities in rates of contact with the criminal justice 
system. The harshness of American penal practices invites extreme comparison, such as the 
historian James Whitman’s claim that they resemble those in Yemen, China and Russia, pre-
2001 Afghanistan, and Nazi Germany, more than those in wealthy, liberal democratic peer 
nations.10 And punishment itself is merely the beginning; the reach of the punitive state 
produces cascading consequences that undermine individual life chances, community 
stability, and American democracy.11 
Ironically, while conflict over urban policing in the 1960s produced a generation of 
histories about the birth and development of police institutions, corresponding attention has 
not been given to their subsequent elaboration. The relationship between local institutions, 
politics, and policing since the 1960s remains indistinct.12 The first wave of social histories 
was highly attentive to the context of its own production, and these historians plumbed the 
                                                 
10 James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide Between America and Europe (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 4. 
11 This literature is voluminous and growing. Examples include Meda Chesney-Lind and Mark Mauer, Invisible 
Punishment: The Collateral Consequences of Mass Imprisonment (New York: The New Press, 2003); Bruce Western, 
Punishment and Inequality in America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006); Jeff Manza and Christopher 
Uggen, Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); 
Todd R. Clear, Imprisoning Communities: How Mass Incarceration Makes Disadvantaged Neighborhoods Worse (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Devah Pager, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass 
Incarceration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Traci Burch, Trading Democracy for Justice: Criminal 
Convictions an the Decline of Neighborhood Political Participation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Amy E. 
Lerman and Vesla M. Weaver, Arresting Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American Crime Control (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2014). One overview of the literature is Marie Gottschalk, “The Long Reach of 
the Carceral State: The Politics of Crime, Mass Imprisonment, and Penal Reform in the United States and 
Abroad,” Law & Social Inquiry 24 (2009): 439–72. 
12 Certain efforts in this regard have been made, such as Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Lost 
Angeles, First Vintage Books Edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), chap. 4–5. Scholars who highlight 
common processes include Christian Parenti, Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis (New York: 
Verso, 1999), 3–6; Garland, The Culture of Control; Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social 
Insecurity; Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: The 
New Press, 2012), chap. 2. One enjoyably dystopian work on the rise of militarized policing is Radley Balko, 
Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America’s Police Forces (New York: PublicAffairs, 2014). On 
militarization in a broader context, see Stephen Graham, Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism (New 
York: Verso, 2011).  
  
    13 
past to understand what police did and why.13 This vein of scholarly inquiry more or less 
atrophied after Eric Monkkonen’s Police in Urban America, 1860-1920 (1981), as the conflict 
that initially sparked the field receded from public view.14 During the central years of the 
punitive turn, the 1980s and 1990s, study of the police became largely technical in 
orientation, framed as “as a tool of progressive management and innovation” for police 
institutions. With a few notable exceptions, the crime control agenda of the state played a 
formative role in shaping research agendas.15 Only in recent years, as the importance of 
“stop-and-frisk” and “zero tolerance” policing in reproducing inequalities in everyday life 
have become clearer, has the social history of policing re-emerged as an important area of 
inquiry.  
This dissertation examines the relationship between race, policing, and politics in a 
single jurisdiction. Rather than looking synoptically down at the city through national or 
state-level changes in criminal justice policy and practice, I situate Policing, Race, and Politics in 
Chicago and look up. The Chicago Police Department, in contrast to the county courts and 
jail or the state-run prisons, is a creature of the city’s jurisdiction. Emphasizing that policing 
                                                 
13 Roger Lane, Policing the City: Boston, 1822-1885 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); James F. 
Richardson, The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); David 
Ralph Johnson, Policing the Urban Underworld: The Impact of Crime on the Development of the American Police, 1800-1887 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979); Wilbur R. Miller, Cops and Bobbies: Police Authority in New York and 
London, Second Edition (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999). For historiographical overviews, see 
Roger Lane, “Urban Police and Crime in Nineteenth-Century America,” Crime and Justice 2 (1980): 1–43; Roger 
Lane, “Urban Police and Crime in Nineteenth-Century America,” Crime and Justice 15 (1992): 1–50; Eric H. 
Monkkonen, “History of Urban Police,” Crime and Justice 15 (1992): 547–80. 
14 Eric H. Monkkonen, Police in Urban America, 1860-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). The 
most notable exception is Allen Steinberg, The Transformation of Criminal Justice: Philadelphia, 1800-1880 (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989). 
15 Police scholarship, in this sense, became part of the broader change in police tactics and techniques that must 
be explained. Wesley G. Skogan and Kathleen Frydl, eds., Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence 
(Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2004), 24. The development of specialist research networks 
around policing bears more than a passing resemblance to poverty research. See Alice O’Connor, Poverty 
Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), chap. 9. 
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and other criminal justice functions originate from different locations within the 
jurisdictional hierarchy of American federalism forces us to reckon with how the city as a 
juridical entity matters. Monkkonen’s recognition that “the history of the police is so much a 
part of the history of the city,” addressed the development and bureaucratization of police 
forces in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Nonetheless, his claim that “it is essential that the 
history of the city provide the first and most dominant framework within which to analyze 
the police,” continues to have force.16 The center of gravity of law enforcement policy-
making undoubtedly has shifted in recent years as the matrix of incentives and constraints 
constructed by state and federal governments have changed. But even in 1987, at the end of 
the period covered by this dissertation, the funding of policing remained overwhelmingly 
local. That year, local governments still made nearly three-quarters of the $56 billion in yearly 
police expenditures nationwide, with states and the federal government splitting the rest.17 
Moreover, police-related expenditures continued to make up the largest share of overall 
spending on criminal justice, accounting for 49 cents of every dollar.18  
Focusing on the city allows me to build upon important insights of historical 
institutionalists. Marie Gottschalk argues that “particular social movements and interest 
groups” act “within the constraints of larger institutional structures.”19 Though Gottschalk 
focuses on how the structure of the American welfare state shaped federal criminal justice 
                                                 
16 Eric H. Monkkonen, “From Cop History to Social History: The Significance of the Police in American 
History,” Journal of Social History 15 (1982): 577. 
17 Local government: 73.7%; state government: 12.8%; federal government: 13.6%. Tracey Kyckelhahn, “Table 
4. Distribution of police protection expenditures, by level of government, FY 1982-2007 (real dollars),” Justice 
Expenditures and Employment, FY 1982-2007-Statistical Tables (Criminal Justice Expenditure and Employment 
Extracts Program, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Dec. 16, 2011). 
18 “Table 1.7: Justice system per capita expenditures: By type of activity, United States, fiscal years 1980-99, 
and 2001\a\” Criminal Justice Sourcebook Online, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t17.csv 
19 Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration in America (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 8. 
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policymaking, her method informs many recent studies, including those that address the 
variegated development of imprisonment practices in different states.20 Facing similar 
problems, states pursue a variety of policies that are shaped by distinctive state-level 
institutional arrangements and political cultures. The results are tremendous differences in 
state-level imprisonment rates. While the average state imprisoned 478 people per 100,000 in 
2013, this includes the spectrum from Louisiana (704 per 100,000) to Maine (148 per 
100,000).21 “The reality of American penal sanctioning,” Vanessa Barker argues,” is much 
more complicated, uneven, and obscure than the discussion of national trends allows.”22 
Policing, Race, and Politics begins from policing’s localism. Urban political institutions 
structure politics in different ways from state or national ones, in part shaping the ways in 
which different groups may access them.23 The transformations of American political 
economy and social geography over the past 50 years reinforced the differential 
opportunities provided by the structure of politics. As jobs fled central cities and 
metropolitan areas spread out, as new streams of migrants arrived, and as the northward 
flow of white and black Southerners reversed, American cities were remade. This 
demographic sifting of the metropolitan area played a central role in reconstructing Chicago 
politics and its relationship to both the state and federal government. If in the aggregate 
American politics were “Rightward Bound” during these years, the trajectory of politics in 
                                                 
20 Outstanding examples of this literature include Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment: How the Democratic 
Process Shapes the Way America Punishes Offenders (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Mona Lynch, Sunbelt 
Justice: Arizona and the Transformation of American Punishment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Robert 
Perkinson, Texas Tough: The Rise of America’s Prison Empire (New York: Picador, 2010); Joshua Page, The Toughest 
Beat: Politics, Punishment, and the Prison Officers Union in California (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
21 Data from the Sentencing Project, http://sentencingproject.org/map/map.cfm (visited Oct. 29, 2015) 
22 Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment, 6.   
23 Lisa Miller maps the varying levels of accessibility to local (Pittsburgh and Philadelphia), state (Pennsylvania), 
and national policymaking to multi-issue community groups, and convincingly demonstrates that political 
arenas shape political policies. Lisa L. Miller, The Perils of Federalism: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime Control 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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Chicago depended in important part on how its residents and institutions responded to these 
epochal changes.24  
* * * 
 The relationship between the Democratic Party, the Mayor, and the Police 
Department structured this history of struggle. “The Chicago Police Department is a 
political institution, operated with a firm hand by Mayor Richard J. Daley,” Renault 
Robinson argued.25 The Department was difficult to change because Mayor Daley used his 
position at the center of party and state to insulate it. Robinson frequently employed the 
classic language of police reform, damning policing for its relationship to politics. What he 
actually sought, though, was the democratization of policing—primarily by empowering 
black Chicagoans to shape and oversee police conduct. Although Mayor Daley and other 
Democratic Party stalwarts justified their power by reference to their often-spectacular 
electoral majorities, they achieved these results by systematically biasing elections in their 
own favor. All political parties attempt to do this to some extent, but Chicago’s Democratic 
Party was unusually successful.26 From 1931 to 1979, Party regulars achieved an unparalleled 
level of dominance. 
 A successful monopoly on electoral success is distinct from machine politics, which 
can be more fruitfully thought of as a process or set of techniques. It is “the manipulation of 
certain incentives to partisan political participation,” such as “favoritism based on political 
                                                 
24 Bruce J. Schlman and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., Rightward Bound: Making American Conservative in the 1970s 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
25 “Report of the January 1970 Grand Jury” (United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 
1970), 6. 
26 The language of bias comes from Jessica Trounstine, Political Monopolies in American Cities: The Rise and Fall of 
Bosses and Reformers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). She helpfully creates a taxonomy of different 
techniques used by the two types of political monopolies she studies  
  
    17 
criteria in personnel decisions, contracting and administration of the laws.”27 The hub of 
machine politics was the political ward, each of which was represented by a committeeman, 
whose rank within the party hierarchy and access to patronage was determined by the size of 
the vote margins he delivered on Election Day. The committeeman was dependent on his 
precinct captains for delivering the votes; in turn, they depended on him to supply the 
patronage jobs. This link between their material wellbeing and their political productivity was 
the engine that drove the machine model of politics.28 From the Civil War through the 
1930s, Republicans and Democrats each used the machine model to compete robustly for 
preeminence in the city. Each party was rife with factionalism. Not until the municipal 
election of 1931 did competitive balance disappear in the face of Democratic dominance. 
“On the ruins of the Republican organization,” Harold Gosnell declared in Machine Politics: 
Chicago Style (1937), “the Democrats have built the most powerful political machine that the 
city has ever seen.”29  
                                                 
27 Raymond E. Wolfinger, “Why Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts,” Journal 
of Politics 34 (1972): 374–75. 
28 Harold F. Gosnell, “The Political Party Versus the Political Machine,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 169 (1933); Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model, 2d ed. (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1968); Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1967), 115; Milton L. Rakove, Don’t Make No Waves ... Don’t Back No Losers: An Insider Analysis 
of the Daley Machine (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1975). Precinct captains used a variety of 
techniques to secure loyalty. Some were purely social, such as attendance at funerals. Others fell in the realm of 
social welfare provision: providing food, coal, rent, or Christmas baskets. Finally, many precinct captains served 
as brokers, for jobs both inside and outside of government, to secure government assistance, for legal services, 
as well as fixing permits and lower tax assessments. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model, chap. 4, esp. 71, tbl. 
8. What worked to secure voters affiliation may have varied by ethnicity (or other categories). Peri E. Arnold, 
“What Bonded Immigrants to Machines? The Case of Jacob Arvey and Chicago’s 24th Ward,” Journal of Policy 
History 25 (2013): 463–88. 
29 Quotes from Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model, 12, 25. Chicago Democrats exploited their dominant 
position after the 1931 election to entrench their position, not only through the local mechanisms for biasing 
votes (patronage, vote buying, ballot stuffing), but also by linking with the federal New Deal programs to vastly 
expand the patronage resources available for distribution. Democratic dominance in the 1935 municipal 
elections, in which Kelly won of 83 percent of the vote almost doubled the Democratic percentage from 1927, 
led Roosevelt to entrust Chicago Democrats with distribution of nearly 68,000 Works Progress Administration 
jobs to their constituents. Stephen Erie, Rainbow’s End: Irish Americans and the Dilemma’s of Urban Machine Politics, 
1840-1985 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), chap. 4. 
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 In the 1950s, Mayor Richard J. Daley fused the Democratic Party and the City of 
Chicago into a “party-state.” The result was a remarkably resilient structure in which each of 
his two roles, as party chairman and the as city mayor, reinforced the other. As Renault 
Robinson and his allies sought to contest law and order policing beginning in 1968, they 
continually ran up against its impermeability. Every direction they turned, it seemed, there 
was a Sergeant Soul Brother of one type or another, grabbing for “the little clout, the little 
crumb drops they give” and attempting to make a place for himself in a racially-stratified 
social and political order. The AAPL President remonstrated against such figures, especially 
black police supervisors and black elected officials, for their unwillingness to confront 
power: “they all were chicken-shit and scared” that they would lose what little they had. Yet, 
he “had a lot of friends among them,” he noted. “They were people that I liked.” Robinson 
“understood their fear. I didn’t criticize them for it. I criticized the issue, you know, in 
general, that the fear was so pervasive that these guys.”30 It was not these individuals who 
were the problem; it was the whole system by which the Democratic party-state ruled.31 
* * * 
 Policing, Race, and Politics in Chicago makes three interlinked arguments. It begins by 
arguing that Superintendent Wilson’s reforms during the first half of the 1960s reshaped the 
role of race in the Police Department. He created more rational appointment and promotion 
procedures, which limited the influence of politics in the Department and resulted in the 
appointment and promotion of more black officers. He also changed the activities of 
                                                 
30 Larry Crowe, Interview with Renault Robinson (The HistoryMakers A2002.107), July 3, 2002, 
http://thmdigital.thehistorymakers.com/iCoreClient.html#/&i=12468, session 1, tape 2, story 9. 
31 Richard Keiser, Subordination or Empowerment? African-American Leadership and the Struggle for Urban Political Power 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), chap. 2. 
  
    19 
policemen: Professional policing on Wilson’s model centered around increased technological 
capacity, which took officers off the streets and put them in cars, and relied heavily on 
aggressive “preventative patrol,” both of which produced tension on the streets. Finally, the 
reconstruction of the Department’s administrative structure reproduced the alienation felt by 
many street officers, subjecting them to new rules and oversight from Downtown that 
impinged upon their prerogatives. These changes structured the rise of “law and order” 
politics within the Department, a politics that City Hall embraced in the aftermath of 
Wilson’s departure.  
Law and order’s most significant creation in Chicago was not repressive and 
discriminatory policing. Policing in the 1970s was repressive and discriminatory (and grew 
somewhat more so over the second half of the decade). But the continuities with the 1960s 
are more striking than the differences, particularly when viewed next to changes that took 
place in the last two decades of the 20th century. By hiring and promoting more black 
officers, Wilson opened up new fissures within the Department. He increased black presence 
at a time of racial retrenchment.32 This opened up a divide between black policemen. Many 
sought advancement through the ranks, even despite double standards at work. Renault 
Robinson and the members of the League rebelled, opposing law and order with Black 
Power. Law and order’s most lasting achievement in Chicago was the creation of the Afro-
American Patrolmen’s League and a broader network of other police reform organizations. 
 Police reformers during the 1970s sought to democratize the Chicago Police 
Department. Through sheer persistence and a pragmatic willingness to ally with anyone who 
                                                 
32 The plummeting of black hiring during his later years and after he retired reflected this. See Figure 1, 
Appendix II.  
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sought change, these organizations populated the field of police policymaking with ordinary 
Chicagoans, unaffiliated with the political machine. Doing so provided new forms of 
oversight, and this forced the Department to change many of its practices over the course of 
the 1970s. Activists won access to more information about police practices; they remade the 
civilian Police Board as a forum for interaction and debate over police policy; they 
transformed policing hiring and personnel practices; and they ended the practices of police 
intelligence gathering. Perhaps even more importantly, police reform activists, especially 
Renault Robinson, transformed local politics: their challenge to police brutality transformed 
the relationship between black politicians and voters and the Democratic machine. Renault 
Robinson and the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League provide a thread connecting the 
collective response to “law and order” repression to the creation of the black independent 
political movement that put Harold Washington in power fifteen years later.  
 
The intractability of local politics caused the League to reach outside its confines to 
build power. By examining its efforts to enlist the federal government in its struggle, this 
dissertation recasts the federal role in local criminal justice policy, and that of local politics in 
shaping federal policy. By 1971, when the League first sought the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration’s (LEAA) assistance in addressing discriminatory personnel 
practices, it did not appear a particularly enthusiastic or likely ally. Indeed, recent historical 
work identifies the entrance of the federal government into state and local criminal justice 
policy in the 1960s one of the lodestones in the creation of a punitive state. “[A]t the very 
same moment that the American Civil Rights Movement had succeeded in newly 
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empowering African Americans in the political sphere by securing passage of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965,” historian Heather Thompson argues, “America’s white 
politicians decided to begin a massive new war on crime that would eventually undercut 
myriad gains of the Civil Rights Movement.”33 Between 1968 and 1983, the LEAA spent 
nearly $73 billion on state and local criminal justice projects—a considerable amount but a 
tiny fraction (less than 5 percent) of total nationwide justice system expenditures.34  
Looking at federal intergovernmental aid from Chicago up (rather than trying to 
understand the LEAA by looking synoptically out from Washington) offers a different 
perspective. In light of other changes in federal aid that resembled the LEAA in structure, 
such as President Richard Nixon’s General Revenue Sharing program, the agency’s spending 
in Chicago is best understood as fiscal aid program that both simultaneously sustained the 
party-state in power and provided resources and secured greater legitimacy for police reform 
organizations. Federal dollars did something else important, too. They brought federal civil 
rights law into local police departments. In 1971, when the League appealed to the LEAA 
for civil rights assistance, the agency was ill equipped for its role in enforcing Title VI of the 
                                                 
33 Heather Ann Thompson, “How Prisons Change the Balance of Power in America,” The Atlantic, October 7, 
2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/10/how-prisons-change-the-balance-of-power-in-
america/280341/.  Thompson’s claim is echoed by others—none of whom disclaim that state-level political 
formation was also important. Vesla Weaver, “The Significance of Policy Failures in Political Development: 
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the Growth of the Carceral State,” in Living Legislation: 
Durability, Change, and the Politics of American Lawmaking, ed. Jeffrey A. Jenkins and Eric M. Patashnik (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012), 221–52; Naomi Murakawa, The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on 
Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).  
34 From 1971 to 1979, they amounted to 4.61 percent of total spending. “Justice Expenditure and Employment 
in the U.S., 1979” (Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, December 1980), 1 tbl. A; Thomas 
E. Cronin, Tania Z. Cronin, and Michael E. Milakovich, U.S. v. Crime in the Streets (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana 
University Press, 1981). I calculated spending in 2013 dollars, using a percentage of GDP using the calculators 
at Measuring Worth, http://www.measuringworth.com (last visited 10/25/2015). All real dollar values for 
government spending on projects throughout this dissertation are calculated using this particular measure of 
change over time. Other monetary calculations are simply adjusted using the consumer price index calculator 
on Measuring Worth. 
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Civil Rights Act of 1964. Robinson’s persistent entreaties, testimony before Congress, and 
public pressure tactics ultimately forced the agency to act. This unleashed a process of 
reciprocal transformations that would provide for greater opportunities for black officers in 
the Chicago Police Department and also result in the creation of a much more robust federal 
enforcement machinery that made a significant difference in forcing police departments to 
hire more women and people of color.  
 It was not until the 1980s that the federal government’s influence on local policing 
turned decisively in favor of punitive action. Even then, it was complicated. While federal 
programs at the end of that decade funded punitive action, perhaps the biggest federal 
impact was on cities’ fiscal health. During the 1960s and 1970s, increased federal spending 
helped to make up for the declining resources available to Chicago from local tax sources. 
After 1978, though, federal aid plummeted, including the elimination of the LEAA and 
General Revenue Sharing. With reduced federal money, cities were forced into difficult 
choices about where to spend and they most often chose law enforcement. When the 
Chicago Police Department launched its war on gangs and drugs in the mid-1980s, it was the 
retraction of federal dollars as much as any punitive federal policy initiatives that shaped its 
choices.  
 
 Harold Washington, Chicago’s progressive black mayor, and its first black Police 
Superintendent oversaw the initiation of the punitive war on gangs and drugs in the mid-
1980s. This dissertation’s final question is how they got there. The answer can be found in 
part in the trajectory of black politics. As activists like Robinson grew frustrated with the 
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pace of legal and administrative action, they concluded that politics was the only way. 
Robinson reminded Defender readers:  
The next time your precinct captain has the nerve to knock at your door and 
ask for your vote for King Daley remember what you are voting for: a police 
department that does nothing to stop serious crime in the black 
community—a police department that refuses to hire and promote black 
police officers—a police department that disrespects black people—a police 
department that kills black people—a police department that takes bribes 
which allow dope to be sold to black children—a police department that 
permits vicious gang activity—a police department that is presently being 
investigated by the federal government.35 
The question was not whether policing was a political act, but how to build a politics around 
reforming policing.  
Efforts to stop police brutality intertwined with efforts to construct independent 
black politics over the course of the 1970s. As Robinson’s exhortation reflected, activists 
were concerned about many different problems, and did not separate questions of crime and 
police brutality from one another. Rather, Robinson saw them as both intimately connected 
to the place of blacks within the political order. Nonetheless, anti-crime initiatives opened up 
political divisions within black communities, even in the face of efforts for solidarity. By 
contrast, anti-brutality activism brought together a diverse set of actors of different political 
orientations. 
                                                 
35 Renault Robinson, “Black Watch,” Chicago Defender, June 16, 1973. 
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In Chicago, the key question surrounding politics was not how to put black people in 
office, for that had been occurring for decades. It was how to use politics to end racial 
domination, and this meant overturning the party-state that preserved such inequalities. The 
path to black political power moved not “From Protest to Politics,” as in Bayard Rustin’s 
classic formulation, but “From Politics to Protest.” The task of building an black political 
movement capable of defeating the Democratic regulars was in getting black politicians and 
voters long disillusioned by their lack of voice to join a electoral protest movement. Police 
brutality and activists who put it in the public spotlight, such as Renault Robinson and 
Howard Saffold, played key roles in negotiating this transition from inside the machine to 
independent Democrats, first for Ralph Metcalfe in 1972 and later for Harold Washington in 
1977 and 1983.  
As my account of black politics and police behavior offers a transformed chronology 
and a more hopeful picture of local activism during the 1970s, it also tracks the rise of 
punitive policing that targeted black youth in the 1980s. The timing and nature of that 
transformation was the culmination of the remaking of Chicago politics. Mayor Washington 
arrived at City Hall carrying the hopes of the unified mass of black Chicagoans who had 
elected him. If confronting crime presented challenges for independent political organizing, 
it presented even greater challenges for governance. Yet as black political success had shifted 
the city government in a more liberal direction, the rest of the country was moving to the 
right. As Mayor, his efforts to respond to his constituents demands for protection from drug 
dealing and gang violence ran into the teeth of this right wing shift. In making policies, 
Washington had to navigate both a reactionary City Council majority that drew upon tropes 
of black criminality to disrupt his plans for reform at every turn and a shrinking budget with 
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no money for social programs and little for violence intervention. Stuck with the Police 
Department as his only well resourced agency, Washington used it to police black youth 
more intensively. The policies produced new forms of stratification of the social order that 
were only exacerbated as the federal and state incentives changed the calculus of policing.  
* * * 
This is a Chicago story but it is also an American one. In some sense, the assertion 
that local variation is the American story in one of the claims at the heart of this dissertation. 
Chicago’s unique party-state during Mayor Daley’s reign from 1955 through 1976 required 
black Chicagoans to undertake a distinctive trajectory to achieve independent political 
success, marking out an important variation on civil rights themes. Yet, it is the rearticulation 
of race and class inequalities embedded in the institutional structure of our federal system 
that strikes me as the most uniquely American aspect of this history. Harold Washington, 
like many black political actors before him, built his triumph on the dispossession of black 
communities, in particular their inability to escape the confines of the city as whites fled to 
better opportunities, more stable housing markets, better resourced schools, and fairer and 
more effective policing from which blacks were excluded. If his triumph marked another 
step on the path to more adequate racial representation, it did not transform the basic 
conditions of its making.  
Ultimately, Policing, Race, and Politics offers a window onto the place of the local state 
in the United States in shaping black destinies over the past four decades. The tale of 
collective struggle culminated in the opening of new opportunities for many talented black 
individuals. Renault Robinson served Harold Washington as Chairman of the Chicago 
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Housing Authority. After spending his whole career as a patrolman, Howard Saffold became 
a Police Commander under the Mayor. Almost all of the Mayor’s bodyguards were drawn 
from the League, and they grew to be some of his closest confidantes. And yet, acting within 
divided government and federal fiscal retrenchment, and in the political context of punitive 
anti-crime politics, the same administration produced new forms of stratification. In 
attempting to solve the seemingly intractable problem of black Chicagoan’s disproportionate 
vulnerability to violence with the means at their disposal, they chose practices that subjected 
black youth to new forms of punitive control. Local power mattered immensely; but so did 
the transformed institutional and political context in which it took place. 
27 
 
CHAPTER 2: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE LOGIC OF POLICE REFORM 
 
 
For five decades of the twentieth century, from 1910 to 1960, the strange history of 
the color line in Chicago simultaneously constrained and enabled black participation in 
politics. Because the structure of politics was centered upon the ward, and the police districts 
in the black wards overlapped closely with this political structure, a symbiotic relationship 
emerged between these two areas of institutional life. Using police as their agents, black 
politicians built a machine that depended on financing from illicit entertainment. These 
aspects of the social and political geography of the city, would shape the relationship of 
black politicians and voters with both the Republican and Democratic parties until the 
1950s. Throughout, black political influence was rewarded with the segmented incorporation 
of black officers into the Police Department. While black men were hired in relatively large 
numbers compared with other cities, the color line nonetheless limited their place inside the 
police institution. 
Only after Mayor Daley consolidated power did the relationship between policing 
and politics in black neighborhoods dramatically change. Despite the reputation of Mayor 
Daley’s Democratic machine for politicizing governance, a police scandal in 1960 led him to 
insulate the Department from party politics and to hire police reformer O.W. Wilson as the 
Superintendent. In his efforts to make the Chicago police more professional, the “college 
cop” transformed the relationship between race, policing, and politics. Because Wilson’s 
reforms did not take into account the fundamentally social nature of the police role, 
however, they exacerbated the social isolation of many rank-and-file patrolmen from the 
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people they policed. While his racial egalitarianism meliorated some of the symptoms of 
division between police officers and black and Latino/a urban residents, they ultimately 
could not contain the emerging conflict. 
Black Politics, Black Police, and Illicit Activity 
 Black Chicagoans took up electoral politics from almost the moment the Fifteenth 
Amendment introduced black suffrage in Illinois. At first, abolitionist networks and patron-
client relations defined black political representation. By the second decade of the twentieth 
century, though, “black politicians were part of the larger process of institutionalizing the 
machine.”1 In the era of machine competition, Republicans and Democrats used their 
positions at the nexus of politics and government to try and build their coalitions. To induce 
others to participate in the hard work of nominating, electing, and controlling officeholders, 
they offered the potential to influence “government policies, policy stands, projects, graft, 
appointive government jobs, and other valued things.”2 Within this political system, the 
pursuit of an anti-racist agenda was adjunct to the pursuit of material benefits.3 
The emergence of a black Republican machine in the Second Ward was made 
possible by the institutionalization of relationships between politics and underground 
entertainment, such as vice, gambling, and prostitution.4 This business was done at the ward 
                                                 
1 Margaret Garb, Freedom’s Ballot: African American Political Struggles in Chicago from Abolition to the Great Migration 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 149. 
2 Jessica Trounstine, Political Monopolies in American Cities: The Rise and Fall of Bosses and Reformers (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008), 23. For similar views on the role of cross-sectorial coordination establishing 
a governing coalition, see John Logan and Harvey Molotch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1987); Clarence Stone, Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988 (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas Press, 1989). 
3 Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model, 2d ed. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 25. 
4 Harold F. Gosnell, Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1935); Mark H. Haller, “Policy Gambling, Entertainment, and the Emergence of Black Politics: Chicago from 
1900-1940,” Journal of Social History 24 (1991): 719–39; St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis: A 
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level, where the police formed a key link between the machine and illicit entrepreneurs.5 
Although there were slightly fewer police districts than the fifty wards, the boundaries of 
most of the “inner city” districts were congruent with the boundaries of a political ward, 
where ward committeemen controlled the assignment of Police Captains. Political control 
over policing produced a patchwork of local legal orders. “In one district a police regulation 
takes the place of the law. In another, the law becomes operative to a slight degree, while in 
still a third it is apparently enforced.”6 The ward-based political organization and its police 
adjuncts encouraged a diversity of local states. 
In the 1910s, racial discrimination and government policy concentrated Chicago’s 
booming black population and illicit activities on “a narrow finger of land,” jutting south 
from the Loop that became known as the Black Belt.7 Prior to the Great Migration, black 
Chicagoans lived in only few of the city’s neighborhoods. In its aftermath, the racial 
homogeneity of those neighborhoods increased dramatically.8 Whites met each attempt to 
exit segregation with “a campaign against Negroes … A continuous struggle marked by 
                                                                                                                                                 
Study of Negro Life in a Northern City, Revised and Enlarged Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); 
Garb, Freedom’s Ballot. 
5 Mark Haller addressed this theme at length. Mark H. Haller, “Police Reform in Chicago, 1905-1935,” 
American Behavioral Scientist 13 (1970): 649–66; Mark H. Haller, “Urban Crime and Criminal Justice: The Chicago 
Case,” Journal of American History 57 (1970): 619–35; Mark H. Haller, “Organized Crime in Urban Society: 
Chicago in the Twentieth Century,” Journal of Social History 5 (1972): 210–34; Mark Haller, “Historical Roots of 
Police Behavior: Chicago, 1890-1925,” Law & Society Review 10 (1976): 303–23; Haller, “Policy Gambling, 
Entertainment, and the Emergence of Black Politics: Chicago from 1900-1940.” 
6 Chicago Vice Commission, The Social Evil in Chicago; a Study of Existing Conditions with Recommendations by the Vice 
Commission of Chicago: A Municipal Body Appointed by the Mayor and the City Council of the City of Chicago, and Submitted 
as Its Report to the Mayor and City Council of Chicago (Chicago: Gunthorp-Warren, 1911), 144. 
7 Allan H. Spear, Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920 (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 
1967), 12. 
8 “None of Chicago’s blacks in 1910 had lived in a census tract that was more than 75 per cent Negro; in 1920, 
35.7 per cent of the black population did. Only 30.8 per cent in 1910 had lived in one that more than 50 per 
cent Negro; in 1920, 50.5 per cent did.” William M. Tuttle Jr., “Contested Neighborhoods and Racial Violence: 
Prelude to the Chicago Riot of 1919,” The Journal of Negro History 55 (1970): 270. For more, see Spear, Black 
Chicago, chap. 1 and 7. 
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bombings, foreclosures of mortgages, and court disputes.”9 When the police destroyed the 
city’s principal vice district in 1912, the emerging Black Belt quickly became a haven for the 
illicit activities.10 The choice, according to historian Cynthia Blair, was “initiated by the joint 
efforts of white reform organizations, the state’s attorney’s office, the city government, and a 
police force that demonstrated little concern about the consequence … for the ‘residence 
districts of the race.’”11 Relocation to the Black Belt was driven by the factors that shaped 
black residential immobility: white racism, black poverty, and political indifference.12 
Amongst the ironies that characterize the history of black Chicago is the central role 
of racial segregation and vice entrepreneurs making black politics possible.13 This process 
cannot be attributed to numbers alone: Voters elected Oscar DePriest, the first black 
Alderman, in 1915, just as the Great Migration was getting underway. Rather, “effective 
organization, inspiring political leaders, and the specific social conditions and political 
                                                 
9 Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1922), 117. 
10 Up until the 1912, the city “pursued a policy of ‘segregated vice,’ restricting the brothels and the gaming 
houses to a few small areas where they would be out of sight of respectable people but under police 
surveillance.” Edward R. Kantowitz, “Carter Harrison II (1897-1905, 1911-1915),” in The Mayors: The Chicago 
Political Tradition, ed. Paul M. Green and Melvin G. Holli, Fourth Edition (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 2013), 22–23. See also “Methods of Dealing with Commercialized Vice,” City Club Bulletin 20 
(November 18, 1912): 342; William T. Stead, If Christ Came to Chicago (Chicago: Laird & Lee, 1894), 446–451 
(Appendix A) and foldout map.  
11 Cynthia M. Blair, I’ve Got to Make My Livin’: Black Women’s Sex Work in Turn-of-the-Century Chicago (Chicago: 
University Of Chicago Press, 2010), 215; Kevin Mumford, Interzones: Black/White Sex Districts in Chicago and New 
York in the Early Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 27. “Invariably the large vice 
districts have been created within or near the settlements of colored people. In the past history of the city every 
time a new vice district was created downtown or on the South Side, the colored families were in the district, 
moving in just ahead of the prostitutes.” Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago: A Study 
of Race Relations and a Race Riot, 343. Police also relocated the illicit drug market from the Levee to the Black 
Belt. Chicago. Vice Commission, The Social Evil in Chicago; a Study of Existing Conditions with Recommendations by the 
Vice Commission of Chicago: A Municipal Body Appointed by the Mayor and the City Council of the City of Chicago, and 
Submitted as Its Report to the Mayor and City Council of Chicago (Chicago: Gunthorp-Warren, 1911), 144. 
12 Charles S. Johnson enumerated the causes of black vice districts as follows: “(1) Negroes are unwelcome in 
desirable white residence locals; (2) small incomes compel them to live in the least expensive places regardless 
of surroundings …” Economic structure and social exclusion rather than moral weakness or deviant culture. A 
third and final factor spoke the importance of politics: “(3) Negroes lack sufficient influence and power to 
protest effectively against the encroachments of vice.” Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in 
Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot, 344.  
13 Garb, Freedom’s Ballot, 149. 
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structures found in the urban North,” combined to create political possibilities.14 Lack of 
ready access to loans drove black entrepreneurs into the vice trades, and the quick profits 
made in in illicit activities became capital for investment in legitimate businesses. Black 
vulnerability within the criminal justice system made political protection particularly 
important. Entrepreneurs and politicians created systems of reciprocal obligations, rooted in 
their mutual desire for power independent of white control. The proprietors of commercial 
leisure establishments provided black politicians with financing in exchange for mediating 
their relationship with the police, which saved them from needing protection from white 
underworld figures.15 William Hale (Bill) Thompson’s narrow mayoral victories in 1915, 
1919, and 1927, depended in part upon the black Second and Third Ward organizations that 
they built.16 
Insert Table 1 
Black police officers have long been a metric for the relationship between African-
Americans and politics. Chicago hired its first black police officer in 1872, but in the decades 
before civil service and stable party factions, the numbers of black officers fluctuated 
dramatically and were reliant on personal connections to white patrons. Black advancement 
up the ranks was restricted, but it occurred. The Chicago Police promoted their first black 
Lieutenant only a year after New York hired its first black officer.17 During the era of 
machine competition, the Irish dominated municipal employment, especially police and fire 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 201. 
15 Gosnell, Negro Politicians, chap. 6; Haller, “Policy Gambling, Entertainment, and the Emergence of Black 
Politics: Chicago from 1900-1940,” 732–734; Garb, Freedom’s Ballot, 147–160. Drake and Cayton expand on the 
development of black illicit business, with less of an emphasis on politics. Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis, 
chap. 17. 
16 Richard A. Keiser, “Explaining African-American Political Empowerment: Windy City Politics from 1900 to 
1983,” Urban Affairs Quarterly 29 (1993): 87.  
17  “Negro a Desk Sergeant,” Chicago Tribune, April 6, 1905, 5; “America’s First Afro-American Lieutenant of 
Police,” Chicago Defender, Sept. 18, 1915, 1; Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 248. 
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jobs.18 Nonetheless, during Thompson’s years in office, black Chicagoans secured a place 
within the municipal bureaucracy roughly equal to their percentage of the population.19 
Appointments to the Chicago Police force symbolized blacks’ place within Republican 
politics. By 1933, “there were 124 Negro patrolmen, 4 sergeants, 2 lieutenants, 1 police 
operator, and 2 police women, for a total of 133.”20 As Table 1 suggests, even if growth in 
police offers in Chicago did not match the black population boom, it remained steady and 
substantial. 
The presence of black police addressed material and symbolic concerns. Many black 
Chicagoans believed, with Gosnell, that black police officers would provide better police 
protection and also safeguard black residents from discrimination. Yet police jobs had a 
special status in urban politics, and the desire for black officers responded to this concern 
“with the prestige which colored officers would bring to the race.” Gosnell speculated, “the 
                                                 
18 The Irish and their descents made up thirty-one percent of city employees in 1900. Stephen Erie, Rainbow’s 
End: Irish Americans and the Dilemma’s of Urban Machine Politics, 1840-1985 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988), chap. 2. By 1930, 76% of the officers on Chicago’s force were of Irish descent. Haller, “Police 
Reform in Chicago,” 650. Wilson remarks on this at the turn of the 1960s as well. James Q. Wilson, 
“Generational and Ethnic Differences Among Career Police Officers,” American Journal of Sociology 69, no. 5 
(1964): 522. 
19 By the mid-1930s, blacks constituted 6.9 percent of Chicago’s population and held 6.4 percent of city jobs. 
Even though most of these were menial and low paying, this level of parity between population and jobs was 
nonetheless remarkable. (In New York, the parity ration was only .57 as compared with Chicago’s .93).  Patrick 
D. Joyce, “A Reversal of Fortunes: Black Empowerment, Political Machines, and City Jobs in New York City 
and Chicago,” Urban Affairs Review 32 (1997): 298. 
20 Thompson’s election in 1915 brought blacks into more high profile positions than ever before, including 
numerous appointments of black lawyers to the city law department and the appointment of Bishop Archibald 
Carey to a seat on the Civil Service Commission. In the Police Department, Thompson oversaw the 
appointment of far greater numbers of black officers than any other official during the party-building period. 
He made almost half of the total appointments of black officers (122 of 267 total), in addition to eighty-six 
reinstatements. Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 251. Chicago far outpaced other cities. W. Martin Dulaney, Black Police 
in America (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1996), chap. 3. By 1926, New York only had forty-six 
black officers, despite its larger police force, and much greater black population. Marilynn S. Johnson, Street 
Justice: A History of Police Violence in New York City (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004), 85, 182. 
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newcomer from the south could say,  ‘What colored man’s heart does not beat a little faster 
when he sees a Negro officer go by in his neat uniform of blue?’”21  
 
 Conflicts over policing, politics, and illicit enterprise in the Black Belt deeply marked 
black participation in formal politics. Time and again, white Democratic politicians—
sometimes with the support of black reformers—targeted the relationship between illicit 
activities and black ward organizations. In 1917, for example, the Democratic State’s 
Attorney indicted and tried Alderman Oscar DePriest for taking bribes from gamblers.22 
Such attacks reflected much more than the corrupt triangular relations between politicians, 
police captains, and underworld operators, for these relationship existed in white wards as 
well. Rather, they targeted blacks for their vulnerable and despised status within the city’s 
social order in an effort to tip the political balance in the Democrats’ favor.23  
The 1931 municipal elections and 1932 Presidential election remade the landscape of 
local politics as if by seismic rupture.24 Democrats exploited their victory to entrench their 
position, not only through the usual mechanisms for biasing votes (patronage, vote buying, 
ballot stuffing), but also by linking with the federal New Deal programs to vastly expand the 
                                                 
21 The single largest wave of black hiring under Thompson followed the riot of 1919. Citing the role of white 
officers in failing to restrain, enabling, and even joining white mobs, black Chicagoans demanded more black 
officers for their own protection. Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 246. 
22 Following a defense conducted by Edward Morris and Clarence Darrow, DePriest was acquitted. Ibid., chap. 
9; Garb, Freedom’s Ballot, 220–222.  
23 For example, in the mid-1920s, Mayor Wiliam Dever targeted the Black Belt for a series of gambling raids 
that resulted in over 1,000 arrests, as part of a campaign of race-baiting Republicans that included hiring 
musicians to play “Bye-Bye Blackbird,” in reference to Mayor Thompson. Douglas Bukowski, “Big Bill 
Thompson: The ‘Model’ Politician,” in The Mayors: The Chicago Political Tradition, Fourth Edition (Carbondale, 
Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 2013), 75–76. 
24 “Chicago’s mayoral election of 1931 was clearly a local version of critical election, one in which voters turned 
out in large numbers, in which there were significant reorganizations of existing electoral coalitions and partisan 
organizations, and in which the issues in the election mobilized significant numbers of new participants.” 
Dianne M. Pinderhughes, Race and Ethnicity in Chicago Politics: A Reexamination of Pluralist Theory (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1987), 47. 
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resources available for distribution.25 They also looked to expand their resources locally. 
When Anton Cermak took control of Chicago in 1931, he had police raid South Side 
gambling and vice operators to send “a clear message that black gamblers would have to 
assist in the building of a Democratic organization on the South Side if they wished 
protection from police interference.”26 Unlike Democrats’ earlier efforts to constitute 
themselves in opposition to “black Republicans,” Cermak and his successors sought to 
expand the available boodle by creating black Democratic organizations in the second and 
third wards. 
Led by Second Ward committeeman and U.S. Congressman William L. Dawson, 
black Democrats built strong ward organizations, but their place in the Party would continue 
to be bedeviled by the conditions of their existence.27 It took two election cycles after 1931 
for black wards to hit the 50 percent Democratic threshold in both national and local 
elections. Thereafter, their momentum in national elections continued its upward trajectory; 
locally, returns in Mayor Martin Kennelly’s second mayoral election in 1951 slumped back 
below 50 percent.28 Dawson was the cause: he sat out the election on account of Kennelly’s 
crackdowns on the South Side’s large-scale “policy” gambling operations, which formed the 
economic basis of his organization. In 1955, Dawson joined with other committeemen to 
dump the two-term incumbent from the Democrat slate. They tabbed Richard J. Daley, the 
                                                 
25 Democratic dominance in the 1935 municipal elections, in which Kelly won of eighty-three percent of the 
vote almost doubled the Democratic percentage from 1927, led Roosevelt to entrust Chicago Democrats with 
distribution of nearly 68,000 Works Progress Administration jobs to their constituents. Erie, Rainbow’s End: Irish 
Americans and the Dilemma’s of Urban Machine Politics, 1840-1985, chap. 4. 
26 Haller, “Policy Gambling, Entertainment, and the Emergence of Black Politics: Chicago from 1900-1940,” 
728, 728–32. 
27 Dawson was a Republican alderman from 1933 to 1939. He became the Democratic committeeman of the 
Second Ward in 1939. Christopher Manning, William L. Dawson and the Limits of Black Electoral Leadership 
(Dekalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009), chap. 3.Christopher Manning, William L. Dawson and the 
Limits of Black Electoral Leadership (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009), chap. XX.  
28 Figures from William J. Grimshaw, Bitter Fruit: Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 1931-1991 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), chap. 3. 
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Party chairman since 1952, in his place. Kennelly blamed Dawson for his fate, and in his 
primary campaign he cloaked racist appeals in anti-machine rhetoric. He cast Dawson as “a 
political overlord of a district where policy rackets and narcotics peddling flourish as they do 
nowhere else in the city.”29 Marshaling the voters in five wards that made up the South Side 
Black Belt by 1955 into a massive turnout, with 75 percent going for Daley, Dawson played 
a critical role in delivering both the primary and the general election for the organization’s 
candidate.30 In 1955,  “the black wards displaced the poor white immigrant wards as the 
Daley machine’s electoral stronghold.”31  
Dawson’s role in bringing Daley into power would be bitterly ironic. Rather than 
elevating the First District Congressman in the party hierarchy, Daley’s consolidation of 
power as head of party and local state, allowed him to cripple Dawson. Daley used the 
power of each to reinforce the power of the other and, in the process, reengineered the 
operation of the local state. As Mayor, Daley took governing authority away from a City 
Council that had dominated his predecessor, in particular by putting budgetary authority in 
the Mayor’s office. The chairman greatly reduced the influence of the ward organizations by 
centralizing the distribution of both patronage jobs and favors that were once the 
prerogative of ward leaders. Most importantly, he undercut Dawson by installing black 
                                                 
29 William J. Grimshaw, Bitter Fruit: Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 1931-1991 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 99, quoting “Editorial: Policy, Narcotics, and Mayoral Politics,” Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 1, 
1955. 
30 Grimshaw and Kleppner demonstrate that Daley’s victory was almost due to his margins in the all the five all 
black wards, and six white and machine wards that ran from downtown to the West Side. Paul Kleppner, 
Chicago Divided: The Making of a Black Mayor (Dekalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1985), 66–74; 
Grimshaw, Bitter Fruit: Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 1931-1991, 97–103. See also James Q. Wilson, Negro 
Politics: The Search for Leadership (New York: The Free Press, 1960), 81–84; Adam Cohen and Elizabeth Taylor, 
American Pharaoh: Mayor Richard J. Daley: His Battle for Chicago and the Nation (Boston: Back Bay Books, 2001), 
chap. 3; Manning, William L. Dawson and the Limits of Black Electoral Leadership, 126–129. 
31 Grimshaw, Bitter Fruit: Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 1931-1991, 101. 
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committeemen personally loyal to him and not the Second Ward leader..32 Daley’s renovation 
of the party and governance greatly reduced the leverage of black politicians, making it much 
more difficult to extract substantive rewards. Despite their tremendous support for Daley 
during the first half of his mayoralty, “at no time did the black ward organizations acquire 
rewards commensurate with either their population size or their productivity.”33 
 
During the years of Democratic dominance from 1930 to 1961, the size and 
complexion of the police force changed dramatically, as Table 1 shows.34 The rise of blacks 
to 11.8 percent of the force far outstripped the rate of black population growth, although it 
remained well below parity.35 During these years, when black employment options remained 
severely restricted, the Police became amongst the most attractive of government employers. 
A number of the black officers who joined the Police made it their ultimate destination after 
hop-scotching through various civil service jobs. Rudy Nimocks was the extreme case: “I 
drove a bus for five years [for the CTA], and I worked in the U.S. post office for a short 
time, but I wasn’t satisfied with those jobs, so I went to the fire department for one year. 
Then I came to the police department.”36 Most men were not “looking for a career” or 
                                                 
32 Cohen and Taylor, American Pharaoh, 142–150, 155–163. 
33 Grimshaw, Bitter Fruit: Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 1931-1991, 107. 
34 Although the Chicago Police kept employment statistics by race when Gosnell was doing his research, they 
stopped doing so during the heyday of Democratic machine control after 1931. Outside of the newspapers, the 
documentary record on the Department between the 1930s and 1960 is very spotty. The Police Department, 
which merged with the thousand-strong Park District Police in 1959, grew from 6,163 officers to 10,065 
officers, despite the fact that the population of the city only inched up (increasing from 3.376 million to 3.55 
million). 
35 Although 22.9 percent of the city that was black, the proper denominator for considering employment parity 
would be the percentage of black men, age twenty-one to sixty-five.  
36 Timuel D. Black, Jr., “Interview with Dr. Rudy Nimocks,” in Bridges of Memory: Chicago’s First Wave of Black 
Migration (Evanston, Ill., and Chicago: Northwestern University Press and DuSable Museum of African 
American History, 2003), 422. Fred Rice worked at the post office while taking exams, for the “park district, 
police exam, fire department exam, the Chicago [Illinois] police exam and any other exam that popped up.” 
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“promotions,” according the Leroy Martin. They joined “to get away from that ‘last to hire, 
first to fire’ situation, because, you know, that has always been the albatross … [A]t least the 
police department and the post office offered you some sort of security, and that’s why most 
of us joined.”37 
Little changed for black officers within the Department during Daley’s first term.38 
“Scratch the surface of the Chicago Police Department,” the Chicago Defender declared in 
1959, “and you will find Jim Crow everywhere, most colored officers will tell you.”39 A Jim 
Crow quota fixed black promotions, such that in 1955 there were only five black sergeants 
and one black Lieutenant.40 A single promotional list was compiled during the 1950s, and no 
black officers qualified.41 The problem was not the written exam. “If you want to know 
about the Negro’s change for promotion,” Gosnell quoted one retired officer, “you had 
                                                                                                                                                 
Fred Rice, Jr. (The HistoryMakers A1993.005), interview by Larry Crowe, June 27, 1993, The HistoryMakers, 
session 1, tape 2, story 2, http://thmdigital.thehistorymakers.com/iCoreClient.html.  
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(Evanston, Ill., and Chicago: Northwestern University Press and DuSable Museum of African American 
History, 2003), 454. Rice similarly stresses the security over the salary. Interview with Fred Rice, 
HistoryMakers, session 1, tape 2, story 2. 
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1912, 3. 
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Black, Jr., “Interview with Leroy Martin,” 448; Black, Jr., “Interview with Dr. Rudy Nimocks,” 424; Timuel D. 
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134. 
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despite the presence on the force of Negro Veterans and college graduates.” Robert Howard, “Brown Lashes 
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better see who gives him his efficiency rating.”42 Kinzie Bluiett’s promotion from lieutenant 
to captain in 1954 made him the only black captain out of 49. None of the 250 lieutenants 
were black.43 There were only six black sergeants out of 750, and four of them were 
“‘hidden’ as though there is afoot a calculated program to minimize Negroes in any 
command capacity.” The Defender estimated that given number of blacks the force, there 
ought to be “200 black sergeants, 14 lieutenants, and 3 captains.”44  
Black politicians lacked the clout to get black officers promoted.45 Despite civil 
service regulations, many officers and police observers believed that a small group of 
captains at Police Headquarters made promotions in accordance with the wishes of 
Democratic politicians.46 Once symbolic racial quotas were filled, black officers harbored few 
hopes of promotion. Nimocks’s acceptance of the widely held belief that only those with 
clout could move up slowed his promotion. “For many, many years a lot of black police 
officers would say, ‘Why take the examination? If you don’t have some clout-if you don’t 
have somebody behind you-you’d just be wasting your three dollars.’”47 The result was that 
black officers just did not enter the force expecting to embark on an upward trajectory. At 
best, Leroy Martin claimed, “We hope[d] we would made detective—be out of uniform—
                                                 
42 Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 263. 
43 “Names 3 New Captains on Police Force: O’Connor Promotes 10 Others, Transfers 64,” Chicago Tribune, 
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before we retire, but the thought of becoming a lieutenant or a sergeant wasn’t even in our 
thinking.”48  
 The color line shaped every aspect of black police officers’ experience at work. Two-
thirds of the officers were assigned to districts that were 80 percent black, with most at the 
Prairie and Wabash Avenue Stations.49 This was a function of Chicago’s geography of racial 
segregation: officers wanted to work near home and “often black police officers were not 
welcome in certain districts in Chicago … The people in this city just were not accustomed 
to being policed by blacks. They were, of course, accustomed to black people being policed 
by whites.”50 Beyond geography, certain special assignments were off limits. Even detectives, 
one of the few positions to which black officers could aspire, faced many restrictions on 
their work: “the only places where a black detective was allowed to work was in burglary and 
robbery. They weren’t working in homicide even thought we had a lot of blacks killing 
blacks.”51 Within the station houses themselves, black officers also faced restrictions.52 Squad 
cars were a particular flashpoint. The Englewood district had seven squad cars in 1959, “but 
Negroes only operate one of the number, car 203. When any of the ‘white’ squad cars breaks 
down, the Negro policemen sigh: ‘Well, ho-hum, man, there’s old 203 turning white 
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again.’”53 This complaint wasn’t simply about prestige; the men wanted shelter from the 
Chicago winter.54  
Race and the Logic of Police Reform 
By 1957, Herbert Brean argued in Life, Chicago “probably has the worst police 
department of any sizeable city.”55 Herbert Goldstein, who helped reform the department in 
the 1960s anatomized the problems: “It had a poor reputation for service, corruption was 
widespread, partisan political influence was pervasive and determinative for all important 
decisions made in the department, and personnel were poorly trained, disorganized, at times 
dispirited, and even disgraced.”56 If the endemic relationship between policing and 
underworld activities remained, their relationship to black politics had changed considerably. 
In the 1950s, the Chicago Outfit knocked off the last of the so-called South Side “policy 
kings.” It neither asked for nor required the protection of Dawson and the other black 
committeeman.57 Moreover, once Daley consolidated political power, there was neither the 
need nor the incentive for black committeemen to maintain an economic base to run their 
organizations independently. Funds for elections now came from downtown.  
 The 1959 scandal of Joe Smith and “sin corner” demonstrated the continuing 
connection of illicit activities and policing in the Black Belt, and their attenuation from 
politics. Joe Smith, the protagonist, was a middle-aged church-going painter and NAACP 
member who tried to get the police to crack down on prostitution at 63rd and Cottage Grove 
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in Woodlawn.58 Police complicity in “sin corner” led to Smith instead finding himself 
accused. According to Woodlawn detectives, a prostitute turned herself in for having been 
paid to “french” Mr. Smith—that is “put his penis in [her] mouth.”59 Nontheless, the crucial 
mistake of the Cottage Grove Station Commander, Captain Phillip Breitzke, was his belief 
that “nobody would go to bat for Joe Smith because he was a Negro.”60 Actually, no one 
went to bat for Breitzke and his detectives, who were reassigned from their duties at the 
station even before the jury returned a “not guilty” verdict. Still, as long as the scandal was 
confined within the parameters of the Black Belt, it could not generate the conditions for 
serious reform.  
 A year later, a larger scandal broke in the North Side Summerdale District. It was a 
doozy. As liberal Hyde Park Alderman Leon Despres put it in the Nation, “The recent 
confession of one slight twenty-three-year-old burglar that his numerous accomplices were 
Chicago policemen has greatly upset the city.”61 The 77-page confession of Richard 
Morrison, known as the “babbling burglar,” recounted how he had worked with policemen 
in the Northside Summerdale district in a series of robberies for nearly two years. Morrison 
blabbed right away, but his words turned into scandal only once he found the right listener: 
Republican State’s Attorney Benjamin Adamowski.62 After his 1956 election, the new Cook 
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County prosecutor used his office to attack the Mayor. Finding policemen with homes full 
of stolen merchandise provided a powerful weapon.63 
 If there were any doubts about Mayor Daley’s political deftness in the early 1960s, 
his handling of the Summerdale scandal put them to rest. “The most amazing thing about 
the police scandal,” according Alderman Seymour Simon, was “the way Daley turned it to 
his own advantage.” It was a two-step maneuver: First, Daley fired Police Commissioner 
O’Connor.64 Then, he invited Orlando W. Wilson, the nation’s leading advocate of police 
reform, to chair a blue ribbon committee with four local notables, to pick the next police 
chief.65  Unsatisfied after an extensive search, the committee turned and recommended 
Wilson as the only man who could do the job.66 With Wilson’s appointment, Simon noted, 
“Daley ended up being treated like a hero and a reformer.”67  
Lateral entry was the only way Wilson could have ever gotten to the top of the mid-
century Chicago Police Department. For starters, he was not Irish or Catholic. A “tall, 
slender, graying man” of Norwegian ancestry, Wilson came to Chicago from the University 
of California, Berkeley, where he was Dean of the School of Criminology.68 A chain-smoker 
and martini drinker, Wilson was much more comfortable with the socialite crowd at the 
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Lyric Opera than with the crowd at Sam Sianis’s Billy Goat Tavern. Wilson’s police career 
began in 1921 when, as a first-year student, he scored highly on a University-administered 
intelligence test and decided to respond to Berkeley Police Chief August Vollmer’s call for 
applications in the student newspaper. Upon his graduation, Vollmer secured him a post as 
the Police Chief in Fullerton, California; he later went on to run the Department in Wichita, 
Kansas.69 He returned to Berkeley in 1939 as professor of police science. A leader of the 
movement to professionalize the police, he went on to write such scintillating tracts as 
Distribution of Patrol Force (1941), Police Records: Their Installation and Use (1942), Police 
Administration (1950), and Police Planning (1952). During his time at Berkeley he directed 
reorganization surveys of more than a dozen police departments.70 
Daley worked hard to protect Wilson from political influence, especially during his 
early years. As unusual as it might seem, this move fit well with Daley’s centralization of 
political power and his principle strategy of for preserving it: providing quality city services.71 
The Mayor gave the Superintendent carte blanche and he made great headway in destroying the 
warrens of power and patronage in the Department, primarily by centralizing control over 
nearly every aspect of police administration. At the same time, much to the dismay of critics 
such as Leon Despres, Daley personally rather than legally protected Wilson. A year after 
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Wilson had arrived, “Chicago now has the best police department it has ever had,” Despres 
conceded, but there was no way to guarantee that things would remain that way.72  
Wilson’s reform project sought to turn policemen into professionals and police 
departments into bureaucracies run on sound organizational principles. Reformers argued 
that the wrong men directed the wrong kind of officers in the wrong kind of activity. 
Accordingly, they directed their major reforms at each of these problems, seeking to 
centralize power over policing in the hands of professional administrators, to attract more 
qualified (e.g., college educated) officers, and to limit the police role to crime prevention.73 
Nothing characterized Wilson’s enlightened reform project better than his efforts to 
standardize crime-reporting periods. Since months were not uniform, how could one learn 
anything by comparing crime across them? Wilson put the Department on a schedule of 
thirteen police periods, each twenty-eight days long.  
Wilson took on “the greatest challenge confronting law enforcement in the United 
States today, perhaps in the world,” with aplomb.74 Having spent decades theorizing how to 
run a police department, Wilson came in with what one of his executive assistant Herman 
Goldstein described as a bold and detailed “top-down plan.”75 Wilson modernized and 
renovated the physical plant and technological capabilities of the department, simplified the 
basic organizational structure of the department, created greater capacities for review of the 
department, including the development of an Internal Investigations Department, 
transformed personnel practices, engaged in active public relations, shifted the deployment 
                                                 
72 Leon M. Despres, “Remarks to League of Women Voters” January 14, 1961, Despres 152-4; “Len O’Connor 
Comments ... (Transcript)” (WMAQ, March 3, 1960), Despres 152-4.   
73 Robert M. Fogelson, Big-City Police (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 159–161. 
74 Robert Bendiner, “A Tale of Cops, Robbers, and the Visiting Professor,” The Reporter, September 15, 1960, 
34. 
75 Goldstein, “The O.W. Wilson Era,” 2. 
  
    45 
of officers, and tried to change their style of policing.76 Whether Wilson merely gave the 
department “more of a face lifting than a fundamental reform,” was hotly debated.77 
Wilson was against racial prejudice. In reflecting on his mentor, Chief Vollmer, 
Wilson admired how he hired a black officer when “there were no social pressures to 
appoint minority groups to police forces.”78 Yet his use of racial egalitarianism as Police 
Superintendent was strategic. Wilson argued that to elevate policemen’s status, the 
Department had to “establish procedures to assure that only the best qualified are allowed to 
join our ranks.”79 The color line symbolized what was wrong with the old Chicago Police 
Department. As Leon Depres asked with shock, “Do you realize that we still have 
segregation in patrol cars in Chicago? A modern, non-corrupt, non-political police 
commissioner would not tolerate such a waste of manpower for one day.”80 Wilson 
eliminated barriers to hiring, promoting, and assigning officers based on his perception of 
their merits, rather than on political (or other) criteria.  
Getting the best men in the right jobs was important to this strategy. Making sure 
those men knew that it was Wilson’s reforms that put them there was equally important. In a 
police force where politicians traditionally controlled hiring and promotion, commanding 
officers’ loyalties often lay outside of police headquarters. The Superintendent’s 
egalitarianism targeted those political relationships, especially familial and ethnic loyalties. 
Despite the changing demographics of the city and the increasing numbers of black officers, 
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the Department remained astonishingly insular. When James Q. Wilson surveyed hundreds 
of sergeants in 1960 and 1965, for example, half had relatives who were police officers and 
one-fifth were sons of cops.81 Above all, the Irish still dominated, both among line officers 
and at the command level. Despite the fact that such ethnic niches characterized nearly every 
sector of the post-WWII economy, the over-representation of men of Irish-descent was 
continually be cited a mark of the Department’s insularity.82 
Daley’s Democratic party-state repeatedly frustrated Chicagoans efforts to end the 
color line in housing, schools, and jobs. Before Wilson’s arrival, the Mayor had done little to 
increase black hiring in the Police Department and nothing to advance black promotion. Yet 
it was Daley’s protection that allowed Superintendent Wilson to transform the Department 
and run it without political interference. This is to say, Wilson challenging the color line 
within the institution was a product of the same regime that enabled its persistence in some 
many other ways.83 Indeed, Wilson sought to make the Police Department more egalitarian, 
in part on account of those conflicts over the limitations the color line placed on black life. 
They made black officers vital resources for easing racial tension and hostility. Black officers 
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were assumed to be “far more effective in dealing with a ghetto population,” and Wilson 
assigned them wherever he though race could work to the Department’s advantage.84  
Wilson greatly stepped up recruitment of black men. The Department placed articles 
in the Defender calling for such recruits; used Captain Kinzie Blueitt’s Wabash Avenue 
District as a surrogate recruiting station to render assistance to black men in filling out 
applications; enlisted black businessmen through the Cosmopolitan Chamber of Commerce 
to put recruiting posters in their windows; and Wilson made the case directly in the media 
that college-educated black applicants not overlook the fact that “police work has developed 
into a field requiring high skill and giving back excellent compensation.”85 He also eliminated 
obstacles that the Civil Service Commission used to screen black applicants out, such as the 
arbitrary application of irrelevant medical criteria.86  
Insert Figure 1 
Wilson was most successful in recruiting black applicants in his first years on the 
force. And the proportion of black recruits fell slowly but steadily during the Wilson years.87  
Even in subsequent years, twenty percent of new officers were black. By 1966, the 
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percentage of black policeman had risen to nearly seventeen percent.88 Compared with most 
cities these percentages were astounding, and the size of Chicago’s force meant it had many 
more black officers than other Department.89 Despite these striking numbers, the city’s 
changing racial demographics meant that the force remained much whiter than the 
population, which had become almost one-third black by the end of the decade. Despite 
Wilson’s concerted efforts to recruit black officers, then, the share of black officers relative 
to population actually fell during the 1960s.  
Black officers advancement on the promotional track was simultaneously striking 
and disappointing. When Wilson took the helm, he realized that the Civil Service 
Commission had not created a new promotional list for twelve years. Many patrolmen, 
“some of whom under normal promotional policies would already be lieutenants and a few, 
perhaps, even captains,” had never even had a chance to apply for promotion.90 Wilson 
worked quickly to reverse this vacuum in supervisory and command positions, and over time 
he ensured more rapid promotion by giving more exams.91  By 1964, he had appointed 870 
new sergeants, 226 new lieutenants, and ninety-four new captains.92  
Prior to Wilson, black officers had been excluded almost wholesale from 
promotions, and Leroy Martin credited the Superintendent for their subsequent 
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advancement, claiming, “most of us would not have made rank had it not been for him.”93 It 
was slow going at first, but as the Defender remarked in May 1961, “If the promotion of only 
two Negroes out of this whopping total [of 100] seems puny, consider that this is the first 
elevation to a lieutenancy for a Negro in a decade.”94 In seven months on the job, Wilson 
promoted twenty-four new black sergeants and four lieutenants.95 By December of 1962, 
there were fifty black sergeants, and blacks occupied eight command posts.96 By 1966, 
Wilson boasted of the vast improvements in black status on the force: in six years the 
Department went from being fifteen percent black with just one black captain and five 
sergeants, to having “four Negro captains, three lieutenants, and 71 sergeants,” as well as 
three of twenty-one District Commanders.97 At the same time, top administrative personnel 
and Wilson’s own staff remained all white.98 None of the three Deputy Superintendents, five 
assistant Deputy Superintendents, or ten Deputy Chiefs were black, nor were any of the six 
Area Chiefs. “Negroes thus hold no policy-making jobs on the Police Department at all, save 
for the three commanding districts—and it’s debatable whether district commanders shape 
policy.”99  
Wilson’s reliance on voluntary change to affect integration of assignments and 
stations was the least successful aspect of efforts to eliminate the color line inside the 
Department. Circular Order Number 8 (March 1960) was a commitment that men would 
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not be turned away on racial grounds.100 Its principle effect was to provide integration 
proponents with leverage, but it was also used, on rare occasions, to discipline.101 While 
black officers were sent to stations that were formerly all white, they suffered the fate of 
many integration pioneers: they were “confronted with long entrenched loyalties of their 
white counterparts and their superiors.” Black officers remained dissatisfied with their 
assignments and their continuing exclusion from two-man patrol cars outside of white 
neighborhoods. Wilson responded in two stages. In September 1963, he told black officers, 
“if you feel that your assignment to another area or district will contribute to the integration 
of the department, I urge you to apply.”102 Only in 1966 did he finally make integration an 
affirmative policy. Wilson’s new directive ordered, “Negroes, Latin Americans, Jews, and 
members of other minority groups will not work together when there are other two-man 
teams available for integration.” “Incompatible officers”—those who refused to work in 
integrated teams—would be put on a one-man job or transferred.103  
Police Solidarity and Public Alienation 
Wilson’s efforts to break down the color line were part of an administrative project 
to centralize and rationalize state power. Policing’s bureaucratic isolation from Democratic 
                                                 
100 It commanded “no discrimination shall be made in recruitment, appointments, promotions, assignment, 
transfers or other personnel actions because of race, creed, color or political beliefs. The sole factor to be 
considered is whether a man is the best man for the job.”  “Orders Integration,” Daily Defender, March 21, 1960, 
3; “Have You Seen?,” Chicago Police Newsletter, June 1960, 2. 
101 Adolph J. Slaughter, “Police Captain Under Fire; Charge Bias: Westside Group Claims Wilson Order 
Ignored,” Chicago Defender, July 4, 1960, 1.In 1961, Wilson suspended a policemen for five days “for refusal to 
work with a Negro policeman.” “Suspend Cop Who Refused to Serve with Negro,” Chicago Defender, October 
30, 1961, 19. 
102 Wilson’s declaration responded to “leaders of the Negro community,” who stressed “‘that we would not 
achieve true integration in the department until a substantial number of Negro officers, particularly those in 
supervisory ranks, had been assigned to work in districts and areas within our city which are inhabited 
predominantly by white residents.’” “Supt. Wilson Leads the Way: Work Anywhere,” Chicago Defender, August 
31, 1963, 1. 
103 “Stiffer Order Issued on Cop Integration: Race Policy Outlined by Wilson,” Chicago Tribune, June 15, 1966, 
B9. 
  
    51 
politics allowed him to pursue egalitarian reforms even as the local state otherwise 
perpetuated racial division. Even if Police Department could be insulated from the political 
influence of the Democratic Party, though, it could not avoid the politics and experience of 
the rank-and-file and the social divisions of the world they policed. The professional project 
rested at bottom on notion of the Police Department as distinct from the world. But officers 
were part of that world, and in refusing to acknowledge their social relation to it, Wilson’s 
reforms exacerbated the isolation of many police officers. Black activists in the 1970s would 
often argue in retrospect that everything changed when Wilson retired, but many of the 
factors at the heart of the strife over policing from 1967 to 1970 were put in place during his 
regime. An often-hidden police subculture undergirded the police rebellion that was at the 
heart of “law and order” politics.  
A few weeks after taking command of the Chicago Police Department, 
Superintendent Wilson gave a speech to the rank-and-file, in groups of 5,000, in a downtown 
theater. He identified morale as a major concern: “We all know that you have lost public 
respect, you have lost public support. I imagine the morale of the department in recent 
months has sunk to a low ebb. … This is a completely unsatisfactory situation and it must be 
corrected.” For Wilson, the answer to the problem of police morale was “obviously a rising 
of standards.”104 Wilson did raise standards. And yet morale—at least as measured by what 
police officers believed the public thought of them—remained low. James Q. Wilson studied 
how the reform of the Police Department between 1960 and 1965 affected police morale 
and citizen respect. Over the five-year period, he found, “there was a substantial 
improvement in how the sergeants thought the department was run but little or no 
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improvement in their morale or in their perception of citizen respect.”105 This suggested that 
morale had little to do with professionalism; instead it was “dependent on factors over which 
police administrators have little control.”106  
The problem of police morale was ubiquitous. In study after study, during the 1960s, 
academics across the country described policemen who did not believe that they were seen 
as protectors of the citizenry. As sociologist William Westley reported, “The policeman finds 
his most pressing problems in his relationships to the public. He is regarded as corrupt and 
inefficient by and meets hostility and criticism from the public. He regards the public as his 
enemy, feels his occupation to be in conflict with the community, and regards himself to be 
a pariah.”107 Another study found that police officers reported feeling a “lack of respect for 
the police, lack of cooperation in enforcement of the law, lack of understanding of the 
requirements of police work.”108 In his book City Police (1973), Jonathan Rubenstein, a 
Philadelphia Inquirer reporter who embedded himself with the Philadelphia Police 
Department, argued, “the nature of [the policeman’s] obligation isolates him from most 
other people.”109 
Race was not the only vector that created isolation. Noting James Baldwin’s 
observation that “The only way to police a ghetto is to be oppressive,” Jerome Skolnick 
observed that “there is greater social distance between police and ‘civilians’ in general 
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regardless of their color than Baldwin considers.”110 Nonetheless, relations were most frayed 
between police and black urbanites. Albert Reiss’s studies provided empirical evidence of 
both police racism and black skepticism. In cataloguing the racial attitudes of more than 600 
officers in Boston, Chicago, and Washington DC, Reiss noted that the vast majority of white 
officers were either “highly prejudiced, extremely anti-Negro” (38 percent) or “prejudiced, 
anti-Negro” (34 percent). These percentages were even worse for white officers who policed 
in predominantly Negro districts, with 45 percent being scored as highly prejudiced. In these 
districts, only one percent of officers expressed attitudes sympathetic to Negroes.111 Not 
surprisingly, Reiss noted, “whites are more satisfied with the job the police are doing than 
are Negroes.”112 
Many Americans believed that police were under attack from all corners of society. 
As Time opined in 1968, “Nothing is tougher than being a policeman in a free society.”113 
Ridgely Hunt, a reporter for the Chicago Tribune, captured the nature of this difficulty in the 
title of a multi-part series called: “The People vs. The Police.” Hunt stressed that the police 
“must perform their duties on streets crowded with people whose hatred of the established 
order is focused entirely on them and their uniforms.”114 These impressions elide the truth in 
certain important respects. General public opinion of the police actually improved from 
1947 to 1963, an era in which opinions about most professions were otherwise remarkably 
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stable.115 Reiss’s intimate surveys in 1966 revealed that, in general “residents of Boston and 
Chicago see police as doing a good job.”116 A “deep strain of nostalgia” for a time “when 
officers enjoyed the respect of citizens and commanded the authority necessary to do their 
job” shaped what officers perceived about public opinion.117  
The unrecognized truth was that policemen were active agents in constituting 
themselves as a group apart. “The policeman’s sense of alienation from society results in the 
development of a distinctive ‘subculture’ or ‘code’ among police officers by which they can 
live, thus providing a basis for self-respect independent to some degree of civilian attitudes,” 
scholar James Q. Wilson argued.118 Police isolation drew police officers into relationships 
with their colleagues that were rooted in a shared occupational outlook. Rubenstein 
concluded that the ambiguities of policemen’s work were such that the “only persons who 
can fully appreciate the policeman’s situation are his colleagues.”119 If these relationships are 
complex, as Skolnick argued, it is nonetheless true that “police show an unusually high 
degree of occupational solidarity.”120 Policemen were not merely buffeted by the people: they 
embraced their rejection, forming an inward-looking circle of loyalty and mutual support.  
 
O.W. Wilson’s programs reinforced the social isolation and solidarity of rank-and-file 
policemen. If black policemen welcomed Wilson’s even hand with regard to recruiting and 
promotion, much of the rest of the force treated him with almost immediate skepticism. 
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When he arrived, many officers conceded the need for change. Nonetheless, as James Q. 
Wilson notes, “the change that they got was more than they had bargained for and it made 
them deeply apprehensive. Given his commitment to change, almost every action 
Superintendent Wilson took was bound to increase rather than allay these anxieties.”121 
Wilson’s speeches, his communiqués—known as Pax 501’s—and the articles in the house 
organ he started The Chicago Police Newsletter, often worked against him in their pedantry. 
The Superintendent, like other police reformers, was suspicious of ordinary patrol 
officers. Wilson’s biographer William J. Bopp noted, “Wilson held that policemen, if not 
closely controlled, would avoid work, engaged in extralegal behavior, and would subvert the 
administration’s goals.”122 In this sense, although Wilson disagreed with the criminal 
procedure decisions of the Warren Court, he was not averse to their basic desire for greater 
control over police behavior.123 Wilson believed that officers needed to operate according to 
rules, but he wanted those rules to be the creation of police administrators, who should have 
broad latitude to fashion aggressive police strategies.  
Wilson’s approach was unremittingly bureaucratic: he issued reams of administrative 
rules and used chain-of-command and internal investigations to see that such rules were 
followed adequately. Patrolmen responded with equal suspicion. Police organizations openly 
opposed his attempts to change disciplinary procedures.124 Following one rally, the 
Superintendent and the Mayor, “decried the ‘shocking display’ of police demonstrators who 
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physically ejected a representative of the corporation council …”125 Resistance was most 
intense during the Superintendent’s early years, occasionally reaching open disrespect, but it 
never entirely quieted. Wilson’s biographer even claimed “he limited his contact with the 
rank and file in order to avoid their verbal abuse.”126 
 If Wilson oversight policies alienated many rank-and-file officers from their 
supervisors, his patrol policies distanced them from the public. Wilson limited the number 
of officers walking a beat, decreasing their regular (and non-confrontational) contact with 
the public. His preference was motor patrol, which he argued increased effectiveness 
“several hundred percent” because of the greater mobility of cars.127 He decreed that one-
man patrol cars be preferred to two-man cars, for their ability to do double the patrol 
without increasing variable costs.128 Under Wilson’s theory of motor patrol, he ubiquity of 
squad cars would give “the criminal the idea that police are everywhere at once.”129 Similarly, 
Wilson took officers away from districts to create special tactical squads. These squads could 
be mobilized to put a high degree of pressure on a particular area. Using officers in this way 
sacrificed regular contact. It also employed an almost militaristic show of force to intimidate 
residents. Task Force officer Howard Saffold related that during such actions, “Everybody 
wanted to make sure that they knew the police were there.”130   
 Wilson wanted his officers to engage in “aggressive preventative patrol”—to prevent 
criminal activity rather than respond to it. Wilson laid out his vision for the choices facing 
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police in an article on arrest privileges in 1960: “To prevent crime, the police must either 
stand guard at every possible point of attack, which is a physical and economic impossibility, 
or intercept the person with criminal intent before he robs, rapes, or kills.” Wilson argued 
for broad privileges to stop and frisk a suspect if the officers had a reasonable suspicion that 
an individual was “seeking an opportunity to commit a crime.” He illustrated this through 
example. Police needed to be able to take the initiative power “to investigate by questioning 
a person who was lurking in the in the neighborhood for no apparent reason … to discover 
whether the suspect was armed and, if so, to disarm him and prosecute him should it be 
discovered that he was carrying the weapon illegally.”131  
Police Professionalism, Civil Rights, and Law and Order 
 Ultimately, policing was about responding to events in the world. Wilson’s demand 
for aggressive preventative patrol and for broad, but clearly defined, legal authority 
responded to the political changes remaking the city. Wilson’s strategic efforts to promote 
black officers offer a window into how urban change impacted the police. Wilson prided 
himself on his role in fairly policing civil rights demonstrations. In his Pax 501 of June 1, 
1964, Wilson began by noting, “Over the past four years, the Chicago Police Department 
has earned the respect and goodwill of the Negro Community by its sincere effort to provide 
fair and impartial enforcement of the law in dealing with wade-ins, move-ins, civil rights 
demonstrations and other incidents with racial overtones.”132 When Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr. came to Chicago in 1966, Wilson invited him to meet with an integrated group of top 
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police commanders to explain his program.133 Wilson tried to conserve police resources by 
instructing his officers to avoid making arrests of demonstrators wherever possible.134  
King and other civil rights leaders were hardly satisfied by the protection provided by 
the police. White mobs attacked marchers and burned their cars, forcing the police into 
decisive action. For many white officers, policing demonstrations put them into the position 
of invoking police authority against white Chicagoans who were trying to enforce racial 
barriers that officers wanted to see preserved. As officer Greg Parzanski described, “There 
were also more black families moving into neighborhoods around us, and there were lots of 
families like mine that were becoming worried.” Black officers, too, were alienated by the 
impact of civil rights activities, though with a different valence. As Fred Rice put it, “police 
had the task of regulating conduct on all these marches and all like that and sit-ins and all 
like that. Police … were the bad guys because they’re the ones that had to enforce the 
laws.”135 For both black and white police, then, the struggle for black freedom exacerbated 
the fundamental tensions they already faced in dealing with the public. 
 Resistance to integration generated the demand for police presence, but Wilson and 
his officers often put the onus on protestors for the consequences. The Police Department’s 
Annual Report in 1966 highlighted the continuation of the high crime rate throughout the 
city even after the demonstrations of the Chicago Freedom Movement and white riots of 
Southwest and Northwest Side residents had ended. “It can only be concluded from these 
statistics that civil disturbances such as these not only nourish an attitude conducive to 
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criminal behavior but that the attitude continues even after the disturbances have ended.”136 
Wilson’s explanation echoed the arguments made by Southern Democrats in Congress, as 
they tried to criminalize civil rights activities. These were the limits of Wilson’s particular 
form of bureaucratically-rooted egalitarianism. Because his vision of the police isolated it 
from the broader political context in which it took place, he naturalized the underlying 
inequalities.137 
Aggressive preventative patrols brought about some of the sharpest conflicts of the 
1960s, especially because police intervened in disputes where individuals might have 
otherwise proceeded unmolested. As James Q. Wilson observed in his case studies for 
Varieties of Police Behavior (1968), one result of such aggressive policing was that “any group 
that experience such a high level of police activity and is self-conscious about these matters 
may feel that it is being ‘harassed.’”138 This was particularly true for black people. The 
NAACP argued against the stop and frisk bill favored by Wilson, citing “the simple fact of 
being a Negro encourages police detention and questioning.”139 Their success in delaying the 
passage of such a bill by the legislature until 1968 did not restrain the use of such tactics on 
the street.140  
Such encounters were fraught, both for police officers and the people they 
policed.141The widely believed link between black freedom and crime made the use of 
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authority in street stops inescapably a question of power. William Westley argued in the 
1950s that policemen especially used violence in response to disrespect for their authority.142 
But the willingness to accept assertions of police authority has historical dimensions. In this 
moment, rank-and-file policemen were being asked to exercise their authority widely and 
decisively, even as it was being challenged from below, particularly by youth of color. 
Resistance to police harassment became an important part of the way in which black 
Chicagoans articulated their opposition to the authority of a state that had little regard for 
their well-being.143 Whether police brutality actually increased during the 1960s remains an 
open question. But in the context of the freedom struggle, the everyday resistance to police 
brutality became part of a larger political contest to contain police power through law, with 
mainstream figures like the Defender, Alderman Leon Despres, and civil rights lawyers taking 
up the cause.144 From 1963 forward, claims of police brutality remained almost constantly in 
the news.  
Such claims put Wilson in a difficult spot and he staked out a circumspect position. 
His executive assistant Herman Goldstein explained, “A police chief who feels that the 
effectiveness of his preventive efforts is dependent on the degree to which he can motivate 
his men to be vigorous in their patrol activities is hard-put to review a complaint alleging 
overly-aggressive behavior.”145 In 1964, in the face of sustained public pressure, Wilson put 
his thoughts to paper. His Pax 501 gestured in multiple directions, reassuring the black 
public that brutality was not to be tolerated where it existed, and reinforcing officers’ belief 
                                                 
142 Westley, “Violence and the Police,” 38 tbl.1. 
143 Diamond, Mean Streets, 255. 
144 “List of Police Brutality Complaints Made to the Chicago Branch, NAACP, During Twelve Month Period 
Beginning December 1, 1962 and Ending December 1, 1963” n.d., ACLU Papers V-75-6; Alex Polikoff, 
“Status Report as of March 17, 1965” n.d., ACLU Papers V-75-6. 
145 Herman Goldstein, “Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police Authority,” Journal of 
Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science 58 (1967): 166. 
  
    61 
that “most complaints of brutality arise out of instances where the complainant has resisted 
arrest, thus necessitating the use of force.” What the document established, however, was 
that the greatest threat for Wilson was ceding control over police authority to any civilian 
body.146 
Civil disorders on the black Westside in 1965 and in the Puerto Rican barrio in 1966 
reflected the difficulty of taming the conflict over authority that was occurring on the street. 
Wilson’s first line of defense was his black command staff. Following the Puerto Rican 
uprising, he shifted his field command so that, in the words of the Defender’s Donald Mosby 
and Arnold Rosenzweig, “Negroes now command all the districts which could give Chicago 
a long hot summer.”147 These black commanders toed the party line. When interviewed by 
the Chicago Tribune about his promotion in 1965 to command the tough Fillmore district, 
which encompassed some of Chicago’s poorest Westside neighborhoods, George Sims 
reported that he had already been visited by a group of men who identified themselves as 
black nationalists. According to Sims, “They told me they were going to keep a close eye on 
me. They said their activities in the area might hinge closely on my performance as a Negro.” 
Sims told newspaper readers that he rejected their framework entirely, “I told them I was a 
policeman. I let them know that enforcing the laws and protecting the community’s citizens 
was my job as a policeman—not a Negro.”148 Even as the Police Department used race to 
head off conflict, Commander Sims argued that police authority and not racial legitimacy 
was their primary concern.  
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* * * 
Over the course of the twentieth century, policing went from being deeply 
embedded within a local political organization to being a more rationalized and 
bureaucratized agency. Black politicians built their power out of stark racial segregation and 
illicit entertainment. The permeability of the Police Department to political influence created 
the key mechanism by which the growth of this power became possible. By the late 1940s, 
attacks on these arrangements, and the independence they provided for the burgeoning 
black political sub-machine, created a conflict with the Mayor Martin Kennelly and other 
Democratic reformers. In resolving this conflict, William Dawson’s organization helped 
Richard J. Daley to consolidate power over politics and governance in the city.  
Paradoxically, this consolidation of power provided the conditions for the reform of 
the Police Department. Even as other parts of the city seemed to be become less racially 
egalitarian, O.W. Wilson challenged the color line inside the Police Department. This was 
part of a broader series of reform practices that sought to centralize, professionalize, and de-
politicize policing. Wilson’s reforms of personnel practices were partially successful, many of 
his other reforms only exacerbated tensions between the police and the black public.  
Among Wilson’s strategies for confronting those tensions were the criminalization of 
black protest and the use of black officers to diffuse symbolically conflict over police action. 
Only as Wilson was on his way out of Chicago did these tensions between the various 
aspects of his professional project emerge into full-blown conflict. Four years later, Renault 
Robinson—an officer brought into the Department because of Wilson’s outreach to black 
men—would challenge the very premises of his program. “In the Chicago Police 
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Department there are seven high ranking blacks who are supposed to be representing the 
black community,” Robinson avowed. “[N]one of them will even admit that police brutality 
exists and that the racial problem in racially changing areas is as bad as it really is. We, as a 
people would be better off if these seven men worked in the Sanitation Department.”149 The 
conflict that would emerge over the rest of the decade had its roots in the project of 
professional police reform.  
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CHAPTER 3: BLACK MEN WITH GUNS 
 
 
At 2 pm on July 12, 1968, nearly 200 people crowded on the sidewalk in front of 
1105 E. 63rd Street. Renault Robinson, a twenty-five year old vice officer for the Chicago 
Police Department, had invited the press and friends to come to a third-floor office, but the 
crowd was too large to fit into the tiny space. So, his press conference took place outside, in 
the ninety-degree heat, under the green line elevated tracks that ran through the heart of the 
Southside Chicago neighborhood of Woodlawn.1 All the major media outlets were in 
attendance, and undercover Chicago Police officers and F.B.I. agents scribbled just as 
furiously as the reporters.  
Five black men faced the crowd. In the center was charismatic, thirty-three year old 
Edward L. “Buzz” Palmer. Tall and lanky, the light-skinned Air Force veteran had been a 
policeman for just three years. The baby-faced Robinson and State Senator Richard 
Newhouse stood on one side of him. Only two years earlier, Newhouse, with the assistance 
of the city’s militant civil rights forces, had defeated a ten-year incumbent backed by Mayor 
Daley’s Cook Country Democratic Central Committee to enter the Illinois Legislature.2 Two 
more men, Reverend George Clements, an assistant diocesan priest at St. Dorothy Catholic 
Church, and Frank Lee, Robinson’s partner in one of the city’s only all-black undercover 
teams, mirrored them on the other side.  
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Palmer announced the formation the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League (AAPL). 
The fledgling organization had six members in addition to Palmer, Robinson, and Lee.3 Out 
of the forty or so other black patrolmen who had shown enough interest to come to a 
meeting, another twenty had signed pledges to become members.4 There were already plenty 
of police organizations: in addition to the Confederation of Police, the Fraternal Order of 
Police, the Chicago Patrolmen’s Association, the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, and a 
host of rank-based organizations, there were others based on officers’ identification with 
particular ethnicities—the Irish, the Polish, the Italians, and the Jews all had their own 
groups.5 But in the minds of the men gathered, those organizations “were nothing but social 
clubs.” As Robinson noted in retrospect, “the guys that were in the original group thought 
that we could deal with our own social activities so if we are going to get into an 
organization, it had to do more than that.”6 It was “not just another police organization 
formed for the purpose of furthering the policeman’s lot.”7  
The first step was escaping the narrowly defined sense of their occupation inculcated 
by police training and practice. Robinson noted, “it wasn’t the type of thing that sprang up 
overnight, and we just decided were going to be public servants and have a social conscious 
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[sic] all of the sudden.”8 They had spent months debating and theorizing, developing an 
understanding of their role as policemen. They concluded that as black patrolmen, they were 
in a unique institutional position. As the occupational sociologist Joseph Bensman wrote in 
1969, “in every period of historical crisis there are groups, occupations, and classes who are 
‘accidentally’ located in the ‘nut-crackers’ of history. Such groups experience in extreme form 
all the cross-pressures, tensions, and contradictions of a society in the process of tearing 
itself apart. … [I]t is black policemen, the blacks in blue, who experience the nut-cracker of 
history in its deepest sense.”9 While locating themselves directly at the center of history, the 
AAPL founders did not see themselves as merely subject to it. Rather, on that sweltering July 
day, the officers declared their intention to change history. 
The rise of the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League reorients our understanding of 
Black Power and its relationship to urban policing. Following the League requires us to trace 
Black Power inside the local state and into the Police Department, whose violence formed 
the principle object of Black Power activism.10 Looking at these black patrolmen takes us 
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back to one of black power’s key insights—power flows from the barrel of a gun—and 
traces what happened to the black men who recognized this because they wore a badge. This 
is an important twist, for elsewhere the primary experiences of critics of state power were as 
its objects.11 The League transformed often anti-statist claims by locating the police, the local 
state’s most visible agents, at the center of their idea of black liberation. This was in part a 
domestication of black power by liberalism.12 But it reciprocally expanded the boundaries of 
liberal thought and action. In Chicago, interracial politics meant for decades that individual 
black success was coupled with the maintenance of broadly separate and unequal worlds. In 
Chicago, “Black power did not displace liberalism; it created a broader popular base and new 
arguments about the city’s political economy that, together, reshaped a longstanding 
commitment to building a more open city.”13 Members of the Police Department, even as 
black officers advanced up the ranks, were key agents in maintaining these racial hierarchies. 
In its turn to black power, the League sought to reverse this role: to use racial solidarity to 
make police agents in helping black people to overcome those limits. 
The League shifts our understanding of policing and the impact of law-and-order 
politics in urban places. The phrase invokes images of Richard Milhous Nixon for many, but 
by 1968 many local police officers had already embraced law and order as their credo.14 It 
was an organized and politicized response to the age-old dilemma of police authority in the 
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12 Devin Fergus helped me see this. Fergus, Liberalism, Black Power, and the Making of American Politics, 1965-1980. 
13 Hegelson, Crucibles of Black Empowerment, 239. 
14 On the association with Nixon, see Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary 
American Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), chap. 3; Michael W. Flamm, Law and Order: Street 
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American History,” The Journal of American History 97 (2010): 703–34; Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: 
Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: The New Press, 2012), chap. 1. 
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street encounter at a very specific historical juncture. Beginning in the 1950s, ethnographic 
studies found that patrolmen’s alienation from the people they policed led them to think of 
themselves as a band apart. By a decade later, the street encounter was a stand-in for a much 
broader struggle over the geography, politics, and order of the city. Many police saw 
themselves as the front line troops in containing the upwelling of black people’s demands 
for their right to the city. Nonetheless, the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League attests that 
this account of police and their behavior is partial. Police Departments became sites of 
struggles to determine the future of the city as those patrolmen who were swept up by the 
idea of Black Power confronted their colleagues and their bosses. Chicago was home to 
more black officers than any other city, and by 1970 it was also the site the largest and most 
militant cadre of black officers standing up against law and order.  
We should see the officers of the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League not simply in 
opposition, but in relation, to the alienation of their fellow officers. Historically, many black 
patrolmen felt estranged from the people they policed. This distance paralleled the 
experience of their white colleagues. Black officers were often excluded from the 
occupational and ethnic solidarities with their fellow officers that came to underpin law-and-
order police politics. Their own exclusion formed the basis for recognition of a broader 
series of divisions that played out in urban space: how police treated black and white 
neighborhoods, and black and white people, differently. It was this culture of policing, and 
the law-and-order politics that accompanied it, that split urban police forces along racial lines 
and created the opening for the rise of Black Power in blue. 
In parallel to white officers, black officers sought refuge from their dilemma of 
professional alienation in solidarity. But they grounded their conception of solidarity in ideas 
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of masculinity and racial authenticity. The League officers claimed that the proper role for 
black police as black men was to be protectors of black people. This required a thorough 
rethinking of their occupational role: if police work as it was currently done produced 
alienation between the police and black communities, their sense of black solidarity dictated 
it was the police work and not communities that needed to change. This chapter tells the 
story of how this bond was built. 
 
From Double Standards to Black Power 
A case of police brutality sparked the officers’ first meetings. Most of the original 
group had attended the police academy together in 1965. Although their assignments 
dispersed them throughout the city, they remained in touch. They first met up in the late fall 
of 1967 or early spring of 1968 to discuss the double standard at work after prosecutors 
alleged that three black officers had beaten two white youths to obtain a confession. In the 
minds of League members, “the accused three had merely followed standard, informal police 
practices[,]” the kind of casual brutality white police routinely used against black youth with 
impunity. Why did the Department dismiss black claims against white officers while 
pursuing white claims against black officers?15 The question was how could black policemen 
get equal treatment with whites at work?  
These career-oriented and upwardly-mobile men hardly seemed likely to buck the 
system. Like their predecessors, most joined the police for economic reasons. If anything, 
deindustrialization made government jobs, as a whole, more important as avenues into the 
                                                 
15 Renault Robinson, “Black Police: A Means of Social Change” (M.A. Thesis, Roosevelt University, 1971), 10–
11, AAPL 54-73; Cowsen, “The Formation of the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League of Chicago,” 3. 
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middle class for African Americans.16 Economic stability informed Reggie Robinson’s 
choice: “I thought I’d get the benefits. I had a baby. I needed insurance and, you know, the 
whole nine yards. They paid for me to go to school.”17 Like Robinson, all of the men already 
had significant work experience.18 Howard Saffold’s trajectory was typical. Returning home 
to Chicago from active military duty, Saffold worked “for the VA for about a year.  Then I 
drove a CTA el for about a year and a half.  And then somebody announced a Chicago 
Police Department exam. … [I]t was a step up from, from CTA, you know, in terms of 
status, I guess.”19  Some of them were direct beneficiaries of Wilson’s efforts to diversify the 
force. Recruiters told Robinson there was “a shortage—I didn't realize then, but the shortage 
was minorities.”20  
Many of the AAPL members had prestigious assignments. Even before attending the 
Police Academy Robinson worked on a special undercover assignment with the Vice and 
Gambling squad for a year. After graduating, he was assigned to the West Side Marquette 
District, where he and Frank Lee became partners. From 1965 to 1968, Robinson compiled 
a tremendous record undercover, making more arrests than any other vice officer in the 
district and earning many citations from the Department for outstanding police work. 21 His 
efficiency ratings were consistently spectacular.22 As Robinson later ruefully noted, he and 
                                                 
16 Virginia Parks, “Revisiting Shibboleths of Race and Urban Economy: Black Unemployment in 
Manufacturing and the Public Sector Compared, Chicago 1950-2000,” International Journal of Urban and Regional 
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17 Interview with Renault Robinson (The HistoryMakers A2002.107), interview by Larry Crowe, July 3, 2002, 
session 1, tape 1, story 9, http://thmdigital.thehistorymakers.com/iCoreClient.html#/&i=12468. 
18 Curtis Cowsen was an assistant manager for Beneficial Finance Company; Robinson followed in his father’s 
footsteps working as a commercial printer. Cowsen, Edward Palmer, and Howard Saffold had been in the 
armed services. 
19 Interview with Howard Saffold, HistoryMakers, session 1, tape 2, story 8.   
20 Interview with Renault Robinson, HistoryMakers, session 1, tape 1, story 9. 
21 Robinson, “Narrative of Robinson’s Ordeal,” 1. 
22 In June of 1966 he received a 98.6; in June of 1967 a 98.8. McClory, The Man Who Beat Clout City, 31. 
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Lee, “we had plainclothes … and we had our own cars and all of that.”23 Saffold enjoyed 
similar advancement. After beginning his career in a mostly white neighborhood on the 
North Side, he became a member of an elite Task Force unit. “[T]hat was an upward step,” 
he told an interviewer. “I mean when you got into an elite unit such as Gang Crimes or, or 
Task Force, you, your efficiency ratings were gonna be high, and you were gonna do all 
right.”24  
Their meetings could have been no more than bull sessions, but as Robinson noted, 
“We had a couple of guys who were not really police-oriented in the group, they were more 
oriented in doing other things—you know—reading …[T]hey said let’s examine this not 
from just a narrow perspective from being a cat out here in a uniform but let’s examine it in 
terms of what’s going on.”25 Buzz Palmer was the “unquestioned leader.”26 He was the 
oldest and the worldliest, having served in Air Force intelligence in both Germany and the 
Philippines.27 Palmer’s interest in civil rights had come out of his earlier work in human 
relations, which had “sensitized him to the needs of black people.” Palmer “constantly called 
meetings” and reached out to other black leaders to help the group formulate their ideas.28 
Perhaps no one in Chicago had experience more relevant to that task than Father George 
Clements, the Roman Catholic priest who became their chaplain and confidant. As a black 
Catholic, Clements instinctively appreciated the insider-outsider dynamics that plagued the 
                                                 
23 Interview with Renault Robinson, HistoryMakers, session 1, tape 2, story 6.  
24 Interview with Howard Saffold, HistoryMakers, session 1, tape 6, story 1. 
25 “Charles Harris Interviews Renault Robinson,” 16. 
26 McClory, The Man Who Beat Clout City, 13. 
27 Rather than opening doors for him back in Chicago, Palmer recalled that his inability to discuss the 
particulars of his military service limited him. Chuck O’Bannon, The Perfect Couple: A Look at Buzz and Alice 
Palmer (Black United Fund of Chicago, 2012), 
http://www.bufi.org/cms/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=204:edward-l-buzz-
palmer&catid=38:2010. 
28 Cowsen, “The Formation of the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League of Chicago,” 4. 
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patrolmen’s relationship with the police institution.29 He faced similar choices. In 1962, as 
the assistant pastor at St. Dorothy’s, he was “a nice colored priest,” involved in Catholic 
inter-racialism.30 Only working under a “brilliant old Irishman,” Father Gerald Scanlon, was 
transformed “from being the purist to activist.”31 By 1968, Clements had already embraced 
the call for Black Power. “White fear, not black power,” he declared, “is the real problem.”32  
The same questions that faced the black patrolmen faced black priests: what roles 
should black people play in black districts or parishes? What roles should they play in 
formulating departmental or diocesan policy towards blacks? 33 Clements credited Father 
Scanlon with driving the dialogue forward by suggesting to his parishioners, “ ‘Black people 
should never allow white people to have any position of prominence in the black community 
until they are allowed to have comparable positions in the white community.’”34 Like the 
patrolmen, Clements was loyal to what the church’s mission even as he criticized it. “The 
church is in a struggle for survival in the ghetto, and the church is going to die unless strong, 
                                                 
29 Chicago was, and remains, one of the most Catholic American cities. In 1970, 43.9 percent of the 5.5 million 
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positive action is taken.”35 Clements’ challenge to the Archdiocese would accelerate in 
parallel to the League’s confrontation with the Police Department.  
Robinson had little idea what the he was getting into. But, led by Palmer and 
Clements, the men quickly moved beyond “the selfish motive of protecting the black 
policeman” to consider “the plight of black people in a broader sense.”36 In formulating their 
questions, they drew upon black Chicago’s own organic forms of racial solidarity, what 
history Jeffrey Hegelson describes as “an extraordinary and broadly shared black nationalist 
response to the direct experience of segregation, discrimination, and diminishing opportunity 
for working-class black residents.”37 This led them to examine the relationship between the 
police department, themselves, and the public. They asked big questions about how police 
power was constituted and exercised. In Robinson’s words, the men considered “how the 
police department reacted to people generally and how they treated blacks.  Who 
commanded and who ran and who operated the police department? And to whose 
advantage was it? What role did we play? Did we have a real function in the police 
department?”38  
 
Law and Order 
                                                 
35 “Our Mission Must Be Black: Clements,” Chicago Defender, May 15, 1968, 11. 
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Many rank-and-file officers across the country asked similar questions in this 
moment, albeit from a slightly different angle. During the second half of the 1960s, the 
mostly white police officers across urban America rebelled against challenges to their 
authority and thrust themselves into politics. The central question raised by this new politics 
of “blue power,” Ed Cray argued, was, “Who is to control the nation’s police forces: the 
police themselves or the community?”39 Many patrolmen, both white and black, answered 
the question decisively in favor of the police. In some places, such as New York City, a 
majority of citizens seconded them.40 So did Mayor Daley. 
In general, Mayor Daley left the politics of law enforcement to the professionals. 
When he did enter into the fray, his maneuverings were often discrete. In 1966, following a 
large uprising of Puerto Ricans on Division Street and minor revolt of blacks on the West 
Side, he named a Citizens Committee to Study Police Community Relations.41 It was classic 
Daley management of a problem: creating a committee stocked with civic notables, but no 
one with any ties to either the Puerto Ricans or the West Siders who had clashed with the 
police. Nor did the Mayor exactly relinquish control to the committee. He sent over a city 
lawyer, Marvin Aspen, to head up its staff. When it issued its report, the committee did not 
deny that police behaved poorly. But it claimed the main issue verbal abuse and not physical 
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brutality. It rested its policy prescriptions primarily on understanding of police brutality as 
rooted in “[t]he inadequacy of constructively sympathetic communication.”42  
 With the large-scale destruction of the West Side following the assassination of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4, 1968, Daley’s handling of the police changed. By 1968, 
Superintendent Wilson had retired and his number two man, James B. Conlisk, Jr., had taken 
over. Conlisk was the son of a police captain, one of the old-line Irish power brokers Wilson 
ousted upon his arrival in the city. Nonetheless, Conlisk thrived as an administrator during 
Wilson’s epoch. During those April 1968 nights of civil disorder, there were a number of 
suspicious deaths at the hands of the police, and indiscriminate arrests, but the 
Superintendent’s basic strategy was restrained. A week later when the fires were 
extinguished, Daley remarked at a sensational press conference that prior to conferring with 
Conlisk after the riots, he “assumed any superintendent would issue instructions to shoot 
arsonists on sight and to maim the looters, but I found out this morning this wasn’t so and 
therefore gave him specific instructions.” These instructions were “very emphatically and 
very definitely … to shoot to kill any arsonist or anyone with a Molotov cocktail in his hand 
in Chicago because they’re potential murders, and to issue a police order to shoot to maim 
or cripple any arsonists and looters—arsonists to kill and looters to maim and detain.”43  His 
statements “won the enthusiastic support of several associations of police personnel.”44 This 
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marked the definitive moment at which the tension over race, protest, and policing in the 
city shifted—for both black and white cops. 
Ideas of law and order embraced by the rank-and-file shaped the new politics 
articulated by the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League. In retrospect, they would cite the 
events following King’s assassination as a driving force behind their organization. For Father 
Clements, King’s death was transformative: “When that bullet went through Dr. King's head 
… I looked in the mirror and the face starring back at me was that of a clergy prostitute. 
And I said, ‘From that day on I was gonna be what Mr. and Mrs. Clements made me. A 
black man.’”45 In the months after the Daley’s press conference, the pace of the patrolmen’s 
informal meetings picked up “and the talk grew more militant.”46 The law and order 
backlash, with its cheap vision of black life, made the men hyper-aware of the repressive 
potential of the state power that they exercised. 
Once the group decided to go public, one of the last orders of business was deciding 
on a name. There were supporters of describing the group as Negro, as Afro-American, as 
black, or with no ethnic designation at all. The question of which name would best 
symbolize the group highlighted just how different the men’s political orientations were in 
the beginning. Curtis Cowsen considered both Palmer and Jack DeBonnett to be “ultra 
black,” while he “thought of [Reggie Robinson] as ultra conservative, and often found 
myself opposed to his views …”47 One example of Robinson’s conservatism was the fact 
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that he favored “Negro.”48 Was Negro “a white man’s definition that was condescending and 
did not offer any sense of black pride[?]” Was the designation “black” too militant or too 
broad?49 They compromised by naming themselves the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League.  
 
The Afro-American Patrolmen’s League 
Standing in front of the crowd of 200, on July 12, 1968, Buzz Palmer read a prepared 
text drawn from a larger statement of purpose that the new AAPL members had crafted and 
ratified by consensus. During its drafting, they struggled collectively over how to state their 
aims precisely. As Chicago Defender reporter Robert McClory chronicled, they did not want to 
be “so overbearing that they would all lose their jobs the day the inevitable public 
announcement was made.” They wrestled over choices of language, with the somewhat 
turgid result being a combination of Willie Ware’s Black Power rhetoric with a slightly 
formal diction.50 The group was vague about exactly what they planned on doing, because 
they did not yet know. Instead, the statement identified a series of tensions in the men’s 
roles. They were simultaneously insiders and outsiders, both in their communities (as police) 
and in the department (as black men). They sought to knit their professional roles and their 
racial identities together, to achieve, in W.E.B. DuBois’s words, a “self-conscious manhood, 
to merge his double self into a better and truer self.”51 
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Like other cops, the AAPL founders felt that the public had little understanding of 
them and their actions. But unlike most other officers, they did not blame the public. Rather, 
they focused on how their actions as policemen alienated them from black Chicagoans. To 
reverse this, they began to think “in terms of solidifying the black policeman with the black 
community,” as Cowsen described.52 Palmer’s statement accordingly triangulated the 
relationships between black police, black communities, and white police. The League’s 
exploration of this triad revealed the difficulties of articulating a bridge between police and 
community. As the officers confronted the obligation to convince both white police and 
black Chicagoans of their sincerity, they wrestled with the question of police authority that 
plagued nearly all officers. The answers they offered pointed to the deep contradictions they 
faced in trying to seek Black Power through law. 
 Their statement’s first line offered a declaration of intent: “We are going to elevate 
the black policeman in the black community to the same image-status enjoyed by the white 
policeman in the white community; that is a protector of the citizenry and not a brutal 
oppressor.”53 This declaration identified the basic struggle of black officers: how to earn the 
respect of black communities while enforcing norms that perpetuated the domination of 
those communities. The black policemen’s function, sociologist Nicholas Alex wrote in 
Blacks in Blue (1969), “would probably be understood by some Negroes as enforcing the 
status quo, legitimating white authority, and generally doing the ‘dirty work’ of white society 
in imposing a white upper class reality on minority groups.”54 Nor did this happen simply by 
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accident; rather, during the Wilson years and after, the assignment of black personnel was 
made in order to blunt the sharpest edges of social conflict. The AAPL zeroed in directly on 
this paradigm, charging that black policemen “were relegated to the role of being brutal 
pawns in a chess game.”55  
Being “blue” had not blinded the AAPL officers to being black. Rather, being a 
black policeman was, to follow Du Bois, to be “gifted with second-sight.”56 Palmer declared, 
“We are husbands, fathers, brothers, neighbors and members of the black community. 
Donning the blue uniform has not changed this. On the contrary, it has sharpened our 
perception of our responsibilities as black males in a society seemingly unresponsive to the 
needs of black people.” If there was no doubt that the police establishment would be 
skeptical of them, the League also realized that it would be necessary to overcome “the 
reservations on the part of … black citizens to this organization.” Yet, even as the officers 
sought to identify with other black people, and make community needs central to the police 
conceptualization of their role, they emphasized their expertise, suggesting that black officers 
“must equip themselves to perform their job in the highest professional tradition.”57  
 To navigate these tensions, the men turned towards a series of tropes that had come 
to dominate black power thinking about race and racism. Like many black power advocates, 
League members embraced “a psychological understanding of racism and its effects,” which 
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at its core “privileged masculinity.”58 In an interview with the Tribune, Palmer described their 
“centralizing theme” as “black manhood,” and argued, “The question of manhood is 
seriously strained when black policemen see their brothers, sisters, and neighbors being 
brutalized by members of police departments.”59 The response to this was to position the 
League as the legitimate defenders of other black people. In doing so, the League drew on a 
broader tradition of armed self-defense that captivated many Black Power advocates. As 
George Clements argued, “I see the Black Policeman as the only real hope that Black people 
have of protection against extermination from this racist nation. Black Police are the only 
group of Black Men—outside of the military—who literally hold the power of life and death 
over the lives of people in this country.”60 Unlike so many advocates of black self-defense, 
policemen formally had the role of protecting black communities; what these men argued is 
that they should actually do it. 
 Here, highly gendered notions of black masculinity reverberated with a the men’s 
conception of the police role. These ideas about black masculinity drew upon three decades 
of writing on the pathology of black families that culminated in Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 
infamous 1965 report on The Negro Family. That they attempted to invert the supposed 
weakness of black masculinity did little to obscure their acceptance of Moynihan’s 
fundamental premises: the problems of black families had to do with their lack of 
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conformity to a particular set of gender norms.61 It is easy to see how this fit together with a 
conception of their occupational role as masculine activity based in confrontation, strength, 
and danger, but it also replicated law-and-order ideas. Rather than fundamentally critique the 
existing social order, the emphasis on black masculinity bound together some of the most 
pernicious ideas about masculinity both in black families and in policing.  
In taking on this role, League members simultaneously stressed their place within the 
establishment and the way in which blacks could not and did not fit comfortably there. 
AAPL members always appeared at public events in their uniforms, even while off duty. 
This was an extraordinary statement about the political power of the uniform for the men’s 
message. In Blacks in Blue, Nicholas Alex devoted entire chapter on the relationship of black 
officers to their uniforms. The officers he interviewed almost uniformly disliked wearing 
their uniforms, referring to it as “a ‘bag’ or a ‘monkey suit.’”62 The uniform symbolized all of 
the complexity of being a police officer: one the one hand, it “stigmatizes him in the ghetto 
as the agent of outside white society. But on the other hand this uniform is the symbol of his 
accomplishment in escaping the lower depths of the ghetto.”63 In staking claim to being 
policemen of a different sort, the officers of the AAPL transformed the symbols the police, 
including the uniform.  
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 League members sought to escape uniformity, redefining what it meant to be a black 
police officer at the level of the self. League officers redefined the uniform, rather than the 
other way around. As “The Saga of the Saph,” a short sketch about Howard Saffold, 
articulated: “A uniform’s s’pose to do wondrous things for a man. T’weren’t so with the 
Saph. He did things for the regulation blue of the Chicago Police Department—big and 
beautiful and black things.”64 This was ultimately about Saffold’s attitude towards policing 
and style marked the change. It provided a way of identifying with young black men and 
women, a way of participating in “authentic form[s] of black racial expression.”65  
Through their embrace of popular styles, AAPL members sought to make visible the 
historic erasure of blackness by the blue uniform. One way of doing so was demonstrated in 
League members’ demand that they be allowed to wear their hair “natural.” In the first 
edition of the organization’s Grapevine newsletter in 1970, Wayne Horse highlighted the 
significance of a haircut. He asked: “Shall we continue to wear our hair in [the] semi-Yul 
Brenner style merely to satisfy the upper echelon...? Is the Natural appearance disliked, as a 
style, or feared as a symbol of the trend of black self-awareness and the reversal of self-
hatred that so long characterized the black race?”66 Refusing the order of a white superior to 
cut his Afro was, for AAPL member Jack DeBonnett, a way of illustrating the “new scope of 
dignity and self-pride in my personal psychological traits.”67  
Finally, the AAPL made clear that the political turn taken by white policemen drove 
the need for an oppositional black police organization: “We find it impossible to operate 
within the framework of existing police organizations. For example, we disagree categorically 
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with the position of the Fraternal Order of Police supporting ‘Stop and Frisk’, and their 
position supporting the order to ‘shoot to kill’ maim [sic] looters during civil disorders.”68 
What was their answer to the “law and order” politics of white officers and politicians? 
Traditionally, police reformers responded to the presence of what they saw as politics in 
policing by demanding greater professionalism. The League echoed this language, calling for 
professionalism as it tried to project its authority. Yet the patrolmen’s behavior in starting a 
militant organization, criticizing the department, and calling for greater responsibility to the 
community, rather than the police bureaucracy, was hardly the role that the reformers like 
O.W. Wilson had imagined for police professionals. 
Though the League did not vote to adopt the symbol used by the Society of African-
American Police in New York until October, it succinctly illustrates some of the basic 
dilemmas faced by the League from the beginning.69 The symbol, a black power fist inside of 
a police star, simultaneously gestures in two directions. It forthrightly signified the League’s 
adoption of the language and images of Black Power. By doing so, the officers linked the 
League with a radical critique of police brutality and violence, and announced its presence as 
an oppositional block within the police department. At the same time, the officers marked 
themselves off distinctly from the world of Black Power activists as cops. In the insignia, for 
example, the Black Power fist was placed within the center of the police star. The 
relationship between the two is ambiguous. Was it an organic union? Or, did the star 
somehow contain or subordinate the fist?  These questions could only be answered over 
time as the officers acted and built their legacy. But from the outset, it also distanced the 
AAPL from Black Power, as if in an effort to demonstrate that the officers were not 
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“hoodlums and thugs” as so many black radicals had been tarred. Nodding towards 
militancy and moderation simultaneously, the League sought to capture the aspects of Black 
Power that projected black strength while limiting the reach of negative stereotypes about 
the lawlessness of Black Power.   
 
The Limits of Organization Building 
As AAPL members recognized in their initial announcement, their activism and ideas 
had audiences outside and within the Department. In fact, the reception they received from 
black Chicagoans would be bound up with the Police Department’s reaction. Because of 
their activism, the League faced police repression. Police treatment of the League did more 
than reinforce the organization’s critique; it also deepened the black public’s identification 
with them and Black Power ideas that were circulating within the city. Here, League 
members were not passive recipients; they helped to create a pragmatic and responsive black 
political culture that leveraged black participation in Chicago’s governing institutions for 
broader community aims.  
The League kicked off its activities by trying to demonstrate its reasonableness, not 
its militancy. Their first major project was a series of seminars they hosted at the University 
of Chicago’s Center for Continuing Studies. By addressing “meaty, significant issues,” the 
seminars provided the officers with an opportunity to demonstrate that they were not 
rabble-rousers, but men serious about reform.70 High-ranking police personnel participated 
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including director of human relations Sam Nolan, who gave the men a talk about the 
importance of social work in forging relationships with the public.71 Black Daily News 
columnist Lu Palmer, who was a known black nationalist, endorsed the overall program as a 
“meaningful and lasting approach” and praised the policemen as offering “leadership from 
the grassroots,” while also recognizing, “This may be a slow route to improved police-ghetto 
relations.”72 
The image the man projected to the Department mattered little, for the police brass 
began trying to destroy the organization even before their July 1968 announcement. 
Robinson had mentioned their interest in founding a black police association to his 
immediate supervisor, Sgt. Richard Barrett, and the Marquette District Commander, William 
McCann. At the time Barrett was head of the Sergeant’s Association, known colloquially 
within the Department as the “Irish mafia.” Barrett discouraged him, arguing, apparently 
without any awareness of the irony, that it would be divisive for policemen to belong to a 
race-based organization.73 Shortly thereafter, the Department sponsored the formation of 
their own group called the American Negro Police Association.74 The Chicago Police and the 
F.B.I. already had the League under surveillance on the day of its announcement.75  
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The police administration opposed League recruitment. When the League attempted 
to distribute recruitment posters through the Office of Public Information to be placed on 
the Department’s 200 bulletin boards across the city, its director initially refused to accept 
the signs. After they removed the supposedly offending phrase, “Brothers Unite,” the Office 
accepted their new signs. But they were never put up. League officers made the rounds 
themselves, only to have the Department remove the posters because they had not gone 
through official channels.76 
Nonetheless, the League recruited members. Howard Saffold saw League members 
on television, and “sought them out. I went looking for them because at that point, I was 
about to quit the Chicago Police Department. I was totally disgruntled between Dr. King 
and … the Democratic Convention. I was kind of convinced that I was in the wrong 
profession.” He arrived while the League was still in its “embryonic stage,” and noticed that 
there “there was a lot of openings for … officers (laughter). It was in formation.”77 He took 
over recruiting,78 and three months in, 270 black patrolmen had signed pledges. The list 
reflected the geography of race within geography of police districts. Almost all of these 
patrolmen came from the six heavily black districts: Wabash (2nd District), Prairie (21st 
District), and Grand Crossing (3rd District) on the Southside, and Marquette (10th District), 
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Fillmore (11th District), and Monroe (12th District) on the Westside. Grand Crossing, with 
thirty-nine pledges, supplied the largest contingent of the membership.79  
The Police Department went far beyond obstruction. They punished League 
members without ever identifying their affiliation as a reason. Outraged members fought 
back: “No official department spokesman will make a public charge against our organization 
because it can not be substantiated,” Robinson declared. “If they could, they would have run 
us out of existence a long time ago.”80 But, changing work conditions was easy. Robinson 
and Lee, for example, lost their undercover vice assignments and were sent to the uniform 
division.81 Almost every other member of the League Board experienced a diminishment in 
his working conditions either because their superiors transferred him without reason or 
because they refused to do so. The Department assigned four of the men (Palmer, Cowsen, 
Saffold, and Silas) to the wet, cold, subterranean CTA Task Force, the so-called “burial 
detail,” widely viewed as having “a particular onus.”82  
This repression was not ad hoc. Robinson’s supervisor informed him, “these orders 
came from above.”83 By the beginning of 1969, the Police Department held command-level 
meetings to discuss how to get rid of the AAPL, the details of which George T. Sims later 
                                                 
79 Of the 270 men, 171 identified their district assignments.  Afro-American Police League of Chicago, “Initial 
Supporting Pledges Received as of 12 October 1968” n.d., AAPL 68. 
80 “Charles Harris Interviews Renault Robinson,” 14. 
81 Robinson went to the 3d District on the far Southside and Lee to the 15th on the Northwest side. Robinson, 
“Narrative of Robinson’s Ordeal,” 4; McClory, The Man Who Beat Clout City, 31; “Robinson Plaintiffs’ Post-
Trial Summary of the Evidence and Discussion of Legal Authorities, Robinson v. Conlisk, Civil Action No. 70-
C-2220” n.d., 69–71, AAPL 25-8. 
82 Jack DuBonnett was moved from the Youth Division to Loop Traffic. Curtis Cowsen was moved from the 
Evidence Tech Division. Nat Silas requested a transfer from Evidence because his sergeant refused to 
accommodate his scheduling requests so he could continue attending college. Saffold disagreed with the modus 
operandi of the Gang Intelligence Unit and requested a transfer. Finally, Palmer was moved from the 9th 
District. Abner Mikva (IL), “Proceedings Before the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee of Black Illinois State 
Legislators-II,” Cong. Rec. 91 (1970): 29099. 
83 “Conversation Between Renault Robinson and Supervisors at the Third District, Tape 3,” 3. 
  
    88 
recounted in court. At the time of the meeting, Commander Sims ran the 11th Police District, 
and was one of the Department’s highest-ranking black officers. The group called together 
by Superintendent Conlisk included every senior black officer, including all four black 
district commanders, other black captains and exempt personnel, and selected white exempt 
personnel. First Deputy James Rochford led off the meeting by declaring, “we have a 
problem with the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League and members of the League, 
particularly Renault Robinson.”84’ 
Supervisory officers constructed a formidable disciplinary history for Robinson, who 
previously had an unblemished record. They began to give him summary punishments and 
file the more serious Complaint Register (CR) numbers against him in 1968 and never 
stopped. Over half of a year, he received four summary punishments and one sustained CR 
number. The AAPL President followed police custom by accepting these charges and the 
minor punishments they entailed. In 1969, he faced an avalanche of paperwork, with fifteen 
CR numbers pending by mid-September.85 These sought to punish a wide variety of 
behaviors. He would later describe the violations as “not having my hat on, not being 
respectful, bringing discredit upon the department, improperly loading a shotgun, being late 
to work, not filling out a report properly, calling a supervisor crazy, things of that nature.”86 
As this description suggests, some involved enforcement of petty rules; others sought to 
punish him for his statements on behalf of the League; others, still, came from 
insubordination. After the first few months of trying to toe the straight and narrow, 
Robinson, Saffold, and others, got a bit unruly. “[I]t wasn’t unusual for one of us to talk 
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back to a supervisor who addressed you improperly,” Saffold noted.87 League members 
openly challenged the assertion of authority at the core of police hierarchy. 
League members continually had to confront their rejection by other black officers. 
“[T]he vast majority of tried to act as if we didn’t exist,” Saffold described. “I mean they 
really would walk the other way when they saw us coming.”88 This reflected a generational 
divide, as the youngest and most inexperienced patrolmen had less to risk and were less 
acculturated to departmental norms. The first edition of the League’s irregular 
mimeographed newsletter, The Grapevine, contained a short, unsigned column entitled 
“Together We Stand,” which noted that while most of the harassment of the League had 
come from members of the Police Department, “most of the criticism, surprisingly enough, 
has come from our own backyard. Yes, from brothers! Veteran brothers. Those with ten 
years or more experience on the force. The Veteran brothers, of course are not members of 
the League.” Ninety percent of the League membership had less than ten years of service.89 
Police leadership expected black supervisory personnel to be on the front line of 
suppressing the League, as Commander Sims testimony recounted.  This was why, Robinson 
argued, promotions only went to “good, safe, niggers.”90 The description was anything but 
an abstraction for League members. “With all this action we go through with the ‘man,’” 
Curtis Cowsen carped in The Grapevine, “we have to be more wary of our black supervisors.” 
One black captain worked so hard to be “unbiased,” “you might think he may be the leader 
of some anti-black organization.”91 Howard Saffold’s district commander, “a brother—but 
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from another generation,” was the source of his disciplinary problems. Saffold’s refusal to 
meet traffic citation quotas earned him a new partner, “A hunky sergeant.” The sergeant’s 
role was “To sort of point out the traffic violations for him. So the Saph rode his beat with 
the Sergeant.” The two men got in an altercation over the sergeant’s treatment of a civilian 
and Saffold refused to continue riding with him. Upon learning this, the Commander 
demanded, “‘Are you disobeying a direct order?’ … The brother from the other generation 
sputtered about discipline and review boards and arrogant Negro patrolmen.”92  
The League officers challenged their supervisors’ identification with the occupation 
over race. Cowsen asked of black supervisors, “If he sells his dignity and manhood, can he 
afford to let you exhibit yours? When a black supervisor humiliates you, is he really trying to 
regain something he no longer possesses?”93 Robinson echoed this, stressing that many black 
policemen, “have little if any ‘soul.’ They have been for the most part de-natured.”94 These 
critiques rested on an idea that there could be “a true, identifiable, authentic form of black 
racial expression and that movement energies should be directed towards the production and 
reproduction of it.”95 Serving the imperatives of the power structure was constructed as a 
form of deracination; the only way to redeem one’s self was by exhibiting one’s black nature.  
 
Law & Order  
If other officers perceived the League as divisive, Buzz Palmer denied the charge. 
“[T]he black policeman was already polarized when he joined the force. Like people 
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everywhere, he had nothing to do with his separateness. It’s white cops who have the power 
to end polarization, not us.”96 The years 1968 and 1969 saw police magnify their claims to 
authority on the street and in politics. These years represented the apex of the ‘law and 
order’ police rebellion in the cities. It became clear, as Cleveland Mayor Carl Stokes wrote, 
“Police have an amazing political power, a power that has mushroomed in the last few years 
with the advent of the big-city crime scare.”97 Local police used a variety of both lawful and 
extralegal techniques to assert their authority.98  
Nowhere was police power articulated more forcefully than in Chicago, which 
ACLU lawyer and scholar Frank Donner, called “the national capital of police repression 
…”99 A warm up for the coming Democratic Convention took place in April 1968, when 
500 riot-helmeted officers waded into a 6,000-person antiwar march downtown, wielding 
justice by billy club. A citizens’ panel blamed the police brutality on the city’s political and 
administrative leadership, arguing, in particular, “The Mayor’s repeated insistence that ‘there 
will be no trouble [at the Democratic Convention]’ cannot help but communicate to the 
police that all dissent is to be intimidated and repressed …”100  
Daley’s image was forever marked by what happened at the Democratic National 
Convention in 1968. For non-Chicagoans, he became “the man who reacted to the peace 
movement and the civil rights movement with uncomprehending hostility, and who sent his 
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police force out to beat up protestors and reporters.”101 This “police riot” was shocking to 
some, but to others it was a delight: a Harris poll showing that sixty-six percent of 
respondents nationwide were on the side of Daley and the police.102 Supt. James B. Conlisk 
issued three-sentence Pax 501. He claimed, “threats to the safety of the city … severely 
tested the Department’s ability to maintain the well-being of our community,” and went on 
to “express my pride in your dedication to the service upon which this community ultimately 
depends for its safety.”103 Two months later, Conlisk demurred from the conclusions drawn 
by Chicago attorney Daniel Walker in Rights in Conflict, his report for the National 
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. If some minor misconduct had 
occurred—he claimed the Department had taken disciplinary action against at least fourteen 
officers—the Superintendent insisted, “The world knows who the rioters were.”104 
The Democratic convention was eye opening for some individuals who believed 
police brutality was just about race. As veteran Chicago civil rights leader Al Raby concluded, 
“The police are not only against blacks. They are against anybody who messes with their 
thing.”105 Raby perceptively recognized how much the brutality demonstrated at the 
convention was a product of the broader challenge to police authority. Class, gender, and 
sexuality also structured interactions between the police and the public, often in relationship 
to each other. Just as black youth and New Left radicals challenged police invocations of 
authority, so did gay activists in the aftermath of the Chicago convention. According to 
historian Timothy Stewart-Winter, “Police misconduct was the first issue on which gay 
activists collaborated over a sustained period with other urban constituencies—and it was on 
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these issues that they departed most sharply from the law-and-order views with which 
Chicago’s white ethnic voters, and the Mayor who spoke for them, were increasingly 
associated.”106  
Many black leaders reacted to the “police riot” with considerable cynicism. As AAPL 
member Willie Ware told the Defender, “in the uproar over the events on Michigan ave., 
people failed to recognize that black people have been beaten and killed for years. The only 
difference between that incident and disturbances on the Westside is color.”107 Some took 
the optimistic position that by committing on national television acts that typically remained 
hidden behind the veil of racial segregation, the police unwittingly lent credence to black 
cries of brutality: “the ‘police brutality’ in Chicago should prove to the white man that such 
things are not figments of Negroes’ imagination.”108 A skeptical patrolman Ware argued that 
the events were likely to have precisely the opposite effect. Now that police have “beaten 
white heads with impunity,” Ware claimed, “they are more able to beat heads anywhere, 
anytime without having to answer for it.”109 
While political polarization went beyond racial lines, race remained the primary 
flashpoint for controversy over policing. The driving force behind the police persecution of 
the AAPL was that it focused an intense spotlight on the question of police legitimacy in 
black neighborhoods. Once the League members recognized the role of race in structuring 
police behavior, the everyday actions of the Chicago Police Department provided a continual 
stream of incidents that allowed them to refine and escalate their critique. The threat of 
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police violence seemed omnipresent in black Chicago, and League officers focused on its use 
in the routine ordering of the city. By the spring of 1969, they had moved from discussing 
“meaty topics” in a university seminar room to directly confronting “specific police actions 
against blacks.”110  
Their response to the police decision to equip squad cars with Ithaca Model 27 
shotguns provides one example. In the spring of 1969, shotguns were mounted “between 
the two front seat occupants in such a position as to expose the barrels of the shotguns to 
the public at all times.”111 Near the time that this happened, the Confederation of Police also 
pushed the Superintendent to give officers even greater capacity to for force, “distributing 
petitions asking Supt. Conlisk to lift his recent ban on automatic weapons, blackjacks and 
weighted clubs.”112 This decision reflected the pervasive fear that police authority was under 
attack. Conlisk’s instructions to the police force noted that that shotgun was a much blunter 
weapon that a service revolver. Shotguns did not need to be aimed; all that was necessary 
was “to merely point it at the target and shoot.” The weapon’s effectiveness came not from 
its precision, but from “its shocking power at close range.” The Police Department 
embraced this shocking power and its psychological effects: It would cause criminals fear; it 
would make black communities feel protected; and it would give policemen confidence. 
Rather than criticizing the police for putting such powerful weapons in officers’ hands for 
ready use, Deputy Superintendent for Community Services Sam Nolan suggested that civil 
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rights groups should “join with the citizens of your community who are truly concerned 
about the protection of their loved ones.”113 
  Buzz Palmer offered a more critical psychological reading of the differences between 
an officer’s service revolver and a shotgun. Palmer’s explanation highlighted how “the 
shotgun is an indiscriminate weapon. A revolver discharges one projectile at a time while the 
shotgun discharges from 12 to 16 pellets.” The key question for the League was when and 
why an officer would use such a weapon. For Palmer, “‘The use of this weapon tells us that 
in the subconscious mind of the police officer he is no longer against the individual 
offender, the outcast, but against society.” Rather than providing protection, Palmer argued, 
“The use of the shotgun brings up the question of genocide.’”114   
 The Superintendent’s decision to lock the shotguns in the trunk to prevent robbery 
did not prevent tragedy.115 Rookie patrolmen Martin Anderson responded to screams from 
inside an apartment at 1502 S. Kedvale, by using his shotgun to shot out the lock. In doing 
so, he killed Linda Anderson, a black nineteen-year old mother of two whose husband was 
serving in Vietnam. Holding a press conference in front of Anderson’s apartment to show 
the damage done by the shotgun, the League was joined by a wide swath of supporters. The 
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use of the shotgun in this case dramatized the claim that police had, in the words of League 
spokesman Tom Mitchell, “complete disregard for black life.”116  
Robinson illustrated the power of the shotgun in what was probably his brashest 
incident of insubordination, a few months later. Generally, Robinson avoided checking out a 
shotgun when leaving the station, as he was supposed to do. On December 30, however, his 
supervisor forced him to do so. According to a memo written by Robinson’s lawyers, 
“Robinson believes he loaded the gun, which was required, in the garage on the way to his 
car. He believes that he misloaded the gun and through inadvertence allowed a live shell to 
enter the chamber. While walking to the car Robinson was holding the gun down and it 
discharged into the pavement.”117 It seems doubtful that this was the case. But even if it was 
an “accident,” given high level of politicization, it still hinted at a resolution to the contested 
point. Shotguns were more dangerous than service revolvers, and it was frightening to 
imagine how their widespread distribution could lead to casual use.118 
Linda Anderson’s killing was not an aberration. From May until the beginning of 
December, the police shot and killed ten other black youths on the West Side. As the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Black Panthers and the Police would later report, “In most 
cases the police offered explanations of the deaths. In most cases residents of the 
community and families of the dead youth claimed that these explanations were false or 
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inadequate.” Both the Coroner’s juries and the IID exonerated the officers involved.119 No 
bills of indictment were retuned.  
 
Repression and Resistance 
In July 1968, the AAPL had announced itself to the public by highlighting the gulf in 
relations between its members and black Chicagoans. By mid-1969, the League described 
itself as the legitimate representatives of black Chicago on the issue of criminal justice. As 
Robinson wrote in a letter, “We … represent the views of the black people of the City. We, 
the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, are the representatives of the people.”120 This 
justification came in part from the League’s participation in the Coalition for United 
Community Action (CUCA), a gathering of around sixty community groups. “Our 
participation in the social struggles of blacks has given us a new image which enables us to 
give a credible witness to the alienated.”121 But it was also because the League members were 
themselves subject to police treatment that reinforced their critique of the Department and 
put them in the same position vis-à-vis police power as other black Chicagoans.  
Throughout moments of crisis in 1969, the League and the Department each 
escalated the pressure on the other party. The League worked by continually pointing out the 
failures of the Department, particularly by bringing publicity to incidents of police brutality 
or indifference. They used these opportunities to demand a meeting with the 
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Superintendent, in which the League would represent black Chicagoans: “We will not meet 
with anyone other than Conlisk, because that would only waste time. And if Conlisk is 
serious he will meet with us; if he isn’t he won’t.”122 The Superintendent deflected their 
entreaties.123 
In mid-September of 1969, Robinson’s disciplinary case took an important turn. A 
sergeant in the IID confidentially tipped off Robinson that the Department was planning to 
combine a number of charges in order to get him dismissed from the force.124 Robinson 
stopped accepting summary punishments and mounted a vigorous public campaign about 
the Department’s treatment of him. On September 14, Robinson detailed the Departments 
harassment, including its plan to fire him, in the Chicago Sun-Times.125 That night, as he was 
driving home from a community meeting in the West Side Austin neighborhood, police 
officers pulled him over at 3:30 am. Perhaps he was being followed; perhaps police thought 
his swerve to avoid a pothole indicted something else.126 Either way, as he explained at a 
hasty lunch-hour press conference the next day, they refused to extend him “professional 
courtesy,” and let him go.127 They arrested him and charged him with four traffic offenses 
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(improper changing of lanes, driving under the influence of alcohol, failure to produce a 
driver’s license, and failure to display a city vehicle sticker).128 
 To be denied preferential treatment (even of professional courtesy) hardly seems like 
a good issue for social mobilization.129 But such courtesies were customary, and in the 
context of the extreme racial polarization over policing and Robinson’s recent charges, the 
incident caused an uproar. The next weekend, 20 AAPL members and Father Clements 
appeared onstage during the weekly Saturday morning meeting of Operation Breadbasket, in 
their respective uniforms. Jesse Jackson introduced Robinson to the more than 2,000 people 
in attendance at the Capitol Theater, as “a dedicated policeman who is standing up for 
justice.”130 Three South Side community groups issued a statement decrying “the repressive 
tactics being demonstrated against the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, and in particular 
its president Renault Robinson.”131 Gus Savage, a liberal black newspaper editor and 
frequent political aspirant, argued, “League members deserve praise rather than 
punishment.” He called upon “all citizens, black and white, to protect the rights of League 
members to fairly criticize the police department …without fear of unfair consequences.”132 
Even the conservative Tribune ran a surprisingly sympathetic overview of the League’s 
views.133 
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 The hearings put on by Illinois state legislators to investigate Robinson’s charges of 
harassment explicitly linked his plight with that of other blacks at the hands of the Chicago 
Police.134 State Senator Richard Newhouse led the committee of fourteen, which also 
included active participation by Harold Washington, Otis Collins, and Charles Chew.135 
Ironically, the irregular nature of the ad-hoc body helped to broaden the scope of the 
inquiry. They had no subpoena power and Conlisk and other police officials rebuffed the 
committee’s attempts to secure their testimony. As the Superintendent replied, “The 
involvement of a political committee in the process of the Police arm of government would 
be unique, and in my judgment, not in the interest of sound Police Department 
discipline.”136 This put pretty strict limits on the amount of fact-finding the committee could 
do. The hearings turned into an opportunity to voice grievances against the Chicago Police 
Department. Buzz Palmer caught the attention of the Tribune, by claiming that “the Chicago 
Police Department, as it is presently constituted is both segregationist in its structure and 
racist in the formation of its policy.”137 Clements suggested that a much more important 
investigation to undertake would be inquiring into the “stranglehold on the Police 
Department [that] has been traditionally exercised and is exercised up to this moment by 
Irish Catholics.”138  
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 After the second hearing, which like the first was held downtown in the state of 
Illinois building, “the hearings [were] taken to the community in order that grass roots 
persons may be encouraged to testify.”139 The legislators held additional sessions at the 
Henry Horner Boys Club on the Westside and the St. Johns Church in on the Grand 
Boulevard on the Southside.140 At these meetings, the public linked the treatment of the 
AAPL with the questions that the AAPL raised about the Chicago Police Department; 
namely, “whether or not the[re] is police brutality and intimidation exercised against 
residents, particularly teen-aged youth, in the black community and minority 
communities.”141 In a very short amount of time, the question of the treatment of the League 
became a broader referendum on police treatment of black Chicagoans. 
 
Black Men with Guns 
 The most divisive issue amongst black Chicagoans in the late 1960s was police 
treatment of young black men with guns: namely, street gangs and, later, the Black Panthers. 
During the mid-1960s, black street gangs multiplied in size in a dynamic and competitive 
process. As one grew, its rivals sought other gangs to incorporate or risked suffering that 
fate themselves. “By the end of 1966,” historian Andrew Diamond concludes, “the 
Blackstone Rangers were believed to represent some two thousand members and the 
Conservative Vice Lords between fifteen hundred and three thousand; other black gangs like 
the Disciples, the Roman Saints, and the Cobras likely possessed memberships of at least 
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several hundred.”142 Super gangs became increasingly influenced by a Black Power ideology 
that mapped well onto their existing sense of territoriality (leading the Blackstone Rangers to 
change their name to the Black P. Stone Nation) and turned toward political action, 
participating, however warily, in certain aspects of the Chicago Freedom Movement in the 
summer of 1966.143 The Blackstone Rangers and their rivals, the Disciples, worked with 
Chicago’s most dynamic community organization, The Woodlawn Organization (TWO), to 
secure a $927,000 federal grant for manpower training, incurring Daley’s wrath by trying to 
prevent the city from playing a role in administering the funds.144 Finally, even as the gang 
members and some of the leadership turned “pro-social,” gang sets became increasingly 
involved in criminal activity, drawing upon ideas of community control to push white 
underworld operators out of black neighborhoods.145  
 In the years between 1967 and 1970, debates over violence in black neighborhoods 
and police brutality centered almost entirely on the question of what to do about street 
gangs. In 1967, the Police Department escalated its crackdown on the gangs by creating a 
ten-man Gang Intelligence Unit, run by Lieutenant Ed Buckney.146 Whether it was motivated 
the party-state’s worries over black power or crime in black neighborhoods has been hotly 
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debated. Alarmed groups stood on both sides of increased police action.147 Some demanded 
government intervention, with one Woodlawn minister imploring TWO’s leader, the Rev. 
Arthur Brazier to try to get the National Guard called in.148 Others called for police to use an 
iron hand. At one community meeting of the Concerned Parents of Woodlawn, the crowd 
applauded as a member shouted, “To heck with getting accused of police brutality, let’s use 
some force on these punks!”149 By contrast, the Reverend John Fry, a stalwart supporter of 
the Rangers and Disciples, accused Gang Intelligence of “buying witnesses, rigging 
testimony, and performing all kinds of payoffs and shakedowns.”150 In either case, only a 
year after the police crackdown did homicides classified by the police as gang-motivated 
spike.151 
This was street milieu that the Black Panthers existed in when they were organized 
by Fred Hampton, Bobby Rush, and others on the West Side in 1968. Distinctions between 
gangs and social movements were blurry. As William O’Neal, who served as the Chicago’s 
Panthers Chief of Security and an FBI informant, commented, “the day I joined I was pretty 
sure it was just another gang, unlike, not unlike the Blackstone Rangers, or, or the Cobras or 
something. I had no idea of, anything about their politics.”152 Confusion reigned on the 
street, too, with the Egyptian Cobras and Black P. Stone Nation interpreting the Panthers as 
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potential rivals.153 Following their objections to Panther recruiting on their turf, Rush and 
Hampton set up a meeting with Blackstone leader Jeff Fort. Rush described the Panthers’ 
choreography: “we left our office on the West Side, drove to the South Side. We had 
weapons, all of us had shotguns and, and, and rifles. And we pulled up … on 67th and 
Blackstone and on the side of the Stones’ headquarters we got out of our vehicles and … 
with military … precision, got into a military formation and actually marched about a block 
to the Stones’ headquarters.”154 The FBI tried to exploit this potential rivalry and sent 
anonymous letters to Fort alleging that the Panthers were planning a hit on him.155 Although 
the Panthers were not made up of gang youth, they tried to recruit them both as members 
and allies. When the Panthers formed a “rainbow coalition” in 1969, they partnered with the 
Young Lords, a former Puerto Rican street gang that had transformed into a community 
organization.156  
The Chicago Police Department treated the Panthers like a gang. As an officer in the 
Gang Intelligence Unit, Howard Saffold was assigned in 1968 to “what they called … the 
Panther Squad.”157 The Chicago Police Department, Saffold retrospectively reflected, could 
not distinguish “between the criminal element” and “a social movement.” Instead, 
“everybody with a Black tam and every with combat boots was a Panther.”158 Yet, if they saw 
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the Panthers as no better than a criminal gang, the FBI’s COINTELPRO Program 
channeled the Chicago Police specifically towards repressing the group. It was the FBI that 
“orchestrated a coordinated national effort to infiltrate and destroy the party.”159 Sometimes 
this involved direct FBI action. On June 4, 1969, for example, Special Agent in Charge 
Marlin Johnson led a raid of the Panther office supposedly in pursuit of George Sams, a 
wanted fugitive. Sams was later revealed to be an FBI informer and highly disturbing agent 
provocateur.160 Nonetheless, the FBI primarily worked indirectly, passing information from 
their informant, William O’Neal, to the Police and the State’s Attorney.  
From April to December of 1969, the Police continually escalated their efforts to 
repress the Panthers, arresting members eleven different times during the summer, and 
raiding their offices on at least three different occasions. The Panthers alleged substantial 
unlawful confiscation and destruction of Panther property during these raids.161 Violence 
between the Panthers and the Police escalated. In July, police shot Panther Larry Roberson, 
who died three months later of complications from his wounds and poor medical care. In 
November, Panther Spurgeon “Jake” Winters, cornered by police an abandoned hotel, went 
on a shooting spree, killing officers Frank Rappaport and John Gilhooly, wounding eight 
others, and destroying five police cars.162 
                                                 
159 Murch, Living for the City, 160. 
160 “Panthers, FBI Tell Views: Rush Hits Raid on Party’s HQ,” Chicago Defender, June 5, 1969, 1; Jeffrey Haas, 
The Assassination of Fred Hampton: How the FBI and the Chicago Police Murdered a Black Panther (Chicago: Lawrence 
Hill Books, 2010), 51. On Sims exceptionally perverse actions in New Haven, see Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. 
Martin, Black against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2013), 248–251. 
161 “Report of the January 1970 Grand Jury” (United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 
1970), 3–12; Commission of Inquiry into the Black Panthers and the Police, Search and Destroy: A Report, 26–27; 
Bloom and Martin, Black against Empire, 226–237. 
162 “Report of the January 1970 Grand Jury,” 3–12; Commission of Inquiry into the Black Panthers and the 
Police, Search and Destroy: A Report, 26–27; Bloom and Martin, Black against Empire, 226–237. 
  
    106 
The raid that killed Fred Hampton and Mark Clark was a response to the killings of 
these two police officers, even if the notional justification was the Panthers possession of 
illegal weapons, namely sawed-off shotguns. Fourteen Chicago Police officers detailed to the 
Cook County State’s Attorney’s Special Prosecutions Unit—created just year to fight street 
gangs—carried it out. At 4:30 am, on December 4, 1969, “the pigs vamped on the 
chairman’s crib.”163 Hampton and eight others were asleep. The officers made no attempt to 
flush them out of the apartment. They massed at the front and back doors and following a 
quick knock, burst in firing. The officers would claim that the Panthers had shot first. They 
would claim that when they called for cease-fire on three occasions, the Panthers yelled, 
“Shoot it out!” The Police fired somewhere between 83 and 90 shots during the incident. 
The Panthers fired at most one. The initial hail of bullets killed Peoria Panther Mark Clark.  
Police killed Fred Hampton in his bed, with two bullets to the head fired at close range from 
a downward angle.164 
In their epic history of the Black Panther Party, Joshua Bloom and Waldo Martin 
concluded, the “unusual aspect of [Fred Hampton’s] case was not that the state killed him … 
but rather the broad mobilization in response to his killing. If not for this support …[t]he 
outrageous details of the killing would never have been exposed.”165 The League was at the 
center of these efforts. The night of the raid, League leaders visited with one of their 
members (George Jones), who had been amongst the five black officers involved, and he 
described to them how it had gone. Robinson and Saffold were amongst the first people to 
visit the Panther apartment after the raid. Robinson told the Times thereafter, “We doubt 
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what was said by the physical evidence …”166 A few days after the raid, Howard Saffold gave 
a statement to the press that contradicted many of the most important claims made by 
State’s Attorney Hanrahan and the raiders (Hampton had not fired any shots, Hampton had 
been shot from close range, there had not been a shootout). Going well beyond the 
conclusion that the police merely conducted the raid improperly, he concluded that it was 
“obviously a political assassination.”167 When the police finally sealed off the crime scene two 
weeks after the shooting, they detailed Saffold to guard the front door in the sub-zero 
weather.168 
Father Clements celebrated a mass for the slain men and spoke at Hampton’s 
funeral. He shielded Bobby Rush, Hampton’s chief deputy, from the Police by giving him 
sanctuary in his church. 169 When Police raided Rush’s apartment at 2040 South State on the 
morning of December 5, he was not there. He eventually turned himself over to the police at 
a highly-choreographed meeting of Jackson’s Operation Breadbasket. Such public surrenders 
were a regular practice in the 1970s to ensure fair police treatment.170 Rush rode to the 
meeting sitting on Renault Robinson’s lap in ACLU attorney Kermit Coleman’s two-seat 
sports car. At the meeting, Rush declared, “I am turning myself into black people and black 
people will dictate my future actions.” Coleman and Robinson handed him over to George 
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T. Sims and Robert Harness, two of the Department’s black commanders, who guaranteed 
his safety.171 
 
Five months later, May 9, 1970, Robison was back on the stage at the Operation 
Breadbasket Saturday morning meeting at the Capitol Theater. On May 4, the police 
suspended him, pending a hearing on the Superintendent’s request that he be fired.172 In 
contrast with the fifteen League members sitting on stage in their uniforms, Robinson wore 
a grey suit. Handing his gun, badge, baton, cap, department gas mask, and blue riot helmet 
over to his former partner, Frank Lee, Robinson told the audience, “I have always seen 
myself as your representative. It was you who gave me this gun and badge. Now I surrender 
them to you for safekeeping. If I ever get them back, it will only be because of you.”173 In 
Rush’s case, the audience was there to protect the sanctity of his physical person. Now, they 
were being reminded of their political role in protecting black policemen and in changing the 
culture of policing in Chicago. 
On July 2, as the date of the hearing on Robinson’s dismissal hearing approached, he 
wrote about what would happen to the League if he were fired. Robinson began by arguing 
that the police penalties directed against him were calculated to raise the costs for other 
policemen of joining the League. But he also argued that this did not matter: “If the AAPL 
had all 2300 blacks in the ranks we would not have any more clout than we have now.” 
Robinson’s argument that the number of members did not matter much was rooted 
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principle underlying the organization—the principle it had announced as its first press 
conference. This was that the League’s “clout is not in the members itself,” but in the 
relationship between black police officers and black people. As he wrote in his column, 
“Our clout is in the community.”174  
* * * 
The politics of policing shifted between 1968 and 1970. During the early part of the 
1960s, the challenge to police authority took place on the street, often in the interactions 
between black youth and police officers. By the end of the decade that conflict had moved 
inside the Department, as the officers of the AAPL picked up strains of Black Power’s 
radical critique of policing and fitted it to their own experience as agents of the state. What 
was truly revolutionary, particularly within the context of Chicago’s politics, was that these 
men used their relationship to state power to challenge its exercise. In so doing, they sought 
to change the decades-old political bargain that had both promoted and limited black 
advancement as subordinate partners in governing Chicago. The League’s criticism of other 
black officers was the most telling element of this ideological shift. For black police officers 
embodied this political bargain: they represented middle-class advancement through 
government employment and, yet, they also served as instruments to limit the advancement 
of other black people. 
 For League members, the solution to this paradox was fundamentally political. They 
did not seek to abandon engagement with state power but to put it on a new foundation. In 
this, they followed the generally pragmatic trajectory of Black Power in Chicago, pointing to 
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what Hegelson has identified as the “conflict between the sense that Chicago had failed 
black people … and the idea that the institutions of the city could be reformed to deliver 
greater equality for all.”175 It was clear to these black patrolmen that solidarity to the Chicago 
Police Department meant perpetuating the broader political and economic order. Drawing 
on ideas of communal black solidarity and racial authenticity, they sought to establish a new 
basis of police authority. “Organized Black policemen represent Black police power. 
Organized Black police power, with the Black community behind it represents a real threat 
to the power structure’s control over the lives of Black people.”176 
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CHAPTER 4: CITIZEN MONITORING AND THE GOVERNANCE OF POLICE 
BRUTALITY 
 
 
 
 
In the early 1970s, a network of citizen activists mobilized to monitor the Police 
Department following the murders of Black Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark Clark. The 
exceptional nature of the public response to the killings made these efforts possible. 
Activists turned back the institutional mechanisms that usually operated to reinforce the 
authority of law enforcement on State’s Attorney Edward Hanrahan, challenging his 
credibility. The outrage of most black Chicagoans, and liberals and radicals of all races and 
ethnicities, forced law enforcement officials to take unusual steps in order to justify the raid. 
Instead of buttressing state power, these actions forced processes typically shrouded in the 
haze of routine bureaucratic action into the light of public view. The most important 
revelation to emerge from the outrage over the murders was not how police used violence in 
Chicago; instead, it was how the institutions of law enforcement operated to obscure such 
violence. 
Deliberate citizen participation in law enforcement in Chicago was almost non-
existent before 1970. As activists worked to reform the police in the aftermath of the Black 
Panther murders, what unified them was not the specific policies they sought to 
implement—though there was much continuity in that regard. Instead, by finding 
institutional nodes at which they could exert pressure on the criminal justice system, they 
tried to open “a path … for meaningful public participation in the solution of major police 
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problems.”1 This emergent network of police reformers envisioned and tried to enact citizen 
participation as an essential ingredient for bringing justice into law enforcement. Sustaining 
this activism required the coordination of different types of groups: those that relied on legal 
or professional expertise helped to open up space for citizen action and to provide citizen 
groups with knowledge for action.   
Some elements of this history are familiar. In turning towards citizen participation 
and community-based organizations, Chicagoans took part in political processes that 
reshaped American politics and policymaking during the 1970s. “The idea of justice as 
rooted in the active work of democratic communities came, in the first instance, out of the 
1960s left,” according to historian Daniel Rodgers.2 While other cities veiled the exercise of 
force by their officers as well, activists for police reform in Chicago believed that their city’s 
particular system of political interest was to blame. Outraged by police homicide, they came 
to see the actions of law enforcement officials as a raw expression of racial domination 
under the Democratic Party. To them, the political system that linked the interests of the 
police to the interests of Mayor Daley perpetuated brutality. Democratic conduct of politics 
also provided a model for the governance of law enforcement. Police obfuscated brutality 
through processes homologous to those that allowed the Democratic electoral monopoly to 
endure. Both exercised control over information—what political scientists calls “information 
bias.”3 Both coordinated action across institutions to reinforce this bias. Their everyday 
                                                 
1 John Hill to Council Delegates and Others, “Alliance to End Repression: Progress Report,” December 1971, 
Alliance 1-2. 
2 Daniel Rodgers, The Age of Fracture (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 191. 
3 On the various methods of biasing electoral politics, including information bias, see Jessica Trounstine, 
Political Monopolies in American Cities: The Rise and Fall of Bosses and Reformers (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2008), chap. 2. 
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processes of governance operated to obstruct understanding of how and when the policed 
exercised force.  
To activists, police practices replicated the forms of political exclusion practiced by 
the Democratic Party. By creating a network of institutions focused on police power, 
activists sought to invert the city’s methods for governing police brutality. Confronted by the 
Democratic Party’s seemingly hermetic insulation to change through electoral politics, they 
probed other avenues to leverage their claims. Mimicking the tactics that the government 
used to shut them out, they sought to produce knowledge about police brutality and 
disseminate it to the public in ways that would force the City to respond. They disrupted the 
coordination of various agencies by finding administrative avenues for citizen monitoring of 
government action. If this changed the calculus for how the governing institutions 
performed their duties, however, it did not fundamentally transform them.  
 
Institutionalizing a Police Reform Network 
By 1976, there were 100 citizens’ organizations in Chicago on file with the Illinois 
Law Enforcement Commission, the state criminal justice funding agency, and likely 
countless other less formalized groups. They engaged in a wide variety of activities that 
extended from improving particular criminal justice processes (such as the assignment of bail 
in county court), to offering youths recreational and employment opportunities, to so-called 
“target hardening” programs that seek to make crime more difficult through changes in the 
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physical environment.4 The activism I chronicle in this chapter was focused on monitoring 
the police and other law enforcement institutions with the capacity to impact police brutality. 
Although many groups played important roles in these campaigns, I focus on four: the Afro-
American Patrolmen’s League; the ACLU’s Ghetto Project; the Alliance to End Repression 
(and its police-work committee, Citizens Action), a participatory civil liberties organization; 
and the Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group, a research-for-action organization based at 
Northwestern. Linked with each other through shared institutional membership and 
common programmatic concerns, these organizations transformed the way citizens 
monitored the police in Chicago. They provided research, police, knowledge, legal talent, 
and—most importantly—citizens who represented interests not adequately recognized by 
the Daley organization, and created an infrastructure that the Police Department found itself 
increasingly unable to ignore. 
In May of 1968, the ACLU hired Kermit Coleman to start up its Ghetto Project.5 
The organization already had a long history of challenging police brutality, but its previous 
focus was on abstract protection and expansion of restraints on government power. By 
contrast, the Ghetto Project sought to “do nothing but represent ghetto residents in their 
fight for equal rights.”6 Coleman bridged the gap between black grassroots movements for 
justice and white liberals. As the first black staff lawyer the ACLU of Illinois ever hired, both 
the lawyer and the organization felt compelled to explain their mutual association. The 
                                                 
4 Lawrence A. Gibbs et al., Fourth Power in the Balance: Citizen Efforts to Address Criminal Justice Problems in Cook 
County, Illinois (Chicago: Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group, 1977), 41. 
5 “People in the News,” Baltimore Afro-American, May 19, 1968, 15. 
6 “The ACLU and the Ghetto,” Civil Liberties, September 1970, ACLU 1973 Deposit 22-11. The Ghetto Project 
was part of the broader growth in the provision of civil legal services. The Office of Economic Opportunity 
would create a cadre of poverty lawyers, paid for by the Legal Services Corporation. Other lawyers would heed 
the calling of greater social responsibility in breaking off from the Chicago Bar Association and creating the 
activist Chicago Council of Lawyers.  
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ACLU magazine, Civil Liberties awkwardly explained: “Coleman finds that black militant 
groups do not denigrate his ‘white liberal’ connections or shun him because he represents 
the ACLU.”7 Similarly, Coleman explained to readers of Muhammad Speaks, “I don’t know 
any other group of white folks in this country (and in this city, in particular) who give as 
much hell to the established order as the ACLU.”8  
Over his four years with the ACLU, Coleman became a ubiquitous figure, handling 
more than 600 cases. As reporter Lu Palmer noted, in Chicago, “when ghetto residents face 
the awesome weight of what’s called justice in America … the accused’s first words are likely 
to be ‘Get Kermit.’”9 Tall, light-skinned, and slim, with an Afro that seemed to grow in 
volume each year, he was the unofficial general counsel for black activists—and the official 
counsel for many of them, including the Black Panthers and the Afro-American Patrolmen’s 
League. Robinson claimed, “Almost anyone active in any civil rights group in the 1960’s 
used his great legal talents.”10 Coleman was circumspect about the value of legal action; he 
recognized repeatedly that “the kind of work he is doing ‘won’t solve the problems that face 
that black community.’”11 Instead, he sought to open space for community action.   
The Alliance to End Repression was “a new kind of innovative flexible people’s civil 
liberties movement.”12 Its creation was “directly sparked by the assassination of Mark Clark 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 5. 
8 Norm Freelain, “Director of Ghetto Project: Black Lawyer Fights for Justice,” Muhammad Speaks, October 10, 
1969, 15, ACLU 1973 Deposit 22-11. 
9 L.F. Palmer, Jr., “Blacks in Trouble? Than Get Kermit,” Chicago Daily News, September 13, 1969, 11, ACLU 
1973 Deposit 22-11. 
10 “News Release: Kermit Coleman, Lawyer-Activist, Found Dead of Massive Stroke,” August 1979, AAPL 60-
463. 
11 Kermit Coleman to Robert Johnson, January 12, 1970, 9, ACLU 1973 Deposit 22-11. 
12 Jack Mendelsohn, October 1971, Alliance 1-2. 
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and Fred Hampton in late 1969.”13 The organization’s animating spirit came from a trio of 
religious liberals: Jack Mendelsohn, a Unitarian Priest, John Hill, a Catholic priest, and Betty 
Plant, a Catholic nun. True to its name, though, it was an organization of organizations. As a 
representative from the Chicago Urban League described, it was “an interracial but 
predominantly white group of leaders from civil liberties, religious, peace, service and 
community organizations.”14 It brought together a wide variety of partners, such as the 
Contract Buyers League, the Japanese-American Association, the Nuns of Merrilac House, 
and the Amalgamated Meat-Cutters.15 If the Alliance skewed white and middle-class, it 
nonetheless prided itself on cutting across geography and demographics to “create a working 
coalition of a variety of organizations reaching from the inner city to suburbia” and to “unite 
the efforts of black and white, radical and moderate, young and middle aged.”16 By 1972, its 
efforts related to the police largely would be taken over by Citizens Alert, which not only 
outlasted its parent organization, but also was much more racially diverse.17 
The Alliance’s self-conscious cosmopolitanism was accompanied by a reformist 
political orientation. As the Rev. Mendelsohn explained to University of Chicago students, 
“The alliance is one of diversity which has not included those whose analysis of society 
                                                 
13 Bud Schultz, “A Notable Reversal: Holding the Chicago Red Squad Accountable,” in The Price of Dissent: 
Testimonies to Political Repression in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 403.  
14 Stu Greene to Laplois Ashford, “Alliance to End Repression Meeting,” October 16, 1970, CUL III-173-
1887.  
15 Organizing documents describe attempts to attract organizations from Education, Business, Political, Black, 
Labor, Legal, Religious, Youth, Community, and Miscellaneous. The Alliance’s organizers invited 55 groups to 
the first meeting; 56 people, representing 44 organizations showed up. “Groups to Be Invited” 1970, Alliance 
3-29; “Organizations That Might Be Invited” 1970, Alliance 3-29. “ATTENDANCE LIST” 1970, Alliance 1-4; 
“Attendance List - Jan. 6 - 14 Meetings - ACLU Office” 1970, Alliance 1-4. 
16 Mendelsohn, October 1971. 
17 Citizens Alert’s diversity was due to Ruth Wells, the Westside organizer who became its executive director in 
1973. See John Hill, “Position Paper for Steering Committee Meeting” (Alliance to End Repression, July 31, 
1973), Alliance 2-1. 
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includes destruction of its institutions.”18 John Hill described the organization in a manner 
that touched on its complex image and organizational position: “We were a group of liberals 
with a radical name and a conservative style.”19 The distinction from organizations like the 
ACLU, or even the radical Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights, resided fundamentally in 
the Alliance’s description of itself as “a prime mover in this new concept of citizens’ 
participation …”20 This was an intimate form of activism that depended on personal contact 
and involvement. Accordingly, Alliance activists favored modes of action like 
“knowledgeable involvement in public meetings, sustained small group interaction with 
public officials, continuing education, litigation when appropriate and necessary, [and] 
volunteer police-community cooperative projects.”21 The organization was not geared 
towards building power but instead to opening up space for representative citizens to enter 
the seemingly closed loop of politics and governance. Despite being radically democratic, 
Alliance activists embraced these conservative tactics. 
Finally, the Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group reexamined the civil liberties 
paradigm by questioning the barrier that the “objectivity question” interposed between study 
and action in the post-WWII university. The Study Group was housed at Northwestern 
University’s recently founded Center for Urban Affairs. Funded by the Ford Foundation, the 
Center was “designed to bridge the gap between basic research and clinical practice …”22 
The project fell within the portfolio of the Center’s Assistant Director, John L. McKnight, 
former director of the Midwest office of the United State Commission on Civil Rights. The 
                                                 
18 Nancy Chisman, “Alliance Opposes Government Repression,” Chicago Maroon, May 14, 1971, 1. 
19 Schultz, “A Notable Reversal: Holding the Chicago Red Squad Accountable,” 406. 
20 Mary Powers, “The Panthers-Hanrahan Case,” The Alliance Open Letter 2, July 1971, 15, Alliance 1-2. 
21 Alliance to End Repression, “Citizen’s Alert: A Proposal for Police Reform in Chicago,” August 1972, 3, 
Alliance 1-3. 
22 “Results, Not Degree, Are Courses’ Goal: N.U. Urban Program Hopes to Aid City,” Chicago Tribune, October 
28, 1968, A20; “$700,000 Ford Grant for Center at N.U.,” Chicago Tribune, May 8, 1969, 8. 
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frustration of change-oriented groups in the late 1960s with the effects of Chicago’s closed 
political system drove its creation. “They found that citizens’ groups were at a tremendous 
disadvantage in trying to deal with the managers and professionals who run large urban 
bureaucracies, and that the reason for this was the lack of specialized information.” Like the 
Alliance, Study Group oriented its efforts to providing entrée for citizens to break down the 
police barriers surrounding policy-making: “We have directed our research efforts towards 
the investigation of Chicago’s criminal justice system to provide a basis for community 
involvement in reform measures.”23 
These organizations each operated independently, but linked with each other in 
multiple ways. For example, the initial cluster of eight organizations that sponsored the 
formation of the Study Group included the Alliance and the ACLU, along with other 
flagship legal and social policy organizations; the AAPL would later join.24 The ACLU was 
also a founding member of the Alliance, which the AAPL also ultimately joined. More 
important was their functional interdependence. One memo, written for Citizen’s Alert 
when it proposed to take over the police-focused work of the Alliance in 1972, summed up 
the relationships. The proposal noted that in addition to playing a role on the Citizens Alert 
Board of Directors, the organization would rely in particularly on the “advice and council” 
of three organizations: “Consultation on police and community affairs will be provided by 
the Afro-American Patrolman’s League; legal services will be provided by the American Civil 
Liberties Union … In formulating specific reform objectives, Citizen’s Alert will utilize the 
                                                 
23 Janice L. Bauer, David J. Roth, and Juanita P. Banez, “Criminal Justice Catalog: A Community Guide to 
Criminal and Juvenile Justice Information in Cook County” (Chicago, 1976), 4, CLESG 1. 
24 The others included the liberal legal organizations, Businessmen for the Public Interest, Chicago Council of 
Lawyers, Community Legal Council, Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the Legal Aid 
Bureau of United Charities of Chicago, as well as the social policy organizations, Chicago Commons 
Association, Community Renewal Society, and Leadership Resource Program. “Memorandum of 
Understanding Governing the Chicago Law Enforcement Study Institute (Draft),” 1970, CUL II-243-2442. 
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research capability of the Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group.” In addition to this, of 
course, Citizens Alert drew on the expertise of the Alliance’s John Hill “as a consultant on 
community organization strategy and tactics.”25 The experience of the prior two years—of 
working in parallel and in concert—taught that Citizens Alert could maximize its capabilities 
through networked action. 
 
Shaping Knowledge  
On December 12, 1969, Cook County State’s Attorney Edward Harahan held a press 
conference to address skepticism about the exclusive story given to the Chicago Tribune by the 
police officers that killed Fred Hampton and Mark Clark. Despite much evidence to the 
contrary, he maintained that the officers had taken heroic action defending themselves under 
gunfire from the Panthers. The press conference was a vintage Hanrahan performance. 
Questioned about evidence that cast doubt on the veracity of the police narrative, the State’s 
Attorney turned incredulous. “I would have thought our office is entitled to expect to be 
believed by the public,” he fulminated. “Our officers wouldn’t lie about the act. I’m talking 
about the credibility of our officers here and myself.”26 With nothing left to fall back on 
except his office, he stomped out. 
This was not bluster. It was how things worked. In most cases, it was exceptionally 
difficult to challenge the State’s Attorney and the Police. This began with the production of 
evidence. Law enforcement institutions turned crime scenes and witness recollections into 
                                                 
25 Alliance to End Repression, “Citizen’s Alert: A Proposal for Police Reform in Chicago.” 
26 Quoted in Jeffrey Haas, The Assassination of Fred Hampton: How the FBI and the Chicago Police Murdered a Black 
Panther (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010), 107. 
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evidence and they often controlled access to inchoate evidence. To substantiate a charge of 
police brutality, a complainant had to be able to offer convincing proof. Problems ranged 
from lack of any evidence, in some cases of police homicide, to questions of credibility and 
corroboration. Police brutality often occurred, like the work of policing, in low visibility 
environments. (The “rough ride” in the back of a squadrol is a classic example.) The most 
frequent witnesses to police brutality were other police officers. When civilian witnesses 
existed, their statements—if heard at all—rarely carried the same evidentiary weight as the 
testimony of the officers they challenged. Physical corroboration did not often exist. 
Regardless of the truth of law enforcement claims, it often was quite difficult for brutality 
victims to prove them false. 
The Panther case demonstrated the advantages law enforcement had in influencing 
media portrayals of events. They typically presented the first, and sometimes only, version of 
a story to the press, under conditions of their choosing.  In shaping public narratives 
through the media, law enforcement institutions managed the evidence to support their 
explanations of their behavior. The morning of the Panther raid, for example, the State’s 
Attorney offered a credible portrayal of the life-or-death circumstances in which the police 
officers found themselves. It was made more convincing because he gave it from behind a 
table covered with piles of guns and ammunition supposedly recovered from the apartment. 
This visual affirmation of Panther viciousness was enough to convince the Sun-Times to bury 
the day’s only highly skeptical story; also, the only one written by a reporter who had actually 
visited the crime scene. It initially appeared that the Panther murders might quickly 
disappear as a matter of governmental concern, as had other suspicious killings of young 
black men by police that preceded this event. 
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Beyond the presentation of evidence and the timing of its dissemination, the press 
also had a relationship of comfortable coexistence with both the Department and the 
Democratic organization.27 At its worst this involved outright collusion between a regular 
network of reporters and the Police “subversive section,” or red squad, which spied on just 
about every activist in Chicago from 1960 to 1975.28 In this arrangement, civil libertarian 
Frank Donner described, “reporters, in exchange for favorable press coverage, received 
information about targets or activities in disfavor with the red squad.”29 Otherwise, 
newspapers generally reproduced the police self-image as the defenders of law-and-order and 
maintained a skeptical distance from claims of police brutality until the end of the 1960s. 
Don Moore, a staff attorney for the ACLU of Illinois, noted in 1963, “The newspapers have 
not been an important factor, except for sporadic outbursts in connection with particular 
cases—every three or four years.” He criticized them as “indifferent, bland, unconscious, 
sometimes, hypocritical. Strong language, but, I think, justified.”30 Later in the decade, 
Donald Mosby at the Chicago Defender, would prove an exception, fighting “a lone battle 
against police brutality … in those days—1966, ’67, ’68, ’69—[he ]was the only reporter on 
                                                 
27 Former Alderman Robert Merriam argued that the newspapers used to play “a more independent active role 
than they do today. They were still, in the 1940s, supportive of someone trying to propose something for the 
improvement of the city. They all made their peace with Mr. Daley. They sally forth now and then, and get very 
indignant, but by and large they don’t seem to want to rock the boat.” Milton L. Rakove, “Interview with 
Robert Merriam,” in We Don’t Want Nobody Nobody Sent: An Oral History of the Daley Years (Bloomington, Ind.: 
Indiana University Press, 1979), 262–263.  
28 Frank J. Donner, Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), 90–91. Police spies concentrated on Left and liberal activists, but their net was 
exceptionally broad. They maintained files on a wide range of establishment figures, too, including longtime 
Daily News columnist Mike Royko, heavy-weight corporate lawyer Albert Jenner, Chicago Bears star Gayle 
Sayers, Sears, Roebuck Chairman Arthur Woods, University of Notre Dame President Ted Hesburg, seven 
black Illinois state legislators, and many, many others. Ibid., 95. The unit held files on more than 117,000 locals, 
141,000 out of town subjects, and 14,000 organizations. Ibid., 92. 
29 Referring specifically to the Chicago Tribune and Chicago Today. Donner, Protectors of Privilege, 139. 
30 Donald P. Moore to Thomas B. Morgan, April 21, 1963, ACLU Papers V-80-10. 
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the case in this town.”31 Until the early 1970s, the historically white press kept “police 
brutality” in quotes.  
 
The extraordinary manner in which the Panthers challenged the State’s Attorney’s 
story underscored the difficulty of the undertaking. The Panthers’ access to potential 
evidence in the apartment at 2337 W. Monroe Street made this possible. The Police left the 
apartment unguarded a few hours after the raid, and no one it sealed off for two weeks.32 
According to Hanrahan’s assistant, Richard Jalovec, this was standard operating procedure. 
He noted, “in retrospect, it is easy for me, too, to say this should have been sealed off, [but] 
it is something that is not normally done and was not done that morning.”33 The surviving 
Panthers and their lawyers had an apartment full of blood and bullet holes to substantiate 
their tale. They fashioned evidence and a persuasive account out of the chaos the raiders left 
behind. 34 
The Panthers’ access to this evidence provided the foundation for an immersive, 
almost theatrical production of their counter narrative. They used the Monroe Street 
apartment to re-stage the story of the assassination. Their tours of the death scene were the 
cellphone videos of their day, and they provided powerful witness to the conditions of the 
killing. Their authors presented a visceral experience of death: “there was blood everywhere. 
                                                 
31 E. Duke McNeil, “Before the Bandwagon,” Chicago Defender, November 13, 1973, 8. 
32 Evidence does not just exist. It must be fashioned through purposeful human action. 
33 “Report of the January 1970 Grand Jury” (United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 
1970), 41. Jalovec testified, “in … talking to Commander Flannigan, the head of Homicide, when we talked 
about sealing the apartment—and he has been head of Homicide in Chicago for 20 years—he said he doesn't 
know of one instance where an apartment was sealed.” Quoted in Ibid., 40. 
34 During the two weeks after the raid, Panther lawyers catalogued ten boxes of evidence from the apartment. 
Flint Taylor, Eyes on the Prize II Interviews, October 18, 1988, Washington University Film and Media 
Archive, Henry Hampton Collection, http://digital.wustl.edu/eyesontheprize/; Haas, The Assassination of Fred 
Hampton: How the FBI and the Chicago Police Murdered a Black Panther. 
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There was blood on the mattress right where he was killed, young man didn’t get up and 
shoot anybody because he was killed on the mattress, sleeping! On the mattress, and we saw 
that. Oh, lord …”35 Visitors left with few doubts about the general course of events. 
“[G]oing into the house and looking at all, all the gunshots, the, the bullet holes, um, how 
they had tore the whole house up, everything, it was, it was, it was obvious it was an 
invasion.”36 The Panthers’ story made sense of the scene: “Hampton was killed in his sleep; 
that after the shooting began he rolled over and protected Deborah Johnson, giving his life 
to save hers; that he was shot through the door; that he was shot through the window; that 
the pattern of bullet holes showed the police had done all the firing …”37 The tours of the 
apartment did not bring Hampton and Clark back to life but they did reanimate their deaths. 
Using the death scene to contest the police account, the Panthers reversed the State’s 
Attorney’s institutional advantages. Their vérité presentation of the “shoot in” pulled back the 
curtain on the regular surreptitious staging of evidence undertaken by law enforcement 
institutions outside of public notice. Daily News columnist Mike Royko responded to his visit 
to the apartment with an acerbic column on December 10. The iconoclastic voice of white, 
ethnic Chicago lampooned the State’s Attorney’s false piety in declaring that his men 
escaped unharmed only by “the grace of God.” “[I]t does appear that miracles occurred,” he 
mocked. “The Panthers’ bullets must have dissolved in the air before they hit anybody or 
anything. Either that or the Panthers were shooting in the wrong direction—namely, at 
                                                 
35 Nancy Jefferson, Eyes on the Prize II Interviews, interview by Judy Richardson, October 22, 1988, 
Washington University Film and Media Archive, Henry Hampton Collection, 
http://digital.wustl.edu/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=eop;cc=eop;q1=fred%20hampton;rgn=main;view=text;idno=jef5427.0754.076. 
36 Marion Stamps, Eyes on the Prize II Interviews, interview by Madison Davis Lacy, Jr., June 3, 1989, 
Washington University Film and Media Archive, Henry Hampton Collection, 
http://digital.wustl.edu/eyesontheprize/. 
37 “Report of the January 1970 Grand Jury,” 36. 
  
    124 
themselves.”38 Royko’s corroboration of the Panthers’ story revealed how easy it had been for 
Hanrahan and the Police to promote their story in the first place and redoubled the 
embryonic skepticism of the press.  
The State’s Attorney’s attempts to provide a convincing rebuttal to the Panthers’ 
dramatic theater only emphasized the artifice of his presentation and drew attention to his 
own stagecraft, furthering the demand for an independent inquiry. On December 11, he 
convinced the Tribune and WBBM-TV to run “exclusive” stories—a take-it-or-leave it 
proposition that required them to accept the officers’ accounts as given by the officers. The 
WBBM broadcast was a reenactment of the events, “a television spectacular … acted out by 
the policemen who did the shooting.” The police built a mock-up of the apartment in which 
the men walked through the raid one-by-one over 28 minutes.39 The Tribune made an 
embarrassing mistake by misidentifying two nail heads in a doorframe as Panther bullet holes 
in blown up picture on its front page. More important, though, was the desperation 
Hanrahan showed in endeavoring to control the narrative. By taking the extraordinary step 
of giving such exclusives, he revealed what went on everyday, behind the scenes: law 
enforcement institutions exercised tremendous control over knowledge.  
 
Citizen Knowledge 
                                                 
38 Quoted in Haas, The Assassination of Fred Hampton: How the FBI and the Chicago Police Murdered a Black Panther, 
102. 
39 The federal grand jury did “not understand how the right to a fair trail can ever be guaranteed when the 
major prosecution witnesses all give a detailed testimonial re-enactment.” “Report of the January 1970 Grand 
Jury,” 118. 
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The production and dissemination of knowledge was a key tactic in the interlinked 
relationship between law enforcement and political power in Chicago. “The veil of secrecy 
over police matters,” anti-brutality crusader and Congressman Ralph Metcalfe declared, “is 
one of the hurdles we are trying to overcome.”40 Only in moments of rupture did the glare 
of public scrutiny part the curtain over police activities. In ordinary cases and on a daily 
basis, information about nearly every aspect of police behavior remained relatively 
shrouded.41 Nor was access the only problem. Evidence of the governing rationality of the 
Democratic Party in Chicago can been seen as clearly in what its law enforcement 
institutions chose not to know as in what they kept from the public. Not knowing was as 
significant an act as not sharing, for it operated to sanction particular behaviors. 42  Secrecy 
redoubled the problem, as what the Police Department knew remained nearly always an 
open question.  
By drawing attention to the production of knowledge, the Hampton-Clark case 
helped to produce a legacy of citizen inquiry that shapes what we know today as we look 
back on policing in the 1970s. Much of my own understanding comes from the archives of 
the Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group. Time and again they fought for access to 
information. For example, the “major barrier” to figuring out whether there was a pattern of 
racial discrimination in the transferring of juveniles to adult court was “[a]ccess to a list of 
the juveniles transferred during the last two years …” Similarly, the principle problem in 
                                                 
40 Robert McClory, “Attacks Police Secrecy,” Chicago Defender, January 17, 1974, 4 (quoting Ralph Metcalfe). 
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42 To understand what police do, we need statistics down to the beat level as to when and where police interact 
with people, from a “consensual” interactions, to street stops, to an arrests, all the way through prosecution. 
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examining the State’s attorney’s failure to prosecute police for homicide was “the access to 
public records.” With the Study Group and its sponsor organizations frequently running up 
against this wall, its no surprise they turned to “a general discussion of the problem of access 
to public information. Most of the representatives agreed it would be a recurring problem … 
It was suggested that the LESG consider a continuing project in the area of disclosure of 
public information.”43  
What aspects of police behavior were knowable in 1970? The single best source of 
information on the Department’s law enforcement activities was its Annual Report, although 
it still omitted crucial details.44 The Department had an Information Division as the point of 
access for questions, but it had limited resources and even less knowledge. The Municipal 
Library seemed like it ought to be useful, but police administrators read the municipal 
ordinance that required them to send their publications there narrowly and excluded 
materials like the Department’s Annual Report on homicide. Nowhere could interested 
persons obtain a complete, indexed, collection of departmental rules and regulations. 
Nowhere could they find a comprehensible budget. Nowhere could they find a list of studies 
of the Police Department. (Although if they knew the name of a study, it was probably in the 
Municipal Library.) Perhaps most importantly, nowhere could they find reliable answers to 
questions about police practices. 
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Police behavior kept evidence of police brutality out of the public eye. In part, this 
involved avoiding creating evidence in the first place. Renault Robinson and Kermit 
Coleman recommended that victims not file charges with the Internal Affairs Division. 
Robinson argued, “Not only is the IAD a whitewash operation, but they will take statements 
from victims and use them to prepare a defense in case a civil suit is filed against the city and 
the police department.”45 In other cases, police avoided investigations by convincing 
complainants to drop their cases. This was usually the product of a “charge swap”: the police 
dropped the charges lodged against arrestees—disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and 
assault—in exchange for the arrestees dropping their brutality complaints. Courts often 
facilitated such exchanges. One judge admitted, “A court like mine can’t affect the actions 
on an [Internal Affairs] complaint.” Nonetheless, once the defendant agreed to such an 
exchange on the record, “He doesn’t think he can pursue the complaint.” Such 
encouragement was “‘a little secret of the trade’ used by judges in order to alleviate crowded 
court dockets.”46 If earnestly held, this belief was nonetheless incorrect: this type of docket 
traffic was unnecessary and, in fact, abetted by just such schemes. 
Even when Internal Affairs sustained brutality complaints, it kept them quiet. 
Discipline cases became public only when the requested discipline was over twenty-nine days 
of suspension and the case went before the Police Board. Otherwise, Internal Affairs was 
extremely secretive, even refusing information to the brutality complainant. Many survivors 
complained that they were never informed of the disposition of their cases, even when the 
Department sustained their allegations. Where they were notified, it was by a form letter that 
omitted the officer’s punishment. Instead, letters read, “the policeman will be ‘disciplined 
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commensurate with the charge involved’ or ‘suspended … for a period, without salary.’” 
Director Alfred Conrad explained this policy to the Chicago Tribune. “You don’t want to ruin 
morale,” he argued. “If a policeman is disciplined and you publish it, then his family knows 
it, his neighbors know it, and he is disgraced in front of his children.”47 
 
All of the citizen efforts aimed at reforming the system; few sought to disgrace 
individual officers in front of their children. The most conventional of these was the Study 
Group’s efforts to research the use of lethal force by police officers, a field of study that was 
as yet in its infancy in 1970. Their work testified to epistemological uncertainty of its 
production, as the Police Department refused to share any information on police 
homicides—not even raw numbers. The Study Group’s archives reveal the doggedness with 
which the organization assembled all publically available data on each killing. Unlike run-of-
the-mill police brutality cases, some public records on these homicides existed: there were 
aggregate statistics collected by the Police Weapons Center of the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police, as well the records of inquests into the cause of death convened by the 
Cook County Coroner. Chicago’s newspapers provided invaluable details, and researchers 
meticulously combed them for scraps of information. This did not stop Superintendent 
James B. Conlisk from later criticizing the Study Group for peddling factual inaccuracies.48 
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This amounted, in the words of spokesman Marshall Patner, to criticizing the Group 
“because it does not furnish information that the department refused to provide.”49 
Although its authors framed The Police and Their Use of Fatal Force as a “first step,” it 
did not prevent them from reaching number of provocative conclusions about the use of 
lethal force by Chicago Police. Using rudimentary statistical techniques, the Study Group 
pointed to three correlations. Chicago Police shot and killed more civilians than police in 
other cities: “the Chicago civilian death rate was over three times that of New York, Los 
Angeles, and Detroit, and 1.5 times that of Philadelphia. Controlling for arrest rates, size of 
police force, and police death rate does not explain Chicago’s relatively high civilian death 
rate.”50 Black Chicagoans were more than six times as likely as white to be shot by police: 
fifty-nine of seventy-nine people killed by the police over the study period were black. This 
over-correlation remained even when the disproportionate black felony arrest rate was taken 
into account. Finally, the Fatal Force Report concluded that the four review institutions 
(Police, State’s Attorney, grand jury, and Coroner) failed to address evidence of police 
misconduct.51 
While the Fatal Force Report substantiated the lines of criticism pursued by many 
critics of police use of force, anti-brutality activists had a hard time recognizing its full 
significance. Russell Meek bluntly argued that the report simply codified common 
knowledge: “Everyone knows that white police kill blacks with little or no provocation and it 
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should be called genocide at worst and murder at best.”52 Renault Robinson’s slightly more 
diplomatic response affirmed the same basic conclusion, “The Report contained a great deal 
[of] information, that we of the AAPL, and people in the black community have known for 
years.”53  
If the report highlighted felt-truths that black nationalists, liberals, and radicals 
commonly articulated, it went well beyond them. Just the act of trying to account for all 
police killings made the report new. To understand the police exercise of lethal force, after 
all, it was necessary to understand the many instances in which the report’s authors 
concluded that there was little question about the legality of the officers’ use of force. By the 
Report’s count, 87 percent of killings did not involve a question of potential criminal 
charges. By revealing the massive scope of the killing—seventy-nine deaths in only nine 
months—the Report laid bare the scope and scale of the shootings, even apart from any 
adjudication of fault in a particular incident. The Fatal Force Report revealed that Police 
Department committed an equivalent dereliction of duty: not making police homicide 
knowable.  
 
 
Policy research created one kind of knowledge. Black activists created a different 
type through social infrastructure.  Both the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League and the 
Urban League’s Action for Survival program set up intake hotlines. The Urban League 
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described its “Survival Line” as a “monitoring system.” They created it to “help the Black 
community to find ways to police the police so that they will be accountable to the 
community, to end crime in our streets and to provide an effective network among Black 
people in Chicago.”54 The Line’s creator speculated that “based on the calls, we could begin 
to see a pattern of the type of repressive acts taking place in the community… we would 
have the facts to show exactly what is happening to us—the type of police service we are 
getting as well as the lack of service.”55 During the first year that the Survival Line was up 
and running, 30 percent of the calls coming in dealt with “criminal action and police 
brutality.”56 Many of these cases of brutality were referred to the Afro-American Patrolmen’s 
League’s Police Brutality Complaint and Referral Service, which also did its own intake, for 
assistance.57 
The principle purpose of the intake lines was help individuals respond to state 
violence, but they also came to serve collective purposes. In the summer of 1972, U.S. 
Congressman Ralph Metcalfe held a “blue ribbon” panel on the misuse of police authority in 
Chicago. Metcalfe’s hearings drew upon many different resources from within the network 
of police reformers Jack Mendelsohn of the Alliance, and John McKnight of the Study 
Group both sat on the panel. Kermit Coleman served as general counsel for the hearings 
and wrote the panel’s report, which the Urban League printed and distributed. The most 
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important contribution to the hearings were the citizen witnesses who testified to their 
experiences—or those of family members—at the hands of the Chicago Police. For two 
days, they offered stories of abuse that took on great collective weight through their 
aggregation. Many of these witnesses came from the Urban League and Patrolmen’s League 
intake services.58  
Metcalfe’s hearing flipped the usual direction of law enforcement inquiry. It was not 
an investigation of the people who appeared before the blue ribbon panel. Instead, the 
members of the panel served as both interlocutors of and representatives for the witnesses in 
turning scrutiny onto law enforcement. As in the Black Panther case, this inverted the usual 
presumptions. Renault Robinson went further, using his weekly op-ed column in the Chicago 
Defender, “The Black Watch,” to try the police for their treatment of people who came to the 
League for assistance.59 Like Metcalfe and the Study Group, Robinson used the information 
about individual instances of brutality to make the case that a structural problem existed. 
But, as the Internal Affairs chief feared, Robinson sought to disgrace brutal police officers. 
He took the disgrace and shame felt by survivors of brutality, as well as black policemen who 
operated within a system that condoned such brutality, and turned it back against its source.  
It was one thing to indirectly violate the “blue wall of silence” by speaking in general 
terms about police racism and brutality as the AAPL head often did. It was something else 
to tell specific tales in this variety of ways. Robinson styled one column in the form of a 
police report:  
CRIME: Rape & Robbery 
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VICTIM: A black woman, mother of two girls 
OFFENDERS: Three white uniformed patrolmen: 
1. 6’2”, 175 of 180 lbs., blonde with a shag haircut, side burns. … 
2. 5’7”, about 150 lbs., black hair, thick mustache and eyebrows. … 
3. 5’7”, a little stockier than the driver, champaigne [sic] blonde (or sandy) 
wore thick prescription glasses (frames).  
DATE OF OCCURRENCE: Saturday, June 16 1973 
TIME: 3:45 A.M.60 
He gave other shocking descriptions of the abject inhumanity with which police treated 
people, especially black women. In relation to the rape described above, he noted “while 
they raped her [the three officers] kept calling her nigger bitch.”61 He detailed the humiliation 
of another woman, beginning with a minor traffic stop and ending in the 115th Street Station, 
where “After two hours of begging to go the bathroom, I couldn’t hold it any longer and 
was forced to urinate on myself … All three [officers] roared with laughter at this act as 
though it were a joke.”62 On a third occasion a police officer arrested a twenty-four year old, 
pregnant woman. He “handcuffed Miss Hill. He beat her, and kicked her in the stomach. 
Miss Hill eventually lost her baby because of the beating.”63  
 In his columns, the AAPL chief took a no-holds-barred approach to fellow officers. 
He named names: Officer James C. Amendola “beat[] Mrs. Lavelle Rogers, a black woman, 
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after he had answered a call to her apartment.” When Richard Leftridge tried to step in, 
“Officer Amendola, and four other white policemen then turned on Leftridge, and beat him 
so badly he lost one eye.”64 Similarly, “Patrolmen John Rafferty, Start Number 4375, … a 
white policeman who works in the 6th District … Officer Rafferty’s favorite past time is 
beating and kicking, and cursing black women in his district. In fact he is so fond of beating 
and abusing black women he has beaten the same black woman on more than one 
occasion.”65 Robinson’s radicalism consisted not in his character of his beliefs about 
reforming the police but the dramatic ways in which he was willing to violate the norms of 
police loyalty to fellow officers in order to prove his loyalty to other black Chicagoans. 
Robinson’s writing reflected the network of resistance that grew up around the 
League. In piercing the blue wall of silence, Robinson advanced the notion that black police 
could be the protectors of black communities and, particularly, black women. The problem 
of police brutality was—and is—often conceived in terms of violence done to black men. 
But Robinson’s stories were artful constructions that allowed him to navigate the particular 
challenges created by the ideology of black masculinity that League officers embraced. 
Writing about black men abused by the police was dangerous, because romantic notions of 
resistance undermined men’s ability to be sympathetic victims. (Indeed, that Police attacked 
the Panthers in their sleep allowed them to escape from this bind.) By putting black women’s 
vulnerability at the center of his columns, Robinson was able to represent blackness as 
vulnerable by its relation with the police department. But he also provided a way out: His 
columns enacted his claims about black policemen’s loyalty to black people over blue 
uniforms. Like all forms of community-building, this one contained hidden (or not so 
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hidden) forms of domination. In the act of giving voice to black women’s grievances against 
the police, he also silenced them as actors. The black male cop, articulating these grievances, 
became the agent for redemption, rather than the women themselves as actors.  
 
The Anatomy of a Cover Up 
Creating knowledge, or refusing to do so, was critical to the Police Department’s 
policy of hiding brutality. Activists contested this by using their locations—within 
communities, the university, Congress—to try and produce their own knowledge. 
Institutions did more than just produce facts. They told narratives that used those facts, and 
then corroborated them. For example, in a police homicide case, four different institutions 
reviewed the action of the officer in Chicago in 1970: the Police Department, the State’s 
Attorney, the Coroner, and a grand jury. As the Study Group speculated, “The presence of 
four reviewing bodies would normally lead to the presumption that police use of fatal force 
is thoroughly scrutinized.”66 This idea is engrained in basic theories of American adversarial 
justice. Legal scholar Richard Leo argues adversarial justice relies on a division of labor, 
pitting the prosecution against the defense with the judge as an impartial referee and on 
division of functions separating investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and punishment.67 The 
presumption that the four institutions would adequately review police homicides relied on 
the notion that they checked each other’s power. The police were responsible for 
investigating crimes and developing evidence. The state’s attorney, responsible for 
prosecuting crimes, decided whether this evidence was sufficient to present an indictment to 
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the grand jury and used it to conduct the prosecution. The grand jury provided an 
independent review of the prosecutor’s decision-making, deciding whether to indict a 
suspect. Finally, the coroner’s investigations of the cause of death were orthogonal to, and 
cut across, the others. 
In reality, these institutions reinforced the decisions of police officers in cases of 
homicide. The presumption of independent scrutiny “[wa]s compromised by the 
interdependence of the four bodies.” Their findings, the Study Group concluded, “tended to 
interlock.”68 The most egregious example was the detailing of police officers to the State’s 
Attorney’s office as part of the Special Prosecutions Unit, literally merging investigation and 
prosecution. Less extreme examples of interdependencies were numerous. As Leo notes, 
detectives regularly adopt a highly partisan and strategic conviction psychology in which they 
decide who is guilty and thoroughly “align[ ] themselves with the prosecution in orientation 
and goal.”69 Because prosecutors are entirely dependent on police officers, they lose their 
incentives to make independent judgments of the evidence. The Chief Judge of New York, 
Sol Wachtler famously complained, “district attorney’s now have so much influence on 
grand juries that ‘by and large’ they could get them to ‘indict a ham sandwich.’”70 Similarly, 
most coroner’s inquests in Cook County in the early 1970s had a single witness: the 
investigating police officer.71 
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In Chicago, a tight network of political interest and affiliation sustained these 
institutional dependencies. Ensuring coordination did not require a firm hand from City 
Hall. Shared beliefs, habits, practices, and goals amongst men produced it. High-ranking law 
enforcement officials (cops, state’s attorneys, etc.) perceived events and acted in response to 
them in relation to their understandings of Democratic politics. This was a practical 
sensibility whose contours accorded with the nature of bureaucratic action in government 
dominated by a single, hierarchically constituted political party.72 Such coordination was the 
manifestation of the structural logic of party governance in their individual behavior. The 
training of the men who ran these institutions habituated them, and regular processes of 
interaction with their counterparts reinforced their habits of mind and action. These 
sensibilities filtered down to uniformed officers. In a city where the vast majority of 
patrolmen believed one needed a political sponsor to advance, can there be any surprise that 
men acted with the political effect in mind? “Don’t make no waves,” was the first rule of the 
Party.73 But police behavior did make waves, and the men trying to calm them usually 
responded in ways that accounted for their understanding of political consequences. That 
being said, their grasp of political consequences was often much less sophisticated than 
Mayor Daley’s. 
 
In responding to the Black Panther murders, law enforcement institutions engaged in 
their habitual practice of reinforcing police claims. A profusion of inquiries, both official and 
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unofficial, took place over the next two years.74 Community based investigations were one 
path by which anger, fear, and a desire for accountability manifested at the grassroots. But 
the demand for justice extended beyond the creation of community solidarity around a 
counter-narrative. A grand jury, the Police Department’s Internal Investigations Division, 
and a Special Coroner’s Inquest all completed their investigative or prosecutorial actions 
within two months after the incident. Jerris Leonard, United States Assistant Attorney 
General for Civil Rights, convened a special federal grand jury, which finished its work in 
May 1970. The case finally ended with the appointment of a special Cook County prosecutor 
and a special grand jury; the trial that resulted was not over until November of 1971. 
Although collectively the investigations provided some answers as to what happened in the 
Monroe Street apartment, they are more useful as a map of the various strategies that 
institutions used to protect their interests. For the local institutions, that meant protecting 
the State’s Attorney, the Police Department, and the Democratic Party. For the Department 
of Justice, it was in shielding the federal involvement in the Panther murders from public 
scrutiny. The divergent nature of their actions was a mirror of these contradictory desires.  
The Police Department’s Internal Investigations Division provided one model for 
the exercise of power, a barely disguised assertion of police prerogative. Following Supt. Jim 
Conlisk’s orders to investigate the raid, the Internal Investigations Division Produced a 
report nine days later. Conlisk’s terse two-sentence press release recounted its conclusion 
that the officers did nothing wrong. Even the Tribune, which ran the officers’ exclusive a 
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week earlier, was skeptical, headlining its story, “Police ‘Clear’ 14 in Panther Raid.” 
Completed in a matter of days, with no public participation, the report convinced no one.75 
It was, as the special grand jury revealed, a product of fantasy rather than investigation. Sgt. 
John Meade, a former State’s Attorney, used the television re-enactment to prepare 
questions, then preparing answers with three of Hanrahan’s assistants and Sgt. Daniel Groth, 
the commander of the raid. These men then briefed the other officers before interviewing 
them. Capt. Harry Ervanian, head of the Internal Investigations, admitted that “the 
investigation was not ‘complete,’ that the circumstances had not been developed ‘with any 
great degree of accuracy,’ that it was an ‘extremely bad’ investigation, and that it would not 
be unfair to conclude that it was ‘nothing but a whitewash.’”76  
The Special Coroner’s Inquest represented a contrary strategy that responded more 
directly to the crisis of authority. In the weeks after the raid, resolutions came from all 
quarters, including from inside the Democratic Party and the downtown establishment, 
calling for an extraordinary inquiry “to restore the public confidence which has been shaken 
by these events.”77 These calls aimed to reestablish public faith in government, an object 
altogether different than the justice demanded by those most critical of the State’s Attorney 
and the Police. Chicago Bar Association President Frank Greenberg argued that any 
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legitimate investigation needed to be “open to the press and participated in by 
representatives of the black community …”78 Even the Mayor agreed. Repeated experience 
with political scandal taught him when and how to distance the Party, and a controlled 
public inquiry seemed appropriate. Despite his continued backing of Hanrahan personally 
and politically, the Mayor concluded, “It is necessary that an orderly and complete 
investigation by an impartial body receives everyone’s cooperation so that all doubts may be 
resolved.”79 
Rather than creating a new procedure, the Democrats adopted the coroner’s inquest 
as the vehicle for the inquiry. Bar President Greenberg, suggesting it, describing the inquest 
“as the only existing instrument within our framework of law, by which the necessary open 
investigation can be carried out.”80 The coroner’s office, and his inquest, was an institutional 
survival from an earlier era, whose task it was to affix the cause of death in cases of 
“unknown or suspected undue causes.”81 Inquests employed six person juries, giving them a 
familial resemblance to a criminal trial, but they were emphatically “not a judicial 
proceeding.”82 Inquisitorial, rather than adversarial in nature, they lacked the evidentiary rules 
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governing a criminal trial and proceeded largely at the presiding coroner’s discretion.83 
Lawyers representing the decedent’s family were regularly allowed to participate, although 
the presiding coroner controlled the number and type-of questions that might be asked on 
cross-examination.84  
While the public nature of the inquest and the possibility of inclusive participation 
gave it potential legitimacy, it was hardly a neutral forum. The Coroner was an elected 
position, no less influenced by political imperatives than any other official.85 Moreover, for 
nearly two decades, anti-brutality lawyers repeatedly tried to leverage the inquest’s potential 
for publicity and participation and were almost never successful.86 No one was less 
optimistic about the procedure than Kermit Coleman. From 1968 to 1972, he became a 
specialist in representing families of the dead before the inquest, taking on at least twenty-
five cases. He never won. As he noted in the aftermath of the shooting of a nineteen-year-
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old black boy, “he was not surprised by the jury’s verdict, since ‘every police killing in this 
city for the last 75 years has been justified.’”87 
The Coroner publically distanced the inquest from politics. He handpicked a racially-
balanced jury (three black and three white men), choosing professionals free from political 
involvement. Moreover, he appointed former Assistant United States’ Attorney Martin 
Gerber to preside as a special deputy coroner. Nontheless, Gerber also gave a hint of just 
how the inquest might be wielded for political effect, which followed up on Daley’s 
emphasis on “everyone’s cooperation.” Knowing that the Panther’s stated intention not to testify, 
Gerber declared, “If there is not a full hearing, only those who refuse to testify will be 
responsible.”88 This was the political catch. Like all of the available state-sponsored legal 
processes, the inquest put the Panthers in a bind. Participate and potentially legitimize a 
whitewash. Refuse and be blamed for allowing the State’s Attorney and the Police to walk. 
Circumstantial evidence suggests that the Corner preferred to lay blame on the Panthers by 
not having them testify. When they refused to answer questions, he did not seek a judicial 
order for them to do so on penalty of contempt, which would almost certainly have been 
granted.89 He did have one of their lawyers jailed for contempt, though, for refusing to 
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produce evidence.90 Keeping the Panthers out of jail for contempt likely served the greater 
end of an impartial appearance.91  
Despite the best efforts of the “blue-ribbon” jurors, the coroner’s inquest did not 
restore faith in law enforcement. The special deputy coroner repeatedly undermined the 
credibility of the proceeding. He took it “on himself to reply for witnesses being interrogated 
by the attorneys representing the slain Panthers’ families.” Worse, he interfered with the 
jurors, who undertook their questioning of witnesses with the utmost seriousness; “on 
several occasions[ he] prevented two jurors … both attorneys, from asking questions …”92 
One juror refused Gerber’s orders to stop questioning Sgt. Groth.93 The real damage was 
done, though, when the Special Deputy Coroner indicated in an interview that the homicides 
were justified, prior to the inquest’s completion. The jurors chastised him, “We are the sole 
determiners of the evidence, here.”94 When the jurors issued they ruling of “justifiable 
homicide,” they did so with the caveat that it was “based solely and exclusively on the 
evidence presented.” The Mayor and the Special Deputy Coroner hoped the Panthers might 
be blamed for such a limited presentation of evidence.95 But this did not appear to convince 
those already doubtful of the raid’s legality. The Defender reported a consensus “that [the 
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verdict] was expected even before the proceedings began and that the proceedings were a 
legal farce.”96 
Ultimately, it was the special federal grand jury that made knowable the multiple 
ways in which the Police, State’s Attorney, and the Coroner advanced the interests of party. 
This was of great use to activists interested in the local criminal justice system. But its 
revelation of how local power worked was a function of its obscuring of the federal deep 
involvement in counter-intelligence activities against the Panthers and, in particular, of the 
role played by a federal informant (Panther Chief of Security William O’Neal) in providing 
the intelligence and a map of the apartment prior to the raid. In leading the grand jury, Jerris 
Leonard embodied the multiple, conflicting interests that characterized the federal role in the 
case. He was also the man charged with keeping them hidden. Leonard was Chief of Staff 
for Attorney General John Mitchell’s Civil Disturbance Group, “which was instructed to 
coordinate intelligence, policy, and action within the Department of Justice concerning 
domestic civil disturbances.”97 Even if this was unknown at the time, liberals harbored 
suspicions about Leonard’s neutrality. On a plane with the Assistant Attorney General a few 
weeks earlier, ACLU head Jay Miller heard Leonard explain Bobby Seale’s inclusion in the 
trial for the disturbances at the 1968 Democratic National Convention thusly: “The Black 
Panthers are nothing but hoodlums and we’ve got to get them.”98 Panther lawyers later 
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concluded, “He was supposed to be looking into civil rights violations against the Panthers, 
yet he had the responsibility to help the FBI and other law enforcement agencies monitor 
and destroy them.”99 Only later in the mid-1970, after Watergate, would the FBI efforts to 
destroy the Chicago Panthers be revealed.100   
The 132-page Report issued by Leonard’s Special Grand Jury on May 15, 1970, was a 
bureaucratic sleight-of-hand.101 It exposed the wrongdoing of the local law enforcement 
while blaming the incident and the lack of indictments on the Panthers. Leonard got 
Hanrahan to drop the indictments against the surviving Panthers by “let[ting] it be known 
that if the indictments against the Panthers by the state prosecutor were dismissed that we 
would not seek indictments against the police officers and the police, and the city officials 
and Hanrahan in the Grand Jury case.”102 While the Assistant Attorney General framed 
himself as protecting the Panthers, his magnanimity was a byproduct of institutional interest. 
By convincing the State’s Attorney to drop the charges, Leonard avoided the possibility that 
a trial would reveal federal involvement.  
The Special Grand Jury’s most decisive intervention was in accounting for the cover 
up of police violence. Normally, such a “charge swap” was a prelude to a non-investigation, 
with evidence of brutality remaining undeveloped. Here, the Report created a public record of 
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the evidence, albeit in a way that the Black Panther claimed, “conspired to cover up, hide and 
protect the actions of the State’s Attorney and his raiders …”103 The Report was flawed; it 
omitted crucial evidence; and it reached unjust conclusions.104 Nonetheless, it also 
overwhelmingly confirmed the Panthers’ interpretation of the evidence.105 Moreover, by 
exposing the processes used by the Chicago Police, the State’s Attorney, and the Cook 
County Coroner, the Special Grand Jury powerfully echoed the Panthers’ critique of the 
legitimacy of those law enforcement institutions. The Report showed, one activist concluded, 
the “DISTORTION OF SYSTEM OF JUSTICE RESULTING FROM POLITICAL 
MACHINE CONTROL OF ALL BRANCHES.” 106  
The grand jury demonstrated with stunning clarity how the actions of law 
enforcement institutions intersected and overlapped in order to reinforce the State’s 
Attorney’s claims. For example, it found the performance of the I.I.D. to be “so seriously 
deficient that it suggests purposeful malfeasance.” Moreover, “the publication of the results 
of this ‘investigation’ … was misleading to the general public by inferring that a legitimate 
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investigation was held.” The orientation of the Chicago Police Crime Laboratory was 
similarly lacking. The Mobile Crime Lab’s team leader averred “that the team’s only purpose 
was to gather evidence supporting the officers’ stories, makes it clear that there simply was 
no thorough examination of the premises.”107 Finally, the Report questioned, “whether the 
continuation of the [coroner’s] inquest system is in the best interests of justice. The findings 
were based on incomplete evidence and, in fact, were not binding on anyone.”108 Like the 
other two investigations, the coroner’s procedure appeared to serve no purpose beyond 
providing a veneer of impartiality to a highly partisan set of findings. 
Some critics of police action believed that grand jury Report did the same, albeit in a 
subtler manner. Panther leader Bobby Rush declared, “we see the (county) coroner’s inquest 
as a simple whitewash; the IID investigation as a simple whitewash and the federal grand 
jury report as a highly sophisticated whitewash.”109 Nonetheless, anti-brutality advocates 
seized on the evidence provided by the Special Grand Jury. ACLU lawyers Alex Polikoff and 
Kermit Coleman argued, “the IID cover-up in this instance is not an exception, not an 
aberration, but the normal pattern of IID operation over the years.” They wrote to the 
Mayor and the Police Superintendent, “We are compelled to say, ‘We told you so. Many, 
many times. Over many, many years.’”110  
The ACLU was right, but it got the mechanics of the case backwards. Internal 
Investigations personnel, the crime lab, and the coroner acted in ways that were not part of 
the “normal pattern … of operation.” In the normal pattern, most evidence was not in an 
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accessible apartment. In the normal pattern, the press accepted the Police and State’s 
Attorney’s stories. In the normal pattern, the IID had no need to coordinate a fake 
investigation. In the normal pattern, the coroner had no need to tightly control the 
proceedings. And, in the normal pattern, the state’s attorney did not have to cut deals with 
the federal government. This is to say: in the normal pattern, covering up required much less 
effort and left many fewer tracks. In the normal pattern, it required only quotidian 
institutional behavior. Only because the Panther case was not in the “normal pattern” were 
the routine interrelationships between institutions revealed so clearly. 
 
Citizens Challenge Bureaucratic Processes 
Police reform activists responded to the Black Panther case trying to find ways hat 
citizen could participate in governing the police. Pockets of potential citizen power existed 
throughout the law enforcement bodies that formally governed the city, but the practices of 
the Democratic Party largely neutralized them. As an anti-brutality network emerged in 
1970s, it sought to use citizen participation to reinvigorate these institutions. Through 
participation, they sought to shift the locus of accountability away from the Democratic 
Party. Two of their campaigns responded directly to the circumstances of the Black Panther 
case: activists sought the appointment of a special prosecutor to indict Hanrahan and to 
change the operation of the Cook County Coroner. The third was a campaign to empower 
and transform the existing civilian Police Board. Each of these campaigns enjoyed some 
success, although none resulted either in as much accountability or as much citizen 
participation as the activists wanted. Despite this, they represented a reordering of the 
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regulation of force by police officers. By populating the institutional field with a new 
network of actors, they disrupted the coordination between institutions that had previously 
operated to obscure brutality. Inserting citizen as monitors, they limited opportunities for 
covering up brutality.  
The newly formed Alliance to End Repression began its campaign against Hanrahan 
almost as soon as he dropped the charges against the surviving Panthers on May 9; the 
group called on the Chief Judge of thee Cook County Courts to appoint a special prosecutor 
in the case. “Nothing less can satisfy the minimum standards of ‘equal justice under law.’”111 
The release of the special federal grand jury’s Report on May 12 added legal heft to their 
claim. Even if the raiders committed no federal crimes, the grand jury provided a plethora of 
evidence of state law crimes. With the failure of either state or federal grand jury’s to charge 
the State’s Attorney and his officers, the arc of justice seemed to stop bending somewhere 
short of Chicago’s Loop. But “the Black and concerned communities would not be appeased 
and the outcry for justice grew.”112 Deviating from the Urban League’s traditional non-
partisanship, executive director Laplois Ashford called “for immediate action by the 
responsible authorities to bring about the resignation or dismissal from office of all law 
enforcement officers or officials who participated in or condoned the notorious perversions 
of justice and legal process in this case.”113 He led League employees in discussions about 
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how to get “the community rallied and organized around the issue of removing Conlisk and 
Hanrahan.”114 
 The Alliance channeled these hopes for accountability back into the legal system. It 
recruited organizations to sign on to a petition drafted by the ACLU to appoint a special 
prosecutor. Over two weeks, the Alliance put together a roster of sity-seven organizations to 
sign the petition to the County Court. Along with the seventeen other groups that submitted 
motions along the same lines, the petitioners formed a broad cross-section of Chicago’s 
social welfare and non-profit organizations. It included churches, street gangs, social welfare 
providers, students, unions, homophile organizations, YMCAs, and many others.115 
That the petition compelled Democratic officials to conduct yet another inquiry 
reflected the exceptional damage inflicted by the grand jury’s Report. Daley again called for a 
full and fair hearing, arguing, “The people should know, both the white community and the 
black community, both for the serving of justice and the serving of the rights of every man 
and woman, we should know actually what happened.”116 The case conveniently found its 
way to the docket of his former law partner and Bridgeport neighbor, Joseph Power, the 
presiding judge of the Cook County Criminal Court. To signal the prosecutor’s 
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independence, Judge Power selected Barnabas Sears.117 Twelve years earlier, Daley’s sworn 
enemy, State’s Attorney Benjamin Adamowski, had chosen Sears to prosecute the crooked 
cops responsible for the 1960 Summerdale scandal.  
The limits of impartiality were evident, but the institutional context meant that the 
costs of meddling were stiffer than they had been in the coroner’s inquest. For months, 
Sears and his four assistants (two black, two white) proceeded unimpeded. When rumors 
began to circulate that the grand jury was prepared to issue indictments, however, Judge 
Power took action. New Yorker staff writer Michael J. Arlen summarized: “Judge Power first 
told Sears that he had to call more witnesses; then—when Sears replied that this sort of a 
request to a Grand Jury was not within a judge’s province—Judge Power publically berated 
Sears; then—when the Grant Jury presented a sealed indictment to Power—the Judge 
refused to open it.”118 Further shenanigans followed, as the Judge determined to investigate 
whether Sears exercised “undue influence” in securing an indictment. Only the intervention 
of the Illinois Supreme Court forced Judge Power to finally open the indictments of 
fourteen individuals, including Hanrahan and eight of the fourteen raiders, for obstruction of 
justice.119 Even then, trial was a long way off. Although Power handed the case off to Judge 
Phillip Romiti, he continued down the same partisan course. Sears had to win a second 
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court before the court set the case for trial.  
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At what point do legal processes, earnestly undertaken by their participants, become 
part of a cover-up? Was Barnabas Sears’s indictment for obstruction of justice (instead of 
homicide) a part of the obstruction of justice, as the Panthers argued? Was it “a feeble 
attempt on the part of the state to redeem itself in the eyes of the People”?120 In retrospect, it 
appeares that Daley’s calculation in favor of a special prosecutor paid off, as the slow and 
complex trial created “a boredom of real and almost dangerous proportions” that distanced 
the conduct of the case from the events that motivated it.121 On October 25, 1972, Judge 
Romiti dismissed all charges at the conclusion of the prosecution’s case-in-chief. The 
evidence was “simply not sufficient to establish or prove any conspiracy against any 
defendant,” so he dismissed all counts. Black reaction was muted: “there was little likelihood 
of obtaining a judge in this country who would have done other than Romiti did,” said 
Alderman William Cousins. Bill Hampton, Ralph Metcalfe and others all concluded the same 
thing: it was “no surprise.”122   
 
Few people, aside from Kermit Coleman and a handful of other lawyers, paid 
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attention to the County Coroner prior to the Hampton-Clark murders. Afterwards, the 
necessity of the inquest procedure became a legitimate question.123 The Study Group’s 
research on fatal force, for example, led to the cleverly titled report, “An Inquest on the 
Cook County Coroner.” It formalized the widespread conclusion that the “Cook County 
inquest rubber-stamps the decisions of the police and the state’s attorney instead of acting as 
an independent, public-interest inquiry into the facts that pertain to an unnatural death.”124 
Its most novel contribution was the result of empirical inquiry into the Coroner’s juries. 
Jurors—all men—served by application, and their assignments were regular rather than 
random. When researchers examined the reports of 151 randomly selected inquests during 
1969 and 1970, they found that just 70 jurors heard all of the cases. One man sat on 42 
juries. Repeat players produced exceptionally brief deliberations: 41 of 51 verdicts that Study 
Group researchers observed took nine minutes or less. Just one took longer than half an 
hour.125  
In constructing a reform campaign to follow up on the Study Group report, the 
Alliance presented the question in classic civil libertarian terms. The process failed “to 
‘provide sufficient legal safeguards to the rights of individuals.’” Their critique was rooted in 
due process: the jurors were “‘virtually employees’ of the coroner,” deputy coroners were 
“political appointees with little or no legal or medical training[,]” and procedures highly 
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discretionary.126 Appearing before the County Board in November 1971, the Alliance argued 
for random jury selection; more formal rules; efforts to train the deputy coroners; and 
upgrading the pool of officers for sensitive cases, by having the Chicago Bar Association 
recommend qualified lawyers.127 Their efforts revealed Coroner Toman’s lack of investment 
in the existing institutional design of the inquest. His interest was in politics, jobs, and perks. 
Accordingly, he promised to implement the changes he could, and seek authority from the 
State Legislature for the others.128 Yet he refused to be pinned down with a commitment.129 
The Coroner’s swift agreement to the Alliance’s terms reflected the changed 
landscape of law enforcement politics. The presence of organizations with the capacity to 
produce both knowledge of state behavior and turnout at meetings encumbered the actions 
of state institutions. But then, promising reform was a great way to diffuse the reformers’ 
energy. Time and again, Mayor Daley promised reforms in the public and left the details for 
hammering out in the more favorable terrain of the Fifth Floor of City Hall.  
In this case, Coroner’s Toman’s commitment was publically tested and found 
wanting. The occasion was another police homicide, in which an off-duty, white policeman 
shot a black, 21-year-old ex-Marine, Cornell Fitzpatrick.130 Whether Fitzpatrick had a gun 
was the disputed question in the case—only the officer and the other security guards saw 
one, supposedly hidden in his palm.131 The anti-brutality network snapped into action: the 
family retained Kermit Coleman; the AAPL investigated; and the Alliance and Citizens Alert 
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joined local residents in demanding an independent inquiry. The Coroner agreed.132 Then he 
changed his mind and delivered “a slap in the face to all those concerned about this 
matter.”133 Citing the “commendable way” he handled the Hampton-Clark case, the Coroner 
appointed Martin Gerber as Special Deputy Coroner.134 
 Renault Robinson summed upped the outrage sparked by the Coroner’s 
appointment of Gerber: 
Once again the City of Chicago stands accused – the mayor, the police chief, 
the state’s attorney and the coroner are the same actors in the same play. 
‘The Killing and Cover Up of Cornell Fitzpatrick,’ starring Martin Gerber 
with guest stars white Patrolman Bernard Martin and special guest the ‘Drop 
Gun.’ This is a repeat performance – the actors are basically the same. The 
guest star is always a white policeman, the victim is always a black young 
man. Any black person in the city of Chicago can give you the outcome of 
the play (An American tragedy). 135  
Irrespective of the result, which was “involuntary manslaughter,” the whole nasty process 
confirmed to the Alliance and the others that the Coroner’s Office was scientifically 
inexcusable, legally indefensible, and politically irredeemable.136 In July, the Alliance and 
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Citizen’s Alert convinced the Cook County Board to sponsor a referendum eliminating the 
coroner’s office in favor of a medical examiner.137 
This was a strange result to a campaign for greater citizen involvement: it eliminated 
citizen involvement altogether. The proposed transformation appealed to the impulse to 
professionalize the medical side of the coroner’s work. But it also removed the delusion that 
the coroner’s office served justice. The impeccable political logic of the petition divorced the 
question of reforming the coroner’s office from the question of its occupant, and left the 
question of the medical examiner’s appointment in the hands of the Democratically 
controlled County Board. When the Republican candidate “seized upon the ALLIANCE 
position for the substance of his platform” in the Coroner’s race—indeed, making it his only 
issue—he boxed Coroner Toman into a corner.138 The incumbent came out in support of 
the referendum.139 In the (otherwise) historic election of November 7, 1972, the voters of 
Cook County overwhelming abolished the Coroner’s office.140  
 
The campaigns to hold the State Attorney and the Coroner accountable 
demonstrated how an institutional network capable of creating information and mobilizing 
actors changed the calculus by which criminal justice institutions performed their duties. On 
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a process level, they discovered that citizen action could disrupt bureaucratic domination 
even while not entirely transforming it. Yet, this amounted to a less full participation than 
organizations like the Alliance sought. As activists looked to democratize policing—to bring 
citizens into the policy-making processes—they discovered that Chicago already had a five-
man civilian Police Board, responsible for making police policy.  As Ruth Wells of Citizen’s 
Alert later noted, “At the time we ‘discovered’ the Chicago Police Board, it was almost 
unknown to the public and the news media although it had been in existence for eleven 
years.”141 For more than a decade, the Alliance and Citizen’s Alert would carry on a sustained 
campaign to invigorate the Police Board. 
The Police Board was O.W. Wilson’s legacy.142 In 1960, the City Council vested the 
power in the five-man Board “to supervise and control the department and to make and 
enforce all necessary and desirable rules therefore, and to direct the Superintendent of Police 
in the management of the Department.”143 By 1970, the Board held real disciplinary trials, 
such as the trial of Renault Robinson, but was otherwise a rubber stamp, with perfunctory 
meetings on policy and budgetary matters.144 Alliance coordinator John Hill pointed out, 
“One Board member stated that in eleven years he could not recall one instance when a 
general order had been disapproved or modified.”145 Superintendents Wilson and Conlisk 
were so correctly confident of Board approval that they typically issued orders first and 
presented them to the Board later. The meetings were “congratulatory sessions” at which 
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“the board smilingly approving everything Conlisk asks, even when they don’t know what 
he’s talking about.”146 
The Alliance/Citizen’s Alert camaign to democratize the Board took various forms. 
It began in 1971 with an effort to intervene in the appointment of a new member. 
Appointment powers were a crucial link between governance and politics. Just as with 
constructing a slate of candidates for office, the Mayor sought balance on the Board. The 
mix usually included top-notch law enforcement people, downtown establishment figures, 
and stalwart extra-governmental members of the Daley coalition (typically, labor leaders). 
Symbolic representation through the appointment of one black Chicagoan on the board was 
a constant. The appointment of the Reverend Wilbur Daniel in 1972 was typical.147 Daniel 
had an ambivalent relationship with the city’s racial militants. During his term as head of the 
NAACP in 1963, protestors picketed his church carrying signs that read, “No More Tokens 
or Toms,” in part because Daniel apologized for an anti-Daley demonstration during a 
recent NAACP convention.148 A year and a half into his term, Daniel resigned to run as a 
Republican against the aging Bill Dawson in the 1964 congressional election. It was a bad 
miscalculation, and Dawson trounced Daniel. In the aftermath the Baptist preacher pledged 
loyalty to Mayor Daley. “I realized that I lived in a city that Daley was running and I wanted 
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to be with him. I wanted to be with him because he could help me with what I wanted to 
do.”149 
The Study Group, the Alliance, and the Urban League’s Action for Survival all 
played a role in the changing relationship between Daley and the members of the Police 
Board. “The board’s lack of independence,” the Study Group concluded, “arises from the 
fact that its members have been selected largely for their loyalty to city hall.”150 The remedy, 
according to Citizens Alert and others, was to make the Board “accountable to and truly 
representative of the various Chicago constituencies rather than to the narrow interest of the 
city administration.”151 Daley was not about to give up choosing the members of the Board. 
Nonetheless, activists asked the Mayor in 1971 to create a “representative” Police Board 
Nomination Commission that would submit a list of candidates to the Mayor.152 Only after 
they got no response for a month did John Hill and the Alliance conclude their request was 
“not seriously considered by the Mayor.”153 
The Alliance/Citizen’s Alert persisted. In January of 1973, they asked the Mayor to 
reconsider his appointments of Paul Goodrich, Morgan Murphy, and Louis Peick, and to 
appoint a nominating commission.154 When Daley did not respond, they implored the City 
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Council to vote down the Goodrich and Murphy nominations because they were 
insufficiently representative. “Both are well-to-do business executives whose life style and 
experience remove them from the everyday experience of ordinary citizens for whom law 
enforcement is a life-and- death matter.”155 Louis Peick’s nomination that year for the 
“labor” seat on the board brought forth a different criticism: “The REAL REASON for the 
appointment of Louis Peick is to PAY OFF A POLITICAL DEBT to a powerful union 
leadership. This ‘reason’ is not good enough. The lives and security of Chicago citizens 
should take precedence over patronage politics.”156 Despite the different thrusts, the 
essences of the arguments were the same. The men represented the interests of the political 
status quo. They were not representative citizens, because they had no connection to 
ordinary Chicagoans for whom changes in policing were the most important. 
Changing the composition of the Board was not the only strategy to make it more 
democratic. Once becoming involved with the question of Police Board composition, 
activists began to try and transform the way the Board worked. This began with attending 
the meetings themselves. When a large contingent of Alliance and Action for Survival 
members showed up at a Board Meeting for the first time, police photographers snapped 
their pictures and plainclothes officers took notes. The first time they attended, the Board 
“met in a very small room and tried to limit our attendance to six people. We pushed in and 
sat on the floor.”157 Defender reporter Robert McClory lampooned that after six months of 
sustained effort, the groups two achievements were “lengthening the time of board meetings 
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from three minutes to one hour, and they have forced the board to move its meetings to 
larger quarters.”158  
 “We must get [the Board] to act on their responsibilities,” Fred Glick implored his 
fellow Alliance members.159 Appearing at Board meetings and asking questions about racial 
discrimination in hiring and promotions, for example, was an effort to get the Board to 
acknowledge its basic oversight responsibility for these matters. Citizen involvement was an 
end in itself, but it was also a means to other equally important substantive policy changes. 
Procedural transformation provided a path for dialogue. A list of important issues raised by 
Citizens Alert over the first half of the 1970s included, “Non-discriminatory procedures for 
hiring and outside monitoring of police exams, psychological testing of police officers, police 
brutality, police board information center, relationship between local commanders and 
community people, respectful treatment of rape victims, foot patrols, and obtaining a system 
of special coroner’s juries for inquest into police-caused deaths.”160 Yet, the point was not 
just to raise issues but to change behavior.  
  The Board’s reluctance to engage the Alliance was met with continual presence, 
which made them impossible to ignore. At first this led to indirect interactions. Alliance 
members would ask questions following the Superintendent’s report to the Board, and he 
would answer them—or some more congenial version thereof—in his report the next 
month. Nonetheless, over time, public presence transformed the nature of the Police Board. 
By the late spring of 1973, the Alliance reported that the Police Board held “a genuine public 
hearing” on the issue of solicitations by police organizations at which “representatives of the 
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Confraternity of Police, by people from the Better Government Association, the Better 
Business Bureau and other public interest groups …” testified to their views.161 Procedurally, 
Alliance members concluded, “Continual questioning and concrete proposals of this board is 
one of the best means of presently effecting policy change in the department, outside of 
direct court action.”162 The Police Board, and its meetings, became the best place for citizens 
to get information about policing and to make their voice herd about police policy. “Citizens 
registered grievances, made requests, sought investigations and information and otherwise let 
off steam … Investigations were ordered, information was given, questions were answered, 
and inquiries were promised.”163  
* * * 
The extraordinary response of the Black Panthers and their allies to the killings of 
Fred Hampton and Mark Clark opened a window onto the operation of law enforcement in 
Chicago. Their creation and dissemination of a counter-narrative called forth a series of 
government responses that demonstrated to the public in new detail how it was possible for 
institutions to routinely obfuscate the behavior of their agents. Activists used this knowledge 
to try and democratize oversight of policing during the first three years of the 1970s by 
animating pre-existing governance structures. They succeeded in engaging these institutions, 
as their presence and their knowledge made the organizations all but impossible to ignore. In 
this sense, they were successful: they populated the terrain of law enforcement with citizens, 
who, at the very least, institutions had to take into consideration. This was a partial success, 
even if it did far more to expose the limitations of institutions than to achieve justice. Only 
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with the establishment of the Police Board as a hub for information and dialogue were 
activists able to create a place for citizen participation. 
 These efforts also revealed just how difficult it was to achieve reform in a political 
structure dominated by a monopoly party. Like the Summerdale scandal of 1960, the 
aftermath of the Hampton-Clark killings showed that the potential for reform was greatest 
when actors outside the closed loop of Chicago politics became involved. In both of those 
cases, Republican prosecutors provided the critical leverage that created momentum for 
reform. But this depended on political opportunity. In 1960, the State’s Attorney’s ambition 
to become Mayor prompted Daley to action. Here, Jerris Leonard’s own political priorities 
and beliefs allowed him to expose law enforcement in Chicago but only to the extent that he 
did not also expose the federal government’s own unlawful activities. Greater success would 
have to wait for the creation of new political opportunities. 
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CHAPTER 5: FROM POLITICS TO PROTEST 
 
 
Two images of striking similarity, twenty-nine months apart, symbolize Ralph 
Metcalfe’s shift from politics to protest. On December 20, 1969, when he testified in front 
of a large crowd of civil rights and Black Power activists, he had been one of Mayor Daley’s 
favored black lieutenants for nearly two decades. On the dais listening were five of his future 
colleagues in the Congressional Black Caucus.1 They came to Chicago in order to hold a 
hearing on the murders of Black Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark Clark. They visited the 
apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street where the killing took place, and took the testimony 
of 19 witnesses.  
Like Metcalfe, Ahmed Arabia “A.A.” Rayner, Jr. (known to his friends as Sammy) 
testified before the Black Caucus members on December 20th. The men received startlingly 
different receptions. Both were aldermen representing majority black wards on the city’s 
Southside. They were about to enter into a fierce race in Chicago’s First Congressional 
District, the seat that Oscar DePriest first won in 1929, and William Dawson held since 
1943. It was Rayner’s campaign against Dawson in 1968, winning forty percent of the vote, 
that forced “The Man” into retirement. The hearing highlighted how race militants saw the 
coming electoral contest. Nearly every important black political figure in Chicago gave 
testimony, and Panther Deputy Minister for Defense, Bobby Rush, criticized all of them—all 
except Sammy Rayner, who he described as “truly a friend of the Panthers.” The rest were 
“using Hampton’s death as a springboard because congressional elections are coming up.” 
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Though the audience treated a number of the speakers with derision, Ralph Metcalfe fared 
the worst. When he spoke, the audience erupted with abuse: they booed throughout his 
testimony and at one point an audience member interrupted him to ask, “Who wrote that 
for you, Dick Daley?”2 
Nearly two-and-a-half years later, on Saturday, May 6, 1972, Metcalfe stood in front 
of a similar capacity crowd at Shiloh Baptist Church. The occasion was a Saturday morning 
meeting of Operation PUSH, and the First District Congressman was the featured speaker. 
In 1969, the Saturday morning Operation PUSH crowd watched Bobby Rush turn himself 
into the police following the Hampton-Clark killings. In 1970, they watched Renault 
Robinson turn in his gun and badge before a hearing to remove him from the police force. 
On this day, they watched Ralph Metcalfe turn from politics to protest. He positively 
beamed, “I never felt so good being black and taking a stand in the struggle.” There was no 
question as to the authorship of his speech on this occasion. Two months earlier, Metcalfe 
had laid a challenge for police reform at the feet of Police Superintendent James B. Conlisk, 
Jr. After twenty years of loyal service, Metcalfe knew that his challenge would reverberate in 
the Mayor’s Office. Rotating his habitual position of facing Bronzeville from City Hall, 
Metcalfe demanded:  “the mayor … must come here to the ghetto where we have the 
criminally-minded police on one hand and criminals on the other.”3 
Ralph Metcalfe underwent a stunning political transformation. In the course of a 
year, he went from being a hard-working, resourceful, loyal Daley machine lieutenant to 
launching himself into political legend. His break from Mayor Daley was a singular moment: 
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it was the first time a successful black machine politician turned his back on the Democratic 
machine. It inverted the typical trajectory of thinking about black politics. Rather than 
moving, in Bayard Rustin’s classic formulation, “From Protest to Politics,” Metcalfe’s 
reversal led him out of the Daley’s inter-ethnic coalition and into independent political 
protest. In making this journey, from politics to protest, Metcalfe set a template for black 
success in independent Democratic politics in Chicago. 
This choice was shaped by the conditions of its making. Metcalfe’s revolution 
embodied the changing character of racial representation in the early 1970s. For most of 
Metcalfe’s life, representing the race meant being an exemplary Negro as he achieved across 
the boundaries of the color line. But as the history of the Afro-American Patrolmen’s 
League demonstrated, even black people working within the establishment no longer saw 
this performance of race as adequately representative. By 1972, outspoken opposition to 
police practices, framed as a critique of the distribution of political power, convincingly 
signified to them a more authentic representation of blackness. That police brutality was the 
bridge for this transition was no accident; rather, police brutality was the most intensely 
contested site of conflict between law and order and black power, two of the mainsprings of 
Chicago politics by the early 1970s.  
To say that Metcalfe moved from “Politics to Protest” is to denaturalize the idea that 
black politics proceeds along any particular trajectory. Black politicians including Metcalfe 
participated in the construction of the political order in which Mayor Daley consolidated 
power over the Democratic Party and Chicago politics in the 1950s. The Third Ward 
committeeman’s choice to cast his lot with Daley in the early 1950s was no less authentic an 
expression of race than his turn against Daley twenty years later. To oppose Daley’s failure 
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to crack down on police brutality was, from all indications, a better representation of the 
preferences of Metcalfe’s constituents in 1972 than was his silence. It undoubtedly was a 
savvy political choice, one that Metcalfe took knowing full well it could cost him his job and 
his political power. This choice was no less political because he framed it as a “black” 
position. Rather, it was a skillful navigation of a changing context, in which Metcalfe 
correctly hazarded that he could break away from the power of the Democratic Party, 
maintain his electoral position, and vault to widespread admiration. Given his twenty years in 
politics, it is frank disrespect to think about his choice as either inevitable or merely racially 
authentic. It was good politics. 
Ralph Metcalfe and Machine Politics 
 Although he had been circling for some years, Ralph Metcalfe settled into orbit 
around the County Democratic Chairman Richard J. Daley’s sun in 1952. The forty-two year 
old Atlanta native’s ascent directly into the inner sanctum of the Party, as the committeeman 
of the Third Ward, was the second fastest thing Metcalfe ever did. The first was run. Having 
moved to Chicago as a child, Ralph won a national interscholastic sprint championship in 
1929, and began his meteoric rise. For half a decade, he competed for the title of the world’s 
fastest man. While at Marquette University, a Jesuit school in Milwaukee, Metcalfe won 
national collegiate sprint championships in 1932, 1933, and 1934. He broke world records in 
every sprint distance from 40- to 220- yards. More than anything else, though, his great fame 
derived from his Olympic achievements. His ticker-tape finish with Eddie Tolan in the 100- 
meter dash in the 1932 Olympics in Los Angeles—Metcalfe was, perhaps unfairly, deprived 
of the gold—remains amongst the closest in Olympic history. At the Nazi Olympics in 
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Berlin in 1936, he held on for silver after Jesse Owens overtook him at the 90- meter mark 
in the 100-. He finally captured gold for running the second leg of the 4 x 100- meter relay.  
Fifteen years after leaving for college, Metcalfe returned to Chicago still surrounded 
by a golden aura. After the Berlin Games, he earned an M.A. in physical education from the 
University of Southern California, built a top-quality track team and taught political science 
at Xavier University (New Orleans), and served as a lieutenant in segregated World War II 
Army, for which he was awarded the Legion of Merit.4 Still trim at thirty-five, Metcalfe had a 
leggy sprinter’s build and a coiffure that seemed to sweep back ever so slightly as though he 
were running at top speed. He quickly integrated himself into the South Side’s black 
bourgeoisie. He parlayed his hero status into a series of governmental appointments over the 
next half-decade, directing the civil rights department of the Mayor’s Commission on 
Human Relations in Chicago and then sitting on the board of the Illinois State Athletic 
Commission, which controlled the lucrative sport of boxing.5  
Metcalfe was a quintessential race man. His status as a black hero reflected how he 
stood out in a white world. Almost everywhere he went he was the first Negro or the only 
one: only member of the Sigma Alpha Nu (Marquette’s honor society); first president of the 
senior class; first director of the alumni lettermen’s “M” club; first winner of the Catholic 
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Interracial Council James J. Hoey Award for Interracial Justice; first member of the State 
Athletic Commission.6 Following this appointment, the black bourgeoisie, included 
Congressman William Dawson, feted him with the customary testimonial dinner.7 He 
embroiled himself in but one race controversy, joining 30 other black guests in walking out 
between the first and second courses of the banquet in honor of the Chicago Tribune’s 
centennial when they found themselves seated at segregated tables in the corner.8 Even as 
the 1940s turned into the 1950s, he remained in the public mind, “Ralph Metcalfe, famed 
Negro athlete and Olympic champion.”9 
 
The years between 1952 and 1955 marked the end of a struggle for power within the 
Democratic Party. Metcalfe’s elevation in the Third Ward was crucial move. When Richard J. 
Daley was elected chairman in 1952, the Party remained primarily an organization for 
coordinating the actions of different ward-based blocs despite dominating government since 
1931. Its internal politics remained fluid and factional, a reality that was exacerbated as 
Republicans gained a third of the seats in the City Council in 1947. Daley changed 
everything. Contrary to the way in which Daley is remembered today—as Boss or Lord of the 
Last Machine or an American Pharaoh, as three of his biographies are entitled—his election was 
                                                 
6 “Ralph Metcalfe U.S.O. Director,” Pittsburgh Courier, February 7, 1942, 16; “Metcalfe Elected Class President,” 
Baltimore Afro-American, October 19, 1935, 20. His co-honoree, Phillip Murray, was at the time head of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations. “Ralph Metcalfe, Phillip Murray Win Racial Tolerance Awards,” New 
York Amsterdam News, November 6, 1943, 7B. Consuelo C. Young, “Olympic Star Ralph Metcalfe Weds 
Madalynne Fay Young,” Chicago Defender, July 26, 1947, 17. “Metcalfe Named to Athletic Post: Ex-Star on Ill. 
Commission,” Philadelphia Tribune, March 19, 1949, 13. 
7 “Testimonial Dinner Honors Metcalfe,” Chicago Tribune, March 31, 1949, B1. 
8 “30 Chicago Civic Leaders Stage Banquet Walkout,” Baltimore Afro-American, June 21, 1947, 1. 
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“widely hailed as a victory for progressivism and reform within the party.”10 Daley did 
reform the machine, and in the process he fit it for the context in which it now operated. He 
disentangled lines of political authority and disabled the power of his rivals. One of his key 
tools in doing this was restocking the ranks of the ward committeemen with men loyal to 
him. Ralph Metcalfe was such a man.  
 Richard J. Daley created Metcalfe as a political actor, and Metcalfe in turn reinforced 
Daley’s power. While the Olympic champion’s name already surfaced as a potential 
candidate for public office in 1950, his slating for the coveted committeeman’s spot was 
nonetheless a shock.11 It was almost unheard of for an individual who had never even served 
as a precinct captain to be given such a position. But this made him an attractive to Daley, 
for Metcalfe owed no one but him. The press’s assumption that Dawson chose Metcalfe was 
the product of Dawson’s considerable efforts to create “a network of obligations and 
loyalties” in order to bring “under his control the organizations of five or six Negro 
wards.”12 But Daley was already beginning to limit Dawson’s power and had forced Metcalfe 
on him despite the Congressman’s remonstrations.13  
By 1970, Dawson’s political adversaries, like Metcalfe’s, saw his actions as the 
product of a psychic deformation, an “Uncle Tom” personality disorder. But Dawson’s 
                                                 
10 Adam Cohen and Elizabeth Taylor, American Pharaoh: Mayor Richard J. Daley: His Battle for Chicago and the 
Nation (Boston: Back Bay Books, 2001), 100. See also Royko, Boss; Bill Granger and Lori Granger, Lords of the 
Last Machine: The Story of Politics in Chicago (New York: Random House, 1987).  
11 “Boom Ralph Metcalfe for Aldermanic Post,” Pittsburgh Courier, December 30, 1950, 12. 
12 James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership (New York: The Free Press, 1960), 50. The Defender 
reported, “Congress William L. Dawson took over direct control of Chicago’s third ward last week when State 
Senator C.C. Wimbish … stepped down as ward committeeman after threatening a fight. He was immediately 
replaced by Ralph Metcalfe, former Olympic champion … Metcalfe is backed by Dawson.” “Rep. Dawson 
Shows Power in Chicago,” Chicago Defender, January 26, 1952, 1. 
13 Former State Representative Corneal Davis, a Dawson protégé was the chief source of the claim that 
Dawson did not want Metcalfe. William J. Grimshaw, Bitter Fruit: Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 1931-1991 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 86. 
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politics, and Metcalfe’s, were conditioned by the structure of opportunity in Chicago politics. 
It was their unfortunate fate that their actions in supporting Daley’s bid for Mayor in 1955 
restricted rather than expanded those opportunities. But there was no other credible 
alternative to the racially-biased reformism of Martin Kennelly. For Daley, the 1955 election 
proved his wisdom in selecting Metcalfe. In his first important primary, the new 
committeeman greatly increase the “surplus” of Democratic votes produced by his ward. It 
rose fromt the 33rd biggest majority citywide in 1951 to the 8th. This redounded to Metcalfe’s 
credit, as he prevailed in his aldermanic race against the deeply experienced and equally 
notable incumbent Archibald Carey. The Defender blared the day after the primary, “Biggest 
upset in the aldermanic races was the victory of former Olympic sprinter Ralph Metcalfe 
over Archibald J. Carey for the aldermanic seat in the third ward … [T]he whole campaign 
issue was Kennelly versus Dawson. Carey got caught in the cross fire.”14 By winning their 
contest against Kennelly, the Southside committeemen unwittingly delivered their futures to 
Daley.  
Black Democrats  
The Democratic Party used its inclusion of black participants to perpetuate and 
defend a system of racial domination and exclusion. This required, first, the construction of 
an electoral monopoly that integrated politics and government, which Metcalfe’s election in 
1955 helped consolidate. All electoral monopolies, whether based on “machine politics” like 
Chicago or “reform politics” like San Diego, operate by working to institutionalize electoral 
advantages that favor the party in power. The Cook County Democrats did more than 
simply win elections. They ensured that it was almost impossible for anyone else to win 
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elections. Through various biasing mechanisms, Mayor Daley and his coalition tilted the field 
of electoral contest in their favor.15 Moreover, they coordinated the activities of a wide 
variety of groups and individuals to ensure that they remained in power. Thus, they were 
able to structure politics such that the election of candidates was “wholly disconnected from 
quality of candidates and representation of voters.”16  
The fate of black independent Democrats during the 1960s illustrated the practical 
choices faced by black politicians once they helped Daley consolidate his power. As the 
clamor for black equality rose during the early 1960s, middle-class black voters began to 
defect from the regular Democrats at the polls. The wards located below 63rd Street on the 
South Side defected first. In 1963, Charles Chew became the first black candidate to prevail 
over the machine in an aldermanic election. In 1967, Sammy Rayner and William Cousins 
also won seats on the Council. Two years, later, Fred Hubbard prevailed in one of the 
poorer wards north of 63rd Street; two years after that, Anna Langford.17 None save Cousins 
succeeded in entrenching a position. Voters initially rallied to the cause of independent 
political power, but isolation from patronage jobs and other instrumentalities of machine 
politics made institution building difficult. The regular Democratic organization’s precinct 
captains worked hard; their livelihoods were at stake, after all. It was hard to beat them 
twice. As a result, most independents either made peace with the machine (Chew, Hubbard) 
or failed to get re-elected (Rayner, Langford). Only Cousins succeeded in building “a 
                                                 
15 Through control over information, by control the size of the electorate and barriers to entry for candidates, 
by using government resources to political ends, and by ensuring that votes for machine candidates translated 
into more seats that average. Jessica Trounstine, Political Monopolies in American Cities: The Rise and Fall of Bosses 
and Reformers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), chap. 2. 
16 This terminology “political monopoly” and the framework centering upon bias and coordination as the key 
techniques for establishing a monopoly, along with the quote come from Ibid., 22. 
17 Chew moved on to the State Senate, but made peace with the Daley machine in so doing. Grimshaw, Bitter 
Fruit: Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 1931-1991, 122–123. 
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continuing organization[] to keep the campaigners together, trained, and ready for another 
day.”18  
Participation in the machine required submission to Party discipline. Daley “uses 
blacks (Negroes) in political maneuvers to pass legislation in interest of the party,” Renault 
Robinson claimed, but “these Negroes have little or no decision-making power; no say so on 
programming.”19 Black Aldermen were not unique in their silence. For most of Daley’s reign, 
only one Democrat, Hyde Park liberal Leon Despres, consistently attempted to pass 
legislation in any other interest. While he had no power over anyone’s decisions but his own, 
his introduction of legislation occasionally bore fruit. But his influence on programming was 
highly indirect. Despres’s bills were almost always referred to the Rules Committee to die. 
When Daley or his top Council lieutenants liked one of his ideas, though, they might 
introduce and pass their own bill—tweaked around the edges, if necessary, to fit Party 
objectives.20 The primary point is that on matters of policy, “white aldermen were silent as 
well.” As Mayor Jane Byrne recalled the era, “To be an alderman was to vote as [the 
machine] directed and to speak out only with permission.”21  
The tradeoff came in influence. James Taylor, the 16th Ward committeeman and the 
longtime rival of Harold Washington recounted with pride, “I make aldermen, state 
representatives, judges, and sanitary district trustees. I enjoy being just what I am. That’s a 
                                                 
18 Joe Mathewson, Up Against Daley (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1974), 133. 
19 Renault Robinson, “File Suit to Curb Cops,” Chicago Defender, June 4, 1970, 12. 
20 This could occur even on not obviously controversial issues. Llorens provides the example of bill addressing 
elevator repars. David Llorens, “‘The Lone “Negro Spokesman” in Chicago’s City Council,’ Negro Digest, 
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Press, 2005), 146. 
21 Jane Byrne, My Chicago (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2003), 185.  
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powerhouse, the ward committeeman.”22 Black committeemen demanded resources like 
whites. As Byrne remembered from her time in the patronage office set up to administer 
federal War on Poverty spending, the black politicians were “rather firm about their 
requests, sometimes demands, for jobs and improvements in their wards.”23 Black and white 
politicians responded to similar incentives with similar behavior. The difference was blacks 
got less within the party and perpetuated a social order that was stratified by race.  
Black Democrats came in for such criticism for the same reasons that black police 
did. They were expected to hold the line against challenges to the social order. “A motion 
resolution or amendment introduced before the city council by Alderman Despres is almost 
invariably the prologue to a ritual,” wrote David Llorens, “usually beginning with a 
repudiation by Alderman Holman (and frequently joined by other administration aldermen) 
whose remarks often approach the point of insult.”24 Holman’s disdain for Despres was 
matched only by his enthusiasm for the Mayor. He was “renowned for standing up at each 
council meeting and exhorting, ‘Thank God for Mayor Daley!’”25 Holman’s thundering, like 
his compliments were a performance, calculated for specific effect: greater clout.26 In this he 
was successful, as he got “the largest slice of Daley’s patronage pie within the black wards.” 
                                                 
22 “Interview with James Taylor,” in We Don’t Want Nobody Nobody Sent: An Oral History of the Daley Years, by 
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independent Democrats, white or black, was palpable. Long-time boss of the twenty-fifth ward Vito Marzullo 
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    175 
His aldermanic successor noted, “Holman was prepared to take the Uncle Tom lumps 
publicly as long as he could produce for his people privately.”27 These were the incentives 
under Daley’s political monopoly. 
Holman’s primary rival for the Mayor’s affections was Ralph Metcalfe. Despres 
described the difference in their styles: “Metcalfe didn’t have a streak of meanness in his 
entire body.”28 In his understated way, he stood up for the Mayor and against civil rights 
activists, leading racial militants to view him “as a Tom, a negative force, a collaborator.”29 
He earned special enmity for a few of his high profile interventions in civil rights politics: 
For example, in 1964, Metcalfe spoke for Daley’s resolution favoring the seating of the all-
white Mississippi delegation over the Freedom Democratic Party at the Democratic National 
Convention. In 1965, he served as the administration’s principal counterweight to the 
Chicago Freedom Movement, forming his own organization called the Chicago Conference 
to Fulfill These Rights. Despres observed that after the Alderman helped facilitate 
conditions for Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to save face and get out of Chicago, “Metcalfe 
could hardly conceal his pleasure.”30 
Metcalfe was not entirely wrong when he argued that “for Black people coming up 
from Mississippi and Alabama in the Second World War, the political machine had been a 
very helpful vehicle, and under Congressman Dawson, the organization of Blacks in Chicago 
politics was probably the best in the world. The machine had served the Black community 
                                                 
27 His successor Tim Evans went on to become Harold Washington’s Council floor leader. Travis, An 
Autobiography of Black Politics, 237. 
28 Ibid., 236. 
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well.”31 Government employment was and has remained an almost immeasurably important 
avenue for black social mobility. By 1968, blacks enjoyed far more decision-making positions 
in government, especially local government, than they did in any other employment sector 
with the exception of labor unions and social welfare organizations. Indeed, they were most 
locked out of the downtown corporate world and the white-shoe law firms.32  
 Nonetheless, black efforts to secure the “divisible goods” the party-state had to offer 
never quite lived up to their promise. The principle that governed Democratic slate-
making—“Every ethnic, racial, religious, and economic group is entitled to have some 
representation on the ticket”—ensured at least symbolic representation.33 Once the party 
filled its racial and ethnic quotas, though, all aspirants saw their chances for advancement 
reduced to the degree that they were not male, white, and of Irish descent. This was not 
exclusively a black problem: getting slated for higher office, longtime Jewish Democratic 
Committeeman Marshall Korshak noted with more than a little salt, was “like winning a 
ticket in the Irish Sweepstakes.”34 Fully half of the ten most important city and county-wide 
elective posts were held by men of Irish descent in 1970, and the proportions were 
considerably higher in administrative positions.35 The upper-ranks of the Police Department 
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were the most Irish of all, encompassing 83 percent of command personnel in December 
1969.36  
Black Politics and Black Youth 
 The race to replace William Dawson as U.S. Congressman in 1970 took place just as 
the killings of Mark Clark and Fred Hampton brought these questions about the relationship 
of the police and racial domination to the fore. The Panther raid, and the effort to keep tabs 
on young black men with guns (whether gangs or revolutionaries) of which it was a part, 
took center stage in politics as Ralph Metcalfe and Sammy Rayner squared off.37 Rayner was 
one of the very few liberals to support the Panthers prior to the killings, and this provided 
him with considerable credibility as black people turned almost wholesale against Hanrahan 
their aftermath. Dawson’s retirement already portended a reshaping of black politics in the 
city, and the ongoing Panther legal drama seemed to reconstitute it on terms unfavorable to 
Metcalfe.  
Prior to the raid, the Metcalfe-Rayner contest promised to present voters with the 
two contrasting styles of political engagement that had come to dominate politics in black 
Chicago since 1963. To Metcalfe’s race man, Rayner was “a colorful, outspoken militant.”38 
His father was a prominent Chicago mortician, and Sammy followed him into the business. 
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A.A. Rayner Sr. conducted Emmett Till’s open-casket wake in at the Rayner & Sons funeral 
home in 1955. His son Sammy arranged for an independent autopsy of Fred Hampton in 
1969 and held the wake at Rayner & Sons, as well. While Metcalfe patiently labored in 
Daley’s vineyard, Rayner was in perpetual political motion as one of the leading gadflies of 
independent black politics. After losing races for alderman in 1963 and Congressman in 
1964, he prevailed against Sixth Ward Alderman Robert Miller, one of the “Silent Six,” in the 
landmark election of 1967. He ran well against Dawson in 1968, but—for better or worse—
Metcalfe was not Dawson.39  
The campaign mirrored the ongoing electoral struggles between machine and 
independent candidates, whatever the pressing political issues at hand. Rayner ran against 
Daley, describing the campaign as being “about a political machine that has hopelessly 
entrapped over one million black people by conspiring to deny us proper welfare reforms, 
adequate housing programs, quality education, and the necessary black economic 
development in our cities.”40 Metcalfe’s campaign was run by his protégé Harold 
Washington, and it depend on the usual people and arguments. Support came from black 
businesses and ministers as well as the AFL-CIO. Metcalfe used the same lines machine 
aldermen had used against independents for years, “People here want service, not a lot of 
meaningless hollering. We work with the team and we get results—lawyers for people in 
trouble, playgrounds, cleaner streets, jobs. We give out 1,200 food baskets in this ward every 
Christmas. These things still count.”41 
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Rayner tied his campaign as closely to the Panther case as possible. Twelve days after 
the killings, he called the workings of Hanrahan’s men an “assassination,” on the City 
Council floor.42 Supporters billed a December 31st rally to commemorate the two victims as a 
chance to show support for the independent alderman’s congressional candidacy.43 The 
campaign became a symbol of the ongoing struggle over “law and order” politics in black 
communities in Chicago and other cities. At the official campaign kick-off in January, Gary 
mayor Richard Hatcher—the first black mayor of any major U.S. city—and Georgia State 
Representative Julian Bond blew the starter’s whistle; other luminaries of the rising black 
political class, including John Conyers, lent their support as well. National papers, such as 
the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and Los Angeles Times, all sent 
reporters to cover the story. Media attention put the question of the relationship between 
black politics and black youth at the center of the race. The dispossession of black youth by 
the Daley organization was an important element of Rayner’s basic political message, and the 
Panther killings seemed to provide a real-life case study of its devastating consequences.  
While black Chicagoans unified against impunity for Hanrahan and his raiders, they 
had not arrived at any singular way of understanding and responding to the violence in their 
communities. Perhaps the most important and widespread area of citizen participation 
during the 1970s and 1980s was around the question of crime prevention, a history longer 
and more diffuse than the mode of citizen participation chronicled in Chapter 3. 
Nonetheless, community anti-crime efforts intersected with movements for police reform in 
ways that revealed the complex politics surrounding crime, law enforcement, and police 
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reform. Whatever their positions on questions of police reform, whatever their beliefs about 
the system of criminal justice, black Chicagoans expressed almost universal concern about 
crime. This concern took many different forms; just as crime was not uniform across the city 
neither was the intensity or nature of concern uniform across the city’s various black 
geographies. Nonetheless, in 1970, it was hard to find any writer in the black press or 
member of black community organizations not emphatically in favor of implementing some 
kind of citizen-based crime prevention program.44  
When the race turned away from the State’s Attorney and to youth gangs, the 
militant Rayner’s momentum flagged. At the beginning of March, the popular deejay and 
owner of Southmoor Bowl, “Daddy-O Daylie” (Holmes Bailey) charged that the Black P. 
Stone Nation tried to extort protection money from him. The Chicago Police Department’s 
Gang Intelligence Unit was quick to follow up the charges and, within a few weeks produced 
a 35-page report detailing the extortion of Daylie and others.45 Stones leader Charles Bey 
maintained that the charges were exaggerated “because of our relationship with Ald. 
Rayner.” In a joint television appearance with Metcalfe on Daddy-O Daylie’s talk show, “For 
Blacks Only,” the independent candidate noted that such adverse publicity was “a conspiracy 
designed to cloud the thinking of voters and to prevent the airing of true campaign issues.”46 
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The intended effect, according to Bey, was clear: “If the people turn against the gangs, they 
turn against Rayner and to Metcalfe.’”47  
The voters’ turn to Metcalfe was decisive. He doubled Dawson’s winning margin 
from two years earlier. Some credited his victory to his skillful exploitation of the crime 
issue. The Tribune quoted one “knowledgeable” black politician, who claimed that black 
voters in the first district “fear the street gangs more than they hate the mayor.”48 But others 
found political organization to be the more likely culprit. The independent Democrat lacked 
the robust precinct organization of his machine opponent. “At only one of 10 polling places 
visited was there a Rayner poll watcher; on only one street corner was there a Rayner man 
passing out literature,” reported R.W. Apple, Jr., of the New York Times. Nowhere was “there 
any visible effort to get out the Rayner vote.” By contrast, Metcalfe had his corps of precinct 
captains stocking polling places, knocking on doors, and even driving the elderly to the vote. 
Apple concluded, “Building a lasting organizational counterforce seems out of reach.”49  
War on Crime 
Metcalfe was a crime fighter before he became an anti-brutality crusader. To score 
political points against Rayner, he employed the same rhetorical strategies embraced by 
proponents of law and order, pivoting from the unifying outrage over police brutality to the 
divisive question of crime. This was politics, and yet it did not mean that Metcalfe was 
insincere in trying to address crime. The residents of his third ward were exceptionally 
vulnerable to violence. Between 1965 and 1974, violent crime rose at incredible speed in 
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Chicago, with the homicide rate more than doubling, as Figure 2 demonstrates.50 This reality 
was particularly brutal in the third ward, where the Wabash Police District was home to the 
highest reported crime rate in the city.51 Over the late spring and summer months of 1971, 
for example, thirty-three people were murdered in a district of just 66,000 residents.52 The 
Ward encompassed some of the city’s densest areas of concentrated poverty and social 
exclusion, including the Robert Taylor Homes that stretched down State Street for two 
miles. At Robert Taylor, the challenge of maintaining social order was among the most 
important concerns of social life throughout the 1970s.53 In particular, people were up in 
arms about gangs. “Gang-motivated” homicides experienced rapid growth over the second 
half of the 1960s, rising from just ten in 1965 to forty-four in 1968 to seventy in 1970, 
before beginning a rapid decline to its previous levels by 1975.  
Insert Figure 2 
As gang homicides escalated and remained high, the question of how black 
organizations ought to respond weighed heavily on their leaders. Dr. Charles G. Hurst, 
president of Malcolm X College, a two-year city school on the Westside, blamed the gang 
question for destroying the “the splendid spirit of togetherness and unity generated out of 
the tragic deaths of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark.”54 This was evident when the Urban 
League convened a wide variety of black organizations to try and turn anger over the Black 
                                                 
50 From 397 murders in 1965 to 892 in 1974. Carolyn R. Block and Richard Block, Chicago Homicide Database: 
1965-1995, 2005, http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR06399v.5. 
51 This would translate to a homicide rate of 150 per 100,000 if it was maintained over the course of a year Bob 
Hunter, “Wabash Police District -- It’s City’s Most Perilous,” Chicago Defender, July 17, 1968, 3. 
52 May to August. Third Ward Committee on Crime Prevention, “Speech on Crime Prevention,” September 
1971, 2. 
53 Sudhir Allahdi Venkatesh, American Project: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Ghetto (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2000), 68–69. 
54 Hurst was referring specifically to the call for Ralph Abernathy to mediate the dispute between Curtis Burrell 
of KOCO and the Black P. Stone Nation. Dr. Charles G. Hurst, “Black Focus,” Chicago Defender, August 6, 
1970, 5. 
  
    183 
Panther killings into a constructive program in May of 1970. Discussions at the meetings 
ranged widely—one might even say wildly. Only gangs grabbed everyone’s attention, but 
opinions about how to think about them and what to do about them revealed deep divisions. 
Some attendees sought to include gang leaders in future meetings, while others expressed 
their belief that “more people should speak out and say what they gangs are doing is wrong.” 
Should gang members be offered financial aid, “thereby greatly decreasing their reasons for 
stealing and killing”? The role of black adults was discussed at length. One attendee 
suggested, “Black leaders are not projecting themselves as images to youth,” leading them to 
emulate less responsible role models (cowboys, gangsters, the mafia). Black adults must 
chastise black youth so the argument went, lest they end up in front of a jury of twelve 
whites.55  
 The group took the name Action for Survival. They issued a programmatic statement 
a few weeks later that framed the question of crime broadly by highlighting various forms of 
violence and exploitation by white-dominated institutions—including the Police 
Department, the syndicate, slumlords, unfair merchants, the courts, white dealers in 
narcotics and illegal guns—perpetuated against black Chicagoans.56 It also dealt head on with 
the “most abhorrent and self-defeating” crime of “Black people murdering Black people.” 
Despite alluding to gangs, the statement did not mention them, and it refused to make them 
the scapegoat for the problems of black Chicago. Instead, the authors argued, “There is no 
one segment of Black Chicago that is responsible for the rapidly rising crime rate.”57 
                                                 
55 “It was further stated that Black adults should be able to chastise Black youth as well as give them direction, 
and because Black youth in trouble are tried by a jury of 12 white people, there is little hope that they will 
receive a fair chance.” Action for Survival, “Meeting Minutes,” June 26, 1970, 2, CUL II-242-2392.  
56 The statement was written primarily by E. Duke McNeil of The Woodlawn Organization. “Crime in the 
Black Community Must Go!!!” July 1, 1970, CUL II-242-2440. 
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    184 
Following the release of the statement and a round of press appearances, members of Action 
for Survival expressed some dismay about its reception. On the television show “Our 
People,” one member noted, “the primary concern seemed to be whether the movement had 
been established to fight Black youth in the community.” Much-handwringing ensued as to 
whether the group might “be used by some people as another device to set Black people 
against Black people.”58  
 Such discord quickly disappeared from public dialogue, even as it continually 
bubbled up in black neighborhoods. In June 1970, a dispute with the Reverend Curtis 
Burrell followed closely on the heels of the Stones’ conflict with Daylie. Burrell was a 
Mennonite, who found God while incarcerated for crimes related to his narcotics addiction. 
By the end of the 1960s, he was preaching in Woodlawn and leading the Kenwood-Oakland 
Community Organization (KOCO). Echoing other social ministries, Burrell argued in 1968 
that the city’s crackdown on gangs was misguided. KOCO “will not stand by and watch as 
the youth of this community are repressed and degraded by the inhumane and unwarranted 
tactics of the Chicago police,” he defiantly broadcast. “We will not be divided from our 
young men who belong to any club or organization, by a city policy of ‘black gang 
busting.’”59 They sought more productive engagement and, in the fall 1968, the organization 
hired a number of Stones to participate in a community-organizing project. Following many 
other War-on-Poverty-era projects, KOCO sought to transform gang members into the 
agents of their own liberation by giving them responsibility and skills.60 The program failed 
                                                 
58 Action for Survival, “Meeting Minutes,” July 10, 1970, 3, CUL II-240-2392. 
59 “Kenwood-Oakland Group Back Teenagers: Rap Police Harassment in Area,” Chicago Defender, July 11, 1968, 
12.   
60 The program had the oddly white supremacist name, “Toward Responsible Freedom.” Arthur Siddon, 
“$9000 Youth Job Goes to Gang Leader,” Chicago Tribune, November 9, 1968, 3. The restaurant never got off 
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for complex reasons, not the least of which was that its self-help ideology was insufficient to 
the task of mainstreaming gang members. 
Burrell’s termination of the program in June 1970 quickly turned into a call to black 
unity, as against the gang.61 Challenged by members of the gang on the project staff, the self-
described “cosmic gangster of God” pulled out a nine-millimeter semi-automatic and fired 
shots in his office.62 In subsequent days, the gang (allegedly) firebombed the KOCO office; 
fired nine shots at his house; and got in in a shootout with Burrell’s new bodyguards at his 
church.63 In response, Burrell walked back his earlier refusal to be divided from black youth. 
“The people have complained about an oppressive dimension of gang activity and these 
concerns have not been addressed as clearly as they need to be.”64 Burrell suggested that “an 
aroused black community” should ostracize, excommunicate, and isolate the gangs. They 
“must be made to feel the pressure of the black community. They must see themselves as a 
people cut off from their main body, where there is no protection or refuge, because of their 
crimes against their people.”65 
Yet, Burrell never issued a call for police repression. As things cooled down, he 
emphasized that the difficulty of handling street gang violence related integrally to the 
problem of racial domination by the Police. He described the paradox black Chicagoans 
                                                 
61 The KOCO leader claimed that the differences were solely because the Stones divisive approach to 
community problems. “KOCO’s Burrell Ousts Sengali: Claim Office Fire Bombed,” Chicago Defender, June 17, 
1970, 1. 
62 Natalie Y. Moore and Lance Williams, The Almighty Black P. Stone Nation: The Rise Fall, and Resurgence of an 
American Gang (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2011), 111–124. 
63 “KOCO’s Burrell Ousts Sengali: Claim Office Fire Bombed,” 1; “Rev. Burrell Defies Gang Threats: Blames 
Stones in Shooting,” Chicago Defender, June 23, 1970, 1. 
64 “Plight of KOCO Told by Rev. Curtis Burrell,” Chicago Defender, June 24, 1970, 4. 
65 Burrell, “Blacks Facing Crime Issue,” Chicago Defender, October 29, 1970, 16. Curtis Burrell, “Blacks Facing 
Crime Issue,” Chicago Defender, October 29, 1970, 16. Yet at the same time, if they black people might mitigate 
criminality through social means, it did not relieve whites of their obligations or change the basic etiology of 
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confronted as a choice between genocide and suicide. “Not to move, means certain death. 
To move the wrong way, means suicide.” On the one hand, failing to act might “let Black on 
Black crime pull us down to total death and decay.” On the other, he argued, “we are 
presently living in a semi-police state.” In Chicago’s courts, black youth “are immediately 
suspect. They are deemed guilty until proven innocent, simply because they are Black 
youths.” Black people had to approach the question of crime “[k]nowing that one’s methods 
may well contribute to this perversion.” Which is to say: “black people must chose a method 
which deals effectively with the crime issue and the equally socially destructive force of 
genocide (in its various forms) and totalitarianism.” Despite the failure of self-help in 
transforming the Stones, the Mennonite minister responded to the paradox of genocide or 
suicide by turning to the indigenous solution of community development. He drew upon 
time-honored notions of racial uplift central to black social politics. He counseled “the 
development and exercise of a disciplined, diligent spirit to be injected into the ‘Black 
Thang.’”66 Burrell offered an incisive critique of policing, but his notion that self-discipline 
might be the solution to gangs only reproduced ideas about black social responsibility—and 
irresponsibility—that underlay the law and order thinking. 
When Metcalfe waded into this most divisive area of social politics in 1971 with the 
creation of the Third Ward Commission on Crime Prevention, he addressed a set of 
problems with which black organizations were already deeply engaged. Metcalfe’s approach 
to crime echoed Burrell’s in turning inward towards community development. He sought “to 
mobilize responsible community and city leadership to deal with the problem of crime in the 
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Third Ward of the City.”67 In a speech given across the pulpits of black Chicago on Oct. 3, 
1971, he and his allies talked tough: “I serve notice on those who would despoil our people 
and violate their property that we declare war on lawless acts … and I say so with the full 
knowledge that we have the support of the entire community.”68 But the actual practices that 
they endorsed focused merely on raising awareness, on “arousing the community to the 
seriousness of problems of crime in the Third Ward,” and on “involving the community 
actively in the solution of the crime problem.”69 Unsurprisingly, Metcalfe’s vision of self-help 
involved greater linkage with the state, including reporting crimes, closer cooperation with 
the police, testifying in court as witnesses, providing education and information about the 
criminal justice system, and finally recruiting and training men for police exams.70 
Nonetheless, his main concern was getting people to band together and say “no more.”71  
In the 1970s, many black people and organizations wanted to do something about 
crime, and in this they participated in a tradition that stretched across the color line and back 
in time. Above all, these efforts evinced a profound impulse to action in the face of gross 
inequality. Renault Robinson warned of the dangers of being “so damned fundamental that 
we are unable to deal with anything that meets the eye.” Deep analysis of conditions 
producing crime could not produce safer streets. Rather, he stressed, action was needed, and 
“nobody has told us how blacks can, here and now, do something about every black man 
woman and child having to be fearful in every black neighborhood in Chicago.”72 Even if he 
admitted that his own solutions might be superficial, it was important to pursue them 
                                                 
67 Third Ward Committee on Crime Prevention, “Program for Action,” October 1971, 1. 
68 Third Ward Committee on Crime Prevention, “Speech on Crime Prevention,” 3. 
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nonetheless. The alternative was to excuse crime and sentence “the peaceable hard working 
blacks of the ghetto to a horrible brand of tyranny of hustlers, murderers and extortionists in 
their midst.”73 
At the same that time Robinson embraced self-help and worked with community 
groups to develop community anti-crime programs, he critiqued the mismatch between the 
obsession with teen gangs and the broader nature of black vulnerability to violence and 
privation. He encouraged “people to think about the deaths and killings that take place in 
Chicago, in a context greater than and in addition to the popular gang oriented theory.”74 
Teen gangs were the symptom of a much deeper problem: destroying them “will not end the 
problems of violence.” Rather, Robinson argued that black people needed to become aware 
of the “real problems of violence in our community” and be involved in “constructively” 
solving them.” “Chicago is a violent community,” he said, and “for the most part, the city 
government does little or nothing to prevent crimes of violence, or to eliminate the 
conditions that led to violence and killing.”75 Focusing on street gang violence, and 
sanctioning the police to use brutal tactics did little to stop gangs. For Robinson, the 
problem was not that police were doing too much. Rather, the police had done nothing to 
stop “street gang terrorism.” They had merely used it as a further excuse for brutal 
practices.76 
The AAPL executive director described the creation of black neighborhoods as sites 
of vulnerability to violence as a dynamic process and not a static condition. The absence of 
adequate social resources reduced black communities to states of abjection in the face of 
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74 Renault Robinson, “Another Kind of Ghetto Terror,” Chicago Defender, June 18, 1970, 12. 
75 Ibid.  
76 Renault Robinson, “The Black Watch,” Chicago Defender, September 12, 1970, 3. 
  
    189 
crime. “Out of the feeling of helplessness and fear, this community will seek the help of the 
police.” Black people “had no one else to turn to.”77 When receiving a call for help, however, 
the Police would send in “the Task Force or just the regular police officer, only he’s very 
vicious and when you complain about police brutality the Police Department remarks, ‘You 
people ask for service and our help and when you get it you complain about the service we 
give you—what do you want?’”78 In response to black vulnerability to violence police 
exercised violence, and then blamed black people for complaining about the reproduction of 
the same problem they had called upon the police to eliminate. Black Chicagoans suborned 
their own harassment because they had few options. 
Metcalfe and Hanrahan 
 Despite the institutionalization of police reform activism, and the widespread 
condemnation of State’s Attorney Edward Hanrahan, he still had not been called into 
account for his role in the Panther raid when he appeared before the Democratic Party slate-
makers to seek their endorsement in his campaign for re-election as State’s Attorney on 
December 7, 1971. Judge Joseph Romiti was still insisting on holding hearings into the 
propriety of the special county grand jury’s indictment. That was about to change. Over the 
next ten months, the Special Prosecutor’s efforts to prosecute him would overlap with the 
State’s Attorney’s own efforts to get re-elected. His legal and political fortunes would 
continually fork in opposite directions. No sooner did one process end in disappointment 
for one party than his adversaries quickly found a way to turn the tables in another context. 
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Ralph Metcalfe led the forces within the Chicago machine against giving Hanrahan 
the Party’s stamp of approval. In the immediate aftermath of the raid, Metcalfe endorsed an 
independent inquiry into the raid, but political observers viewed him as continuing to 
support his fellow Democrat.79 But two Decembers later, he and State Senator Cecil Partee 
urged the Democrats considering endorsements to dump Harahan or suffer widespread 
rebellion among black voters.80 Though their opinions were considered, they were not 
heeded. The leaders of social welfare and community organizations across the city reacted 
with fury.81 Some of the most perceptive commentators on race viewed the endorsement as 
an index of the Daley organization’s opinion about the political power of black Chicagoans. 
Alderman Cousins identified it as “a pitch for the backlash vote which Mayor Daley 
apparently believes is stronger than any kind of a front lash vote blacks might make.”82  
Black voters had been the heart of Daley’s coalition during his first three elections. 
But in the mid-1960s, black voters in the middle-class wards began to reject the machine and 
black voters throughout the city began to participate in electoral politics in much lower 
numbers. Already by 1967, the Mayor had begun to turn the Democratic electorate “inside 
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out.” His strength shifted from the inner city wards that had secured his dominance, to the 
“outlying white areas on the Northwest and Southwest sides of the city.”83 With weary 
resignation, Renault Robinson took note of the fact that “The party has slated unfortunate 
candidates in the past and they were never blocked by the black community.”84 With 
disturbing glee, Fourth Ward Alderman Claude Holman agreed. “The blacks are not going 
against Hanrahan.”85 
  If Metcalfe failed to convince the slate-makers, his performance nonetheless earned 
him plaudits amongst public-opinion makers. These compliments were redoubled a few 
weeks later when, following the Illinois Supreme Court’s refusal to allow Judge Romiti’s 
inquiry, Democrats reversed themselves. Metcalfe’s argument that “the momentum of 
feeling against Hanrahan was gathering at such a terrific rate that I was fearful for the party,” 
carried the day.86 His dissent does not seem to have been a matter of principle, unless “Don’t 
back no losers,” can be described as such.87 Regardless, it was a major victory for Metcalfe 
and a vindication of his place in the Party, argued his protégé, Third Ward Alderman Tyrone 
Kenner. “This just shows that men who are able to lodge protests within the council of the 
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Democratic Party can be effective—more so than those who just scream on the streets.”88 
Even the independents applauded. “Since we have been very liberal with our derogatory 
adjectives in describing ‘machine controlled blacks’ who devote full time to the art of 
politics,” Vernon Jarrett genuflected, “perhaps it would inspire them and us if we extended a 
few expressions of praise when they display the kind of backbone that some of their severest 
critics don’t always show in private.”89  
Insert Table 2  
 Hanrahan did better with primary voters. “If I don’t seek reelection,” the State’s 
Attorney argued in explaining his decision to stay in the race, “that would be the Black 
Panthers’ biggest propaganda victory.”90 While Daley and other prominent Democrats 
accepted this decision with unusual equanimity, Metcalfe openly grumbled, admitting that he 
“resented the challenge by Hanrahan. He does not concern himself with the welfare of his 
party.”91 The State’s Attorney’s victory was front-page national news, and it provided succor 
to those who believed Daley had never wanted to drop him.92 Certainly white party regulars 
continued to work for Hanrahan against the candidate slated in his place, Traffic Court 
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Judge Raymond Berg, and liberal former ACLU lawyer and Assistant United States Attorney 
Donald Page Moore.93  
 Black voters did not lose because their committeemen did not deliver on Election 
Day. They lost because of the processes unleashed by their long-term subordination within 
the party-state. Metcalfe and the black committeemen delivered dominant majorities for 
Berg. While the white suburbs and white city wards voted for Hanrahan, the black wards 
actually voted more strongly against him in percentage terms. The difference was numbers. 
The historic demise of registration and voter turnout in the black wards after 1963 was an 
electoral technique that helped the machine to maintain its strength even as black voters 
grew increasingly disaffected.94 This decline of black voting was not a defect of black voters; 
such patterns emerged everywhere monopolies successfully controlled local politics. Low 
turnout in this context was an effect of the deeper shift in the operation of Democratic 
electoral power. 
Metcalfe Turns Black 
 As he waded into anti-crime politics with the creation of the Third Ward Committee 
on Crime Prevention Metcalfe also stepped cautiously into anti-brutality politics with his 
opposition of Hanrahan inside party circles. Over the ensuing months he would bring the 
two together in a campaign to demand better police services for Chicago’s marginalized 
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peoples. This campaign began on the morning of the March 21 primary, even as voters were 
going to the polls to choose Hanrahan as the Democratic nominee in the fall election. 
Metcalfe led a delegation of black men from the Third Ward Committee on Crime 
Prevention to meet with Superintendent Conlisk.95  
 This meeting is famously remembered as the start of Metcalfe’s work as an anti 
police brutality crusader, because its proximate cause was police mistreatment of Dr. Herbert 
Odom, one of Metcalfe’s closest political allies.96 Two Task Force officers pulled over 
Odom’s late-model Cadillac a few days earlier, supposedly for not having a light above the 
rear license plate. During the course of the stop, they manhandled Dr. Odom and ultimately 
arrested him. The indignity of the arrest had everything to do with social class, and the 
presence of the Third Ward Committee in Conlisk’s office had everything to do with 
political influence.97 Nevertheless, the men used this particular exercise of authority to raise 
questions about just what the police were doing in black communities. They called  
upon the Superintendent “to take disciplinary action against the two arresting officers, to 
issue a memorandum to all members of the police department to stop immediately the 
harassment of black citizens and to seriously consider the elimination of the task force 
which—in the view of the community representatives present—has not curbed crime in the 
black community.”98  
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 The sad reality of the history of police brutality and neglect in Chicago has been that 
once one is attuned to it, a short wait almost inevitably turns up an obnoxious case of police 
mistreatment. The cause of the furor in 1972 was not changing patterns of behavior but 
changing patterns of attention, themselves the product of unceasing agitation over brutality 
during the previous two years. Less than a month later, police bungled a second case 
involving another doctor friend of the Congressman. The consequences this time were 
worse, as the man slammed into another car after having a stroke while driving; police 
locked him up without medical attention and he went into a coma.99 Although Conlisk had 
ignored their first set of requests, the Third Ward Committee met with him again on April 
17. This time they delivered six demands at the nexus of crime and brutality: the elimination 
of all task force operations; the establishment of a citizen’s board in each police district 
“acceptable to the community of that district”; and reform of hiring and promotion 
practices.100 The final demand was that the Superintendent implement the plans by May 31.  
Metcalfe’s spat with Superintendent Conlisk might have remained just that. The 
conflict escalated slowly enough that at nearly any point it seemed possible that either side 
would back off.101 Even going that far left Metcalfe “scared to death” of challenging the 
machine, Renault Robinson noted, “because he was one of them.” But it would have been 
more embarrassing not to speak out about brutality against “his campaign manager and chief 
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fundraiser. So he had to say something.”102 And Conlisk was a vulnerable target. Nixon had 
named an ambitious, young prosecutor named James R. Thompson as United States 
Attorney on November 29, 1971. He immediately launched a host of political corruption 
prosecutions and, by March of 1972, had empanelled a special grand jury to look into police 
corruption.103 (The Knapp Commission also had just opened its hearings in New York 
City.104) In March, the Study Group published its Fatal Force Report. By the beginning of 
July, the Tribune declared that Supt. Conlisk’s job was on the line.105 The scandal sizzled for 
eighteen months, until convictions finally him brought down in October 1973.106 In a 
political battle, the Congressman could make somebody believe he might best a weakened 
Conlisk. The plaudits he won from the black press could only have reinforced his self-belief. 
As the Defender’s political gossip column recognized, “Rep. Metcalfe may be a product of the 
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system but he has given the system a serious challenge on the police issue now. No black 
elected official in Chicago has ever been given the support that he is getting now.”107  
Each conflict with the Superintendent pushed Metcalfe further away from 
reconciliation, until he made his stand by challenging Daley.108 Reggie Robinson described 
the process as an iterative one: “the further we pushed him out there, the further estranged 
he got from Daley.”109 The terms of the showdown were set by early May: Metcalfe invited 
Mayor Daley to meet with him and other leaders at Liberty Baptist Church to discuss the 
problem of police brutality on May 1.110 The Mayor did not show, but his response 
evidenced the seriousness with which he took Metcalfe’s challenge. He took the initiative, 
invited the Congressman to a City Council meeting at City Hall on May 3 to discuss police 
and black community relations. Metcalfe declined. The Superintendent and Mayor made a 
thirty-minute presentation offering a number of modest concessions.111 As the conflict 
progressed, the Mayor and the black machine Alderman would constantly be scrambling to 
get in front of Metcalfe on the issue, holding City Council hearings and offering public 
criticism of Conlisk.112  
  Metcalfe staked out his anti police brutality position on the terrain of racial solidarity 
and authenticity already employed the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League and others. 
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Powerful currents of black-nationalist thought surrounded Metcalfe, and it was hard not to 
get swept up. This began with his son Ralph Metcalfe, Jr., who came of age with Black 
Power.113 But it was equally a product of his experience in Washington. Moving outside of 
the narrow confines of everyday life as a committeeman and Alderman was important. There 
was a lot of distance between Congress and Chicago, and during his first term there Metcalfe 
submerged himself in the politics of race in a new way. He was among the founding 
members of the Congressional Black Caucus. In 1971, after President Nixon refused to meet 
with the future caucus members, they boycotted his State of the Union address. Metcalfe 
admitted the influence of his younger, more militant colleagues. “In the caucus we have 
decided to put the interests of black people first—above all else and that means even going 
against our party or our political leaders if black interests don’t coincide with their 
positions.”114 Similarly, as his conflict with the Police Superintendent and the Mayor 
developed, he participated in the National Black Political Convention in Gary, Indiana.115 
The Convention was “in many respects the high point of the Black Power movement,” as 
men and women from across the political and ideological spectrum came together and 
outlined a program for political change.116 In the coming months, the Congressman’s 
remarks spilled forth with the optimism of the Convention.  
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Metcalfe framed both his resistance to Daley and his own political transformation as 
recognition of their true selves. After describing everything that he and others had done to 
work within the system for reform of the Police Department, the Third Ward 
committeeman recalled a series of prayer-ins the Ward’s Anti-Crime Committee held against 
crime and fear. “Yes,” he said, “we got down on our knees and prayed. And we had the 
Superintendent to kneel with us.” Nothing changed. “Well, brothers and sisters, we also 
have gotten up off our knees,” he continued. “This seems to be the biggest problem with 
this Administration. The Mayor can’t seem to tolerate us unless we are down on our knees.” 
But, “The Mayor of this city is not the almighty God that I was taught to pray to.”117 After 
years of obeisance, Daley appeared to Metcalfe as a false idol. 
Metcalfe’s framing of his own transformation revealed the power of the racial 
imaginary. Throughout his career, Metcalfe persistently argued in favor of advancing the 
cause of black people through party politics, often in opposition to black critics. His career 
spoke of nothing if not the multiple positions within black politics.118 Each was rooted in a 
person’s location within a complex matrix of institutional affiliations, social positions, and 
political beliefs, and each constructed a particularized version of what it meant to be black.119 
He described his own transformation from organization man to racial militant as a racial 
conversion narrative. He informed the audience, “I held a personal meeting with myself, my 
conscience and the people who elected me and decided that when I look into the mirror I 
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can be proud of a man who has the guts to participate in the struggle.” Repudiating his 
previous politics, he declared that when others asked, “‘what has happened to Ralph 
Metcalfe,’ and ‘what took him so long’ he replies, ‘it is never too late to be black.’”120 It was, 
as his erstwhile opponent Sammy Rayner characterized, a complete 180: “All of a sudden, 
he’s become black and beautiful.”121 In this moment of shifting possibilities, he justified his 
political transformation in terms of his racial subjectivity.  
As he presented the case, black subjectivity grew out of political subjection: “It is not 
only Ralph Metcalfe on the spot today,” Metcalfe implored, “every black man is on the 
spot.” Metcalfe’s statement mirrored an ontology of racial oppression that failed to 
recognize humanity of black people. Rather, it equated one black person (Ralph Metcalfe) 
with any other black person (every black man). Metcalfe turned this racial ontology towards 
the service of imagining a political destiny that could overcome divisions among black 
people. He highlighted to the audience the stark terms of the struggle to come. Despite the 
decline in their turnout over the last half-decade, black Chicagoans represented a still 
inchoate political power because of their sheer numbers. As he put it, “that’s power if used 
correctly and we can be powerful from this moment on.” But as the Congressman knew, any 
challenge would be bitterly resisted. At City Hall, he informed his audience, “they’re not too 
sure that we blacks mean what we’re saying and are sure we’re going to do nothing but make 
a lot of noise, since they’re convinced we can’t stick together for a long time.”122 
Metcalfe’s invocation of shared conceptions of black vulnerability to state violence 
did much to create the very unity it purported to describe. From their first meeting with the 
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Superintendent, through the announcement of the six demands, the Third Ward Committee 
on Crime Prevention highlighted both police brutality and ineffective police protection. 
Similarly, Metcalfe’s demand to the Mayor was that he “come here to the ghetto where we 
have the criminally-minded police on one hand and criminals on the other.”123 Nonetheless, 
police brutality, and not police protection, provided the most effective issue for political 
mobilization. If crime proved divisive, police brutality bridged class and neighborhood, as 
well as experiences with the criminal justice system. In the wake of Metcalfe’s stand, “Black 
unity … bust[ed] out all over in Chicago.” Even in the moment when black social 
stratification was accelerating, black people of all classes remained at some risk of 
mistreatment by the police, even that risk was not identical. This common ground saw 
meetings of Metcalfe’s new organization, the Concerned Citizens for Police Reform (CCPR), 
encompass “every brand of conservative seriously and joyously mixing with every shade of 
militant.”124 
Police brutality also provided an issue for building relationships with Latino/as, who 
despite the Division Street riot in 1966 remained almost completely excluded from 
participation in the governing coalition. Chicago’s large and growing Mexican and Puerto 
Rican populations were nearly invisible to regular Democratic politicians. Police brutality 
provided the first major issue where blacks and Latino/as came together seeking to make a 
joint intervention into city politics. Latino/a support made it clear to Metcalfe that “the 
problem existed in city-wide proportions and that a larger movement was necessary.”125 In 
late May, he pushed beyond the specific boundaries of blackness: “I no longer represent the 
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3d Ward and the 1st Congressional District, but all oppressed people. My goals are the same 
but I have a broader base, for the people are directing me, the people are supporting me.”126 
 During the summer of 1972, Metcalfe brought all the social and political forces that 
formed part of the anti-brutality crusade together to hold hearings on the misuse of police 
authority. This “blue ribbon” panel had all of the trappings of a legislative hearing. The sea 
of black and brown faces, however, made it fundamentally unlike most legislative hearings. 
Collectively the participants sought to imagine a new paradigm for governing, questioning 
how—given adequate political will—they might re-channel police behavior to protect such 
citizens. The panel possessed none of the power to move law. Instead, it used the 
enthusiasm and anger of police critics to generate momentum in the arena of politics. 
Nonetheless, this tremendous moment of communal togetherness should not obscure how 
Metcalfe also used the hearings to successfully consolidate his position as the leader of the 
reform forces. Without Metcalfe the hearings would not have happened, but he constructed 
them on top of the previous four years of effort by Renault Robinson and the other 
members of the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, Kermit Coleman, and the various 
organizations who participated in the police reform network chronicled in Chapter 3. 
 In the story of rising black independent political power in Chicago, Metcalfe has long 
been lionized as a hero. He did take risks in stepping out against Daley. Over breakfast with 
Robinson on morning, he fretted, “this is gonna be a disaster for me and my career. He said, 
they’re gonna take everything away from me. And they did. They took all of his clout.”127 
Metcalfe lost his police bodyguards. He lost patronage jobs that he had controlled for years, 
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including the three workers who ran his popular athletic program. He was soon under 
investigation by the I.R.S. for activities that occurred while he was chairman of the City 
Council Zoning Committee. Nonetheless, it would be incorrect to recognize Metcalfe as 
substituting a politics of interest with a politics of value. Whatever his faults, he was a 
shrewd and conservative political operator who sensed the limits of the possible. Just as 
changing political opportunities made possible Metcalfe’s ascent in the Third Ward, 
Metcalfe’s whole history points to his recognition of the changing costs and opportunities of 
the political moment.    
Defeating Hanrahan 
 When Hanrahan won the March primary election, he became the candidate of 
Metcalfe’s party. Daley and most of the party hierarchy were happy to welcome him back 
into the fold. When a reporter cornered Metcalfe early May to ask his feelings, the 
Congressman snapped, “I’m not prepared to support the State’s Attorney.”128 Metcalfe’s 
activism against police brutality brought them into open conflict. In a speech to the Chicago 
Jaycees, Hanrahan argued that Metcalfe and other black leaders “frequently charge police 
brutality, but never utter a word about the constant massive civilian brutality which primarily 
victimizes their fellow blacks and has too often caused the death of Chicago Police 
officers.”129 He put himself forward as the only individual willing to defend the interests of 
residents of black communities. “[T]hey know that no other state’s attorney made any real 
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effort against the street gang violence. They know that I’ve been trying to have the law 
applied, by God, the same so far as South Side crime as Oak Park and Winnetka.”130 
 Hanrahan was not the only one who thought this way. “The average black who 
moves from neighborhood to neighborhood,” one letter writer to the Defender argued, “is 
not running from the police, he is running from black hoodlums.”131 Louis A. Fitzgerald, a 
controversial sometime Defender columnist, further disparaged: “Blacks who continually 
castigate the police and condemn them for lack of law enforcement are also those who do 
not participate and cooperate in the curtailment of increasing incidents of crime. … It is 
disgusting to see no one in the Black community stand up and be counted and renounce 
Black Crime!”132 Moreover, he condemned structural explanations for crimes committed by 
black people: “Blacks who continually blame racism, poverty and bigotry as a reason to 
commit acts of violence and property destruction are no better than those who commit the 
acts.”133 You’re either with us or against us.   
These criticisms were flatly inaccurate. Well-known Woodlawn educator Barbara 
Sizemore cited Ralph Metcalfe and Father George Clements in exposing the false dichotomy 
constructed by Hanrahan and the others.134 Black leaders, Renault Robinson noted, “are 
concerned about crime and also feel that Chicago must have a responsive Police 
Department.”135 Their principle argument was that the white criminal justice system gave too 
little thought to black victims of crime. Describing the father of a murdered fifteen-year old, 
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Vernon Jarrett editorialized, “He knew that if his son had been killed by a white person, the 
slaying would have become a cause célèbre. But since this was a black-on-black murder, it 
was soon forgotten.”136 Some even went as far as suggesting that black people convicted of 
crimes against other black people got lesser punishments. “It has been a pattern in the 
courts, so some lawyers say, that black on black crime results in ‘rewards’ for assailants 
rather than punishments.”137 Jarrett and others used the language of “black on black” 
crime—which would be picked up by reactionaries in the 1980s—not to highlight some 
black “innate depravity” but the refusal of law enforcement and the media to give equal 
consideration to black lives.138 
In criticizing Hanrahan, Metcalfe and his allies stressed the relationship between 
police violence and crime, and how the failure to stop one exacerbated the others. “Laxity in 
the state’s attorney’s office has contributed to the creation of the dangerous climate in our 
police department today.” Metcalfe argued, “corruption, brutality, violence, and possibly 
murder, are not only tolerated but seemingly condoned.”139 If the Congressman already had 
made many bold statements in recent months, his decision to actively campaign for 
Republican Bernard Carey in his race against Hanrahan was his most decisive action. He 
framed it in terms of Hanrahan’s failings in black neighborhoods. The New York Times 
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reported, the Congressman “will instruct his precinct captains to work against Mr. Hanrahan 
because of ‘his low conviction record, his non-existance [sic] rate of prosecuting police for 
corruption and extortion and his poor street gang prosecution rate.”140 Carey echoed these 
criticisms, openly disparaging Superintendent Conlisk for providing contradictory testimony 
in the Hanrahan case.141 He spoke against firing at fleeing suspects.142 Yet his campaign ads 
stressed Hanrahan’s record as a prosecutor. As one read, “This race is not about race! It’s 
not about white vs. black. Not about black vs. white. It’s about the bungling of criminal 
justice.”143 
Although the black regular Democratic committeemen had worked assiduously 
against Hanrahan in the primary election, only Metcalfe among them supported Bernard 
Carey in the November general election. His allies in this effort included the independent 
aldermen (and lone alderwoman), as well as State Representative Harold Washington and 
State Senator Richard Newhouse. The rare entrance of non-partisan organizations 
accompanied Metcalfe’s usual stance against his own party into the race. The Alliance 
concluded, “it would be inconsistent with the objectives to the Alliance to remain neutral 
and not seek actively to bring about a change in the administration and policies of that 
office.”144 They joined Jesse Jackson’s Operation PUSH and many other organizations in 
supporting the Republican. 
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Machine politics in Chicago was the art of making the expected happen. With Judge 
Phillip Romiti’s decision to dismiss all charges against Hanrahan a week before the election, 
his victory on November 8, 1972 seemed inevitable. Jack Mendelsohn of the Alliance, like 
other opponents, implored, “Legalities aside, the facts cannot vindicate Hanrahan’s 
conduct.”145 Perhaps the greatest obstacles were the liberal candidates on the ballot. The 
anti-Hanrahan forces also desperately wanted to elect George McGovern (over Richard 
Nixon) and independent Democrat Daniel Walker for Governor. The answer was “vote-
splitting,” a cumbersome procedure using Chicago’s voting machines. Operation PUSH’s 
political education division “started teaching classes … in the vote splitting techniques.”146 
Expectations remained low in the face of what was expected to be a massive turnout in the 
white ethnic wards.  
Insert Table 3  
On November 8, the saga of Edward Hanrahan came to its unexpected conclusion. 
After two years of twists and turns, his loss provided at least a minor measure of justice. By 
the slim margin of 1,167,872 to 1,038,666, the voters of Cook County elected Bernard Carey 
State’s Attorney. Among the critical sectors of voters there were some surprises. Hanrahan’s 
percentage of the votes in white ethnic wards moved only a small percent from the 
primary.147 Although he won the suburbs in March, he lost there in November, as the 
suburban Republicans who had crossed over to support him in in the primary backed their 
own by a small margin. The fact that Carey was the lone Republican to win office in Cook 
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County, however, demonstrated that it was not Republicans that made the biggest 
difference. It was the black and lakefront liberal wards that turned the race. In the primary, 
Hanrahan received sixteen percent of the votes in black wards. But together, he and the 
regular Democratic candidate captured more than sixty-one percent. (In the liberal wards, 
both Hanrahan and Raymond Berg captured over twenty-nine percent each, adding up to 
near 60 percent). With the power of the Democratic organization behind him in thirteen of 
fourteen black wards in November, only one ward—Claude Holman’s—went for the State’s 
Attorney.148 He could not clear forty percent, as all the other majority black wards favored 
Carey and gave commanding majorities to the Democratic gubernatorial and presidential 
candidates.149 Black voters split their tickets more than twice as often as whites, leading one 
political commentator to marvel: “The black voters of Chicago may be the most 
sophisticated black voters in America.”150 Ralph Metcalfe won reelection by the largest 
margin of any Congressman in city. 
* * * 
 Ralph Metcalfe’s political evolution, together with Edward Hanrahan’s defeat in 
1972, highlights the importance of police brutality to independent black electoral politics in 
the 1970s. Independents had already demonstrated that they could beat the regular 
Democratic organization in any one ward on multiple occasions since 1963. But what 
happened in 1972 was different: in a high-profile countywide election, black and liberal 
voters provided the decisive margin to defeat a favorite son of the regular Democratic 
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organization. Hanrahan was the candidate of law-and-order, and his loss revealed how such 
currents swept unevenly over the rocky terrain of American politics.  
 During the two years following the murders of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, 
activists organized to challenge the Democratic party-state’s capacity to cover up police 
violence. In politics, police brutality provided the bridge for Ralph Metcalfe to negotiate a 
new political identity for himself. Activists sought to populate the institutions of governance 
with representative citizens, rooted in particular politics rather than loyal to the party-state. 
Metcalfe’s personal transformation embodied a similar process, as he remade his lineaments 
of affiliation outside of the political party.  
 Metcalfe was a politician, and his transformation—however sincerely felt—reflected 
the available political opportunities. These years revealed much about the conditions under 
which black Chicagoans might be able to construct a politics free from the racial domination 
of Daley’s party-state. Even within the hopefulness of the moment, though, the events of 
the early 1970s offered mixed signals about the kind of politics that would emerge and its 
vulnerabilities. Metcalfe’s success in turning against the regulars demanded his projection as 
a leader of police reformers. He swooped in, putting himself at the forefront of a more 
participatory politics and making himself a focal point for negotiation with the city. Until 
1975, when Metcalfe endorsed Daley’s opponent in the mayoral election, there remained a 
palpable fear on behalf of activists that he would return to Daley’s fold, disabling the work 
that had been done.  
 Just as ambiguous was the place of anti-crime efforts in the emerging political 
alignment. Contrary to the dichotomies constructed by advocates of law-and-order, those 
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individuals screaming “police brutality!” were also screaming “too much crime!” At no point 
did liberals and independents cede the question of crime to conservatives. But, in practice, 
attempts to organize around crime only fostered social division. Building a political 
movement that placed the local state’s role in fostering disparities in their vulnerability to 
crime at the center was a complex and difficult task that—despite its paramount importance 
to many involved—remained on the fringes of this particular political rebellion. The political 
conditions under which Metcalfe was able to break away from the regular organization 
presented ominous signals for the ability of an independent black politics to address some of 
the key questions it faced.  
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CHAPTER 6: FEDERAL POWER, POLICING, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
 
 
By the summer of 1970, Renault Robinson faced dismissal from the Chicago Police 
Department. As he and his lawyers prepared for an upcoming hearing before the civilian 
Police Board in October, the Afro-American’s Patrolmen’s League pursued all avenues to 
protect him. They held press conferences and rallies, solicited support from community 
groups and politicians, and had sympathetic aldermen call for an investigation.1 A delegation 
of “middle-class Blacks” secured an audience with Mayor Richard J. Daley to plead 
Robinson’s case.2 On September 9, in a last ditch effort, Robinson turned to the federal 
courts. He and other League members sued Superintendent James B. Conlisk, the city, and 
the Police Board, alleging violation of their rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. As the Complaint’s “Statement of Facts” averred, the 
Department engaged in “unequal treatment, arbitrary suspension, other arbitrary discipline, 
and other forms of harassment” against Robinson and the League, “because … they are 
black men, because the League is an organization of black Department members, and 
because Renault Robinson and the League have criticized the Department.”3 The suit sought 
to stop the Department’s retaliation and to use law to demarcate space for organizing. 
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While the complaint gestured toward racial discrimination, it contained only a hint of 
the general offensive against the Department’s personnel practices that would begin nine 
months later. By July 1971, Robinson remarkably remained on the force and Robinson v. 
Conlisk remained in motion around the Northern District of Illinois, moving from the 
docket of Judge James B. Parsons, who recused himself, to Judge Abraham Lincoln 
Marovitz, and then, finally, settling with Judge Frank J. McGarr.4 The League suspected the 
city of “taking a position of just waiting us out.”5 As the patrolmen looked for leverage, they 
discovered that “Chicago was receiving in excess of $10 million in funds from the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration [(LEAA)].” (Actually, yearly totals were much 
smaller.)6 Recognizing that the agency had “regulations which required them not to give 
money to agencies that would discriminate,” and having accumulated many complaints from 
black applicants and officers about personnel administration, the League requested that the 
LEAA investigate and hold a public hearing.7 In the pendency of such a hearing, Robinson 
asked the agency to temporarily halt funding to the Chicago Police.8 He hoped this might 
“prod the slow process of the court along.”9 
That these two institutions—the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League and the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Agency—should come together was no surprise: they were equally 
products of the combustible reactions over race, space, and power that characterized the 
urban conflicts of the 1960s. The LEAA was the federal government’s institutional answer 
to the controversies over law enforcement at the center of American political life, 
                                                 
4 “3 Black Policemen Released in Chicago,” New York Times, July 11, 1971, 35; “Afro Cop Chief Put on Spot 
Again,” 4.  
5 Revenue Sharing (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1974), 81. 
6 The Chicago Police never received anywhere near that amount money in a single year.  
7 Revenue Sharing, 81. 
8 Tony Anthony, “Afro Cops to U.S.: Halt Police Funding,” Chicago Defender, June 5, 1971, 1. 
9 Revenue Sharing, 82. 
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particularly in the years between 1964 and 1968. The bill that Lyndon Johnson proposed in 
early 1967 differed in key ways from the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968 (Safe Streets Act) that he signed a year and a half later. Congressional conservatives 
used the hearings and debate over the Act to rhetorically link rising crime, urban riots, and 
political protest, deploying them much in the way that Richard Nixon would in his election 
to the presidency in 1968. The Safe Streets Act they passed portended the Republican’s 
domestic agenda. It was a reconfiguration of state power that Nixon would, as President, call 
the New Federalism. By using block grants to channel Washington’s dollars to states and 
cities while restricting federal bureaucratic oversight over how they were spent, the Safe 
Streets Act became the New Federalism’s first practical experiment. 
This chapter reframes federal involvement in local law enforcement as a fiscal 
assistance program by setting the LEAA in relation to Nixon’s other major New Federalist 
program, General Revenue Sharing. If the law enforcement program was the vehicle through 
which the federal government fought crime, the battle in Chicago was not much more than a 
skirmish.10 Between the passage of the Safe Streets Act in 1968 and 1974, federal money had 
little effect on the conduct of policing in Chicago. Rather, the most high profile example of 
LEAA spending in Chicago was for the creation of the Police Community Service Aides 
program, which hired 400 residents of the city’s four Model Cities neighborhoods. This 
program did not bring the community into the Police Department, as its self-described aims 
purported. Rather, it was an example of Mayor Daley’s creative engagement of the federal 
                                                 
10 Rather then demonstrating a federal role in instantiating our contemporary punitive practices, my study of 
Chicago echoes the conclusions of the scholars who studied the program a generation ago that the agency did 
little to reform the criminal justice system and less to stop crime. Malcom M. Feeley and Austin D. Sarat, The 
Policy Dilemma: Federal Crime Policy and Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1968-1978 (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1980). 
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government in order to strengthen the Democratic party-state by creating a new series of 
patronage jobs.  
Robinson had his own ideas for bringing representative community members into 
policing: more black officers and a fairer system of promotion. His hopes that the federal 
money would bring leverage for this were misplaced. This was because of the structure of 
the federal program. If conservatives sought to launch a war on crime in the late 1960s, they 
remained ambivalent about the use of federal power in those efforts. This chapter traces the 
effects of their ambivalence. Congressional conservatives feared giving the federal 
government greater power over law enforcement: criminal justice institutions were bulwarks 
of white supremacy, and they did not want the federal government to use federal civil rights 
law to reform them. Accordingly, they sought to blunt civil rights enforcement by 
restructuring intergovernmental aid. Through the New Federalism, they limited federal 
control over how state and local governments spent federal money and, thereby, successfully 
limited civil rights oversight.  
New Federalism and Civil Rights  
Passed four years apart and signed into law by Presidents from different parties, the 
Safe Streets Act and the General Revenue Sharing Act tried in similar ways to transform the 
structure of inter-governmental funding. By putting federal money into the hands of state 
and local governments with little federal oversight or direction as to how to spend it, they 
sought to transfer the center of gravity for policy-making away from Washington. This had 
everything to do with limiting civil rights gains, in an even more direct way than scholars 
have noticed. It began in 1968, when Congressional conservatives justified changes to the 
  
    215 
President’s law enforcement bill in terms of their fear of federal civil rights enforcement in 
the context of local policing. Their institutional solution, the block grant, was the first step 
towards New Federalism.  
Insert Figure 3 
Changes in the tax structure and financing of American government after the New 
Deal undergirded all discretionary federal grant programs. The relative fiscal positions of 
local, state, and federal governments underwent massive transformations during the middle 
decades of the twentieth century. As Figure 3 shows, measured as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product, federal revenues grew five-fold from 1932 to 1970, while local revenues 
actually fell by nearly thirty-nine percent. As a proportion of total collections, local revenues 
fell from fifty-two to under eighteen percent—much faster than local spending fell.11 
Different taxation mechanisms produced these inter-governmental disparities. State and city 
tax bases rely on weak and regressive property and sales taxes. By 1970, they produced 
seventy-four percent of state and local revenue.12 Urban tax bases eroded especially 
dramatically in the decades after World War II, as the changing political economies of 
postwar industrial and residential development restructured metropolitan geographies and 
produced massive declines in the value of taxable real estate within cities. The past 
generation of monographs on metropolitan history demonstrated how a wide variety of 
                                                 
11 Converted into constant 1970 dollars—that is, by adjusting normalizing spending using growth in the 
consumer price index—federal, state, and local revenues all grew between 1932 and 1970, with federal revenues 
growing about three times as fast as state or local. Measuring change in constant dollars, however, does not 
capture the full impact of what happened. Calculating spending as a percentage of GDP offers a better measure 
of revenue collection in relation to the overall size of the economy. Bruce A Wallin, From Revenue Sharing to 
Deficit Sharing: General Revenue Sharing and Cities (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 3. 
12 Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, General Explanation of the State and Local Fiscal 
Assistance Act and the Federal-State Tax Collection Act of 1972, H.R. 14370, 92d Congress, Public Law 92-512 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1973), 7. 
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government programs incentivized and shaped this decline.13 By contrast, the federal 
government raised revenue with an enhanced and progressive personal income tax after 
1932. Its tax system possessed “a broader reach, provisions for withholding, a progressive 
rate structure fueled by inflation, and [was] unfettered by tax competition concerns.”14 The 
creation of this superior tax system made the federal government’s predominance in post-
WWII American politics and policy possible.  
 
The growth of federal categorical grant programs reflected this shift in fiscal power. 
Viewed narrowly, these programs vindicated federal interests in particular policy problems. 
Grants-in-aid focused on defined purposes and gave federal agencies a high degree of 
control over which state and local entities received funds (recipients applied for the program, 
met criteria, and prevailed over others) and the performance conditions for programs.15 
From a wide angle, however, categorical grant programs collectively addressed their 
recipients’ weak fiscal capacity. Urban governments lacked the means to address the 
demographic, social, and political legacies they faced; discretionary federal spending through 
categorical grants provided both dollars and policy direction.  
 
                                                 
13 There is a large literature. Key books include Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier : The Suburbanization of the 
United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and 
Housing in Chicago 1940-1960 (Chicago, Ill: University Of Chicago Press, 1998); Robert O. Self, American Babylon: 
Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005); Thomas J. Sugrue 
and Kevin M. Kruse, eds., The New Suburban History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); David M. P. 
Freund, Colored Property : State Policy and White Racial Politics in Suburban America (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2007); Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit, Updated 
Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). 
14 Wallin, From Revenue Sharing to Deficit Sharing: General Revenue Sharing and Cities, 5. 
15 Robert Jay Dilger, “Federal Grants to State and Local Governments: A Historical Perspective on 
Contemporary Issues” (Congressional Research Service, March 5, 2015), 3 and 4, tbl. 1. 
  
    217 
When Lyndon B. Johnson sent a bill to Congress to create a grant-in-aid program for 
law enforcement early in 1967, he called for federal funding of an unprecedented scope for 
activities that local governments previously had funded on their own. The federal 
government had been involved in law enforcement since the country’s birth. Federal 
involvement in criminal justice was outlined in the Constitution, and the first Congress 
criminalized a wide variety of behaviors.16 Over time, the breadth of these prohibitions was 
limited only by the shifting boundaries of federal jurisdiction.17 In the twentieth century 
federal power stretched to reach an increasing array of behaviors, “subject to the changing 
winds of politics, to fashions and movements.”18 Prior to the 1960s, the new subjects of 
federal criminal regulation included lotteries, alcohol, auto theft, “white slavery,” and drug 
crimes.19 The events of the late 1960s in Chicago, including the assassinations of Mark Clark 
and Fred Hampton and the prosecutions following the Democratic National Convention, 
demonstrated how state and federal jurisdictions often overlapped.20 Nevertheless, local 
agencies remained on the front line of law enforcement, as the growth of federal categorical 
                                                 
16 The Constitution authorizes Congress to punish “counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the 
United States,” as well as piracies and felonies on the high seas, offenses against the law of nation, and treason.  
United States Constitution, Article I, section 8 and Article 3, section 3. 
17 This was particularly so with regard to race. When the Supreme Court aborted Congressional criminal 
prohibitions to safeguard the lives, property, and votes of African-Americans in the 1870s and 1880s, it set the 
protection of African-Americans largely outside of the boundaries of federal jurisdiction.  
18 Lawrence Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 268. 
19 As Lisa Miller stresses, “the growth of congressional jurisdiction over the criminal law is an of the 
nationalization of a wide range of social issues in the first half of the twentieth century.” Lisa L. Miller, The 
Perils of Federalism: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime Control (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 44. 
20 Federal prosecutors based their case in the Chicago Seven trial following the 1968 Democratic Convention 
almost entirely upon the testimony of undercover police officers. FBI domestic surveillance, and an FBI 
informant, supplied local officers with the information for the December 1969 raid on the Black Panthers 
apartment. What was true in these high profile political cases was also true in other realms of federal crime 
control, such as drug enforcement and organized crime. 
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grants before 1968 brought only a trickle of money and little federal oversight into criminal 
justice.21 
Johnson took up criminal justice in 1965, and his bill was the culmination of much 
federal effort, including two years of study by the Presidential Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.22 The first Title of the Act was its heart: it 
proposed the creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA) to dispense 
grants-in-aid directly to state and local law enforcement institutions.23 Southern Democrats, 
particularly in the Senate, transformed many aspects of Johnson’s bill.24 To score political 
points, they focused public attention on their attempts to overturn Miranda v. Arizona and to 
allow more liberal wiretapping.25 But their chief achievement, and the one that most precisely 
                                                 
21 Most federal criminal justice dollars were spent on explicitly federal functions, not supporting state and local 
institutions. In 1969, for example, the federal government spent $554,614 million on direct criminal justice 
expenditures. The vast majority of this direct spending (almost 60 percent) came through the Department of 
Justice. Then home of the U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Marshalls, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the federal Bureau of Prisons, as well as the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, the DOJ spent $356 million [1969 dollars] on direct law enforcement. The Department of the 
Treasury, home to the Bureau of Customs, the Secret Services, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, spent more than $90 million. Grant-in-aid funding was spent on basic 
education in state and local penitentiaries, juvenile delinquency prevention efforts, model cities, and programs 
involving military veterans. Making the Safe Streets Act Work: An Intergovernmental Challenge (Washington, D.C.: 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1970), 5, tbl. 3. 
22 At a cost of more than $2.5 million, the nineteen commissioners, “63 staff members, 175 consultants, 
hundreds of advisors, 5 national surveys, 3 national conferences,” the “Crime Commission” produced a 
comprehensive, if over-stuffed and dull, report structured around a laundry list of more than 200 hundred 
reforms. Thomas E. Cronin, Tania Z. Cronin, and Michael E. Milakovich, U.S. v. Crime in the Streets 
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1981), 39. 
23 The LEAA built upon the efforts of the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA), which spent a little 
more than $20 million between 1965 and 1968 funding the education and training of law enforcement 
personnel, and research on law enforcement. 
24 The Act the President signed into law contained a grab bag of liberal and conservative provisions. These 
included titles restored the pre-Miranda rules for admissibility of confessions and allowing interlocutory appeal 
by the government when evidence is suppressed (Title II, VIII); restricted and permitted wiretapping (Title III); 
and regulated handgun sales and possession (Titles IV, VII). Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, 
Public Law 90–351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968). President Johnson objected to Title II and believed that the bans in 
Titles III nor IV did not go far enough. 
25 No one grandstanded more than Subcommittee chairman John L. McClellan, who opened 10 days of 
hearings by declaring, “Three bills that the subcommittee will consider are of particular importance … S. 674, 
on confessions; S. 675, on wiretapping; and S. 678, on outlawing the Mafia …” He pointedly ignored S. 917, 
the Johnson administration’s bill. Senators Ervin, Hruska, and Thurmond also signaled out the confessions bill 
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reveals the interactions between “law and order” politics and federalism, was their remaking 
of Title I’s structure.  
Congressional debates illustrated the striking paradox conservatives faced in turning 
to “law-and-order” in the late 1960s. How could they advance federal aid to state and local 
law enforcement without giving greater power to the federal government to control those 
institutions? Conservatives might want law-and-order but they worried that greater federal 
power might come at the expense of local capacity to structure racial hierarchies. The same 
people who wanted to limit the reach of civil rights laws also sought to limit federal intrusion 
into state and local criminal justice institutions, precisely because such intrusions might bring 
vigorous civil rights enforcement. 
 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act was heart of the problem for Southern conservatives. 
As originally enacted in 1964, section 601 provided, “No person in the United States shall on 
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.” Title VI applied largely to cover those programs where “public or 
private institutions that intervene between the Federal Government and the intended 
beneficiaries—and the program benefits reach the individual beneficiary indirectly.” 
Although programs under this mandate varied widely, their common element was that they 
“operate[d] through intermediaries, called ‘recipients.’”26 In 1974, the United States 
                                                                                                                                                 
as of paramount importance in their remarks. Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1967), 2–3. 
26 United States Commission on Civil Rights, Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort: A Report of the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1970), 547, 550–51. 
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Commission on Civil Rights undertook searching examination of Title VI compliance and 
found it applied to more than 400 programs, with spending of $50 billion (more than half-a-
trillion dollars in 2013, when converted as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product).27 As 
Assistant Attorney General Thomas Perez noted in 2010, “Title VI’s breadth of coverage is 
extensive and it can address a huge array of injustices: from environmental racism to 
discriminatory profiling, and from disparities in health care and basic service to inequities in 
transportation, housing, and education.”28  
Southern conservatives endeavored to directly limit the application of civil rights law 
in the crime control context. Senator James O. Eastland worried that creating the LEAA to 
dispense moneys through direct grants to local agencies, “would undermine the basic 
premise of our Federal Republic; that is, that there should be local control and supervision 
over law enforcement. In my judgment, this undermining of local control of law 
enforcement could lead to a national police force, and perhaps to a national police state.” 
Eastland focused primarily on the power of LEAA administrators to “establish ‘guidelines’, 
compliance with which would be a condition for the granting of Federal funds.” The 
Mississippian was vague about how such guidelines might reduce state governments to a 
state of abjection, referring only to the “painful experiences” of other state and local 
institutions in “attempting to comply with guidelines laid down by other Federal agencies in 
the disbursement of Federal funds.”29 Eastland’s writing is thin on substance and thick with 
allusion, yet there can be no mistake about his meaning.  
                                                 
27 United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort--1974; Volume VI: To 
Extend Federal Financial Assistance (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1975), 1. 
28 Thomas E Perez to Federal Funding Agency Civil Rights Directors, “Title VI Coordination and 
Enforcement,” August 19, 2010, 5, www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/titlevi_memo_tp.pdf. 
29 “Separate Statement of James O. Eastland,” in S.R. 1092, 90th Cong., 1968, 220–221. 
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Senators John McClellan (D-Ark) and Strom Thurmond (D-SC) fleshed out 
Eastland’s allusions, zeroing in on the “painful experiences” of southern school districts with 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s (HEW) desegregation guidelines. In a 
colloquy with Attorney General Ramsey Clark, Thurmond asked, “Are you not going to 
develop here the same pressures and irritations that now are going on between HEW and 
the States? … Of course I am speaking of the Guidelines …” During the Johnson 
Administration, HEW’s actual or threatened use of Title VI to cut off of federal aid was the 
most effective tool for transforming the racial make-up of recalcitrant school districts. In 
exchange for nearly $590 million of federal money, the seventeen border and southern states 
had to comply with HEW’s guidelines.30 For example, they contained a “percentage scale for 
normally expected progress” for districts using “freedom of choice” plans.31 A district that 
was eight or nine percent black in 1966-67, for example, was expected to double the figure 
by the next year.32 The Senator submitted that it was these guidelines, “which went further 
than the Supreme Court decision, which went further than the civil law itself, and which is 
causing so much trouble now.”33 If by trouble, he meant effective integration, he was right. 
Implementation of HEW’s annual guidelines was a crucial step in the recasting of the 
                                                 
30 Joseph Crespino, In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative Counterrevolution (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 176; James Dunn, “Title VI, the Guidelines, and School Desegregation in 
the South,” Virginia Law Review 53 (1967): 53–64; United States v. Jefferson County, 372 F. 2d 836 (5th Cir. 
1966); Guidelines for School Desegregation, Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Civil Rights, House of 
Representatives, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. (1966).  
31 Freedom of choice plans eliminated zoned assignments and allowed students to choose which school they 
would attend. Dunn, “Title VI, the Guidelines, and School Desegregation in the South,” 63. 
32 Robert B. Semple, Jr., “U.S. to Adhere to School Desegregation Guidelines,” New York Times, January 1, 
1967, 43. 
33 Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement, 485. 
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meaning of Brown toward “a legal obligation not merely to stop segregating students, but to 
achieve racial integration in schools.”34  
As Congress transformed the bill into a model New Federalist program, conservative 
members of both Houses sought to prevent the new agency from imposing Title VI 
guidelines on law enforcement. This aim was most visible in the Senate committee hearings, 
where McClellan quizzed the Attorney General, “would you have any authority under this 
bill, with respect to plans involving personnel or police departments generally, to require a 
planning entity to have a ratio of police personnel according to race corresponding the racial 
population of the area covered by the plan?” Where the population was evenly divided 
between blacks and whites, would the Attorney General be able to say, “You have got to 
have 50 percent of your policemen colored, otherwise you get no money and the plan is no 
good?”35 The Senators remained suspicious of the Attorney General’s assurances. The most 
direct solution, which was ultimately adopted, was inserting a rule into the bill that barred 
the use of quotas. The Safe Streets Act prohibited the Administration from using Title VI to 
“require, or condition the availability or amount of a grant upon the adoption by an 
applicant or grantee under this title of a percentage ratio, quota system, or other program to 
achieve racial balance or to eliminate racial imbalance in any law enforcement agency.”36 This 
                                                 
34 Stephen C. Halpern, On the Limits of Law: The Ironic Legacy of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 43. The Supreme Court ratified this approach in Green v. County 
School Boad of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
35 Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement, 487. 
36 Whether their experiences with Southern law enforcement or with liberal promises were the decisive factor, 
the Southerners remained skeptical of Clark’s assurances. During the Attorney General’s testimony Senator 
Thurmond alluded to Hubert Humphrey’s promise to “eat his hat” if Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ever led 
to racial quotas. Ibid., 493. A grant be discontinued for these reasons. Safe Streets Act, vol. 82, sec. 518. 
  
    223 
would make the issuance of integration guidelines on the same model as those issued for 
Southern schools impossible.37  
The Safe Streets Act went beyond this to offer a structural limitation on “Federal 
usurpation of control”: the block grant funding mechanism.38 In debate, conservatives 
focused less on the substance of Title I than on how it would structure inter-governmental 
relationships. Their solution to the paradox of how to strengthen state and local law 
enforcement without extending federal control was the elimination of categorical grants. 
They used block grants to put decision-making over spending in the hands of fifty State 
Planning Agencies (SPAs), to be created by state governors.39 The LEAA would disburse 
Part B (Planning) grants to the SPAs in order to devise a statewide plan.40 Once LEAA 
accepted the state plan, it would disburse Part C (Action) funds in an amount determined by 
statutory formula, which the state agencies would then pass through.41 Given that everyone 
assumed LEAA-funded programs would focus on law enforcement, the decision to put 
governors at the center of planning made little practical sense.42 As the Attorney General 
argued, “The cities have historically had the leadership and the responsibility for local law 
                                                 
37 Clark insisted the government would cut of funds where discrimination produced racial imbalance, which his 
interlocutors saw this as merely restating the question. Thurmond’s response: “Discrimination is not the point. 
Racial balance is the point …” Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement, 491. He insisted, however, 
that such action would not be necessary: While “every major city in the country has a smaller proportion of 
Negro policeman to population than whites … in nearly all of these jurisdictions, if not all, a conscious effort is 
being made because of the practicalities of law enforcement to quality and train and recruit more Negro police 
officers.” Ibid., 493.  
38 Statement of Senator Hruska (R-NE), Cong. Rec., May 10, 1968, S5346. If this was not enough, section 518 
also explicitly barred the federal government and its employees from exercising “direction, supervision, or 
control.” Safe Streets Act, vol. 82, sec. 518.  
39 The only previous block grant program, the Partnership for Health Act, created state planning agencies. The 
Partnership for Health Act: Lessons from a Pioneering Block Grant (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1977). 
40 Much of this money would be passed through to state and local planning agencies. 
41 LEAA also distributed Part D “discretionary grants” directly to recipient institutions. LEAA disbursed 85 
percent of its funds as Part B and C grants and the remaining 15 percent as Part D grants. 
42 After 1970, the focus would broaden to more deliberately include prisons and jails, and later courts.  
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enforcement, and the State has not played a role.”43 Governors had “no experience in the 
field.”44  
But it made sense for those who wanted to limit the impact of Title VI. There, what 
mattered most was not who planned the spending but who granted the funds and their 
relationship to federal civil rights law. Congressional conservatives did not propose block 
grants—as would advocates of spending cuts after 1980—in order to consolidate programs 
and shrink federal aid.45 The Safe Streets Act created a costly new program in a new 
substantive area.46 Congress used block grants not to change the size of government but to 
change its shape. Block grants redistributed political power away from Ramsey Clark and the 
federal bureaucracy and put it into the hands of state governors. This did not explicitly 
restrict Title VI’s reach. Rather, the Safe Streets Act reduced federal civil rights oversight by 
limiting federal contact with state and local institutions, federal oversight of their activities, 
and federal dexterity in wielding federal dollars. 
 
The LEAA shaped the relationship between criminal justice and civil rights policy. 
General Revenue Sharing was equally important. One of the centerpieces of Nixon’s 
domestic policy, Revenue Sharing responded directly to the pressure on state and local 
                                                 
43 Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement, 814. 
44 Ibid., 382. 
45 This was unlike the Reagan administration, which using block to eliminate individual entitlements to services 
and replace them with fixed grants to the states. President Reagan proposed in his first term consolidating 85 
federal programs into seven block grants in order to reduce social spending. In the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981, the Democratic Congress stopped just short of what the President wanted—
reducing 77 categorical grants into nine block grants—they cut the overall level of funding of those programs 
almost twenty-five percent. 
46 Indeed, in 1976, John Conyers joked, in relation to LEAA, “we have now what some people have termed … 
a ‘fiscal relief program,’ for the law enforcement agencies of America at every level.” Statement of Rep. 
Conyers (D-MI), Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee 
on the Judiciary. House of Representatives. 94th Cong. 2d Session (Mar. 11, 1976), 446. 
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budgets in the 1970s by dispensing $30.2 billion from 1972 to 1976 ($143.9 billion in 2013 
dollars). Although funds could be spent on many things, the importance of police 
departments to municipal budgets implicated this New Federalist program in the practical 
working out of civil rights in law enforcement during the 1970s. While the Title VI 
implications of the law were not addressed as explicitly as in in debates over the Safe Streets 
Act, they were no less apparent. Like the block grant, the structure of General Revenue 
Sharing offered a fiscal technology to supply federal dollars while neutralizing federal civil 
rights enforcement.  
President Nixon structured federal fiscal assistance in a manner that “carried the 
principles behind block grants to their logical conclusion.”47 From the present, it might 
appear odd that the largest discretionary domestic program in history had fewer strings and 
less accountability than any previous spending program, but these were essential 
characteristics of the plan. Nixon sought to remake the federal power by cutting down on 
bureaucracy and consolidating authority in the White House.48 The General Revenue Sharing 
Act mandated “a set portion of the revenues, from federal income taxes, be remitted directly 
to the states, with a minimum of federal restrictions on how these dollars are to be used.”49 
It cut out federal decision-makers in almost every significant respect: “the money is 
automatically distributed according to a formula to all those jurisdictions which meet certain 
                                                 
47 Timothy Conlan, From New Federalism to Devolution: Twenty-Five Years of Intergovernmental Reform (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 65. 
48 As a whole, Nixon’s quest to remake the federal bureaucracy failed. Categorical grant programs grew faster 
than the general inflation of federal spending during his first term, from $18.6 billion to $34.4 billion (an 
increase of just over 50 percent in constant dollars). As a percentage of the federal budget, grant-in-aid 
expenditures grew from 10.4 to 14.9 percent. Congressional and bureaucratic politics subverted Nixon’s 
attempt to convert 130 categorical grant programs into six Special Revenue Sharing Funds: Law Enforcement, 
Manpower, Urban and Rural Community Development, Transportation, and Education. Only the 
Comprehensive Education and Training Act of 1974 (Manpower) passed. Conlan, From New Federalism to 
Devolution. 
49 Richard M. Nixon, “Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs,” August 8, 1969, 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2191. 
  
    226 
objective eligibility criteria and … that recipients are left free to spend the money on a wide 
range of public services.”50  
Although Nixon had wanted no strings attached to general revenue sharing funds, in 
the final bill Congress established eight priority areas for local government expenditures on 
operations: public safety, environmental protection, public transportation, health, recreation, 
libraries, social services for the aged and the poor, and financial administration.51 Recipients 
of funds under the program submitted projected- and actual-use reports to the Office of 
Revenue Sharing. According to the actual-use reports, federal revenue dollars flowed 
disproportionately towards public safety: in the first two and a half years, nearly $2.2 billion, 
almost twenty-three percent of the total reported expenditures.52 Big cities declared spending 
at triple this level: 62.3 percent of funds for public safety.53 Chicago claimed an even higher 
rate, allocating $70 of its $95 million in revenue sharing in 1973 just for police salaries.54  
Analyses of the fiscal effects of General Revenue Sharing suggest that less was spent 
on urban policing than these actual-use figures declared.55 Cities’ weak revenue collection 
                                                 
50 Robert D. Reischauer, General Revenue Sharing: The Program’s Incentives, General Series Reprint 313 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), 41. 
51 States faced no such restrictions, nor did the legislation restrict any government’s capital expenditures. Eileen 
Shanahan, “Race Bias Feared in Funds Sharing: Commission on Civil Rights Urges Stronger Curbs,” New York 
Times, August 5, 1971, 21. 
52 Actual use reports showed the use of such funds as operating or capital expenses and further broke them out 
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billion), four-fifths of which went to operations (as opposed to capital expenditures). Municipalities with more 
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Have All the Dollars Gone? Implications of General Revenue Sharing for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 
(Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1976), 6, tbl. 3, and 7, tbl. 4. 
53 Cities with over a million residents. Nathan et al., Where Have All the Dollars Gone? Implications of General Revenue 
Sharing for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. 
54 Susanna McBee, “U.S. Asked to Halt Revenue-Sharing to Chicago,” Washington Post, September 15, 1974, 
A24. Graham W. Watt to Mayor Daley, May 9, 1974, 1, AAPL 24-5. 
55 The problem of fiscal effects goes beyond the mere intentional shifting of moneys between accounts. For 
example, in a given year a government may have actually increased its spending on law enforcement the 
amount reported to the Office of Revenue Sharing. But, given the importance of policing to local politics, 
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capacities meant that they needed money to maintain a wide variety of services. The 
fungibility of revenue sharing funds meant that big city mayors could claim this new, federal 
money was being dedicated to policing, even though many cities would have spent similar 
amounts without it. Funds that would have been spent on policing could then be shifted to 
preserve existing services across the budget. Even so, this overstating of public safety in 
actual-use reports expresses how important policing was to urban fiscal politics. The 
infusion of federal dollars gave big city mayors an opportunity to declare the priority of 
public safety regardless of the actual net fiscal effect of the dollars.  
Liberals and civil rights leaders noted their appreciation for the basic idea of revenue 
sharing by recognizing the crucial aid that the program might provide to cities. Moreover, it 
might do so while embracing principles of tax fairness,56 encouraging state and local 
governments to rely on progressive and broad-based income taxes.57 In spite of these 
                                                                                                                                                 
elsewhere in the budget. The fiscal effect, then, occurred on the programs that were not cut rather than on the 
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Collection Act of 1972, H.R. 14370, 92d Congress, Public Law 92-512, 2. 
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potential goods, they were skeptical of the program. They raised what Nixon special advisor 
Ed Harper described as “persistent questions about whether or not the revenue sharing 
programs will result in a reversal of civil rights gains.”58 These concerns only partially related 
to the questions of whether the bill should contain a specific civil rights provision. Critics of 
revenue sharing focused broadly on the Nixon’s plan’s blithe ignorance of “the states 
[failure] in their responsibility to the people. Federal power has been needed to correct local 
injustices such as discrimination and neglect of cities.”59 Or, as Bayard Rustin put it more 
bluntly, revenue sharing “simply means states rights.”60 
Organized labor, civil rights organizations, and the Congressional Black Caucus all 
criticized revenue sharing on these grounds. Congressman Gus Hawkins argued, “when 
Nixon talks about giving government back to the people and ‘revenue sharing,’ I doubt that 
he is motivated by interested in meeting the needs of black and brown Americans.”61 
Hawkins and others focused much of their attention on the potentially negative impact of 
revenue sharing on programs designed to assist urban residents, particularly the poor and 
racial minorities. Nixon proposed an overall increase in federal funds, but the New York 
Times editorialized, “revenue sharing can be a device for scaling down as well as increasing 
the flow of funds from Washington.” In particular, advocates worried that revenue sharing 
would be used to eliminate the federal transfers going towards established grant-in-aid 
                                                 
58 Ed Harper to Len Garment, “Revenue Sharing Programs and Civil Rights,” Mar. 18, 1971, Harper 24-Civil 
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program areas. Even if the level of funding maintained, the Times warned of “[a]n even 
greater danger … that the return to states and localities of unearmarked Federal money will 
result in a decline, rather than an expansion in total public action to deal with urgent social 
problems.”62 Cities and states might subvert the cause of equality without federal direction. 
Critics also raised an overlapping set of questions about civil rights enforcement by 
the Office of Revenue Sharing. Nixon’s initial proposal in 1969 mentioned nothing about 
civil rights, causing activists immediately to seek assurances that civil rights guarantees would 
apply.63 As National Urban League chief Whitney Young argued in his syndicated column, 
“If federal power is to be shared with local government the federal government must build 
into its proposals iron-clad safeguards that will prevent discrimination.”64 Moreover, they 
wanted to extend the reach of Title VII, the 1964 Act’s employment discrimination 
provision. As part of the set of compromises necessary to pass the bill, Congress exempted 
state and local governments from its coverage. When the House Ways and Means 
Committee considered Nixon’s General Revenue Sharing Act in 1972, a Labor 
subcommittee simultaneously contemplated the removal of the state and local government 
exemption from Title VII as part of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.  
The two bills had no formal relationship. Nonetheless, civil rights activists 
understood how the revenue sharing would transform inter-governmental relations. Father 
Ted Hesburgh, Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, argued in a letter to the 
Nixon administration that the Title VII expansion was imperative to Revenue Sharing’s 
success. “Since revenue sharing would serve to increase the responsibility of state 
                                                 
62 “Editorial: Prospective on Revenue Sharing,” New York Times, January 27, 1971, 36. 
63 Ethel Payne, “Top Leaders Hold Secret Meeting With Atty. General Mitchell,” New Pittsburgh Courier, 
November 1, 1969, 2. 
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governments, prior enactment of effective equal employment opportunity controls is 
imperative.”65 Although Nixon had not initially supported the change to Title VII, the 
administration shifted its position during committee hearings. This was reportedly to assuage 
worries about potential discrimination with General Revenue Sharing funds. The successful 
removal of the exemption gave “the federal government power to combat racial 
discrimination in local police forces and other state and municipal agencies.”66   
Within the administration, there also was debate over whether Title VI applied of its 
own force to the General Revenue Sharing Act. Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights 
Jerris Leonard opined, “since Title VI is dependent on the concept of specific ‘programs or 
activities’ (e.g., public school program), it seems doubtful that in general Title VI would 
apply of its of its own force to the revenue sharing payments.”67 Other figures inside the 
White House disagreed.68 Whether to mollify their critics about their commitment to civil 
rights or out of concern that Title VI would not apply, the White House included—and 
touted—a Title VI-style guarantee in the General Revenue Sharing Act.69 Section 122 even 
formally outpaced Title VI by protecting against discrimination on the basis of sex and 
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covering employment even where it was not the purpose of the funded program or activity, 
as well as giving the Attorney General independent authority to bring suit directly “whenever 
he believes that there is a pattern or practice of discrimination.”70  
The value of the statutory prohibition was not easy to calculate. The Commission on 
Civil Rights and other organizations already were highly critical of the Nixon 
administration’s enforcement of Title VI for categorical grant programs. Revenue sharing 
was massive in scope; over 38,000 governmental units would get money each year. This 
created a new set of problems. Any federal agency attempting to police the compliance of so 
many recipients would face a burden of major proportions. Then-Assistant Attorney 
General for Civil Rights Jerris Leonard wondered whether a compliance operation was even 
compatible with the structure of New Federalism. He questioned “whether the extent of 
federal surveillance over state and local government would be consistent with the purpose of 
revenue sharing.”71 His suggestion was to recognize and embrace this incompatibility, by 
making civil rights enforcement the job of the states. This was precisely the solution that 
conservatives had sought to the dilemma of how to use the federal government’s capabilities 
to strengthen states and cities, without disturbing the status quo racial hierarchy, all along. 
This became the era of the New Federalism. 
Federal Money and Local Law Enforcement 
 Examining the expenditure of federal money in Chicago reinforces the sense that the 
LEAA’s primary role was not as a vehicle of repression through tougher policing but as a 
fiscal support program. Chicago’s Democratic regime employed it to its own ends, in part 
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because the block grant structure made this relatively easy. Other than the approval of state 
plans, the LEAA left the choices about funding with the Illinois Law Enforcement 
Commission. (See Figure 4.) In turn, the state was divided up into a series of regional 
committees, which contributed ideas to state plans and also passed along applications for 
funds in their region along with a recommendation. With few exceptions, the Illinois 
Commission followed the recommendations of its regional committees. 
Insert Figure 4 
 The Illinois Law Enforcement Commission allocated a majority of its spending from 
1969 to 1975 to policing. Almost all of those funds went to government agencies. There 
were important exceptions to this rule, as the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, Citizens 
Alert, and the Law Enforcement Study Group all received federal funding for projects 
related to monitoring the police.72 Nonetheless, just five percent of funds went to non-
criminal-justice agencies. Of the rest, statewide, 52 percent of funds were allocated for 
policing, 20 percent for corrections, nine percent for courts, and 14 percent for a 
combination of the three. 
The Illinois Law Enforcement Commission granted a large portion of its monies in 
Chicago to the Police Department. The years between 1969 and 1971 are particularly 
important to the argument that the LEAA was used for repressive purposes.73 Only during 
those years did the LEAA match funds for anti-riot purchases at a higher rate than for other 
purposes. These funding mechanisms led police departments nationwide to over-concentrate 
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their spending on tactical hardware. As well, funds flowed disproportionately to police 
during these years, due to questions about the meaning of funds for “law enforcement.” The 
Chicago Police Department spent $159,625 of the $5.85 million it received on anti-riot gear, 
which included the purchase of face shields for helmets and body armor. They also spent 
$115,121 on a microfilm retrieval system for intelligence files. This is to say: the Police 
Department spent a less than seven percent of its LEAA funds on riot and surveillance gear. 
Given that LEAA funding made up five percent of the total Departmental budget, this 
means that marginal impact of this funding was miniscule—around a third of a percent of 
the total Department budget.  
By contrast, substantial funds poured into three other projects: portable radios 
($844,882 of federal money), a new building for Area 4 headquarters ($1.7 million), and 
Police Community Service Aides Project (almost $2.6 million). Over the course of the 1970s, 
the pattern of spending for the Chicago Police Department broadly followed these contours. 
Large grants went to capital projects and projects purported to improve police-citizen 
relations. The capital projects focused on technological investment or infrastructure 
revitalization. Neither of these should be sniffed at in explaining the rise of punitive policing: 
scholars repeatedly have demonstrated that physical and technological modernization is 
perfectly compatible with, and often useful for, repression. But this happens only when 
repression forms part of the agenda of the governing regime (even in the guise of anti-crime 
activities). In this case, the introduction of more technological capacity and better 
infrastructure at most furthered the capability of the Chicago Police Department to conduct 
operations in the particular style it had already established, with the radios giving centralized 
command slightly more control over officers.  
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Insert Figure 5 
The most persuasive evidence that the use of these funds did not make the Chicago 
Police Department more repressive comes from the Department’s arrest data. Arrests are, of 
course, an imperfect metric for police activity: they only cover one type of behavior and may 
not represent the way in which police contacts with the public were otherwise changing. 
Nonetheless, they do provide one way of looking at change over time. Statistics from the 
Police Department’s Annual Reports show that numbers of arrests were remarkably stable 
during the 1970s. As Figure 6 shows, arrests for major crimes, such as assault, robbery, 
burglary, and auto-theft, increased slightly from 1966 to 1974, as both the rate of crime and 
the number of police officers increased.74 As I explain in Chapter 7, although it is certain that 
crime was increasing over these years, the scale of that increase is unknowable—the product 
of the epistemological uncertainty surrounding crime statistics, discrete definitional changes, 
and the Chicago Police Department’s deliberate manipulation of their numbers.75 Regardless, 
the increase in the number of arrests was quite modest, particularly when compared with the 
doubling of the number of homicides in these years. As crime leveled off after 1974 and the 
number of policemen fell, arrests similarly declined. Over the sixteen-year period as a whole, 
though, the increases and decreases are much less striking that the relative constancy of 
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arrests.76 
Insert Figure 6 
Public order offenses tell a story of apparently even more consistency.77 Arrest for 
major crimes represented a relatively minor portion of police work; arrests for the seven 
major crimes that make up the official crime rate never consisted of more than 20 percent of 
total arrests. By contrast, arresting people for public order crimes—for being out of place—
constituted the most significant use of the state’s monopoly on legitimate force.78 When a 
Police Department is cracking down, or becoming more punitive, public order arrests seem 
like one likely place for such activities. Within the category of arrests that I have classified as 
public order arrests, particular offenses differed dramatically over time.79 For example, police 
made 76,000 arrests for drunkenness in 1962; this was by far the most frequently made type 
of arrest, making up forty percent of all arrests. By 1977, police no longer made arrests for 
drunkenness. Nonetheless, the total number of public order arrests remained very close to 
what they had been fifteen years earlier. This is to say, police appear to have substituted one 
type of arrest for another. For example, disorderly conduct arrests made up almost entirely 
for the fall in arrests for drunkenness, rising from a 32,000 in 1962 (when drunkenness 
arrests were at their peak) to almost 93,000 in 1977 when drunkenness arrests hit zero. 
                                                 
76 This is particularly true in comparison to the period from 1982 to 1987, and thereafter, which saw dramatic shifts in the numbers of arrests for 
these crimes.  
77 I have included as public order arrests those categories which correspond to behavior inappropriate because 
of its public location: drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, suspicion, curfew or loitering, runaways, 
vandalism, and the residual “catchall” category describing crimes not falling into other categories. It may be 
that such  
78 Such arrests rose to 76 percent of total arrests and never fell below 59 percent. 
79 Most of these seem to fit obviously into the category. The most questionable inclusion is the residual “other 
arrest” category. I included it because total arrests are much more stable each year if it is included, making it 
seem likely that the various arrests in that category were substitutes for other public order offenses. This 
circular reasoning (public order arrests are more stable if it is included, ergo it must be a public order arrest). 
Nonetheless, this was as persuasive as any justification I had for leaving it out.  
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Together, drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and an undefined catchall category for other 
disturbing behavior made up almost half of the arrests in year, and they remained at a 
remarkably consistent level.80   
 The Police Community Service Aides Program was by far the largest LEAA funded 
project in the state of Illinois in these years. This program was the latest step in a long line of 
efforts to formulate programs under the “police-community relations” paradigm. In 
Chicago, a formal program of police-community relations started under O.W. Wilson. Each 
expansion of the division was driven by crisis: following civil disorders in 1967, 
Superintendent Conlisk created a Community Services Division; after the Black Panther 
murders, he elevated it to the status of a Bureau and appointed Sam Nolan, a black officer, 
as the Deputy Superintendent in charge. This made Nolan one of the six highest-ranking 
officers in the Department.81 Such symbolic representation was typical, for police-
community relations directed themselves almost entirely to relations between black people 
and the Police Department.82 This approach framed conflict over policing as a problem of 
communication and understanding. Rooted in social scientific notions of racism as an 
irrational psychological disposition, advocates of police-community relations sought to 
resolve urban conflict by addressing underlying prejudices held by the police about black 
communities and black people about the police.83  
Insert Figure 7 
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This was not what happened in practice. Renault Robinson argued, “for the most 
part, police community relations programs are really only police public relations—and there 
is a big difference between the two.” Community-relations programs did not provide an 
opportunity for dialogue. Rather, they asked residents to be passive, one-way recipients of 
attempts “to sell the police image to the public,” and to “accept the department as it is.”84 
Robinson argued that the problem was one of police policy towards black Chicagoans, and 
the solution had little to do with image. “Unless the legitimate grievances relating to the 
police are confronted by the police administration frankly and effectively improvement of 
police-community relations will be impossible.”85 Police-relations programs failed, he argued, 
because they offered no way for black people to “influence … the power or policy making 
structures of the police department,” without which, Robinson claimed, they would not 
succeed. 86 
The Police Community Services Aides addressed the problem of involving black 
people by hiring them, not as officers, but as aides. The program was funded almost entirely 
with federal dollars from the LEAA and the Model Cities Program, part of the second phase 
of the War on Poverty. The goal of the Model Cities Program was to increase coordination 
of existing urban programs in each of five target areas in Chicago, and to provide additional 
funds for local plans.87 Mayor Daley’s War on Poverty agency, the Chicago Committee on 
Urban Opportunity, conceived of the program to address two problems: (1) the 
disproportionately high amount of crime in the target areas, and (2) improvement in the 
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relationship between the communities and the police.”88 More than 400 aides were hired and 
nearly seventy police officers were reassigned to six storefront “service centers.” The aides 
were hired primary from the four Model Cities areas: Uptown (North), Grand Crossing 
(Near South), Woodlawn (Mid-South), and Lawndale (West). They spent many hours in a 
hastily prepared and executed training program and wore special green uniforms that 
identified them as Community Service Aides.  
The lack of community involvement in planning and administration led many to 
reject the broader Model Cities program.89 For example, the city rejected out of hand The 
Woodlawn Organization’s proposed plan for the Mid-South Model Cities area.90 Instead, as 
one mild critic described, Model Cities programs attempted, “to find a way to get the citizens 
to participate on terms that are acceptable to them, the administrators.”91 Activists resisted 
these entreaties: in one incident, The Woodlawn Organization members who formed a 
minority block on the Area Planning Council proposed an amendment to give the Afro-
American Patrolmen’s League control over the Board that was to oversee the Community 
Service Aides program.92 They distrusted the program that the city set up, and worried that it 
might “turn into a network of ‘police spies.’”93 Such fears had not entirely dissipated a year 
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into the program: Community Service Aides themselves testified that they “believed 
community residents saw them as spies for the police department.”94   
The problem, though, was not that the aides were too close to the Police 
Department. It was the precise opposite: they had almost no relationship with the district 
officers. “They are not to be spies, stool pigeons, or policeman,” Sergeant Charles Walker 
informed the Tribune. “In fact, if they learn the name of a drug peddler, I’d rather they 
wouldn’t turn it in to the police.”95 This distancing was so successful that surveys of both the 
Police officers and Aides revealed that “the Community Service Aide Project has little 
identification with the police.”96 Most rank-and-file officers were totally disinterested but 
those who responded to a survey expressed “distinctly negative” views “toward the 
program’s values and existence.”97 Despite the stated intention that the Aides serve as a 
bridge, the program merely emphasized the existing gap between the Police and residents of 
the Model Cities neighborhoods. 
The case of the Aides program emphasized that the City never intended to 
incorporate citizens in policing. It sought to change them. As the Chicago Police Star, the 
Department’s in-house organ described, the Aides “ were able to see things through the eyes 
of the police and they saw a different picture of what an officer on the street is faced with in 
his daily work.” The Star concluded that, although many of Aides began the program with 
mixed emotions about working with the Police, their experiences changed their attitudes.98 
Police saw themselves as engaged in a pedagogical enterprise, making model citizens as a 
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path to making model cities. When surveyed about the most important goals of the program, 
both officers and Aides answered, “upgrading the citizenry” far more frequently than any 
other answer. Officers believed such “upgrades” would improve police-community relations, 
but Aides more often saw them as distinct issues.99  
This tutelage was related to a second aspect of the Program: crime control. The 
initial proposal identified crime as the issue that prompted the program, and it put the onus 
for crime squarely on the Model Cities communities: “The lack of responsiveness and 
responsibility in the community for law and order, is at the base of the problems.”100 In 
action, however, the Community Service Aides Program put almost no effort into any 
activities specifically aimed at reducing crime.101 It merely hoped. Maybe putting extra bodies 
on the street would help: “Just their presence in the neighborhood will be a deterrent,” 
Police Captain Richard Rochford speculated.102 Or, maybe the tutelary role of the Police 
would produce an anti-crime dividend. As the program statement on crime reduction 
stressed: “It is only through development of this citizens involvement, that the responsibility 
for law enforcement will become the community’s and not solely that of the police 
department.”103  
                                                 
99 A much higher number of Police believed that improved police-community relations were a goal of the 
project (68 percent) than did Aides (just 26 percent). Criminal Justice Education Foundation, “Community 
Service Aide Evaluation Report,” 22. Making model citizens involved offering tutelage to the Aides and the 
Model Cities areas as to how to have a better community. “We have to show aides and residents how to want 
more for themselves and for their community,” described Sergeant Leonard Walker. “Community Service 
Aides,” Chicago Police Star, August 1970, 7, CPL-MRC. 
100 Joint Youth Development Committee, Committee on Youth Welfare, City of Chicago, “Model Cities 
Problem Statement: Crime Reduction,” August 23, 1968, 6, CPL-MRC. 
101 Criminal Justice Education Foundation, “Community Service Aide Evaluation Report,” 34. 
102 William Currie, “Woodlawn Workshop Looks to Horizon,” Chicago Tribune, March 2, 1969, SCL4. “There is 
no doubt that the conspicuous presence of the aides in their green uniforms has helped to reduce the number 
of incidents of crime.” Frank Zahour, “Aides Free Policemen for Crime Fighting,” Chicago Tribune, June 6, 
1971, N_A10. 
103 Joint Youth Development Committee, Committee on Youth Welfare, City of Chicago, “Model Cities 
Problem Statement: Crime Reduction,” 7. 
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In the end, the programmatic objectives seem to have mattered little to the Police 
Department. The Illinois Law Enforcement Commission denied the Department’s 
application for more funding for the program in August of 1973 in large part because its 
evaluation was “at best inconclusive as to the project’s impact upon community residents 
and the project contribution to document [sic] crime reduction in the target area.”104 This is 
not to say the program was without effects, but they had little to do with its stated 
objectives. The Aides allowed the city to bureaucratize some of the social service functions 
played by ward precinct captains.105 A description of the activities of the aides in the Police 
Department in 1971 read like an updated version the list of favors done by precinct captains 
that Harold Gosnell recorded in 1937: “the investigation of adult missing persons cases, 
increased effort at elementary schools to prevent harassment of little children by older 
youngsters, an animal control program, and intensified emphasis on the detection of stolen 
autos.”106 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the City cleared more than 50,000 
abandoned autos each year.107 Almost every article on the Community Service Aids noted 
what a critical role they played in identifying and reporting such vehicles. This might be 
understood as an attack on the outward signs of neighborhood disorder that would become 
such important signifiers in criminological theory in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
 The program’s final role was not to be overlooked: it provided federal employment 
for Chicagoans. From the beginning the project proposal stated, “a collateral purpose is the 
issue of underemployment and unemployment in the Model Cities neighborhoods through 
                                                 
104 John E. Fahnestock to Planning and Budget Committee, Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, “Grant 
880-03,” August 30, 1973, CUL III-177-1925. 
105 David L. Protess, Community Power and Social Policy: Citizen Participation in the Chicago Model Cities Program (Ph.D. 
Dissertation: University of Chicago, 1974), 70–71. 
106 Chicago Police Department, Annual Report, 1971, 7. 
107 Donald Yabush, “93,000 in 1970: Chicago: Where Old Cars Go to Die,” Chicago Tribune, February 22, 1973, 
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the hiring of more than 400 community residents.”108 These jobs were exempt from civil 
service requirements and therefore were useful tools for the Democratic Party. Tribune 
reporters turned up some evidence that “potential employees reportedly have to have a letter 
from their ward committeeman before being hired.”109 Renault Robinson criticized, “The 
program opens up the possibility of ‘buying’ the loyalty of at least 400 more black people 
and expanding the mayor’s ‘network’ in the black community by 400 more ‘agents’ all at the 
expense of the federal government.”110 Whether or not this was the purpose of the program, 
this was its principle effect: expanding and reinforcing the existing structure of politics by 
bringing black (in Grand Grossing, Woodlawn, and Lawndale), as well as Latino/a and poor 
white (Uptown) Chicagoans into the party-state’s network of interest on the bottom rung.  
The AAPL, the New Federalism, and Civil Rights Compliance 
Even as the LEAA preserved the status quo by providing funds to expand the reach 
of the party-state, the League engaged and tested the New Federalist institutions and how 
they would carry out their civil rights responsibilities. The League began by filing a complaint 
with the LEAA alleging that the Chicago Police Department discriminated by race in its 
personnel practices on July 2, 1971. Two years and two months later, in September of 1973, 
the Chicago NAACP and the Joint Civil Committee on Mexican American Affairs joined the 
League in filing a similar claim with the Office of Revenue Sharing. They brought the first 
action under Title VI, and the second under the General Revenue Sharing’s own Title VI-
like provision. Institutional design deeply shaped the way each agency addressed their 
complaints.  
                                                 
108 Criminal Justice Education Foundation, “Community Service Aide Evaluation Report,” 60. 
109 Peter Negronda and Cornelia Honchar, “Patronage, Favoratism Mark Model Cities Here,” Chicago Tribune, 
February 21, 1972, 1. 
110 Renault Robinson, “The Black Watch,” Chicago Defender, September 12, 1970, 3. 
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The Afro-American Patrolmen’s League’s complaint was the first and most 
important test of civil rights compliance for the New Federalism. In contrast to the 
complaint they filed in Robinson v. Conlisk, the League’s two-and-a-half page letter to the 
LEAA—and their much more developed 13-page complaint to the Office of Revenue 
Sharing—hardly mentioned the black patrolmen’s specific grievances. As their brief 
numerical portrait of the Department’s racial composition highlighted (see Table 1), the 
question before the agency was generalized discrimination in the Department’s personnel 
practices. The seven charges they leveled addressed four major facets of personnel 
management: hiring, promotion, assignments, and discipline. In each area, the League alleged 
that the discrimination was “purposeful and intentional,” although Robinson also stated, “it 
would be obviously very difficult to prove the existence of a ‘gentlemen’s agreement.’” 
Alluding to the Supreme Court’s decision three months earlier in Griggs v. Duke Power, he 
noted, “it does not matter whether it is purposeful or not, it must be stopped.”111  
Robinson’s advocacy of equal employment practices was multivalent. His advocacy 
was oriented in part to “make sure that blacks and women get our equal portion of the 
pie.”112 But it was also part of an analysis of the relationship between politics and power. His 
critique of why black police officers, especially those with goals of advancing up the 
Department hierarchy, often threw their lot in with the “Chicago Political System,” made 
clear that black officers were not a unified political block. Despite their understanding that 
shared racial identity did not always produce common political interests, the League 
nonetheless advocated that the Department hire more black men. Robinson declared, “there 
                                                 
111 Renault A. Robinson to Jerris Leonard, June 2, 1971, CUL II-218-2155. 
112 Statement of Renault Robinson, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary. House of Representatives. 94th Cong. 2d Session (Mar. 11, 1976), 497.  
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are too many white police who don’t care about Black people and some white police hate 
Black people. These two groups coupled with the few Black police [w]ho don’t care 
constitute the majority of Police in the Black community.”113 Changing hiring practices to 
include more black officers seemed like the most straightforward way to create more 
community participation in the police force. Changing promotional practices was equally 
important. The promotional system was central to why black officers on the force did not 
care—or, rather, cared more about trying to please their superiors.  
Robinson paired advocacy for more black officers with a deep engagement of the 
question, “How can we secure the kind of black policemen that we need?” His answer was 
“that the black people of Chicago are going to have to demand the right to oversee this mass 
induction of new men into the force.”114 His “concrete solution” was for the Superintendent 
to contract with a black agency for “screening, testing, and examining all black applicants for 
the Chicago Police Department.” While this was impermissible under state civil service laws, 
the proposal still asserted something crucial: “blacks are available who can be trained to be 
competent and efficient police officers. At the same time, we shall always demand that these 
men be compassionate toward the black community in the execution of their duties.” In 
approaching the promotion of black officers, Robinson took a similar approach, arguing, “it 
must be accomplished without filling jobs with black enemies of black people.” To find such 
people, the Department needed to consider the “opinion of organizations,” like the AAPL, 
whose members were “totally involved in the struggle for black liberation.”115  
                                                 
113 Renault Robinson, “File Suit to Curb Cops,” Chicago Defender, June 4, 1970, 12. 
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As the League became more deeply involved in this vector of struggle, its demands 
for equality escalated.116 Whereas in the summer of 1970 the black patrolmen anticipated a 
proposal to hire 500 black recruits, a year later they sought a much more dramatic shift. 
Robinson advocated that all police trainees should be black until “the entire force is 
integrated or at least fifty-five percent of all police in the Black community including officers 
above the rank of Sergeant are Black.” In nine of the 21 districts, he argued that there should 
be a “Black District commander and Black Watch Commander and Black Field Lieutenants 
and a majority of Black Sergeants and, of course, seventy-five to eighty-five percent of the 
men in these areas should be Black.”117 By October 1971, he translated this into numerical 
terms, arguing that black officers should be increased by 30% or 3,000.118 
 
When Jerris Leonard became the administrator of the LEAA on May 14, 1971, the 
agency’s compliance program was virtually non-existent. It had little staff, fewer procedures, 
and no standards.119 After examining the LEAA’s handling of the League’s complaint, a civil 
rights specialist from the Department of Justice’s Community Relations Service, eviscerated 
                                                 
116 This is a common story in civil rights struggles. Two classic examples are the changing claims articulated by 
the Birmingham bus boycotters and the changing claims of the black plaintiffs in the schools case that would 
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Community Wants More Black Policemen,” Chicago Defender, June 12, 1971, 24. 
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the agency as “an embarrassment to the U.S. Justice Department.”120 And these were just the 
administrative problems. More importantly, neither the administrators at the LEAA nor the 
Office of Revenue Sharing accepted responsibility for enforcing civil rights. Each embraced 
the antipathy to federal bureaucracy underlying the New Federalism. The administrator of 
the Office of Revenue Sharing claimed that the organization could “construct and manage a 
comprehensive compliance system,” without creating its own bureaucratic organization.121  
Enforcement of Title VI varied widely by agency across the federal government.122 
With few exceptions, as Father Robert Drinan (D-MA) noted, “there is no big bureaucracy 
enforcing civil rights in any of these agencies.”123 What set the two New Federalist agencies 
apart was their disavowal of the most effective enforcement tools, such as preapproval 
reviews or even post-award compliance reviews. Herbert Rice, who became chief of Civil 
Rights Compliance at the LEAA in 1971, concluded that preapproval “reviews might 
interfere with the ‘delicate balance between Federal/State relations[.]” Since both agencies 
granted money to the states and localities to allocate, they had “no way to determine in 
                                                 
120 Ibid. 
121 Civil Rights Aspects of General Revenue Sharing (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1973), 6. Attempts to incorporate state auditors were a miserable failure on the civil rights front. As the 
General Accounting Office documented that through Dec. 31, 1971, not one of the 1600 audit reports 
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advance of funding … to which state or local … agencies funds will be distributed or how 
they will be spent.”124 For example, Chicago declared that most funds went, or would go, to 
the Police Department. Did withholding funds based on such declarations prevent the city 
making an independent decision to spend them on something else?  
Complaints about discrimination in public employment (and for the LEAA, 
specifically in police departments) became the focal point of each agency’s civil rights 
compliance operation.125 Despite a preference expressed in LEAA regulations for judicial 
(over administrative enforcement), by November of 1971, “the only enforcement actions 
undertaken related to LEAA activities have been amicus curiae (friend of the court) briefs 
filed by the Department of Justice” in suits that alleged racially discriminatory employment 
procedures in the Mississippi Highway Patrol and Boston Police Department.126 By 1974, the 
Office of Revenue Sharing had neither initiated administrative hearing against any 
government for discrimination nor referred a case for litigation.127  
Filing an administrative complaint put the League in a structurally distinct position 
from civil litigation. In the latter, it had the burden of proof as well as the benefit of the 
power to scrutinize the Police Department’s records through discovery. In administrative 
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proceedings, the League had no burden to convince a neutral fact-finder. Instead, the 
agencies’ civil rights enforcers operated under the legal obligation to ensure that federal 
moneys were not spent to discriminate. LEAA officials responded defensively to Robinson’s 
pressure. Herbert Rice lectured him, “Your best assurance for expeditious handling of this 
matter … would seem to be for you to cooperate fully with me in putting together the 
facts.”128 Rice’s idea of cooperation meant asking “Mr. Robinson to be an investigator of his 
complaint.”129 As Rice wrote Robinson, “all parts of your complaint would be susceptible to 
further documentation.” Affidavits regarding medical examination, promotion, efficiency 
ratings, and police discipline were “essential to a proper evaluation of the complaint.”130 
Robinson supplied six—though not quickly—averring to discrimination in hiring, discipline, 
and evaluation. What they demonstrated was that the League’s accusation demanded a more 
searching examination of the Police Department’s actions than affidavits from the aggrieved 
could provide.131 
Insert Table 4 
LEAA recalcitrance did not stem from its administrators’ failure to recognize that 
hiring patterns within the Chicago Police Department were problematic. Based on the 
descriptive statistics that Robinson provided, Rice and Leonard surmised that the 
Department likely needed “an affirmative action program to more effectively recruit, train, 
                                                 
128 His defensiveness was partially the product of Robinson (and his allies) appealing to more senior Justice 
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complaint …” Herbert C. Rice to Renault Robinson, September 22, 1971, AAPL 8-2. 
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promote minorities into and within its ranks.”132 But how could an agency structured to 
disperse federal funds get a local institution to change its behavior? LEAA’s approach 
reflected the orientation of the Safe Streets Act: Rice and Leonard sought the Police 
Department’s voluntary cooperation. Compare Rice’s pedantry towards Robinson with his 
encomium to the Police Superintendent’s Aide and Legal Advisor, Charles Finston: “I want 
you do know, Charley, that we feel the cordial manner in which you, Supt. Conlisk and the 
others in the Department have cooperated with us as we consider this manner has been very 
helpful. Please feel free to call me at anytime I might be of assistance.”133 Consider, approve, 
wish, allow: these were the verbs that peppered the LEAA’s requests to the CPD.134  
The LEAA’s investigation of the Department’s personnel practices, conducted by 
three independent contractors, underscores how seriously the agency took its mandate to 
cooperate with funding recipients. The LEAA requested the Department’s approval, both 
for the idea of conducting a study and for the investigators. They agreed on three ex-police 
officers: Ph.Ds. Paul Whisenand (the team leader) and Robert Hoffman, and lawyer Lloyd 
Sealy.135 The LEAA neither requested nor welcomed Robinson’s input; he learned about the 
                                                 
132 Herbert Rice to Charles Finston, Sept. 27, 1971, Leonard Papers 1-Official Correspondence [September 
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survey in the newspaper.136 Once the study team got down to business, they rejected most of 
the League’s suggestions. They refused to hold public hearings.137 Later, they even refused to 
survey black officers about their experience, an omission that Robinson argued, “severely 
limits the capacity of any investigation.”138 Robinson feared a whitewash.139  
 
The report issued by the LEAA study team, The Chicago Police Department: An 
Evaluation of Personnel Practices (the Whisenand Report), did not produce action. Nonetheless, it 
provided the League and its allies with a blueprint for their case against the Chicago Police 
Department for discrimination in hiring, promotions, and discipline. The Report concluded: 
“the survey team did not observe any intentional or planned program … to exclude blacks 
or other minority group members from either employment or promotion.” Yet, this hardly 
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II-218-2155. 
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summarized the Report’s finding, Robinson described it as “only a face-saving device 
intended to soften the contents of the report.”140  
Whisenand and his co-authors spent the majority of the report exploring the various 
ways in which blacks were “adversely affected by the present personnel system.” It offered a 
numbing catalogue of disparities. Black and Latino men applied to the police force in 
numbers roughly equal to their percentage of the population, but the report concluded that 
government action caused their numbers to drop at every step. In hiring: “The written test 
and the medical tests disqualify a disproportionately high number of minority group 
applicants and do so without adequate justification in terms of demonstrated requirements 
for job performance.” In promotion: “[T]he present promotional process does have the effect 
of disproportionately excluding blacks from promotion[,]” primarily through the written 
exam. In assignments: “Certain key positions which have a high propensity for either face-to-
face or verbal communications with the public have relatively few black officers.” In discipline: 
“The data shows that black officers in the Department are charged with … violations [of 
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Department rules] 7.2% above their representative percentage on the Department” and 
sustained a rate 9.9% higher.141  
While the Whisenand Report offered no legal conclusions about the Department’s 
failure to meet its equal employment obligations, it hinted at the legal framework for making 
such a judgment.142 It opened by explaining “the ‘right’ and the rationale for the federal 
government to become legally involved” with the personnel practices of the Chicago Police 
Department. In addition to Title VI, the Safe Streets Act, and implementing regulations, it 
also noted the extension of Title VII to apply to state and municipal governments in 1972. 
As the authors recognized, Griggs v. Duke Power Co. was the most important Title VII case 
addressing “artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment.”143 Griggs was 
essentially concerned with the meaning of intent under Title VII with respect to aptitude 
tests similar to those used by the Chicago Police Department for hiring and promotion. The 
Court concluded that Title VII prohibited “not only overt discrimination but also practices 
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. … If an employment practice which 
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice 
is prohibited.” Faulty practices could not redeemed by “good intent or absence of 
discriminatory intent.”144 This quick survey suggested that the authors likely understood 
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federal law did not require an “intentional or planned program” of discrimination to find 
discrimination within the meaning of Title VI.145 
The Whisenand Report clearly described how CPD’s personnel practices discriminated 
against black applicants and officers, and provided a roadmap to improve those failures. The 
most important of the authors’ thirty-six recommendations drew directly upon the 
framework of Griggs. They recommended concrete action in addressing hiring: to 
“discontinue the use of the present type of written test until and unless the test is validated 
as (1) having a demonstrable relationship to effective job performance, and (2) as being fair 
(differentially validated) for both minority group and non-minority members.”146 In the 
realm of promotion, the report went further. It called for adoption of “[a] policy and 
program of affirmative action on the promotion of minority group members,” including 
“realistic goals with which to provide direction for minority group promotion.”147  
 
By design, the voluntary compliance paradigm ignored a history of state and local 
obstreperousness on civil rights. Chicago’s leaders, beginning with the Mayor, possessed a 
wealth of experience in the bureaucratic skill of collaborating to achieve nothing. They drew 
out the investigation process. Jerris Leonard proposed an independent study on Sept. 1, 
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146 Whisenand, Hoffman, and Sealy, “Whisenhand Report,” 3.30. 
147 Ibid., 5.13. 
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1971; it took until March 7, 1972, for it to begin.148 And, once the LEAA released the 
Whisenand Report in early September, the Chicago Police “voluntarily” went on as before.  
When the LEAA asked the Department to postpone the scheduled captain’s 
promotional exam to allow for further discussion of its suggested reforms, for example, the 
city refused, and then ignored the suggestions.149 Departmental leaders were dismissive: 
Superintendent Conlisk “disparaged the report as a ‘numbers game’ which was of ‘no 
concern’ to him.” His successor, James Rochford declared in a 1974 deposition, that he “had 
not bothered to look at the report since becoming Superintendent and had no plans to do 
so...”150 Even as the Department ignored the LEAA, it took nine months to admit failure. 
Not until May 22, 1973 would Herb Rice conclude, “Discussions and correspondence with 
the official of the City of Chicago have not resulted in a commitment by those officials to 
undertake significant steps to achieve what this agency believes to be voluntary compliance 
with the civil rights laws and regulations.”151  
The sequencing of the investigations meant that the League’s attempt to get the 
Revenue Sharing agency to enforce compliance differed considerably from its actions with 
the LEAA. The agency benefitted from the findings of the LEAA’s study team and the 
                                                 
148 Law Enforcement Assistance Administration/Chicago Police Department, “Survey of Personnel Practices: 
On Site Task Performance,” April 5, 1972, AAPL 8-3; Jerris Leonard to James B. Conlisk, Sept. 1, 1971, 
Leonard 1-Official Correspondence [Aug. 1971]. 
149 Renault A. Robinson and Howard Saffold to Herbert C. Rice, September 20, 1972, AAPL 4-1. It did allow 
federal monitors to be present at the exam. “U.S. to Have Watchers at Police Test,” Chicago Tribune, September 
30, 1972, 2. 
150 U.S. v. Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218, 234 (N.D.Ill. 1976). Later on, Leonard asked the Department not post a 
promotional list from the exam. They did so on November 30. Jerris Leonard to John H. Dent, November 9, 
1972, AAPL 8-7; Renault A. Robinson to Jerris Leonard, “Discrimination within the Chicago Police 
Department,” December 6, 1972, AAPL 8-2. Just 3 of 57 men on the list were black. Afro-American 
Patrolmen’s League, “Narrative Statement Concerning the LEAA’s Findings of Racial Discrimination in the 
Chicago Police Department and the Unsuccessful Attempt to Secure Voluntary Compliance,” 1973, AAPL 8-2. 
151 Herbert C. Rice to Renault A. Robinson, “Complaint of Discrimination of the Afro-American Patrolmen’s 
League Against the Chicago Police Department,” May 22, 1973, AAPL 4-2. 
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ongoing federal court action, and it moved quickly to complete an onsite audit and civil 
rights investigation of the Department (see Timeline).152 As to voluntary compliance, the 
past was prologue. From the completion of the four-day audit and civil rights investigation 
on October 26 until May 22, 1974, the Office of Revenue Sharing took no action.153 This 
was in part because the Department of Justice was now suing the city and urged the Office 
of Revenue Sharing not to act on its own. But the agency’s understanding of its role 
reinforced inaction. By now the city’s unwillingness to voluntarily change was clear; the New 
Federalism’s lack of alternative approaches to compliance was equally evident.  
Most telling of the “very cautious, very restrained, and very inhibited” civil rights 
enforcement was the refusal of either agency to suspend, defer, or otherwise withhold 
federal funds, even where they concluded the Department discriminated.154 One critical 
report described, “The main difference between the LEAA and its civil rights critics centers 
on the question of whether or not the law requires the agency to stop paying money to 
discriminatory grantees. … [F]unds have never been terminated for civil rights reasons.”155 
The same situation obtained with respect to Revenue Sharing. Harold Himmelman, one of 
the League’s lawyers, argued that the power to defer federal funds “can be implemented 
even prior to administrative hearings … so long as deferral is pursuant to some 
safeguards.”156 The Office of Revenue Sharing never offered a clear rebuttal to this 
                                                 
152 In the Statement of Reasons Office of Revenue Sharing filed in Robinson v. Shultz, it stated that “a civil rights 
investigation conducted by ORS in October 1973, had revealed ‘evidence of discrimination within the 
[Chicago] police department.’” U.S. v. Chicago, 395 F. Supp. 329, 333 (N.D.Ill. 1975).  
153 Office of Revenue Sharing did engage in tri-partite negotiations with the DOJ and the city. The League was, 
once again, left out entirely. “Chronology of Actions Relating to Alleged Discrimination in the Police 
Deparment of the City of Chicago,” Revenue Sharing, 34–35. 
154 Statement of Senator Muskie (D-ME), Ibid., 32. 
155 Law Enforcement: The Federal Role; Report of The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976), 128. 
156 Statement of Harold Himmelman, Revenue Sharing, 61. 
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interpretation; instead, the administrator responded with a declaration, “I do not suspend 
payments until after the completion of an administrative hearing, or litigation.”157 Although 
the agency had temporarily deferred payments for failures to file paperwork, it insisted that 
no such powers of action existed to prevent discrimination.158  
* * * 
The LEAA, like the New Federalism of which it should be considered an integral 
part, offered flexible fiscal assistance for state and local governments. For congressional 
conservatives, such a financing structure provided a way to involve the federal government 
in state and local crime control, while making it extremely difficult for the agency to use Title 
VI to ensure equal employment opportunity. While preserving the racial status quo within 
police departments, the structure of the program meant that local programs would not serve 
any coordinated federal end. While the failure of the the Police Community Service Aides 
program frustrated local activists who wanted to see representative citizens incorporated into 
the Department, they never leveled accusation that the program turned LEAA funding 
towards repressive ends. 
 The presence of federal dollars attracted the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, 
leading them to attempt to induce a civil rights compliance. “What we found,” Renault 
Robinson noted, “is that we did not have a friend in the Federal Government as we thought 
we had in terms of them following their own regulations.”159 The failure of these agencies to 
create viable arenas for the vindication of equal employment claims sent the AAPL back to 
                                                 
157 Statement of Graham Watt, Revenue Sharing, 32. 
158 Statement of Graham Watt, Revenue Sharing, 31. He persisted with this interpretation even after a federal 
district court declared that deferral was within his discretion. Robinson v. Shultz, No. 74-248 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 
1974). 
159 Statement of Renault Robinson, Revenue Sharing, 81–82. 
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federal court. What they found was that their efforts to force Title VI compliance continued 
to shape every aspect of their case.
258 
 
CHAPTER 7: ENFORCING TITLE VI 
 
 
The League’s complaint against the LEAA was among the first wave of actions 
undertaken by police officers and aspiring police officers to hold municipal institutions 
accountable for employment discrimination.1 Over the three years that the League sought 
administrative remedies for its case, it acquired a whole new range of allies, arguments, and 
strategies. Robinson already had proven his mettle in the face of three years of exceptional 
hostility from the Police Department. Being stonewalled by federal agencies produced a 
different sort of activist. With remarkable stamina, the League chief fired off letters to an 
array of individuals: local allies, members of Illinois’ Congressional delegation, the leaders of 
the Congressional Black Caucus, other legislators, the heads of other federal Departments, 
including the Attorney General and the Secretary of Labor, and even the President of the 
United States.2 Adopting a variety of rhetorical postures and arguments, he sought to 
convince any and all of them to use their influence to get the agencies to address the officers’ 
discrimination claims.3 These connections would transform the place of the AAPL in the 
overall architecture of activism on behalf of civil rights enforcement. The administrative 
enforcement experience transformed the group’s capacity for making claims that both 
reflected and shaped emerging movements for equal opportunity in policing.  
                                                 
1 Employment discrimination suits first took off in the period from 1969-1971, even before Congress amended 
Title VII to cover state and local governments. See Justin McCrary, “The Effect of Court-Ordered Hiring 
Quotas on the Composition and Quality of Police,” American Economic Review 91 (2007): 320–322, 330–331, esp. 
331, fig. 4. 
2 Most of these letters can be found in the AAPL collection. AAPL 8-2 and 8-3.  
3 Robinson’s doggedness led even his allies to offer bromides to patience. Illinois Senator Chuck Percy assured 
Robinson, “An investigation of this nature takes quite some time …” Charles H. Percy to Renault A Robinson, 
October 20, 1971, AAPL 8-2. 
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This history shows that bureaucratic action and legal activism represented 
complementary paths to social change. League members initially filed the LEAA complaint 
because they wanted to avoid the slow pace of litigation. Two years later, when the agency 
gave up trying to secure voluntary compliance from the Chicago Police, Robinson v. Conlisk 
was still slowly wending through federal court. The League’s go-round with the Office of 
Revenue Sharing did no more to bring compliance. Nevertheless, the administrative 
enforcement process created the conditions for the League to succeed in court: it produced a 
more precise legal theory with a more robust and coherent array of claims, greater resources 
for litigation, and a wider set of legal targets. Legal victory was a massive and complicated 
undertaking. It involved many different lawsuits in two different courts. They generated 
10,000 pages of testimony and a staggering number of motions, written decisions, and 
interlocutory appeals.4 Even if the Police Department never buckled to the will of the courts, 
or to the demands of the plaintiffs, it was remade, through litigation, in the image of the city.  
This is a history of reciprocal action. Federal civil rights enforcement, particularly 
with respect to equal employment opportunity in Police Departments, was also remade. 
Changes in national politics following President Richard Nixon’s resignation made the 
refashioning of civil rights law possible. Nonetheless, it was the League’s ability to capitalize 
on its experience with the LEAA and the Office of Revenue Sharing that shaped the 
restructuring of federal civil rights enforcement. In Congressional hearings, Chicago became 
a key example of what was wrong with civil rights enforcement under the New Federalism. 
Renault Robinson and League allies became the key players in driving change in Congress.  
                                                 
4 The most important rulings took place on November 7, 1974 (Marshall granted plaintiffs a preliminary 
injunction); December 18, 1974 (Judge Smith cut off Revenue Sharing funds); January 5, 1976 (Marshall ruled 
for the plaintiffs and imposed hiring quotas); March 31, 1976 (Marshall scheduled the resumption of Revenue 
Sharing); and January 11, 1977 (Seventh Circuit upheld most of Marshall’s rulings). 
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Legal Mitosis 
The fruits of the LEAA compliance process were visible in the Second Amended 
Complaint the League filed in April 1973. The League’s lawyers, led by Tom Gottschalk of 
the venerable Chicago firm of Kirkland & Ellis, nested grievances about ill-treatment within 
a broader lawsuit about racial discrimination. The suit now contained a second count 
accusing the Department of “a pattern or practice of racial discrimination” in assignments, 
promotions, supervision, and discipline.5 If many questions remained to be answered during 
the 60 days of trial, the Report had traced more boldly the League’s initial sketchy assertions 
of racism in personnel practices. 
Insert Figure 8 
The League’s actions and their networking produced a form of legal mitosis. (See 
Figure 8.) While the Robinson plaintiffs were well situated to bring claims regarding 
discrimination against black officers, they had no standing to challenge the Department’s 
hiring practices. Citizens Alert addressed this gap. By 1973, the Alliance had been working 
on the issue of employment discrimination for three years. In June of 1971, along with the 
Chicago Urban League, they petitioned the head of the civilian Police Board to make more 
efforts to hire black applications.6 In 1972, during the LEAA study, they filed a request with 
the city’s Human Relations Commission to “seek remedies to the recruitment deficiencies of 
the Police Department” and filed a charge with the federal Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission on behalf of black and Latin American applicants.7 On May 16, 
1973, the Alliance supported eleven black and Latino applicants to the police force, who 
                                                 
5 “Second Amended Complaint, Robinson v. Conlisk,” 1972, para. 21–22, AAPL 22-5. 
6 John Hill to James Taylor, June 7, 1971, CUL II-244-2456. 
7 John Hill to Council Delegates and Others, “July-August Progress Report,” 1972, 1–2, Alliance 1-3. 
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filed suit in federal court under the caption, Camacho v. Conlisk, alleging discrimination in 
hiring.8 
When Chicago refused to comply voluntarily to remedy its discriminatory practices, 
both the LEAA and the Office of Revenue Sharing referred the League’s complaints to the 
federeal Attorney General. LEAA regulations expressed a preference for judicial rather than 
administrative resolution of claims, providing that “where judicial proceedings … are as 
likely or more likely to result in compliance than administrative proceedings …[the 
responsible Department official] shall invoke the judicial remedy rather than the 
administrative remedy.”9 Using litigation rather than the generally faster administrative 
adjudication paralleled the Nixon administration’s handling of school desegregation. In that 
context, the administration did not avoid its civil rights responsibilities so much as seek to 
moderate the pace of compliance. In both cases, administrators succeeded in shifting 
attention for enforcement away form the executive branch and onto the courts.10 
The federal government filed a third lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois on 
August 15, 1973. United States Attorney General Eliot Richardson announced the lawsuit, 
captioned United States v. Chicago, from the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. it was 
first time the Department of Justice had used its new powers under the 1972 amendments to 
Title VII to sue a local police department.11 This complaint went beyond the others, 
                                                 
8 Jack Mendelsohn, “Statement to Press on Federal Suit Against the City of Chicago, the Chicago Police 
Department, and the Chicago Civil Service Commission,” May 16, 1973, Alliance 2-1. 
9 C.F.R., vol. 28, 1971, sec. 42.206(a) (italics mine). 
10 Dean J. Kotlowski, Nixon’s Civil Rights: Politics Principle, and Policy (Washington, D.C.: Harvard University 
Press, 2001), 28. 
11 Robinson’s persistent entreaties pushed Justice to begin considering the suit had been under consideration 
since April, even before the LEAA officially referred the case to them.  Glen Elasser, “U.S. Considers Suing 
Chicago Police for Discriminatory Hiring,” Chicago Tribune, April 22, 1973, 1. They ultimately filed suit only 
when the Department forced they hand, by refusing to back down from its decision to hold a promotional 
exam for sergeants on Aug. 18. District Judge Phillip W. Tone denied the federal government’s motion for a 
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inasmuch as it provided a unitary vehicle for raising all the problems with the Chicago Police 
Department’s personnel practices. These included the failings detailed in the Whisenand 
Report, but went beyond them to incorporate the demographic group categorically excluded 
from nearly all police positions: women.12 Title VII’s inclusion of sex produced a revolution in 
police forces, greatly increasing the already growing percentage of women officers.  
The addition of women—in particular, white women—in a lawsuit traceable entirely 
to the League’s efforts had a certain irony. In the organization’s early days the AAPL’s 
leaders spoke of restoring “black masculinity.” Such an idea, common in black power circles 
in the late 1960s, inverted the racial pathologies that were described in a long lineage of 
studies of Afro-American life, crystallized in Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 1965 report, The 
Negro Family: A Case for National Action.13 It also drew on particular ideas about the 
relationship of masculinity to the police role. The understanding of policing as an activity 
based in confrontation, strength, and danger came under assault during the early 1970s. Most 
studies have not demonstrated these to be key characteristics of police activity or found 
gender to be an important variable in understanding potential success as a patrol officer.14  
                                                                                                                                                 
temporary restraining order to hold up the sergeant’s exam, preferring instead to let the promotional applicants 
be privately informed of their scores and the possibility that they “may or may not” be the basis for promotion. 
Robert McClory, “City to Fight Bias Suit,” Chicago Defender, August 16, 1973, 1; David Gilbert, “Judge Denies 
U.S. Plea to Ban City Tests for Police,” Chicago Tribune, August 16, 1973, A2; Judith Bernstein, “Meeting on 
January 23, 1974 with David Allen, Barry Alberts, Bill McNally, John Conniff, Judy Bernstein,” January 25, 
1974, 1–2, AAPL 2-4. The DOJ simultaneously filed suit against the city of Buffalo, NY.  
12 The number of parties to the litigation would continue to multiply during 1974. On the plaintiffs’ side, a class 
of women denied the right to be patrol officers intervened with Carolyn Burauer, as the named plaintiff. By 
contrast, three groups of men joined the suit to defend their prerogatives under the existing entrance and 
promotional exams: Roy Isakson was the named plaintiff representing the men who held spots on the 1971 
patrolmen’s roster; Louis Arado those who held spots on the 1973 sergeant’s rosters; and Nicholas J. 
McNamara sat similarly situated with respect to the 1970 lieutenants roster. U.S. v. Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218, 
225–229 (N.D.Ill. 1976). 
13 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of Moynihan. 
14 For a synopsis of relevant studies, see Wesley G. Skogan and Kathleen Frydl, eds., Fairness and Effectiveness in 
Policing: The Evidence (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2004), 151–152. 
  
    263 
If masculinity made sense as a frame for the League’s activities in 1968, League 
officers understood by the early 1970s that women fit into their conception of the 
professional police role quite well. Far from resisting the inclusion of women, AAPL officers 
pushed to have data on the exclusion of female applicants included in the LEAA’s 
investigation. The League emphasized the “definite need for having more policewomen—
and an even greater need for having more Black policewomen.” In preparation for the 
policewomen’s exam in the summer of 1972, more than 1,000 women attended AAPL 
tutoring classes. Moreover, “a number of women … did not get a chance to register because 
of the enormous turnout at City Hall [and] others stood in line for hours.”15 All told, 5,200 
women took the June exam, despite the fact that there were no current openings for 
policewomen.16 
Women’s presence in the lawsuit raised slightly different questions than those asked 
by the black and Latino men. No one denied that women were categorically barred from 
most police jobs on the basis of sex; they simply justified this exclusion based on what police 
did. Women’s work within the police department—more particularly, their limitation to 
special job categories—“was consistently defined and understood in terms of their gender.”17 
Such discrimination was permissible only where it was a “bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular … enterprise.” 
There was no such thing as a race-based bona fide occupational qualification. Even so, the 
                                                 
15 Curtis Cowsen and Ivory Clark, “Afro American Patrolmen’s League Workshop for Policewomen,” May 20, 
1972, AAPL 4-1; Wyola G. Evans to Paul Wisenand, “Policewomen’s Exam,” June 28, 1972, AAPL 8-4. Nor 
was this unique unto Chicago’s officers. The National Black Police Association’s official policy expressed 
support for expanding opportunities for women in law enforcement. See Statement of Tony Fisher, Hearings on 
Civil Rights Enforcement by the Office of Revenue Sharing, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (Dec. 1 and 2, 1982), 76.  
16 “5,200 Women Take Police Test,” Chicago Tribune, June 4, 1972, 4. 
17 Megan Adams, “‘The Feminine Arm of the Law’: Police Wives, Policewomen, and Gender Politics in the 
Chicago Police Department, 1950-1984,” Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas 10 (2013): 95. 
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women’s case bore on that of minority men because it focused attention on the police role, 
albeit from an orthogonal perspective.18 These lawsuits asked police departments to 
demonstrate what being a police officer required. How did different characteristics matter—
physical stature and strength, cognitive abilities and education, psychological acuity, cultural 
awareness? Women’s demands for inclusion challenged the notion that policing was a 
“fundamentally male” occupation.19 Answering the question—What makes a good police 
officer?—was not precisely the task of the federal court in adjudicating lawsuits seeking 
equal opportunity. But it gave shape and urgency to the litigation.   
Its most important change was fortuitous. In the fall of 1973, Robinson v. Conlisk was 
calendared to the docket of newly appointed federal district court judge Prentice H. 
Marshall. He was a Democrat proposed by Republican Senator Charles H. Percy and 
nominated by President Nixon.20 An experienced civil litigator and law professor, Judge 
Marshall quickly got up to speed.21 Over the stout objections of the city, he granted the 
motions of the Camacho and U.S. v. Chicago plaintiffs to consolidate all three cases on April 
24, 1974, and he set briefings on the question of a preliminary injunction to begin in May.22 
                                                 
18 I am minimizing the complex relationship between race and sex here. Serena Mayeri, Reasoning from Race: 
Feminism, Law, and the Civil Rights Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). Testimony of 
Penelope Brace, the most high-profile female patrol officer, discussing her experience in Philadelphia illustrates 
some of the differences: “Commissioner O’Neill state that God in his wisdom made women different, and that 
we had times of accounting within ourselves when we were physically and psychologically unfit for police duty. 
The commanding officer of the juvenile aid division implied that to open the department to women would be 
to invite rampant lesbianism.” Statement of Penelope Brace, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary. House of Representatives. 94th Cong. 2d Session 
(Mar. 11, 1976), 503. 
19 Adams, “‘The Feminine Arm of the Law’: Police Wives, Policewomen, and Gender Politics in the Chicago 
Police Department, 1950-1984,” 95. 
20 Despite the fact that Marshall was a liberal Democrat, Senator Percy had suggested him to president Nixon 
for appointment earlier in 1973. Interview with Retired Judge Prentice H. Marshall, interview by Collins T. 
Fitzpatrick, 1999, http://www.ilndhistory.uscourts.gov/OralHistories/MarshallPrentice.pdf. 
21 In 1976, the lawyers practicing in the Northern District of Illinois would pick Prentice Marshall as the best 
judge on the bench. William Curie, “Lawyers Here Pick Prentice Marshall as Top U.S. Judge,” Chicago Tribune, 
May 26, 1976, B1. 
22 U.S. v. Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
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As Marshall would reflect years later, “We moved that case pretty fast. We held hearings on 
the preliminary injunction and I granted the preliminary injunction. Then we moved the 
merits along well too. … I thought that it was desirable to get everything done at once.” 23 
When Robinson finally had his day in court, the League had more allies at the plaintiffs’ table 
as well as the litigation resources of the Department of Justice; and they had a judge ready to 
fairly and speedily consider their claims.  
 
The Revenue Sharing compliance process opened a second legal flank, eventually 
allowing the plaintiffs to trap the city in the pincers of two federal courts. The League filed 
its administrative complaint with the Office of Revenue Sharing a month after the 
Department of Justice had filed U.S. v. Conlisk. Donald Allen, the lead attorney from the 
Civil Rights Division, was “very distressed by this having been filed in a city where Justice 
had already filed a lawsuit.” Traditions of regulatory enforcement encouraged all other 
agencies to step back once Justice had taken steps in a particular city. Allen’s principle 
concern was that precipitous action by the Office of Revenue sharing might adversely affect 
the lawsuit. What if the agency found the CPD to be in compliance—an unlikely prospect—
or, even worse, reached a weak settlement with them? Allen sought to head off this 
possibility. He met with Revenue Sharing civil rights compliance staff and made it clear that 
the Justice Department would be watching the agency’s actions closely.24 
Given his experiences, Robinson must have known that filing a second 
administrative complaint was risky. He believed that litigation of Camacho and U.S. v. Chicago 
                                                 
23 Interview with Retired Judge Prentice H. Marshall, 84–85. 
24 Bernstein, “Meeting on January 23, 1974 with David Allen, Barry Alberts, Bill McNally, John Conniff, Judy 
Bernstein,” 3. 
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would change the calculus for the city: “we figured at that point something would happen.” 
But nothing did, and “then we saw a long trial, and we saw years going by and we saw 
nothing being done.” The purpose of the administrative complaint was to bring the city to 
the table. It asked the agency to cut off 
$70 million temporarily as an aid to help prod Chicago along in changing its 
employment practices. We were not concerned with stopping the money 
completely because law enforcement needs the money very badly. But we 
hoped that that would cause them to speed up their attempt to change their 
practices by holding up $70 million.25 
The Office of Revenue Sharing denied that it had any authority to withhold funds. Their 
refusal embroiled the agency in a case with an increasingly complex array of issues and 
parties. 
Rather than withdrawing their administrative complaint, or leaving the Justice 
Department to handle negotiations for both agencies (as Assistant Attorney General Allen 
desired), the League pressed forward to file a second lawsuit in federal district court in 
Washington D.C. on February 7, 1974. This suit changed the regular pattern: it put the 
matter of enforcement squarely between the League and the agency. The Police were not a 
party.26 Robinson charged the Office of Revenue Sharing with unlawful inaction; they “never 
moved to implement the statutory requirements of notification which starts the whole 
                                                 
25 Testimony of Renault Robinson, Revenue Sharing (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1974), 83. 
26 “[I]t is clear that it was, at all times aware of the action.”  U.S. v. Chicago, 395 F. Supp. 329, 333 (N.D.Ill. 
1975). 
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administrative process running.”27 Less than two months later, on April 4, 1974, Judge John 
Lewis Smith granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. He ordered the Secretary 
of the Treasury to invoke the mandatory enforcement procedures under the General 
Revenue Sharing Act and to notify the Governor of Illinois of the Police Department’s non-
compliance. While he agreed with the League’s argument that the Secretary possessed the 
power to defer funds, he maintained that this remained a discretionary decision while the 
Revenue Sharing Act’s mini-Title VI procedures were at work. He refused to order it.28  
 The enabling acts of both New Federalist agencies required the state governor to be 
notified in the event of civil rights non-compliance, to give him an opportunity to seek 
voluntary reformation by the offending agency. Illinois Governor Dan Walker’s lawyers 
admitted that they had no idea what “the Governor’s office was expected to do as a result of 
Judge Smith’s ruling in the Robinson case.”29 They requested assistance from Robinson’s 
attorneys, who found that the legislative history of the General Revenue Sharing Act shed no 
light on the question.30 While an executive commission (the Illinois Law Enforcement 
Commission) bestowed LEAA funds, the state had no similar involvement in the 
distribution of revenue sharing funds.  
When the Office of Revenue Sharing notified Governor Walker of the Chicago 
Police Department’s non-compliance, LEAA director David Fogel was developing anti-
discrimination guidelines that were “probably … the toughest in nation.” Fogel, a Berkeley-
trained criminologist and experienced administrator, had the agency issue rules requiring 
                                                 
27 Statement of Harold Himmelman, Revenue Sharing, 63. 
28 Order, Robinson v. Shultz, No. 74-243 (D.D.C. April 4, 1974), AAPL Papers 24-5.  
29 James M. Johnstone, “Robinson v. Chicago - Telephone Conversation with Chet Kamin of Governor 
Walker’s Office,” April 5, 1974, AAPL 2-4. 
30 James M. Johnstone to Chester Kamin, “Robinson v. Shultz - Chicago Revenue Sharing Case,” April 16, 
1974, AAPL 2-4. 
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grant recipients to have a comprehensive antidiscrimination program and to provide a 
detailed accounting within sixty days of receiving a grant.31 Despite being awarded more than 
two-million dollars worth of grants in March 1974, the Chicago Police failed to comply. 
When the Governor received ORS’s notification the sixty-day window was just about up. On 
June 12, 1974, Fogel withheld the funds from the Chicago Police.32  
The Office of Revenue Sharing also referred the League complaint to the 
Department of Justice. On May 30, 1974, the federal government amended its complaint in 
U.S. v. Chicago to include allegations that the Chicago Police had violated the General 
Revenue Sharing Act.33 When the government’s lawyers moved for a preliminary injunction 
that same day, though, they did not ask for a cut-off of revenue sharing funds. This led 
Robinson back to D.C. to renew his motion for an injunction before Judge Smith on June 3. 
The D.C. court again refused, but its decision alluded to the fact that the referral satisfied the 
duty to enforce only “until such time as non-compliance is determined by the court.”34  
Officer Quality and Affirmative Action 
                                                 
31 Fogel’s career trajectory is fascinating. First an academic, he then ran the Minnesota Department of 
Corrections. Governor tried to appoint him director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, which the 
Illinois Senate refused in a party-line vote, citing concerns that Fogel “coddled criminals.” Walker installed him 
as head of ILEC, which did not require confirmation by the Senate. The House then symbolically cut his pay of 
the ILEC director by $10,000. Robert Enstad, “Name Fogel to Illinois Prisons Post,” Chicago Tribune, January 
19, 1973, 13; Robert Enstad, “Prison Chief: Reformer or Coddler of Criminals?,” Chicago Tribune, January 28, 
1973, 14; Neil Mehler, “State Senate Turns Down Fogel as Penal Director,” Chicago Tribune, March 23, 1973, 5; 
“Fogel Gets Justice Post,” Chicago Tribune, May 2, 1973, 3; Frank Zahour, “Walker Appointee Hit: Panel Cuts 
Fogel’s Salary,” Chicago Tribune, May 10, 1973, A1. 
32 John O’Brien, “$2 Million in Grants to Police Being Held Up,” Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1974, 3. Even as 
ILEC further developed its guidelines in cooperation with the city over the coming months, the Police 
Department—though not other city agencies—refused to submit the required certifications. Robert Enstad and 
John O’Brien, “State Turns Down Reply on Police Guidelines,” Chicago Tribune, December 21, 1974, N1; “State 
to Insist City Obey Edict,” Chicago Defender, December 26, 1974, 1. 
33 U.S. v. Chicago, 395 F. Supp. 329, 334 (N.D. Ill. 1975). 
34 Robinson v. Shultz, No. 74-248, (D.D.C. June 28, 1974), 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7810, *2.   
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Attempts to settle U.S. v. Chicago failed, but not for lack of effort by Assistant 
Attorney General Allen. The City was willing to accept hiring goals for women, as well as 
black and Latino men moving forward. But they were unwilling to acknowledge or account 
for past discrimination.35 For Robinson, a settlement was just the kind of deal-making that 
always characterized Chicago politics. He refused to “‘sell-out’ and prevent mounds of 
evidence on police discrimination from ever being presented in federal court.”36 Describing 
the soon to unfold trial as “Chicago’s Watergate,” he promised, “The AAPL will never make 
a deal.”37 Nearly 45 months after the League filed suit, trial began on May 30. As the Chicago 
Defender dramatically described, “U.S. District Court Judge Prentice Marshall’s courtroom is 
the arena where Renault Robinson, advocate of change within the Chicago police 
department and Superintendent James Rochford, champion of the status quo, will butt 
heads.”38  
Insert Figure 9 
 Robinson’s case was the most high profile employment discrimination case ever 
brought against a local police department. The 17-day hearing on the preliminary injunction 
in May and June of 1974 and the 43-day trial the following year were path-breaking, and 
exhausting, for the court and the parties. Judge Marshall’s decision tracked the Whisenand 
Report closely. Figure 9 clearly illustrates the moments at which the Department and Civil 
Service Commission instantiated disparities. The percentage of blacks on the police force 
                                                 
35 “Police Bias Talks Lag; Trial Thursday,” Chicago Tribune, May 26, 1974, 2. 
36 Robert McClory, “See Plot to Kill Cop Suit,” Chicago Defender, May 14, 1974, 1. 
37 “Renault Sees Local Watergate,” Chicago Defender, May 16, 1974, 2. 
38 Joseph Longmeyer, “Judge to Decide on Police Dispute,” Chicago Defender, May 28, 1974, 3. 
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came nowhere close to the percentage of blacks in Chicago.39 The percentage of blacks hired 
after the civil service examination and the background check was far below the percentage of 
black applicants. Marshall was convinced that this was the product of recent history. Under 
O.W. Wilson, the percentage of blacks on the force reached near parity with the city’ 
population of working-age black men. After he retired, the rate of hiring plummeted; the 
classes hired after 1971 were just ten percent black.40 Promotions were worse, in part 
because the declining number of black men on the force created a much lower baseline. 
Nonetheless, the percentage of men likely to become sergeants (the top 400) was nowhere 
near matching even the percentage of blacks that passed the test, and it was further from the 
percentage that took the exam. 
The city’s implausible defense began from a relatively sound premise: blacks now 
looked upon the police “as ‘oppressive forces of evil.’” Nonetheless, the city’s conclusion 
that the prevailing sentiment in black Chicago stressed, “you shouldn’t be part of them, you 
shouldn’t work for them,” was undermined by the fact that blacks continued applying to the 
force in high numbers.41 In 1971, the percentage of working-age black men in the city was 
just under twenty-six percent, yet they comprised more than twenty-nine percent of 
applicants.42 Judge Marshall concluded, “it appears that black male interest in the 
Department was up rather than down.” The problem was that after the mid-1960s, the 
Police Department was no longer interested in having black cops. The “blue rebellion” 
produced by the conflict over race and space in the 1960s and early 1970s drove the decrease 
                                                 
39 Nor did it come close to matching the percentage of black men in the labor force. In 1970, “the male 
population of Chicago was 60.1% white, 32.1% black and 7% Spanish, while the male labor force was 67% 
white, 25.8% black, and 7.2% Spanish.” U.S. v. Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218, 233 (N.D.Ill. 1976). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Testimony of Renault Robinson, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary. House of Representatives. 94th Cong. 2d Session (Mar. 11, 1976), 504. 
42 U.S. v. Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218, 233 (N.D.Ill. 1976). 
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in hiring, as the Whisenand Report suggested and the evidence adduced at trial confirmed. Its 
chief mechanisms were the methods that the Department used to screen police officers.43 
If they followed the LEAA Report, Marshall, and ultimately the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals, drew the legal conclusions that the LEAA study team studiously avoided. With 
Griggs as his North Star, Marshall navigated a thicket of testimony and motions to issue a 
preliminary injunction on November 7, 1974. Concluding that disparities existed was easy. 
The heart of the case, and the core of the city’s claim, was its claim that disparities in the 
patrolmen’s exam and background checks, and in the sergeant’s exam and efficiency ratings, 
were valid. In the end, Judge Marshall concluded that the city had not shown its selection 
methods to be “demonstrably related to job performance.”44  
Accurate prediction of job performance required taking steps that the city flatly 
refused to consider. During O.W. Wilson’s tenure, the Department hired John Furcon of the 
University of Chicago’s Industrial Relations Center to design a battery of tests that could be 
used in hiring patrol officers. (These tests were never put into practice.) Furcon found two 
key facts: First, “There are clear-cut statistically significant differences in response by white 
and black police officers to the majority of tests in the battery.” Furcon showed that white 
officers scored higher on some tests (more, overall) and blacks on others. Second, “There is 
no clear-cut difference in actual job performance between white and black officers …” 
Accordingly, a department could “use different test performance standards to predict 
                                                 
43 Blacks (and Latinos) failed the civil service exam at twice the rate of whites. Department background checks 
also disproportionately disqualified them, at a rate of 25.7 percent as opposed to 15.2 percent of eligible whites. 
The statistical case for adverse impact of the promotional tests was similarly disparate: Only 1.77 percent of the 
1298 black candidates who took the Sergeants exam ended up within the top 400 (the number likely to be 
appointed) on the 1973 sergeants roster, as opposed to 7.07% of the white candidates.  
44 U.S. v. Chicago, 549 F. 2d 415, 427 (7th Cr. 1977). 
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identical job performance standards.” To find the best cops, Furcon concluded, a 
department had to hire blacks and whites according to separate standards.45  
The city’s actins indicate that its priorty was not to hire the best officers but to 
preserving its authority to chose how it hired officers. It showed remarkably little curiosity 
about new approaches to officer quality. Furcon said flat-out, “Efforts to maintain invalid or 
unproven standards will only result in continued professional and legal pressure to bring 
selection practices into conformity with professional psychological principles in the testing 
area.”46 But the city insisted on the validity of its methods, despite continuing pressure. 
Experts from the Civil Service Commission and academics hired to testify on behalf of the 
city attempted to validate the status quo. The court of appeals explained, “No job analysis of 
the position of patrolman was conducted before the 1971 examination or the 1974 validity 
study, indicating that the criteria used in the study were in fact chosen for their availability 
rather than because they would accurately predict job performance.”47  
The city could not back its way into validation, and it had little interest in moving 
forward. Circuit Judge Luther Swygert noted that Judge Marshall “demonstrated unusual 
patience with the defendants,” despite their recalcitrance.48 Despite the result, the district 
court was generous to the city. Some examples: Judge Marshall refused to order the 
                                                 
45 John Furcon, Occasional Paper 35: Some Answers About Police Officer Selection Testing (Chicago: Industrial Relations 
Center, University of Chicago, 1972), 35, 35, 39. 
46 Ibid., 41. 
47 U.S. v. Chicago, 549 F. 2d 415, 431 (7th Cr. 1977). 
48 Ibid., 448 (Pell, J., dissenting in part). This was echoed by Circuit Judge Pell, who dissented in part: “Certainly 
Judge Marshall … can be said to have given every ounce of devoted attention to the best possible resolution of 
the thorny questions involved.” Ibid.  Marshall treated the city as a loving parent manages a potentially 
wayward adolescent, not pushing too hard, providing the structure and opportunity for good decision-making, 
remaining level-headed in the face of intransigence. Later in life, Marshall relished being described as an 
“activist judge,” this is a product of the politics of judging in the Reagan era, for example, when the federal 
government tried to undermine his rulings in U.S. v. Conlisk. Peggy Ellis, “Former District Judge Prentice 
Marshall, 77,” Daytona Beach News-Journal, May 27, 2004, 6C. 
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imposition of hiring and promotion quotas with the preliminary injunction, instead hoping 
that, “a new patrolmen’s examination … hopefully, will cure the deficiencies found in the 
1971 exam.”49 He reacted with equanimity when the city unilaterally breached an interim 
hiring agreement made with the other parties in December 1974. Once quotas were in place, 
Marshall allowed the city substitute lists from their newly designed exam, even though it 
produced employment ratios less favorable to blacks than the quotas. He did not find that 
the promotion process for lieutenants was unlawful, despite the tiny number of black 
lieutenants (eleven of 276 were black or Latino) and the equally dismal roster to fill the 
existing forty-seven vacancies (with just three blacks or Latinos). Early on in litigation, 
Marshall announced, “It is far better in cases of this nature that the remedy come from the 
parties rather than the court.” 50 He stuck steadfastly to this principle throughout. 
Insert Figure 10 
The court sought to understand police decision-making and to impose as little as 
possible on the city’s administrative prerogatives, a deference illustrated by his refusal to 
enjoin their reliance on “efficiency ratings.” Every six months, supervisors ranked the 
patrolmen under their command in five categories and then averaged these to obtain an 
efficiency rating. Although the scale was from 0 to 100, more than ninety percent of officers 
received scores between 80 and 95. The average of black score was less than one percent 
lower than the average white score. Figure 10 plots an “index of representation” for the 
ratings of all officers who took the 1973 sergeants’ exam by race. Each black rating would 
have a dot at 1 if around eighteen percent of those who received it were black (just over 18 
                                                 
49 U.S. v. Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543, 561 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
50 Ibid. 
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percent of promotional applicants were black), and vice-versa for whites. The size of the 
dots reflects the number of officers receiving that score. The chart suggests that close 
averages masked significant differences. What mattered from promotion was not averages, 
but the distribution of scores. Black officers had far fewer high scores. This is why although 
black officers made up 9.4 percent of the top 383 scores on the written sergeant’s test, they 
made up just 5.2 percent of the top 383 sergeant’s applicants once efficiency ratings were 
taken into account.51 Marshall knew these ratings did not measure performance. But the 
close average indicated that they also were not grossly discriminatory. Accordingly, he 
allowed them in recognition of the administrative imperatives that inhered in running a 
police department or any other large agency: namely, the need for mechanisms to continually 
measure employee performance.52 
 Marshall reluctantly imposed, and the appellate court approved, quotas for both 
patrol officers and sergeants.53 Opposition to quotas in law enforcement was, of course, 
central to conservative aims in the passage of the LEAA.54 Even Robinson’s supporters 
concluded that it would be presumptuous to argue, “given a certain set of facts, a district 
                                                 
51 For the period from January to June 1973, 89.6 percent of black officer’s ratings fell between 80 and 95; for 
whites, 92 percent fell within this range. The average black officer’s score was 84.3; the average white officer’s 
85.2. Blacks only made up 323 (13.6 percent) of the 2365 applicants with efficiency scores of 89 or better. 
Given the racial composition of the pool of applicants (18.4 percent black), a third more black applicants—
112—would need to be added to the pool (with a corresponding 112 whites subtracted) to reach parity (index 
= 1). Ibid.; U.S. v. Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218, 238 (N.D.Ill. 1976); “Percentage of Blacks and Whites Receiving 
Various Efficiency Ratings,” in U.S. v. Chicago, 1974, 25 tbl. A, 26 tbl. B. The plot of the best-fit trend-lines for 
blacks and whites further suggests that this was unlikely a random pattern. There is a strong correlation 
between race and outlier efficiency ratings that the city failed to explain. 
52 U.S. v. Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218, 239 (N.D.Ill. 1976). 
53 U.S. v. Chicago, 549 F. 2d at 450 (Pell, J., dissenting in part). 
54 The language around the use of race in hiring obscures more than it explains. For example, by 1974, “An 
instruction was issued to all SPA’s regarding the use of ‘goals and timetables’ under Section 518(b) of the Crime 
Control Act of 1973 This instruction concludes that the imposition of goals and timetables represents a 
permissible method of overcoming the effects of past discrimination against minorities and women found to 
exist within the hiring and promotional practices of an LEAA-recipient.” Sixth Annual Report of LEAA 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1974), 189. 
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court must order certain affirmative action relief.”55 Seventh Circuit Judge Wilbur Pell, who 
dissented in part but assented to the quotas, claimed that his reluctance to do so related to 
“today’s climate of increasing crime, with accompanying increase of public indignation and 
fear, [in which] the only standard for police department composition at every echelon should 
be, in my opinion the very best possible person obtainable for the work to be performed.”56 
This commonly held sentiment seemed to miss the meaning suggested by legal facts in this 
case: namely, that in terms of predicting an officers’ quality, Chicago’s tests likely were less 
accurate than Judge Marshall’s quotas.  
The quotas addressed the longstanding discrimination built into the Chicago police. 
Civil Rights activist Jesse Jackson explained quotas like this: “Today, we would make clear 
that zero is a number and therefore likewise is a quota. Our population is 12, perhaps even 
15 percent of the Nation’s. We choose the 12 to 15 percent rather than the zero as our 
standard.”57 Jackson’s point was apt: the Police Department already employed racial 
formulas to regulate employment. It imposed racial quotas by using tests and other screening 
mechanisms whose relation to job performance they never bothered to understand. The 
quotas pointed to how opportunities already were distributed unequally along arbitrary, 
categorical lines. 
Pay to Perform 
Judge Marshall refused to unfreeze funds that Judge John Smith of the D.C. District 
Court put in escrow on December 18, 1974, following Marshall’s issuance of a preliminary 
                                                 
55 Joe Santucci to Art Jefferson, “Duty of Federal District Judge to Order Affirmative Action Relief,” April 8, 
1975, 1, AAPL 2-5. 
56  
57 Statement of Jesse Jackson, Discrimination in Employment (Oversight) (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1972), 9. 
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injunction. In upholding Marshall’s action, the Seventh Circuit majority argued that enjoining 
funds was less intrusive than directly meddling in the administration of local government. 
Judge Pell dissented on precisely this point: “Stopping the flow of lifeblood to a body is 
certainly more fatal than enjoining that body from certain activity.”58 Pell’s assessment was 
more accurate: Marshall cut off federal funds to accomplish his primary objective, which 
included direct meddling in the Police Department. Pell’s dissent erred, though, in its 
assessment of the city’s bona fides. For example, what Marshall characterized as the city’s 
“arrogant, contumacious refusal … to honor their interim hiring agreement[,]” Judge Pell 
labeled unfortunate timing. Judge Smith’s order to enjoin revenue sharing payments came 
just two days after Judge Marshall approved an interim order agreed to by the parties to hire 
600 officers, half black and Latino men and one-third female.59  The city unilaterally 
repudiated the agreement without notifying Judge Marshall. Judge Pell saw this in parallel to 
“the case of the contrived plot, if something had happened earlier or later, how different the 
results would have been!”60 
Pell was oblivious to how early and how often the AAPL had contrived the plot 
point. More than any other aspect of the case against the Chicago police, the fund cut-off 
particularly reflected Robinson’s determination and tenacity. After seven years as a “constant 
pilgrim,” Robinson might have stepped back while the Department of Justice brought the 
city into compliance. But Robinson was skeptical, perhaps rightly. So when the federal 
lawyers failed to ask Judge Marshall to enjoin revenue sharing funds in their motion for a 
preliminary injunction in May 1974, Robinson turned to the D.C. federal court Smith initially 
                                                 
58 U.S. v. Chicago, 549 F. 2d at 448 (Pell, J., dissenting). 
59 John Wilson to Tom Gottschalk, “Robinson v. Conlisk / Proposed Interim Patrol Officer Hiring,” 
November 25, 1974, AAPL 24-3. 
60 U.S. v. Chicago, 549 F. 2d at 445 (Pell, J., dissenting). 
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denied his motion, deferring to the need to give the Department of Justice flexibility in its 
decision-making. Robinson did not give up. When Marshall issued his November 7, 1974, 
preliminary injunction, Robinson seized this opportunity to renew the promise of Title VI.  
Judge Smith’s order mandated that a quarterly payment of revenue sharing funds of 
nearly $19 million dollars be put in escrow. Although the attempts of the city’s lawyers to 
collaterally attack the order failed, they did result in the consolidation of Robinson v. Shultz 
with the other cases on Marshall’s docket.61 Smith’s escrowing of federal funds poked a huge 
hole in the city’s budget, of which general revenue sharing funds accounted for nearly twelve 
percent.62 Near the end of 1975, after almost $78 million had been withheld the city secured 
bridge loans from two commercial banks for $55 million to ensure that it did not run short 
of cash at the end of the year.63 Whether the freeze tightened the budget too much for the 
City to carry out the hiring agreement is difficult to assess, in part because neither the city 
budget director nor the comptroller did the math.64 Marshall concluded that the best 
estimates pointed towards a cost of around $350,000 per quarter to hire the 600 new 
officers. His “inescapable” conclusion: “the City cancelled the $350,000 interim hiring 
program in an attempt to lever loose $19,000,000 in revenue sharing funds.”65  
It was a high-risk strategy to rearticulate the nature of the case, oriented towards 
political aims more than legal strategy. The Mayor cast the city as the victim of an unjust 
                                                 
61 The City made no motion to intervene in the DC action. Only when its collateral attack on the D.C. court’s 
jurisdiction failed did the city move to intervene in the D.C. litigation. When it finally appeared before Judge 
Smith, “[The City] then moved to dismiss the District of Columbia action. Its motion was denied. It moved to 
vacate or stay the order of December 18, 1974. That motion was denied.”  U.S. v. Chicago, 395 F. Supp. 329, 
337 (N.D.Ill. 1975). 
62 Robert McClory, “City Begs for U.S. Funds,” Chicago Defender, December 24, 1974, 1. 
63 Edward Schreiber, “To Offset Federal Freeze: City to Borrow $55 Million,” Chicago Tribune, December 20, 
1975, N3. 
64 Clark Burrus, “Affidavit,” in U.S. v. Chicago, 1974; Edward Bedore, “Affidavit,” in U.S. v. Chicago, 1974. 
65 U.S. v. Chicago, 416 F. Supp. 788, 345 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
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double standard. After all, the proportion of black officers in his Police Department was 
much higher than at the FBI or U.S. Attorney’s office in the Northern District of Illinois.66 
Secondly, City officials and lawyers also claimed that the loss of revenue sharing dollars 
made it impossible to hire the new officers, and would cause a reduction in police services. 
This claim was backed up by a gap between authorized and actual force strength. By 
November 1974, the city reported, “more than 700 patrolman and 50-100 sergeant vacancies 
have accrued.”67 Yet the number of police officers was at an historic high, well above 
13,000.68 If the city actually wanted to hire more officers from the existing lists, Marshall 
preferred they do so by agreement with the plaintiffs. This was one reason why he refused to 
impose quotas along with his preliminary injunction, and why he invited the parties to ask 
him “for interim relief which would permit appointments from the current eligible lists upon 
an equitable basis” pending development of new exams and practices.69 As Howard Saffold 
and Renault Robinson argued, the court gave the city a choice: whether “(1) to curtail police 
services or (2) to have more patrol officers on a fair basis …”70 But the court did not prevent 
them from hiring. 
Whatever the political calculus, the Mayor’s brinksmanship affected the Police 
Department’s position in court. In an April 21, 1975, opinion on continuing the withholding 
of revenue sharing funds, Marshall asked, “Have conditions changed so as to render the 
order intolerable or inequitable?  No change has been shown. Indeed, to the extent that 
                                                 
66 Richard Philbrick, “Daley Assails Ruling on Police Bias,” Chicago Tribune, April 23, 1975, B1. 
67 U.S. v. Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543, 547 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
68 Police staffing levels grew in tandem with rising homicide levels, which reached their all-time peak in 1974. 
69 He acted “without prejudice to an application by the parties, upon a showing of necessity…” U.S. v. 
Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
70 Howard Saffold and Renault Robinson, “The Facts About the So-Called Police ‘Crisis in Manpower,’” 
November 12, 1974, AAPL 63-12. 
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conditions have changed, they support continuation of the order.”71 He cited a litany of 
unilateral actions taken by the Department between December 18, 1974 and April 1975, 
beginning with the breach of the hiring agreement, and including Acting Superintendent 
James Rochford’s promotion of “temporary” sergeants and a group of lieutenants, and the 
setting of the date of a new civil service exam for patrolmen, each without notice to or leave 
of the court. Even ORS and Treasury officials now agreed that, “in view of the City’s refusal 
to implement the interim hiring agreement and to give assurances that it would comply with 
this court’s order of November 7, 1974, the Secretary had concluded that further revenue 
sharing payments should not be made to the City.”72 
Such resistance eroded only after federal money stopped flowing to the city. Finally, 
on May 16, 1975, Chicago complied with the court’s March 1975 order to hire 200 officers 
using the quotas that it had agreed to in December.73 In the fourteen months between the 
imposition of the cut off and the final release of the funds on March 31, 1976, this was the 
only action taken by the Department to rectify discrimination.74 Even then, Marshall decried 
the city’s proposals as continuing to advance a “pay now—perform later philosophy.”75  
The leverage of federal funds did not dismantle the ongoing racial stratification 
across multiple institutional domains and its effects on black success in meeting police 
entrance requirements. But it could and did force the city to invest in a new process for 
screening patrol officers. In its proportions, this hiring far outstripped O.W. Wilson’s 
                                                 
71 U.S. v. Chicago, 395 F. Supp. 329, 344–345 (N.D. Ill. 1975). 
72 U.S. v. Chicago, 416 F. Supp. 788, 338 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
73 The May 16 date came from a presentation by Chicago Asst. Corp. Counsel Earl Neal at a meeting on release 
of Revenue Sharing funds. Harold Himmelman to Tom Gottschalk and Frank Cicero, “Meeting at the Justice 
Department on March 1, 1976,” March 2, 1976, AAPL 2-6. They also hired 200 temporary sergeants in accord 
with the quota ratios, but these were only temporary appointments. U.S. v. Chicago, 534 F. 2d 708, 710–711 
(7th Cir. 1976). 
74 U.S. v. Chicago, 416 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
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vaunted recruitment of black officers and, by recognizing the legitimate claims of Latino 
men and women of all races and ethnicities, ended a much wider spectrum of exclusions. 
The Department offered a new patrolmen’s exam in 1975, created by professors at Bowling 
Green University. Marshall accepted it, although it still excluded minorities at a higher rate 
than whites. Despite its flaws, the new process more than tripled the rate at which black men 
were hired. As economist Justice McCrary calculated, African-Americans made up 
approximately 10 percent of new hires from 1971 through 1973. “By 1975 it had climbed to 
40 percent, and throughout the 1975-1990 period, the hiring share averaged 32 percent.”76 
The overall composition of the Department changed slowly, in part because of its 
exceptionally low rate of attrition. Even as the black population stabilized at around one-
third of the city, the black percentage of the force never quite reached parity. Nonetheless, 
the case transformed this practically and symbolically important public sector institution in a 
meaningful way.  
For the League, the case brought vindication of the claims of their organization, and 
especially for the long-suffering Renault Robinson. Judge Marshall’s ruling on the Robinson 
plaintiffs’ claims on September 27, 1977—more than seven years after they filed suit—
declared that “Robinson had been subjected to ‘repeated, planned and systematic violations 
of his 1st and 14th Amendment rights by his police superiors.” The court awarded him 
$75,000 in back pay and ordered his disciplinary record expunged; other League members, 
including, Ocie Brown, Charles Sias, William Bigby, Jerry Crawley, and Howard Saffold were 
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awarded $10,000 each.77 Not until the League helped to put a black Mayor in office, 
however, would Robinson’s outstanding account with the City finally be paid.  
Congressional Liberals, Title VI, & the New Federalism 
Were the Chicago litigation the endpoint, this would be a hopeful story of local legal 
activism: righteous black policemen, aided by dedicated lawyers, defeated the nefarious 
intentions of southern congressional conservatives and brought the Chicago Political System 
to heel. This was a triumph, and an important piece of evidence challenging our collective 
imagination about the federal war on crime and its relationship to civil rights. The influence 
on the Chicago case went far beyond the city’s borders. Judge Smith’s order to escrow 
Revenue Sharing funds was the first such suspension for discrimination.78 Following the 
decision, a spokesman for the Department of Justice announced that it “could be a 
precedent for similar actions in several other cities including Tallahassee, Fla., Buffalo and 
Philadelphia.”79 The AAPL was also at the forefront of a broad, grassroots movement 
among police officers and aspirants, led by many of the local affiliates of the National Black 
Police Association (NBPA).80 These efforts stretched throughout the country, and unlike 
school desegregation, their success was not concentrated in any region. Most of the 
successful efforts in the federal courts were brought under Title VII; many, like Chicago, 
involved the Justice Department as a party. One scholar described the effect of such 
litigation as “[a]rguably the most aggressive affirmative action program ever implemented in 
                                                 
77 Robert McClory, “Chi Police Score Major Court Win,” Baltimore Afro-American, October 8, 1977, 1. 
78 Robinson v. Shultz, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11527, *1 (D.D.C. 1974). 
79 Ernest Holsendolph, “U.S. Revenue Sharing Aid to Chicago Halted for Bias,” New York Times, December 19, 
1974, 1. 
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the United States.”81 Following the Chicago case, LEAA action contributed to equal 
employment efforts in many cities, including Buffalo, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Milwaukee, 
Birmingham, Pittsburgh, Los Angeles, Cleveland, and San Francisco, as well as dozens of 
state and county agencies.82 
 Robinson was an important actor in the effort to challenge the civil rights 
enforcement under the New Federalism. But he recognized clearly the limits of litigation. As 
he told one congressional committee, “We are hoping that we don’t have to continue to do 
the Government’s work by filing lawsuits, that maybe the Government could do its own 
work.”83 In the mid-1970s, this issue was central to the broader enforcement of civil rights in 
intergovernmental aid. Had New Federalism etherized Title VI? Was it possible to enforce 
civil rights while providing states and localities with direct fiscal aid? Or, did these aims 
remain—as conservative Southern senators assumed in 1968—structurally at odds?  
Robinson’s testimony before Congress in the 1970s reflected the expanding horizon 
of his equal employment activism. In 1972, he spoke before a House subcommittee on 
Equal Opportunity as part of a broader hearing into civil rights in employment in Chicago. 
That hearing was held at the behest of Congressman Ralph Metcalfe. Robinson—like nearly 
all the invitees—critiqued the city’s hiring record (though most focused on contracting). By 
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1974, Robinson had built close relations with the Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights and 
the Center for National Policy Review, bringing him directly into the circle of activists 
working on regulatory enforcement in D.C. His next appearance before a Congressional 
committee in 1974, accompanied by Harold Himmelman, focused on the ORS’s response to 
the League’s complaint. The third time, in 1976, Robinson represented the National Black 
Police Association. Accompanied by Richard Larson of the national ACLU and Penelope 
Brace, a pioneer in the fight against sex discrimination from Philadelphia, he spoke of the 
need for new administrative strategies. Chicago discriminated, Robinson argued, “but 
Chicago is not alone in that category, every city in the United States is discriminating.” 
Rather than being part of the remedy, LEAA elided the problem. In the simplest terms, 
“There should be compliance prior to getting the money. … That would resolve the 
problem, so the courts would not have to fool with it.” This was much preferable to tying up 
federal funding all through out the country, an action that “causes heartache to the citizens, 
and could be easily eliminated if your legislation would just force LEAA to comply to begin 
with.”84 
Robinson’s congressional testimony was part of a multivalent strategy to get the 
LEAA to enforce its mandate, one that played out as we have seen in agency adjudication 
and in the courts.  He also focused on administrative rule-making and legislation. This 
activism concentrated on two different kinds of reform, which can be illustrated through the 
attempt of the League and its allies to initiate agency rule-making under section 553(e) of the 
                                                 
84 Statement of Renault Robinson, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary. House of Representatives. 94th Cong. 2d Session (Mar. 11, 1976), 494, 495, 
496. 
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Administrative Procedure Act in 1971.85 The black officers joined the National Spanish 
Speaking Coalition, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., and the Native 
American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., under the organization of the 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, in asking the LEAA to develop comprehensive anti-
discrimination rules.86 A coalition organized by the Center for National Policy Review 
(CNPR) submitted eight substantive petitions, each seeking to expand LEAA’s civil rights 
regulatory portfolio, on December 9, 1971. These proposed rules ran along two primary 
axes: rules for equal participation in planning and equal employment, and improvement of 
compliance. The requests for equality including prohibition of discrimination in the 
composition of state planning agencies, affirmative action, outlawing minimum height 
requirements and sex discrimination, and assuring equal employment opportunity for 
correctional facilities outside of urban areas. The compliance requests tracked what critics 
had wanted all along, including pre-compliance review, deletion of the preference for judicial 
remedies, and more detailed complaint requirements and investigation responsibilities and 
deadlines.87 If “granted,” to use the language of the APA, the eight requests would have 
renovated the LEAA civil rights regime, bringing it into line with the recommendations of 
the Commission on Civil Rights. 
The fate of this attempt to compel rulemaking ran straight into the design of the Safe 
Streets Act, refracted through Jerris Leonard. The APA requires agencies to make some 
                                                 
85 The APA provides, “Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for issuance, 
amendment, or repeal of a rule.” 5 U.S.C. s 553(e).  
86 “Equal Job Opportunity in Law Enforcement” (Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and The Center for 
National Policy Review, School of Law, the Catholic University of America, October 1973), AAPL 56-407. 
87 Raymond Marcin, “Memorandum of Meeting at LEAA,” January 26, 1972, AAPL 2-2. 
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disposition of the requests within a reasonable time.88 Heretofore, the LEAA had issued no 
guidelines as to how it might act upon a petition for rulemaking.89 In response to the 
petitions, the agency issued a regulation barring sex discrimination and a “guideline” putting 
the burden on police departments to justify minimum height requirements by relation to job 
performance.90 Eventually, the agency also informed the recipients of LEAA funds that 
“goals and timetables” were “a permissible method of overcoming the effects of past 
discrimination against minorities and women.”91 But the petitioners made no headway on 
their larger and arguably more important proposals. The LEAA would make better rules, but 
it would not construct an aggressive and proactive oversight regime.  
Congressional liberals took action. As the Safe Streets Act’s June 30, 1973, date of 
expiration approached, Nixon pushed Congress to consider a Special Revenue Sharing bill 
for law enforcement and to shrink the LEAA, which would “retain authority over 
discretionary funding, national planning, auditing, research, statistics and civil rights 
                                                 
88 See United States Constitution, amend. 1 (“Congress shall make no law … abridging … the right of the people 
… to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
89 Arthur Jefferson of the Center for National Policy Review described the year long process as “carrying on 
negotiations with Jerris Leonard …” Arthur M Jefferson and Renault A. Robinson, January 9, 1973, AAPL 10-
4. 
90 Marcin, “Memorandum of Meeting at LEAA”; “Equal Job Opportunity in Law Enforcement.” The LEAA 
published the final regulation (on sex discrimination) and guideline (on height) on March 9, 1973. Subpart E--
Equal Employment Opportunity Guidelines, Fed. Reg., vol. 48, 1973, 6388–6390; Equal Rights Guidelines, Fed. Reg., vol. 
48, 1973, 6415. This last action was particularly important in Chicago, with its large and growing Latino/a 
population. Minimum height requirements had been a major path for the exclusion of Latino applicants from 
the Chicago Police force. Following the December 4, 1971 patrolman exam, for example, doctors examined 
106 “Spanish Americans.” A remarkable 46 of these—a remarkable 43 percent—failed their medical 
examinations, a rate far outstripping blacks (35 percent) and whites (20 percent). The single factor that 
distorted Latino rejection rates was the height requirement: 24 of the 46 rejections were for being too short. 
Paul M. Whisenand, Robert E. Hoffman, and Lloyd Sealy, “The Chicago Police Department: An Evaluation of 
Personnel Practices; Prepared for the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency” 1972, 3.17, 3.22, 22-6, AAPL 22-6. 
(During the lawsuit, Chicago negotiated a consent decree with the Camacho plaintiffs to lower the height 
requirements.) 
91 Sixth Annual Report of LEAA, 189. 
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compliance—and the very important areas of leadership and technical assistance.”92 The 
requirements that previously encumbered states—LEAA plan approval, matching funds, 
maintenance of effort—would disappear.93 Congress spit the bit; instead it amended the Safe 
Streets Act to look more, and not less, like a categorical grant program. This shift had 
actually begun in 1970, with the addition of the Part E block grant to fund prison and jail 
“improvements” and construction. In both 1970 and 1973, Congress added requirements 
and bureaucratic oversight to the planning and approval process, cutting against the 
fundamental thrust of New Federalism.94 Within this overall shift, liberal democrats pushed 
for stronger civil rights provisions. Democrat Barbara Jordan of Texas led the fight, arguing 
first for a Title VI or VII provision within organic statute, “The existing LEAA statutes 
contain no provisions designed to prevent discrimination in benefits or employment … As a 
result, LEAA has been particularly slow to develop an effective civil rights enforcement 
program.”95  
Jordan’s amendments enhanced the LEAA’s civil rights enforcement where 
individuals had made complaints. First, like Section 122 in the General Revenue Sharing Act, 
Jordan’s amendment gave the Safe streets Act its own little Title VI, one that went beyond 
the Civil Rights Act’s contours, including a prohibition on sex-based discrimination and 
giving the attorney general power to institute suits for a “pattern or practice” violation. It 
                                                 
92 Amendments to Title I (LEAA) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1973), 172 (Statement of Elliot Richardson). 
93 Richard M. Nixon, “Special Message to Congress on Special Revenue Sharing for Law Enforcement,” March 
2, 1971, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/we/?pid=3334. 
94 Nothing illustrates the increasing complexity of Act, from its 1968 passage to revisions in 1970, 1973, and 
1976, like the planning requirements charts in John K. Hudzik, Federal Aid to Criminal Justice: Rhetoric, Results, 
Lessons (Washington, D.C.: National Criminal Justice Association, 1984), 29, fig. 1, 34, fig. 3, 40, fig. 5, and 49, 
fig. 7. 
95 Ms. Jordan (D-TX), Cong Rec. H4895 (June 18, 1973), in Indexed Legislative History of the Crime Control Assistance 
Act of 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Office of General Counsel, Law Enforcement Assistance Act, 1973), p. 110.  
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also erased the historic LEAA regulatory preference for judicial or legislative action, and 
made fund cut-offs mandatory, once a state governor had a “reasonable time” to respond to 
an administrative determination.96 But by focusing on complaint processing, even Jordan’s 
bill did not fundamentally challenge the separation of civil rights and planning that 
structured New Federalism.97 Moreover, Representative Walter Flowers  (D-AL) convinced 
the House to reinsert the anti-quota provision back into the law.98  
Jordan’s bill highlighted the LEAA’s continuing limitations. The agency did not 
propose regulations to implement the Jordan amendment until December 1975 (twenty-
eight months after it became law). When the agency came up for reauthorization again 1976, 
the House Judiciary Committee’s Report observed, “LEAA has never terminated payment of 
funds to any recipient because of a civil rights violation.”99 The Chicago experience changed 
the agency. It sought compliance in more ways than before and was more aggressive with 
complaints.100 Nonetheless, Representative Robert McClory (R-IL) gave an accurate sense of 
the landscape when he noted, “There is evidence that LEAA did try to influence the course 
                                                 
96 Jordan’s bill initially had a 60-day time limit, but she agreed to convert this into a “reasonable time.”  House 
Committee on the Judiciary, “Law Enforcement Assistance Amendments,” H.Rep. (House of Representatives, 
93rd Cong., June 5, 1973), 7. 
97 Charles Rangel, “Racial Discrimination and Law Enforcement Funds,” Congressional Record 118 (March 29, 
1972): 11388–90. 
98 Compare Rep. Walter Flowers (D-AL) (“Mr. Chairman. by taking this out of the law … we would be 
opening the door to interference of all kinds--interference of the operation or the [LEAA]--all the way down to 
the local police or local sheriff's department.”) and Rep. Barbara Jordan (D-TX) (“The Courts have said we do 
not mandate quotas, and the administration has said we do not mandate quotas, and nobody is mandating 
quotas in this legislation.”), Cong Rec. H4895 (June 18, 1973), in Indexed Legislative History of the Crime Control 
Assistance Act of 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Office of General Counsel, Law Enforcement Assistance Act, 1973), 
p. 110. 
99 “Report of the House Judiciary Committee on the Extension of LEAA,” 94th Cong. 2d Sess., HR. No. 94-
1155 (May 15, 1976), 11, in Indexed Legislative History of the Crime Control Assistance Act of 1976 (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of General Counsel, Law Enforcement Assistance Act, 1976), 207. 
100 Philadelphia, the LEAA initiated fund termination. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: Hearings Before 
the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary. House of Representatives. 94th Cong. 2d Session (Mar. 
11, 1976), 508 (testimony of Penelope Brace). LEAA also withheld 18 grant awards in 1976 for the lack of an 
equal employment opportunity program. Eighth Annual Report of LEAA (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1976), 57. By 1974, LEAA began requiring preclearance for discretionary grant 
made by the agency to (Part D) of more than $750,000. Sixth Annual Report of LEAA, 179.  
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of the hiring and personnel practices of the offending police departments, but there is also 
evidence that the influence was not remarkably successful.”101 
Most outside observers held Revenue Sharing enforcement efforts in even lower 
esteem. To say the agency’s compliance enforcement remained “rather passive,” as the 
Commission on Civil Rights did in 1975, was to put it mildly. Even after Judge Smith 
declared the agency had both the power—and at a certain point, the obligation—to withhold 
funds in the Chicago case, its civil rights compliance personnel continued to be “opposed in 
practice to utilizing this means for seeking compliance with civil rights provisions.”102 
Smith’s decision to suspend funds to Chicago inspired activists elsewhere, who stepped up 
their efforts to draw attention to discriminatory employment practices in hopes of a similar 
result.103 In January of 1975, a group of twenty-two civil rights organizations wrote to 
President Gerald Ford about their dissatisfaction with the Revenue Sharing program. Their 
letter emphasized, “Of all the questions raised about revenue sharing, the issue of civil rights 
ranks among the highest.”104 These concerns were echoed by the Commission on Civil 
Rights, which asked Congress to appropriate an additional $7.5 million so that the agency 
could increase its civil rights personnel from a mere handful to 300.105  
Critics saw administrative discretion as the problem. President Ford’s proposed 
                                                 
101 Robert McClory was no particular advocate of federal vigor in civil rights matters. Robert McClory (R-IL), 
Cong. Rec. H9284 (Aug. 31, 1976), in Indexed Legislative History of the Crime Control Assistance Act of 1976, 272. 
102 United States Commission on Civil Rights, Making Civil Rights Sense Out of Revenue Sharing Dollars, 
Clearinghouse Report 50 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1975), 66 and 66 
n.107. 
103 John W. Lewis, Jr., “Revenue Sharing Funds to Be Cut Off When Recipients Are Guilty of Bias,” New 
Pittsburgh Courier, January 11, 1975, 2; Ernest Holsendolph, “Discrimination in Public Hiring Is a Target of 
More Complaints,” New York Times, February 11, 1975, 67. 
104 Ernest Holsendolph, “Revenue Sharing Scored by Civil Rights Groups,” New York Times, January 21, 1975, 
16. 
105 “Bias Seen in Use of Shared Funds: Rights Panel Urging Hiring of Additional Monitors,” New York Times, 
February 14, 1975, 14. 
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reauthorization of the Revenue Sharing program only deepened such concerns. Its cautious 
language provided that the Secretary of the Treasury “May withhold all or a portion of funds 
due that government (found guilty of discrimination), may require the repayment of funds 
expended in a discriminatory manner, and may terminate the eligibility of a state or local 
government to receive one or more payments.”106 When the agency finally issued regulations 
for fund cut-off in 1975, they were narrow and discretionary.107 What advocates wanted was 
a reduction in agency discretion.108 The League’s lawyer in Robinson v. Shultz argued that an 
effective enforcement regime would include “specific time limitations between steps in the 
administrative compliance process,” as well as “an amendment to direct Treasury to suspend 
revenue sharing funds to a jurisdiction pending the outcome of a final administrative or 
judicial proceeding,” whenever prima facie evidence of discrimination existed.109 
Armed with the Jordan Amendments, the National Black Police Association sued in 
1975 to force LEAA to cut off funds where either an LEAA investigation or a federal court 
had concluded that a state or local government discriminated (NPBA v. Velde).110 The claim 
was that the mandatory language—shall—of the Jordan Amendment created a positive duty 
                                                 
106 Ernest Holsendolph, “Ford Asks for More Revenue Sharing,” New York Times, April 26, 1975, 27. (italics 
added) 
107 Graham W. Watt to Harold Himmelman, January 31, 1975, 1–2 and Enclosures, AAPL 2-5. Don Edwards 
Committee’s Report was highly critical of the regulations. The Civil Rights Aspects of Revenue Sharing,” 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee, 94th Congress, 1st Sess. 
(Nov. 1975), 20-22.  
108 “Enforcing a Congressional Mandate: LEAA and Civil Rights,” Yale Law Journal 85 (1976): 733–737. 
109 Civil Rights Aspects of General Revenue Sharing: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the 
Committee on the Judiciary. House of Representatives. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 8), 50 (testimony of Harold 
Himmelman).  
110 Robert McClory, “Ask U.S. to Halt Funds,” Chicago Defender, September 4, 1975, 1; Timothy S. Robinson, 
“ACLU Challenges Grants to Biased Police Forces,” Washington Post, September 5, 1974, sec. A5, A5; United 
Press International, “A.C.L.U. Charges Police Bias, Sues for Federal Funds Cut-Off,” New York Times, 
September 6, 1975, 7. See also Testimony of Richard E. Larson, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary. House of Representatives. 94th Cong. 2d 
Session (Mar. 11, 1976), 502.  
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on the administrator’s part.111 The case contained important practical (plaintiff’s standing, 
defendant’s immunity) and theoretical (separation of powers) questions, and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to resolve some of them. Opinions among the Court’s members were 
tangled enough after the first draft of the majority opinion that the Chief Justice considered 
having the case reargued. Instead, the Court vacated and remanded the case for 
consideration in light of a different qualified immunity case.112 While the NBPA ultimately 
prevailed on the legal questions in the D.C. Circuit in 1983, the result was by then academic, 
as the LEAA had gone out of business.113 
Nonetheless, the suit was not simply about the courts checking the agency. As Art 
Jefferson of the Center for National Policy Review wrote to Robinson, litigation and 
legislation could work hand in hand as Congress considered reauthorizing the LEAA in 
1976. Indeed, Congressional reauthorizations of both the LEAA and Revenue Sharing 
included new civil rights regimes. As Richard Larson, who had directed ACLU efforts to 
reform compliance, puffed, “the 94th Congress enacted two acts providing for the most 
comprehensive and effective civil rights enforcement schemes yet conceived.”114   
Insert Table 5 
Larson highlighted new limites on administrative deference: “Rather than providing a 
wide degree of discretion to a federal funding agency, the new provisions tremendously 
                                                 
111 A similar suit was filed in the ORS context, although owing to differences in that statutory scheme met a 
different fate. Council of and for the Blind of Delaware County Valley v. Regan, 709 F. 2d 1521 (D.C. Cir. 
1983). 
112 The case: Butterfield v. Fitzgerald. See Velde v. National Black Police Association, Inc., Supreme Court Case Files 
Collection. Box 84. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, 
VA, 
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles/?utm_source=scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu%2Fcasefiles%2
F337&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages (acc. Jul. 5, 2015). 
113 NBPA v. Velde, 712 F. 2d 569 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
114 Richard Larson, “LEAA Legislation Report,” 1976, 870, AAPL 65. 
  
    291 
restrict that discretion.” 115 As Table 5 shows for the LEAA, the Act established three 
different periods: the trigger, the 60-day voluntary compliance period, and the 120-day 
administrative hearing period.116 Defined periods were one of the law’s automatic features: 
once the “trigger” finding of discrimination had been made—by state or federal courts or 
agencies, by the LEAA, or by the filing of a suit by the Attorney General—“the initiation of 
procedures for the suspension or termination of … money is automatic and by law.”117 
(According to Larson, had these automatic mechanisms been in place earlier, LEAA would 
have cut funds to approximately 50 Police Departments between 1972-1975.118) The final 
mandatory provision of the law required the agency to promulgate regulations within 90 
days, establishing timelines for its administrative processes. Not only were the LEAA and 
Revenue Sharing schemes parallel, but also the provisions of each meant that a finding by 
either agency would trigger fund cut-off for the other.  
In fact, the new regulatory regime modestly improved enforcement. In 1980, the 
Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics in the Department of Justice issued a 
report that argued that the “combined enforcement regime for title VI and VII,” created “in 
effect the most comprehensive civil rights enforcement scheme enacted by Congress.” This 
                                                 
115 Ibid. 
116 Larson provides a point by point comparison of the two schemes. E. Richard Larson, “LEAA and Revenue 
Sharing: New Legislation on Civil Rights Enforcement,” Clearinghouse Review 10 (1977): 876–878. 
117 Gregory J. Utken, “Cutting Off of Federal Monies to State and Local Governments: Civil Rights 
Enforcement Under the Law Enforcement Assistance and Revenue Sharing Acts,” Res Gestae, October 1977, 
434. The case when the LEAA brought suit was slightly different. LEAA must suspend funding of the grantee 
after 45 days unless within that period the United States or the grantee has obtained a court order to the 
contrary.” Charles A. Lauer and Thomas A. Llewellyn, “Federal Grant Litigation Involving Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration,” in Awakening the Slumbering Giant: Intergovernmental Relations and Federal Grant Law 
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Department to seek the suspension, termination, or repayment of LEAA funding …” Larson, “LEAA 
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was an overly glowing self-evaluation: courts often exempted law enforcement agencies from 
the mandatory fund cut-off.119 Nonetheless, the agency took more—and more decisive—
action.120 The Office Revenue Sharing’s compliance system continued to draw more 
criticism, but, this was to be expected for a much bigger program with a heavier burden. 
Complaints involved not only the time-limitations for state and local agencies, but also the 
standards used for determining whether to “trigger” the compliance process. Even with 
these shortcomings, however, the level of improvement from prior to 1976 was 
substantial.121  
* * * 
Nixon’s New Federalist programs provided important new sources of funds to urban 
governments during the first half of the 1970s. In light of this story, federal criminal justice 
                                                 
119 See cases collected at Lauer and Llewellyn, “Federal Grant Litigation Involving Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration,” 55, fns. 7–9. 
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policy in the 1970s was not a direct negation of civil rights advances; rather, liberals used 
federal funding to bring civil rights into new institutional domains. Any history of the 
relationship between civil rights and punitive policing must incorporate the rise of equal 
employment opportunity norms. Rather than a story of the unfettered rise of law-and-order, 
this 1970s tale is of relentless efforts by liberals to impose civil rights regulation on 
institutional structures that had been designed to be hostile to such efforts. Liberals 
constructed a more robust apparatus that pushed police departments much closer to the 
ideals of equal employment opportunity that animated black activists and, in particular, the 
officers of the AAPL. 
 Renault Robinson’s story is a counter-narrative to the inexorable rise of punitive 
policing, which would come to characterize American cities in the last two decades of the 
twentieth century. By 1976, law enforcement had not triumphed over civil rights. Rather, 
through the efforts of local activists and congressional allies, police had incorporated equal 
employment to a degree heretofore unknown. In a broader sense, in the post-Watergate 
Congress, the political climate that produced the Safe Streets Act in 1968 disappeared in the 
aftermath of the President’s resignation. Senator Edward Kennedy highlighted this when he 
testified before John Conyers subcommittee on the 1976 LEAA reauthorization. “I … 
remember the not too distant past when the slogans of ‘law and order’ and ‘domestic 
tranquility’ really blunted any kind of intelligent discussion about this issue.”122 In the middle 
of the decade, with liberals in the ascendency in Washington, options for criminal justice 
policy seemed much greater.  
                                                 
122 Statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: Hearings Before the 
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CHAPTER 8: BLACK POLICE ‘ENTER POLITICS TO GAIN CLOUT’ 
 
 
Renault Robinson first approached Harold Washington to introduce a bill on behalf 
of the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League in 1969. The League President was in the midst of 
trying to stop the Police Department from dismissing him for a series of trumped-up 
offenses. He asked the machine Democrat from Chicago to introduce “legislation designed 
to provide police officers with an element of legal protection against wanton and arbitrary 
departmental abuses.”1 He approached Washington with little expectation that the state 
representative would agree.2 Indeed, the State Legislature rarely intervened in the politics of 
law enforcement in Chicago during the 1960s and 1970s unless the Superintendent of Police 
or the Cook County State’s Attorney proposed a bill. Nevertheless, as Robinson later 
recollected, “Harold volunteered knowing full well that, ah, he’d be castigated by Daley and 
his forces for doing so.”3 Washington walked this fine line for years: struggling to remain in 
the good graces of the Cook County Democrats while at the same time serving as perhaps 
the leading voice in the House for greater inclusion of African Americans in the political and 
economic life of the state and city. 
 During the 1970s, Renault Robinson would absorb from Harold Washington’s many 
lessons about the inner workings of Chicago’s Democratic Party. “I felt he was a mentor in 
that he could tell me a lot about the system. He came up in the Democratic party. He came 
up as a machine politician. He had been involved all of his adult life. That’s all he did, was be 
                                                 
1 “Ask Law for Cop Protection,” Chicago Defender, October 18, 1969, 1. 
2 Robert McClory, The Man Who Beat Clout City (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1977). 
3 Renault Robinson, Eyes on the Prize II Interview, interview by Madison Davis Lacy, Jr., April 14, 1989, 
Washington University Film and Media Archive, Henry Hampton Collection, 
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a politician.”4 After a half-dozen years on the tilting ground, continually facing off against 
the Chicago Police in the press, in administrative proceedings, and in the courts, Renault 
Robinson concluded that only political action could transform the Police Department from 
an instrument of racial domination into a government agency that promoted the well-being 
of black Chicagoans. “It is clear now,” he declared in February of 1974 following the 
appointment of James Rochford as Superintendent, “that reform will come to Chicago only 
when Mayor Daley is defeated.”5  
 Renault Robinson was a lynchpin, fastening the axle of police reform to the wheel of 
independent black politics during the 1970s. Ralph Metcalfe’s turn against the Daley 
organization in 1972 first signaled the possibility that black politicians could break away from 
the machine. Over the course of the 1970s, Robinson was among the most important 
activists attempting to channel the momentum generated by Metcalfe’s rebellion back into 
politics. This required, as Robinson would soon discover, something more than the good 
name the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League had acquired for itself among grassroots 
activists. It required organization to change the trajectory of politics that had developed 
under the Daley administration, in which black voters became increasingly detached from 
participation. 
To the Precinct Hall Born 
Harold Washington was to the precinct hall born. Harold’s parents, Roy and Bertha 
Washington, moved to Chicago in 1917, a year after Roy graduated from high school in 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Renault Robinson, “Editorial Reply: James Rochford,” WBBM Newsradio 78, February 13, 1974, Despres 146-
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downstate Lawrenceville.6 Roy went to work on the killing floor at the slaughterhouse 
Wilson & Company while attending law school at night at Chicago Kent College of Law. 
Harold, the last of their four children, was born on April 15, 1922. When the Illinois bar 
admitted Roy Washington the next year, he become one of around a hundred black lawyers 
in the city. It was not easy to build a legal practice inside the confines of the color line. Like 
other black attorneys, who continued on as postal clerks or Pullman porters after taking their 
degrees, Washington continued to work in the slaughterhouse for another two years as he 
built his practice. He also joined the Democratic Party as one of a pioneering group of black 
men who anticipated the future of black voters, long before the masses of their fellows left 
the party of Lincoln in appreciable numbers. Harold and his siblings, who lived with their 
father after their parents divorced, grew up within the Southside political milieu. The leading 
South Side politicians of the day, “William L. Dawson, Oscar De Priest, Mike Sneed, Arthur 
W. Mitchell, and C.C. Wimbish were frequent visitors in our home.” Washington noted. “I 
was literally raised in a political atmosphere.”7 
What Roy Washington got out of politics was a living. His plum was a job in the 
Corporation Counsel’s office, where he prosecuted cases in police court down at 48th and 
Wabash. It may have been, as activist and author Dempsey Travis described, a “typical 
colored assignment,” but it provided a steady income.8 In addition, Washington cultivated 
political connections and created a base for his steady accumulation of real estate. 
Nonetheless, he wanted more. The elder Washington’s great aspiration was a judgeship. 
When that failed to materialize, he convinced his fellow precinct captains to support him to 
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become alderman of the Third Ward in 1947. He lost that election to Republican Archibald 
Carey, the same man that Ralph Metcalfe would defeat for Alderman two terms later, in 
1955. Roy Washington’s defeat remains one of the great Southside political intrigues of the 
period. He was undone by a power struggle over whether the white committeeman (in what 
was becoming an all black ward) or the rising black boss (William Dawson) would control 
the ward.9 Dawson prevailed, but at Roy Washington’s expense.  
Growing up at his father’s side, Harold learned to preach and politick. Harold was 
never called to the pulpit like his father and grandfather. Instead, he found his vocation in 
the political ward. With a precocity and fervor reminiscent of a teenage preacher, Harold 
worked the precinct with Roy from the age of thirteen or fourteen. In school, he was a 
voracious reader and a gifted student but also restless. He left DuSable High after three years 
to join the Civilian Conservation Corps in 1939 and spent three-and-a-half years in the U.S. 
Army during World War II.10 His path upon his return to Chicago took him out of the 
Southside and into distinctively inter-racial—and later nearly all white—environments. On 
the GI Bill, he partook in the great experiment that was Roosevelt University. It was one of 
the only universities in the country set up with a racially open enrollment policy, and there 
he became student body president. Washington’s friends were the radicals but he did not 
count himself among them—a posture that would hold for his entire political life. When he 
                                                 
9 Despite running a top-notch campaign, which his sons Roy, Jr., and Harold threw themselves into, he could 
not overcome the factional forces working against him. Washington was the choice of neither the white Third 
Ward committeeman Mike Sneed nor the Second Ward Committeeman Dawson. To further his own aims, 
each man sandbagged Washington’s candidacy. Sneed supported Archibald Carey in order to show Dawson 
and the bosses that his support could make or break a candidate. Dawson sought to bring down Sneed, by 
helping the Republican win the election. Unsurprisingly, Dawson had the sounder strategy. When Washington 
lost to Rev. Archibald Carey, Dawson prevailed in the intraparty battle. State Senator C.C. Wimbish was 
installed as Third Ward Committeeman. William J. Grimshaw, Bitter Fruit: Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 
1931-1991 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 66–67; Travis, An Autobiography of Black Politics. 
10 Rising to the rank of technical staff sergeant, he served as a soil technician building landing runways for 
planes in the South Pacific.  
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decided to follow the path his father had blazed, he chose Northwestern University Law 
School. After Roosevelt, Northwestern’s racial exclusivity must have come as a shock. 
Washington was the only black student in his entering class in 1949. In 1952, he began work 
in Roy Washington’s law office at 366 East 47th Street.  
The year that Harold Washington began working for his father, Ralph Metcalfe 
opened the headquarters of the Third Ward Democratic organization in the same building. 
Roy saw the new committeeman’s meteoric rise and suggested that his son hitch up his 
wagon across the hall. In the last few years before his father passed away in 1954, Harold 
took over the job rounding up his votes. But he formally remained outside the Third Ward 
Organization, until Metcalfe summoned him a few weeks after Roy passed away. Metcalfe, 
then forty-three, asked the man a dozen years his junior, “Are you going to take up your 
father’s precinct and also take his job in the corporation counsel’s office?”11 Harold had little 
interest in managing his father’s real estate holdings and not much of a legal practice of his 
own, so he said yes.12 
 Roy Washington labored for decades in a police court on the South Side and never 
mustered enough support in the Democratic organization to win appointment or election. 
By contrast, Harold had been in Metcalfe’s organization for a year when he shared the dais at 
a celebration of the tenth anniversary of Roosevelt College with Chief Justice Earl Warren 
and former first lady Eleanor Roosevelt. His seatmate was Mayor Daley, who came away 
suitably impressed with the speech given by the young lawyer. As Washington later recalled, 
corporation counsel John Melaniphy pulled him into his office an informed him, “I think 
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Mayor Daley wants to groom you to be the city prosecutor.” During the six months 
Washington spent being transferred around the division to become acquainted with all of its 
functions, he sensed trouble with his colleagues. “The white folk were trying to get me out 
because they thought I was Daley’s favorite house nigger.”13 Washington could not take the 
pressure. He quit and became Metcalfe’s aldermanic secretary and the supervisor of his 
precinct captains.  
 Metcalfe contributed political access, hard work, and a steely resolve. Washington 
brought precinct-level know-how, personal charisma, and a talent for recruiting. The 
younger man would become the engine of one of the strongest political organizations in the 
city as Metcalfe’s key lieutenant, even after Washington left his job with the Alderman to 
become an arbitrator for the Illinois Industrial Commission in 1961.14 A decade after they 
experienced a falling out, Washington described their relationship in professional, rather 
than personal terms. “Metcalfe and I were never close. It wasn’t his fault. Ralph tried to 
effect a friendship but we were just two different kinds of people.”15 Washington’s portfolio 
during the late 1950s and early 1960s primarily focused on bringing youth into the 
organization. “Washington re-organized the Third Ward Y[oung ] D[emocrat]s in 1958 and 
while president of that group was instrumental in getting them the ‘Outstanding’ Young 
Democrat for the state.”16 He spent about ten years in total organizing and advising the 
organization and, in almost every respect, the Young Democrats came to outstrip the regular 
Third Ward organization. By 1961, three quarters of the precinct captains in the Ward were 
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members of the Young Democrats.17 In 1963, Washington paved the way for the election of 
the first black president of the Young Democrats.18  
A Maverick, But Not Totally 
After twelve years working on his behalf, Alderman Metcalfe sponsored Harold 
Washington for an electoral position. With the support of Chicago’s Democratic 
organization, Washington became one of the three representatives from Illinois’ twenty-sixth 
senatorial district in the House of Representatives. Even then, the new state representative 
continued to be a key cog in Metcalfe’s organization. Washington had been the Alderman’s 
campaign manager in 1963, and he kept a role in each of Metcalfe’s subsequent campaigns. 
In 1967, he was the assistant campaign manager, before reassuming the top spot in the Third 
Ward committeeman’s Congressional campaigns in 1970 and 1972. During Washington’s 
time in Springfield, he found other patrons, most particularly Speaker of the Illinois House 
Jack Touhy and State Senator Cecil Partee. Nonetheless, he remained under Metcalfe’s wing 
as well, calling on the elder man for protection when he angered Daley with some of his 
independent stands. Only when defeating Metcalfe became Daley’s focus would their 
relationship change.  
Washington found his calling as a legislator in Springfield, where he served in the 
House from 1965 to 1975, and in the Senate from 1976 to 1980, when he moved on to the 
U.S. Congress. Throughout his tenure he was widely acclaimed as an “industrious legislator” 
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and “one of the most articulate and hard working members of the General Assembly.”19 
Although he never advanced in the official party leadership in either house, he became the 
chairman of the House Civil Judiciary committee in 1975. He was a key sponsor of certain 
important pieces of legislation: he made Illinois the first state to recognize the Reverend Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s birthday as a holiday; he sponsored equal opportunity for the 
physically disabled and a bill to reform medical malpractice lawsuits, as well as saving 
Provident Hospital with $15 million in state financing.20 Above all, Washington was known 
as a skilled parliamentary operator. His most notable act in Springfield was probably the 
legislative maneuver he and three other clack Senators used to disrupt that body’s leadership 
election in 1977 and win concessions for its black members.21 
Washington suffered a number of personal setbacks in Springfield. For lack of 
attention to minor matters,” Mike Royko discerned, Washington “brought big troubles on 
himself.”22 In 1970, the Illinois Bar suspended his law license for accepting legal fees but 
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failing to adequately represent his clients.23 In one of the cases, Washington admitted to 
being in the wrong and returned the $150. In the others, he was accused of bilking clients of 
a total of $265. What seems to have gotten the state representative in trouble with the Bar, 
however, was his refusal to take its inquiry seriously: he neither responded to letters 
requesting an explanation nor showed up to his hearings. The Bar suspended his license for 
a year in response to the complaints.24 More serious was the case brought by U.S. Attorney 
James R. Thompson, the “anti-machine gun,” that resulted in Washington serving thirty-tree 
days in jail for failing to file income tax returns for 1964, 1965, 1967, and 1969 (although he 
owed only $508 in taxes).25 At the time, neither of these problems disturbed his political 
prospects. “So durable is his support,” the Defender noted in a long profile of the state 
representative in 1974, “that when he faced some heat a few years back over some income 
tax and legal problems, his constituency rallied behind him and his record of professional 
integrity remained intact.”26  
A detailed study of Washington’s record in Springfield demonstrates his complex 
relationship with Chicago’s Democratic Party. He was a machine Democrat, but one who 
took advantage of the independence that being 200 miles down Interstate 55 permitted. The 
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organization supported some of the liberal initiatives Washington backed, especially during 
the late 1960s, including an expansion of FEPC coverage, a state open housing law, 
expanded regulation of consumer credit and greater protections for creditors, support for 
recruitment and manpower training of minority groups, and minor civil service reforms.27 
On other measures, which included overturning stop-and-frisk, curbs on demonstrations, 
cancelling the authority of the City Council to veto siting decisions for public housing 
projects, Washington opposed organization Democrats.28 Although Washington stood out as 
a speaker on some of these bills, he was not alone; other black Democrats from Chicago 
joined him more than occasionally.29 
In general, the bills sponsored by Washington and other black representatives, 
primarily addressed programs essential for black social welfare and economic advancement.30 
Washington arrived in Springfield a “moderate on civil rights,” as the Tribune noted in 1966. 
For example, when Dr. King arrived to kick of his Chicago Freedom Movement, Metcalfe 
asked Washington to meet the civil rights leader at the airport. But Washington also joined 
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the anti-King organization Metcalfe created to testify to the strength of Chicago’s indigenous 
black leadership. Over the course of fifteen years in in Springfield, though, Washington was 
among the most expansive and diligent of the black representatives in speaking on behalf of 
fairer credit practices, affirmative action, and fair housing. “[H]e often has shown a not-too-
typical fearlessness in speaking out on racial matters[,]” Vernon Jarrett observed in 1972.31 
Within the legislature itself, he helped to form a caucus to seek greater black recognition and 
inclusion in leadership.32 Washington introduced, defended, and stewarded civil rights bills 
through the House, particularly in the realm of equal employment opportunity.33 He 
sponsored the Commission on Minorities in Sate Government and chaired House Contracts 
Compliance commission.34 He seemed to be continually asking some version of the same 
question: “Is a fair share of these dollars getting back to minority taxpayers thru either jobs 
or contracts?”35 
Throughout his years in the House, Washington actively tried limit the scope of law 
enforcement’s power over black people. Washington was a leading opponent of stop-and-
frisk from the introduction of the first such bill in 1965 to his unsuccessful campaign for its 
repeal in 1973. He resisted other “oppressive laws” proposed by the Illinois State’s 
Attorney’s Association, and supported by Edward Hanrahan, including a number of “ill 
conceived and dangerous” restrictions on constitutional trial rights.36 Similarly, he supported 
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curtailing state prohibition of marijuana and policy gambling.37 He was a fervent opponent 
of the death penalty, particularly after conservatives tried to reintroduce it to Illinois law in 
the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision striking down the death penalty scheme at 
issue in Furman v. Georgia (1972). “‘We don’t need any laws to kill black people,’ he stated, 
‘Enough of us already die through poverty, war, and neglect.’”38 The Chicago Democratic 
organizations supported few of these stands, but even where Daley took the opposite 
position, he seemed to view such deviations as annoying but accepted. For example, O.W. 
Wilson was a major proponent of the state’s passage of a stop-and-frisk law that was first 
introduced in 1965, and Daley gave the bill his support. That all of Chicago’s black 
legislators opposed the bill when it was passed and signed into law in 1968 hints that Daley 
may have accepted this deviation from the party line. 
 On other matters, Washington responded to the demands of his constituents for 
greater protection from violence by expanding the state’s punitive reach. In doing so, he 
furthered interests supported by other Chicago Democrats. Two 1972 bills exemplify this 
trend:  Washington introduced a Witness Protection Act to provide funds for the physical 
protection of witnesses (either through paying bodyguards, taking the witness into custody, 
or relocating them to another community).39 He also supported a law making gang 
recruitment of a person under 17 a felony. Remarkably, this law was co-sponsored by all 177 
members of the House. Washington argued that the law would “attack the gangs where they 
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are most vulnerable, in their recruitment of new members. … the most terrible aspect is the 
intimidation of the younger children. This law will make it easier to convict a gang recruiter, 
and will allow us to put a few in jail for 10 years to set an example for the community.”40 
There was little reason for state legislators to do or say much that pertained directly 
to the Chicago Police Department. After Robinson’s first request for assistance from 
Washington, the legislator often introduced the League’s bills, despite the political 
consequences. More often than not the bills sought to intrude upon the prerogatives of the 
Chicago Police Department. In 1972, he introduced a resolution in the House in support of 
Ralph Metcalfe’s six demands and urging the mayor to respond to the invitation to meet 
with the Concern Citizens for Police Reform.41 He also introduced a bill on behalf of the 
League to overturn the state stop-and-frisk statute, for which both Howard Saffold and 
Renault Robinson testified in favor.42 In 1973, Washington proposed the creation of a civil 
panel with authority to investigate police officers for brutality or corruption, to subpoena 
department records, and to present evidence to a special prosecutor. Robinson argued, “The 
commission would operate on an on-going basis and would not in any way be controlled by 
the Chicago Police Department.”43 Politically, these bills brought nothing but trouble with 
Mayor Daley, but the 28th District representative seemed to enjoy the small victory of 
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survival, even if it usually required him to seek the intercession of one of his powerful 
Democratic mentors to keep Daley’s from kicking him off the Democratic ticket at the next 
election.  
Adlai Stevenson III, Washington’s seatmate when he arrived in Springfield, summed 
his legislative record up best: “Harold Washington was a maverick, but not totally.”44 In 
1967, the Independent Voters of Illinois, the local version of the liberal Americans for 
Democratic Action, named him Best Legislator of the Year for a voting record they 
considered the fourth most liberal (out of 177) in the Illinois House. In 1974, Washington 
was one of the five machine candidates endorsed by the independent Democratic Governor 
Walker (he supported thirty-six candidates overall).45 Nonetheless, “Washington paid more 
obeisance to the party as the years went by,” one of his biographers argued, “trading his 
reputation as Best Legislator of the Year for a modicum of safety in his seat.”46 Each two 
year cycle, his rating from the IVI fell a little bit, until by 1975, he was number forty-two, 
which remained nonetheless more impressive than the other Democratic Representative 
who shared his district, James Taylor, who was rated 134.47 He was a maverick, but not 
totally. 
Political Opportunity and Police Reform 
Washington was part of the pressure building for police reform during 1972 and 
1973. At the insistence of the Mayor, Police Superintendent James B. Conlisk met the 
demands of the Concerned Citizens for Police Reform by holding “community meetings” in 
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each of the twenty police districts. Intended to bridge divides, instead these meetings 
revealed and exacerbated them; the reception he received depended almost entirely on the 
ethno-racial identity of the residents.48 The first few meetings in black neighborhoods 
produced such vehement confrontations that the Superintendent resorted to requiring 
written questions.49 The City also used its patronage operation to pack the audience. At one 
meeting, “two brave young black women” revealed to a journalist they were Police 
Community Service Aides; they were sent home at 4:30 to change out of their green 
uniforms and ordered to “report to the Paderewski Elementary school in the Marquette 
District where the city was being held.”50 Despite the restrictions, members of these 
audiences wanted to have their voices heard.51 Sick of the charade, Renault Robinson and 
Howard Saffold showed up at the final meeting with bullhorns for the crowd to use to 
address Conlisk directly.52 
Conlisk joined his community meetings with promises for greater oversight of police 
brutality investigations. The Chicago Bar Association and the Police Department had been in 
ongoing discussions over police brutality investigations out of the public eye since the 
killings of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark.53 Nonetheless, when Conlisk needed to deflect 
the results of the Study Group’s Fatal Force Report and the stirrings of pressure from 
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Metcalfe in 1972, he made public the efforts of the Department and the Bar to engage in a 
“joint inquiry” as to the feasibility of an alternative disciplinary system. The Bar Association 
made for a great partner: as Conlisk noted, “there is no organization as prestigious as that.”54 
And it did not hurt that the Bar Association’s last report backed the police to the hilt. This 
was not enough to deflect the demands of Metcalfe’s Concerned Citizens for Police Reform 
for immediate action. A few weeks later Conlisk announced that the city’s Commission on 
Human Relations would review all police brutality complaints.55 By the summer of 1972, 
public interest lawyer Bob Howard would write a fellow reformer, “the issue is no longer 
whether the complaint process should be totally controlled by the Police Department—the 
City administration and the white establishment agree that they can’t get away with that any 
longer.”56 
Actually, the City kept getting away with it until new political opportunities emerged 
at the end of 1973. Superintendent James B. Conlisk resigned in disgrace in October 1973 
following the convictions of Chicago Police officers in federal court for shaking down tavern 
owners. Less than a month later, the Chicago Tribune published an eight-part series of articles 
on police brutality. Over the course of five months, Emmett George, George Bliss, Pamela 
Zekman, and William Mullen—the latter three of which had won a Pulitzer Prize for 
investigating vote fraud in Chicago in 1970—investigated and authenticated brutality 
accusations at a level of detail that no organization previously possessed the time or 
                                                 
54 Thomas Powers, “Bar Unit, Cops to Probe Alleged Police Brutality,” Chicago Tribune, April 15, 1972, N3; 
Robert Enstad, “Bar Association Tells Police Probe Plan,” Chicago Tribune, April 18, 1972, A8. Moreover, in 
earning the ire of the Mayor when they encouraged Hanrahan to take a leave of absence while under 
indictment, they retained an aura of independence Edward Schreiber, “Daley Rips Bar Over Hanrahan: Mayor: 
Hanrahan Deserves a Chance,” Chicago Tribune, Aug. 27, 1971, 1.   
55 Ronal Koizol, “Council Probes Brutality Issue; Conlisk Griled,” Chicago Tribune, May 6, 1972, A5; Robert 
McClory, “Conlisk Sweats: Daleys Aides Zap Cop Chief,” Chicago Defender, May 6, 1972, 1. 
56 Bob Howard and Leon Finney, “Comments on Legal and Factual Aspects of Police Litigation,” 1972, 5, 7, 
AAPL 7-6. 
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resources to do.57 They were much indebted to the activists, who had laid the groundwork. 
Moreover, some of the black and Latino brutality survivors they profiled initially contacted 
the League or Congressman Metcalfe or another organization within the emerging police 
reform network.  
 “Until publication of these stories,” Ruth Wells the president of Citizens Alert 
claimed, “the Chicago news media always put quotation marks on the words ‘police 
brutality.’ Since the series, the media have now accepted it as a fact, without the quotes.”58 
The Tribune’s credibility was in part a function of who the reporters focused on and how 
they authenticated their claims. Out of the hundreds of cases that the Tribune examined, the 
thirty-six profiles focused primarily black and white men (twelve each), and also included 
black and white women and Latino men. Their ages varied from fourteen to seventy, though 
three-fifths were over thirty.59 The reporters concluded, “police brutality can happen to 
anyone, … it is not reserved for blacks, the poor, or the so-called radicals.”60 With this 
truism, the series obscured broader questions of race, class, power, and politics that provided 
much of the frisson to police-community relations over the previous decade. More 
interesting than the victims’ diversity was their un-remarked upon uniformity. They were 
working people: typical occupations included a truck driver, foundry worker, janitor, city 
employee, and hospital dietician. They were not people on the social margins, and neither 
were they radicals or criminals. A few broke laws; e.g., double-parking. Other challenged the 
                                                 
57 The quote comes from the headnote to the story, all of which were captioned, “Police Brutality,” Chicago 
Tribune, November 7, 1973, 1. 
58 Ruth Wells, “Law Enforcement in the Minority Community,” 1975, 3, Alliance 17-39. 
59 Two of the biggest outliers appeared on the first day: 14-year old Claude Bailey, a white teenager who lost his 
eye when struck by a police officer, was much younger than anyone else profiled, “Teen-Ager Loses His Left 
Eye,” Chicago Tribune, November 4, 1973, 10. Harriet Bauman, a 36-year old white housewife living in a $60,000 
house in the pleasant, outlying Northside neighborhood of Rodgers Park, was much wealthier. “Housewife 
Dragged from Rogers Park Home,” Chicago Tribune, November 4, 1973, 10. 
60 George Bliss et al., “Police Brutality Exposed,” Chicago Tribune, November 4, 1973, 1.  
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authority of police officers—mildly. But in no case was any behavior accused that would 
challenge their fitness as members of the urban polity.61  
The Tribune used the strength of their medium to reinforce the credibility of the 
stories they told. In photos and in pictures, they constructed sympathetic characters. These 
stories showed police brutality survivors to be normal people and upstanding community 
members. The portraits acquired heft over the course of the series. It was one thing to find 
four respectable persons abused by police, as was the case in the first set of stories on 
November 4. By the time a reader reached the final article eight days later on Mr. and Mrs. 
Nearly—the 35th and 36th persons profiled—the stories had taken on a collective meaning 
that eclipsed the individuals. The reporters also relied on technological authentication. 
“According to some experts,” readers were informed in a sidebar to the first day’s story, “a 
lie test can readily determine if a suspect should be released or be held for further 
investigation.”62 The polygraph appeared almost as a character in some of the stories, 
showing up at precisely the right moment to cinch the argument.63 By selecting almost 
exclusively to profile individuals who had truthfully answered polygraph examinations, the 
Tribune provided a form of seemingly credible, independent witness, a factor that was absent 
in many cases that involved pitting an officer’s word against a civilian’s. 
                                                 
61 The Editorial Board’s response to the series concluded, “Gratuitous, unprovoked assault and battery is a 
crime, whoever commits it.” This, of course, left the possibility that non-gratuitous and provoked cases of 
assault existed and were not criminal. “Editorial: Act Against Police Brutality!,” Chicago Tribune, November 15, 
1973, 24. 
62“Lie Detector a Major Crime Fighter,” Chicago Tribune, November 4, 1973, 10. 
63 The first story in the series, appearing above the fold on the front page, concluded with this powerful piece 
of evidence: “Both men took the polygraph test, and Johnson passed with [officer] Francis failed.” Bliss et al., 
“Police Brutality Exposed,” 1. A second untitled article from Nov. 4 provided, “Tim Howard took a polygraph 
test, and it supported his story that he was beaten by two policemen who attempted to shake him down for $25 
for not arresting him.” Finally, “Mrs. Bauman’s story sounds wholly unbelievable, but witnesses and a 
polygraph test arranged by the Tribune support it.” “Housewife Dragged from Rogers Park Home,” 10. 
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The power of the Tribune story was multiplied by timing. Readers were much more 
willing in 1973 to believe that the misconduct of government officials went all the way up 
the chain of command. President Nixon’s dirty tricks had been in the news for more than a 
year, transforming public skepticism of government in the aftermath of the Johnson 
administration into outright distrust. In Chicago, advocates of police reform repeatedly 
turned to Watergate to justify reform. “Just as there is a national consensus that Watergate 
must be independently investigated, we believe there is a consensus among the people of 
Chicago that there must be an independent agency to investigate complaints of police 
misconduct toward citizens.”64 By printing the story in the immediate wake of Conlisk’s 
resignation, the Tribune helped to expand the political possibilities for citizen participation.  
Mayor Daley embraced Conlisk’s resignation as a political opportunity. He got rid of 
a Superintendent who had become a liability; he could use the reset to reinforce the 
Department’s credibility and to lessen the pressure from community groups. Citizens Alert 
immediately set out to engage the public in the process of picking a new superintendent, 
holding a half-day conference “to define and list those question which ought to be asked of 
anyone seeking the superintendent’s office.”65 They generated 21 questions for potential 
candidates.66 Others called for a “candidate from outside Chicago” who might undertake 
                                                 
64 “Joint Statement of the Chicago Bar Association, Chicago Council of Lawyers and Cook County Bar 
Association,” November 27, 1973, Despres 153-8. 
65 Alliance to End Repression, “Progress Report,” December 1973, Alliance 2-1. Largely as a function of the 
stability in the Mayor’s office, just two Police Superintendents ran the Department between 1960 and 1974. 
James B. Conlisk’s resignation in a cloud of scandal on November 1, 1973, presented the first opportunity for 
the network of police reformers to weigh in on a Superintendent’s appointment. It continued following Daley’s 
death, as the elections of new Mayors in 1977, 1979, and 1983, each brought the appointment of new 
Superintendents. 
66 These included inquiries into racial and ethnic imbalance in the personnel of the Chicago Police Department, 
police relations with minority communities, general community relations, excessive force, psychological testing, 
and internal investigations. Citizens Alert, “Note to Interviewers,” 1973, AAPL 60-453. 
  
    313 
“aggressive reorganization” of the Department.67 Mayor Daley played to the crowd: As a 
banner headline on the front page of the December 6 Tribune read: “Daley Rips Police 
Brutality.”68 Citizens Alert brokered a meeting between Daley and West Side activists at 
which he agreed to expand and reorganize the Police Board. Police Board president Marlin 
Johnson adopted Citizen’s Alert’s talking points to explain the need to grow the board to 
between seven and nine members: “A larger Police Board would give the city better 
representation and there would be more work performed.”69 He also ordered acting 
Superintendent James Rochford to examine a host of different policies related to police 
brutality and the hiring of racial and ethnic minorities. “Rochford, whose application to 
become permanent superintendent of the department is being considered by the board, 
accepted each of the Board’s assignments with a quiet nod.”70  
Many groups circulated proposals to reform police oversight during 1972 and 1973, 
and the common element that unite almost all of them was a call “for a greater degree of 
citizen involvement in the police discipline system.”71 The city’s three bar associations (the 
                                                 
67 Compton specifically mentioned including reform of the selection process to implement a program of 
psychological testing; to implement a program of affirmative action in personnel practices; and to establish 
clear rules for the use of fatal force and investigation of brutality cases. James W. Compton to The Honorable 
Richard J. Daley, November 13, 1973, CUL III-177-1921. 
68 Daley’s speech contained his “strongest statements on the issue of police brutality.” Alan Merridew and 
George Bliss, “Daley Rips Police Brutality: Pledges Action to Combat It,” Chicago Tribune, Dec. 6, 1973, 1.  
69 Wells, “Law Enforcement in the Minority Community,” 2. The group left the names of six potential west 
side appointees with the Mayor. “We feel a West Sider will be on the board,” activist Danny Davis declared at 
the end of the session. Edward Schreiber, “Daley Plans Police Board Revamping,” Chicago Tribune, February 5, 
1974. 
70 The Board ordered Rochford to submit reports on the Department’s plans for psychologically screening 
recruits and officers frequently subject to brutality complaints, as well as to study the efforts of New York City 
in the latter regard. They also ordered him to review the last month’s brutality complaints and to work with a 
Board subcommittee on studying the low rate of minority hires in the Department.  William Mullen and 
Pamela Zekman, “Probe Brutality, Police Told: Board Orders Rochford to Take Immediate Steps,” Chicago 
Tribune, November 16, 1973, 1. This proposal was much more assertive than the tepid monitoring board the 
Bar Association proposed a year earlier. James W. Compton to James W. Kissel, Letter and Attachment (June 
28, 1974), CUL II-219-2160. 
71 Knoohuizen, “The Question of Police Discipline: An Analysis of the Proposed Office of Professional 
Standards (Draft),” 22. The Commission’s reports of its monitoring of brutality cases from June 1, 1972 to May 
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Chicago Bar Association, the liberal Chicago Council of Lawyers, and the Cook County Bar 
Association, the black bar) joined together to propose a fact-finding agency that would 
employ civilian investigators, who would report to a representative governing board with the 
power to make findings of fact.72 “This proposal,” the Study Group noted, “is the 
culmination of community pressure which has been building for almost a decade behind the 
notion that direct civilian involvement at a policy-making level is the answer to the IAD’s 
continuing lack of credibility with the public.”73 Metcalfe, Robinson, Marshall Patner of the 
Study Group, and Bob Howard of the ACLU introduced a similar plan, as part of a 
comprehensive police reform.74 
Mayor Daley’s efforts to appear conciliatory were merely a prelude to unilateral 
action.75 After eighteen months of estrangement from Metcalfe, he agreed to meet with the 
Congressman and a negotiating team with authority to strike a bargain.76 Tribune columnist 
Bob Wiedrich described Daley’s treatment of Metcalfe as a series of “obvious overtures” and 
                                                                                                                                                 
31, 1973, suggested that oversight might have a powerful effect. It recorded a massive uptick in the rate of 
complaints sustained, from a previous high of 4 percent in 1969 to 9.9 percent. Chicago Commission on 
Human Relations, “Police Review Program Report for the Period June 1, 1972 through May 31, 1973,” 1973, 
Despres 150-7. The Police Department disputed the statistics as inaccurate and claimed an increase only to 
6.7% “Police Watchdog May Growl, But Has Little Bit,” Chicago Tribune, Nov. 9, 1973, p.8 The role of the 
Commission on Human Relations was complicated by the fact that its Chairman, Peter Fitzpatrick, had a “long 
personal history of representing police officers who are being sued for alleged brutality.” Knoohuizen, “The 
Question of Police Discipline: An Analysis of the Proposed Office of Professional Standards (Draft),” 31. 
72 They sought representation of five groups: the bar associations, police organizations (including the AAPL), 
business and labor groups, private organizations interested in law enforcement (including the ACLU, the CUL, 
the League of Black Women, and others), community service oriented groups (including the Concerned 
Citizens, La Raza and others). They agency would also have independent control over its own staffing. “Joint 
Statement of the Chicago Bar Association, Chicago Council of Lawyers and Cook County Bar Association.”  
73 Knoohuizen, “The Question of Police Discipline: An Analysis of the Proposed Office of Professional 
Standards (Draft),” 34. 
74 The proposal included changes to police board representation, employment and promotion practices, police 
harassment of blacks and Latino/as, and public disclosure of information William Mullen and George 
Emmeett, “Group Proposes New System: Dump IAD, Use Civilians, Cops Urged,” Chicago Tribune, November 
17, 1973, S1. 
75 One observer suggested that Daley sought to avoid losing white support by looking like he caved into black 
leaders. “Political Cunning,” Chicago Defender, Feb. 26, 1974, p.11. 
76 Statement of the Honorable Ralph H. Metcalfe to Concerned Citizens for Police Reform, Feb. 15, 1974, 
CUL II-219-2160.  
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argued that the Mayor’s “promises to expand the Police Board and broaden its 
representation has to be part of a master fence mending plan.”77 But in the end, he did what 
he wanted: he hired James Rochford, who had been Conlisk’s principle deputy.78 Reformers 
who hoped for an outsider were severely disappointed. At the time, the League’s lawsuit had 
not yet revealed that Rochford led the effort to get Renault Robinson fired from the Police 
Department.79 Nonetheless, Metcalfe knew enough to recognize, “James Rochford has been 
at the seat of power thru the years of conscious, consistent racial discrimination in police 
employment … while corruption and brutality have flourished and been tolerated.”80 Renault 
Robinson echoed the Congressman’s dismay “Chicago was so close to political reform; it’s 
unfair for one man, Mayor Daley, to cheat the city out of it.”81 
Almost Police Reform 
Over the three years he served at the helm of the Department, James Rochford left a 
complex legacy. Of all the Department’s Superintendents during the period from 1960 until 
1987, he was most frequently caught in crosscutting currents that threatened the autonomy 
of the Police Department and his power as its leader.82 From his first day on the job, he 
sought to instantiate change. He immediately requested letters of resignation from all seventy 
exempt officers, merely to have on file.83 At his first press conference he made an eight-point 
pledge, whose dimensions included “a safer Chicago, control of street gangs, elimination of 
                                                 
77 Bob Wiedrich, “Daley’s Looking Like ’75 Candidate,” Chicago Tribune, February 11, 1974, 22. 
78 This followed a pattern: Conlisk was also O.W. Wilson’s First Deputy Superintendents.  
79 See Chapter 2.  
80 Vernon Jarrett, “Metcalfe Shows No Signs of Copout,” Chicago Tribune, December 14, 1973, 22. 
81 Robinson, “Editorial Reply: James Rochford.” 
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orders. 
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police misconduct, a reduction in street crime, police respect for citizens and the public’s 
respect for policemen.”84 His most substantial promise was the creation of the Office of 
Professional Standards, a new institution for investigating police brutality cases. He 
incorporated some aspects of the reformers’ proposals: the organization was run by three 
civilian administrators—one white, one black, one Latino; it was staffed by civilian 
investigators; it reported directly to the Superintendent with no intervening links in the chain 
of command; and, finally, cases were sent to the Commission on Human Relations and the 
Cook County State’s Attorney before a final determination. It constituted, according to the 
Study Group, “a more thorough overhaul of system than anything attempted by his two 
predecessors.”85  
Though a departure from the status quo, police reformers agreed that these changes 
were inadequate. The Concerned Citizens resolved not to be manipulated by the symbolic 
racial politics of Rochford’s appointments: “we will not equate a new face, be it black or 
white, with the kind of substantive change needed to make the Chicago Police Department 
responsive to the people. We need a change in the relationship between the Police 
Department and the people.”86 The Study Group provided some evidence, and plenty of 
institutional analysis, to substantiate the claim that even civilian investigators would 
                                                 
84 Chicago United, “Announced Programs of Chicago’s New Police Superintendent James M. Rochford,” 
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turned off the Superintendent’s performance in interviews, where he claimed to be considering the 
appointment of a Professional Standard’s Board made up of community members. He made clear in interviews 
that there would be no room on such a board for the representatives of the “dispossessed.” Urban League 
president James Compton concluded, “The Rochford Plan is carefully designed to exclude representatives of 
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inevitably adopt police perspectives if they remained within and under the control of police 
officers.87 Institutional context shaped the impact of introducing civilians as investigators. 
Once installed as Superintendent, Rochford could not simply ignore reformers. The 
League, Citizens Alert, the Alliance, and the Study Group remained small organizations, but 
they were well established by now. Nothing reflected their institutionalization better than 
their receipt of federal funds during the mid 1970s to carry out their work. In 1974, the local 
Cook County-Chicago Criminal Justice Commission recommended rejecting applications 
from the League and Citizens Alert; one member suggested, for example, “the intent of 
Citizens Alert might be to criticize public agencies.” Nonetheless, Illinois Law Enforcement 
Commission under David Fogel’s direction chose to fund them.88 In the League’s case, this 
allowed a number of officers to take leaves of absence from the force to work part- or full-
time as anti-brutality organizers.89 
The funding for these organizations was paltry compared with the tens of millions of 
dollars that the Police Department received from the LEAA. For organizations always on 
the fringe of insolvency, though, these funds had significant fiscal and reputational effects. 
Citizens Alert existed as an entirely volunteer organization until its grant of federal monies 
                                                 
87 Janice L. Bauer, The Chicago Police Department: Office of Professional Standards: A One Year Analysis (Chicago: 
Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group, 1976). 
88 John O’Brien, “Justice Commission Can’t Help Youth Program,” Chicago Tribune, May 30, 1974, W9. On the 
Afro-American Patrolmen’s League’s rejection, see Bob Wiedrich, “Renault Robinson Finds Cash, Friends,” 
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enabled it to hire its first paid staff member.90 This staff member, Ruth Wells, was a veteran 
Westside activist instrumental in broadening the organization’s appeal, especially for blacks 
and Latino/as. Similarly, the $107,000 grant to the League’s not-for-profit arm rescued it 
from the brink of bankruptcy, where it had been for most of its existence.91 Relative to the 
size of their budget and the marginal value of money, the contributions of the Illinois Law 
Enforcement Commission did much more to shape and enable the actions of these police 
reformers than they did for the Police Department. 
 The new stature of these groups was illustrated by Rochford’s behavior toward them. 
Citizens Alert “praised his willingness to discuss problem areas with various community 
groups.”92 The Superintendent, a few of his subordinates, and members of the Police Board, 
regularly held “accountability sessions” with Citizens Alert. Whatever they accomplished, the 
remarkable fact was that they allowed “community representatives to meet personally with 
the Superintendent to talk about problems.”93 Rochford even took steps to improve public 
access to information about the police. In its 1976 report on the Office of Professional 
Standards, the Study Group criticized the Department for keeping relevant data on police 
brutality from the public. Moreover, Police failure to creatively use its own data meant that 
even “Supt. Rochford cannot himself assess the disciplinary system for which he promised 
personal responsibility.”94 His response was to propose a meeting with the Study Group, 
“where ‘your people and my people’ who work in statistical analysis will sit down with the 
                                                 
90 Citizens Alert, “History,” n.d., 1, Citizens Alert I-1-7. 
91 On the League’s finances, see Clarence Page, “Black Police League Broke, Robinson Says,” Chicago Tribune, 
August 6, 1974, 10. Wiedrich, “Renault Robinson Finds Cash, Friends,” A4. 
92 Schumake Terrele, “Rochford Gets ‘Poor’ Rating,” Chicago Defender, February 12, 1975, 4. 
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information requested, analyze it together, and talk about it.”95 Similarly, he vastly expanded 
the level of detail in his reports to the Police Board, after Citizens Alert had been requesting 
such changes for years.96  
 
Rochford entered office in the face of a massive uproar over police brutality. He also 
confronted a mobilization against crime that demanded his attention. The question of why 
such a mobilization happened in 1974 is not hard to answer: annual homicides had been 
rising continuously until 1972, when it tailed off to 708. The next two years it shot upwards 
until hitting its all-time peak of 962 murders in 1974.97 In 1974, legendary Chicago Defender 
reporter Ethel Payne, the first-lady of the black press, helped to organize a Coalition of 
Concerned Women in the War on Crime. On the one hand, Payne offered a structural 
perspective on crime rooted in long-term inequalities in housing, health, education, and 
employment, as well as contemporary distrust of government. “On the other side,” she 
argued, “we have to deal the immediate; that which threatens our personal safety.” The 
demand for community action existed despite Payne’s belief that such immediate activity 
dealt only “with the mundane symptoms and not the cause of the problem.” The pressing 
question was “how to more effectively utilize citizen action as a deterrent to crime.”98 In 
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meeting with the Police Superintendent, the women also declared their intention “to make 
the police responsive to the people.”99 
Ralph Metcalfe worked with other local, state, and federal officials towards “halting 
the immense level of crime that presently exists and runs rampant in Chicago, in particular in 
the crime infested Robert Taylor Housing Development, located on the Southside.” The 
concerns and experiences of many of the residents were at the center of his story: “residents 
are terrified to travel freely throughout the neighborhood and the though of night travel is a 
nightmare.” Harold Washington introduced a bill to supply the Illinois Law Enforcement 
Commission with emergency funds for witness protection, “so as to encourage witnesses to 
come forth and testify against those involved in criminal activity.” Metcalfe’s own efforts 
included introduction of one bill in Congress to ban handguns, and another for speedy 
trials.100  
Insert Figure 11 
Although national (and international) statistics provide some benchmarks for 
thinking about how crime rates changed over time, it is difficult to assemble a specific 
picture for Chicago in the 1970s. The most commonly cited measure of crime for any local 
area is information collected for the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Part I of the UCR 
consists of seven crimes: four crimes of violence (criminal homicide, rape, assault, and 
robbery) and three property crimes (burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft). The FBI 
reports the index as a total of the seven crimes, adjusted to a standardized rate of per 
100,000 residents. This records only “crimes known to the police,” and is therefore a 
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product of a complex series of activities.101 These include “things which go on ‘out there’ in 
the environment (crime), the responses of those who are victims of it (reporting), and 
societies efforts to discover and record it (policing).”102  
Four institutional factors shaped crime reporting in Chicago during this period. In 
the first years after O.W. Wilson arrived in Chicago, investments in communication and data 
processing capabilities produced a skyrocketing official crime rate. 103  Second, changing 
crime definitions sometimes caused wild spikes, as can be seen with theft in Figure 11, which 
climbed sharply when its definition was changed to include thefts below $50. Third, the 
Police Department routinely downgraded and under-reported crime from some time in the 
mid-1970s (it is impossible to know when) until 1982, when the Tribune discovered the 
practice.104 Finally, the relationship between the police and the policed affected crime 
reporting: the less legitimate the people of a neighborhood perceive the police to be the less 
like they are to report crimes. The result of all of this is that the statistics are always “open to 
diverse and often conflicting interpretations. If they registered a sharp rise in criminal 
activity, did this mean that the police were getting worse and therefore more crimes were 
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being committed, or that the police were getting better and as a result more crimes were 
being reported?”105 
Insert Table 6 
As I argued in Chapter 5, both arrests for index crimes and public order arrests 
stayed remarkably stable over the period from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. Within this 
internal stability, however, there were changes after 1974, which suggests that 
Superintendent Rochford responded to the calls for more efforts to stop crime. The most 
important change overall, within the pattern of stability, was how the changes in the 
composition of public order arrests affected the racial composition of arrestees. Looking at 
statistics that correlate race and crime (or race and arrests) is always problematic.106 Here, the 
instability of racial categories makes it doubly incoherent (or, as it were, reveals the 
incoherence of the categories).107 While it appears that the black and white categories are 
stable, they are not. For example, in the reports, the only group outside of black and white 
arrested a substantial number of times was “other” from 1973 and 1980. The numbers of 
arrests make it likely that this category was being used to classify Latino/as. During the years 
1981 to 1986 and again from 1993 to 1997 when the designation “Hispanic” was added 
separate from the racial categories, the Police stopped using “other” in this way. This means 
that police officers likely identified people as either black or white who might not have self-
identified that way. The result of these gyrations is that it is impossible to calculate arrest 
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rates according to our contemporary ethno-racial scheme.108 Given that the numbers seem to 
reveal Latinos moving in and out of the “white” category much more so than the “black” 
category, the only way to construct a reasonable set of comparisons is to use the categories 
that most officers seem to have employed: black and non-black.109 
Insert Figure 12  
 The appeals to greater police protection were the likely cause of a set of very specific 
changes in policing. The substitution of one type of public order arrest for another was not 
racially neutral. While police arrested roughly the same number of people in the aggregate, 
they arrested blacks at higher rates for public order crimes beginning in 1974 than over the 
previous fifteen years. This is largely the function of a substitution of disorderly conduct 
arrests for drunkenness arrests. Drunkenness arrests rates, like those for vagrancy, varied 
relatively little by race and only a little bit over time.110 By contrast, arrest practices for 
disorderly conduct were both more discriminatory (on average) and fluctuated more over 
time. From 1960 to the height of the mass civil rights action around school integration in 
1963, police went from arresting blacks for disorderly conduct at double the rate of non-
blacks to arresting them at five times the rate of non-blacks. This ratio fell back to its 1960 
level by 1969 before doubling in 1974 and remaining at that high level until the end of the 
decade. Disorderly conduct arrests grew substantially over this period, so the substitution of 
such arrests produced a more racially discriminatory arrest pattern. This makes it likely that 
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police were not just substituting what they filled out on a form; instead, they changed their 
behavior and the location of their activities from 1974 on.  
Black Police “Enter Politics to Gain Clout” 
 Rochford’s appointment was a political as well as an administrative maneuver, and its 
influence redounded in politics as well as police policy. Prior to February of 1974, Renault 
Robinson had been involved in politics only as a means to try and advance the agenda of 
police reform. Following Rochford’s appointment, however, “the league decided it would 
have to ‘enter politics to gain clout.’”111 The League asked its members to consider running 
for political office, and came up with six wards where it believed campaigns might be 
possible—based on the candidates, community feeling, the amount of money that could be 
raised, and the number of volunteers needed. Tribune columnist Bob Wiedrich suggested that 
the League’s decision to turn to politics was somehow related its receipt of money from the 
Illinois law Enforcement Commission the same week. He “question[ed] the independent 
Democratic Mr. Walker’s state commission choosing the exact same time to give Robinson a 
financial transfusion. That smacks of politics, too.”112 
In the end, Frank Lee and Howard Saffold took the plunge. Their campaign 
materials stressed how the men’s experience in the League had prepared them to address 
crime, police community relations, and discrimination. Based on this experience, one 
campaign brochure suggested, Frank Lee “is not a politician but knowledgeable of Chicago’s 
political arena and uniquely qualified to make the process work for the people.”113 As the 
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men would soon find out, issues were hardly the stuff of Chicago elections. Rather, 
particularly in a low-turnout, off-year February race, the question was whether you had the 
money and organization to mobilize voters. The Afro-American Patrolmen’s League did not. 
Both campaigns were abject failures. 
Insert Figure 13  
Frank Lee entered the race in the West Side 28th Ward, encompassing East and West 
Garfield Park. The ward contained “perhaps the most wretched housing, the highest 
unemployment rate, and the most abject poverty in the city.”114 Compared with the ward’s 
located in the historic Black Belt or middle-class neighborhoods south of Woodlawn, the so-
called “plantation wards” showed the least independence from the machine.115 None of the 
four had elected an anti-machine alderman and two of them continued providing the Daley 
machine with substantial majorities into the 1970s, as black support everywhere else 
collapsed.116 Prior to the 1975 election, Defender reporter Robert McClory accused two of the 
West side aldermen, including 28th Ward incumbent Jimmy Washington, of being “best 
known” for “occupying their seats and saying nothing.”117 In the 1975 primaries, for 
example, Daley fared far better in the four Westside wards than on other black wards of the 
city, but almost 70 percent of the voting age population there did not turn out to vote.118 In 
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this political context, Frank Lee’s shoestring campaign might be thought of as a success for 
clearing the eleven percent threshold.  
Insert Figure 14  
Howard Saffold ran in the 7th Ward, which embraced the middle-class neighborhood 
of South Shore. Although South Shore was majority black in 1975, Polish Chicagoans 
dominated 14 of the 58 precincts and turned out in very high numbers to vote. There were 
also a substantial number of Latino/as. Seven candidates entered the race, but it really came 
down to a challenge between four contenders—and Saffold was not one of them. One was 
the former Polish alderman, Robert Wilinski, who had lost the seat when a federal district 
court threw out maps drawn by the Democrats for racial gerrymandering. The other was the 
current alderman, Gerald Jones, who had prevailed in the much blacker district after the map 
was thrown out. In the interim, the appellate court had reversed the district court, reinstating 
the old map with its Polish precincts. Alderman Jones fell out with his ward committeeman, 
and the Democratic Party choice to back a different black candidate, Leon Rice. Finally, the 
Independent Voters of Illinois endorsed an alternative Polish candidate, Eugene Piotrowski. 
Added to the mix was a long-time aide of Ralph Metcalfe (Wilbur Gaines). Saffold garnered 
only five percent of the vote, finishing fifth, behind the two alderman and the two endorsed 
candidates.119 With an already mobilized electorate polarized around a pre-existing issue, the 
district was an impossible place for the League to make inroads.  
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More broadly, the municipal elections in 1975 were a false dawn for independent 
black politics. The League’s difficulty in running credible candidates was echoed by the pains 
of black activists to put forth a candidate in the mayoral race. Charles Hayes, vice president 
of the vibrant Amalgamated Meat Cutters’ Union, and lawyer James Montgomery chaired a 
Committee for a Black Mayor formed to galvanize black voters behind a single candidate 
who might be able to demonstrate their collective clout.120 Ralph Metcalfe was the 
overwhelming favorite of members of the committee and the public.121 Harold Washington’s 
speech to the Committee stressed the qualifications of a serious challenger. “He has an 
illustrious record of public service. He can draw support from the regular voter and the 
independent voter. He can get support from the white, Latino, and Black communities.” 
Despite the fact that he rated high with many, Washington spoke in the interest of 
“promoting the empowerment of blacks in this city”; he argued, “let’s go with our best—
Ralph Metcalfe.” 122 
The attempt to assemble a black coalition for a citywide election brought to light 
fissures within the anti-machine electorate. Metcalfe flirted with challenging Daley. He 
rejected the committee’s draft; then, was interested.123 When the committee fell woefully 
short of being able to raise the half-million dollars the Congressman felt would be needed, 
he passed.124 Columnist Vernon Jarrett argued, “[Metcalfe] was called upon to work a 
miracle,” and embraced his absence as a chance to “seriously and constantly go[] about the 
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business of preparing for a self-determining, grass-roots-oriented political mobilization.”125 
In the short term, though, the cause of a black Mayor was definitively sunk when Metcalfe 
threw his support in the race to the liberal, white Alderman William Singer. State Senator 
Richard Newhouse was left to carry the banner as the first black candidate for mayor. 
“Practical politician that he was, Metcalfe chose to endorse a white liberal with a slim chance 
of wining over a black who he though had not the chance of a feather in the storm.”126 In 
lieu of endorsement, the Committee rated both Singer and Newhouse qualified.127 
Daley prevailed easily in the primary, but with especially low voter turnout and 
without getting much over the fifty percent threshold.128 Voters spread the remaining ballots 
among multiple candidates: Singer, Newhouse, and former State’s Attorney Edward 
Hanrahan. While Metcalfe’s endorsement did not put Singer over the top in the black wards, 
there were promising signs as “his combined vote with Newhouse’s carried seven wards and 
was close in four more.”129 Daley received the votes of only twenty-two percent of the 
voting age electorate, a lower total than in any of his other contested elections. More 
distinctive was the completely changed composition of the electorate: in 1975, sixty-four 
percent of the Mayor’s votes came from white voters.130 Newhouse won just under eight 
percent of the vote citywide, most of which came from his 18.5 percent in the black wards.131  
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Metcalfe’s endorsement of Singer in the 1975 mayoral race brought the full force of 
the aging and increasing embattled Daley organization against him in his 1976 Congressional 
contest. Daley pulled out all the stops in favor of his candidate, Erwin France. Nonetheless, 
Metcalfe won easily, carrying all but a few dozen of the First District’s 400 precincts.132 
Metcalfe’s victory came without Washington’s support. For all of the talk of Washington’s 
independence, he remained a member of the Democratic organization and knew the limits to 
Daley’s tolerance. Washington was willing to challenge the machine on the margin: he 
enjoyed taking small stands, while still living to fight another day. Washington had stuck with 
Metcalfe from 1972 through 1975. In 1976, he chose personal desire for advancement to the 
State Senate in 1976. He had a hard enough time getting the party endorsement anyhow, 
without raising a ruckus.133 And he needed the support: Washington’s opponent, the 
independent Democrat and former-Alderwoman Anna Langford, declared his victory relied 
on “cheat[ing] by the Democratic machine. Washington called himself an organization liberal 
but whatever he was, he’s not now. He’s heavily indebted to the machine to the point where 
I doubt he can really do much on his own.”134  
After Daley 
  The announcement of the Mayor’s death on December 20, 1976, caused an 
immediate crisis in Chicago politics. Under the rules of succession, the president pro tempore 
of the City Council, who was the black regular Democratic Alderman, Wilson Frost, was 
supposed to at least temporarily succeed to the mayor’s chair. But by Daley’s funeral two 
days later, however, the machine’s power brokers had decided on a different course. They 
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did not seek Frost’s input so much as his assent. Counting noses, the Alderman realized that 
he could not get the necessary twenty-five votes, and cut a deal that saw him installed as 
chairman of the Council’s powerful Finance Committee. On December 28, 1976, the 
Alderman from Daley’s 11th Ward, Michael Bilandic, became Mayor; Alderman Eddie 
Vrdolyak became the president pro tempore and Ed Burke continued as chairman of the 
Police and Fire Committee. In the space of a week, the power brokers who would dominate 
the regular organization for the next decade—especially Aldermen Vrdolyak and Burke—
had taken their places.135  
 Daley’s death opened new possibilities for Washington. On the evening of Frost’s 
snub, black political leaders assembled at the Community Progressive Church in the Grand 
Boulevard neighborhood. Following a rousing series of speeches, Harold Washington 
proposed a resolution to elect Chicago’s first black mayor in the special election to replace 
Daley.136 South Side publisher Gus Savage and Ralph Metcalfe were named chairs of the 
effort. Renault Robinson was co-chair of the search committee.137 Under Robinson, there 
would be no confusion over backing a white liberal as a substitute. “It should be understood 
that we are not racist,” he declared. “We are not about to back someone just because he or 
she is black. We have criteria other than color. Race is important only because we have been 
dealt out deliberately by people with racist outlooks on life.”138 As always, unity was easier to 
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discuss than to create. This time, the source of tension was the size of the committee. After a 
divisive meeting on January 2, Robinson cast the tie-breaking vote to expand the committee 
to interested individuals not among the original invited group. Worried that size would 
produce divisions, a smaller core split off to form a second, separate committee without 
even informing him. Robinson quit.139  
Like Metcalfe two years earlier, Harold Washington waffled. When both committees 
chose him, he was flattered, but also cited “insufficient time and money” as obstacles to 
running a credible campaign.140 Actually, Metcalfe was the source of his uncertainty. Despite 
the overwhelming preference for Washington among committee members, Metcalfe came 
out against him—presumably in retaliation for Washington’s refusal to back him in his race 
against the machine the year before.141 Washington entered, though, in part because the 
dynamics of the race were more promising: Bilandic did not have Daley’s personality, 
popularity, or his control of the party. Alderman Roman Pucinski, a long-time political 
figure, represented the possibility of splitting the white vote; at least, he might cleave off a 
large percentage of his Polish co-ethnics. Finally, Washington himself represented the 
possibility of a black-liberal-labor fusion. He won a ballot spot as the candidate of the 
Independent Voters of Illinois.142 There would be no asking black voters to chose between a 
black or liberal candidate: Washington was it. “He stands a good chance,” Vernon Jarrett 
                                                 
139 The first group consisted of 46 people, the second 79. David Axelrod, “Black Mayor Search Panel Head 
Quits,” Chicago Tribune, January 9, 1977, 3. 
140 On the committees’ choice, see Neil Mehler and David Axelrod, “Blacks Favor Mayor Bid by Washington,” 
Chicago Tribune, January 20, 1977, 10. On his waffling, see Vernon Jarrett, “Is the Senator’s ‘No’ Really ‘Yes’?,” 
Chicago Tribune, February 16, 1977, B3; Nathaniel Clay, “Sen. Washington Says ‘No’ to Mayoral Bid,” Chicago 
Defender, February 19, 1977, 3. 
141 Kleppner, Chicago Divided: The Making of a Black Mayor, 97; Travis, Harold, 103. 
142 On the IVI, see David Axelrod and George Estep, “IVI Unit Picks Washington in Dem Mayor Bid,” Chicago 
Tribune, February 21, 1977, 1; F. Richard Ciccone, “IVI’s Goal--Get City Blacks in Fold,” Chicago Tribune, 
February 28, 1977, 3. On labor support, see William Griffin, “Union Group Backing Bid by Washington,” 
Chicago Tribune, March 17, 1977, B9. 
  
    332 
declared, “of putting together the first sustained black-led threat to the Democratic machine 
from within the party.”143 On February 19, he declared, “I am in the race to offer the voters 
a genuine option for progress.”144  
 Renault Robinson and the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League were at the center of 
it all. League members literally surrounded the candidate throughout the campaign, 
providing security for him despite the candidate’s reluctance. Howard Saffold expressed the 
perspective of the officers, “We could not have a Black man running around by himself 
talking about being Mayor of the city of Chicago. The establishment might pay some dude to 
hit him upside of the head.” More than just protection, though, the officers “wanted to be 
part of a campaign for a serious Black mayoral candidate.” They decorated a camper with 
campaign banners and drove around when Washington was in Chicago.145  
Robinson ran the campaign, his first foray into politics since the failed Aldermanic 
campaigns of 1975. It was a “learning situation” for all involved. Washington’s largest race to 
date had covered just five wards. “We wanted to know what would it really take for a Black 
to run a citywide campaign,” Robinson recalled. “What would it take? What did you have to 
do? How did you develop the support? How did you handle the press? How did you get, ah, 
people to assist and help and participate? How did you raise money?”146 In a relatively short 
period of time, Robinson and the rest of Washington’s team put together a citywide 
organization.147 They drew on fellow activists to develop rudimentary policy materials, 
particularly about policing, which echoed the themes of the previous decade. “The 
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Department is intentionally isolated from civilian accountability, from community groups, 
from researchers, and from open discussions of the alternatives in police policy.”148 But the 
issues were less important than the experience of trying to organize on a large scale.  
Bilandic cruised to victory, if not in an inspiring fashion. Despite the Acting Mayor’s 
best efforts to pump up his victory, turnout plummeted both overall and specifically in the 
black wards. Citywide, sixty-five percent of the voting-age population did not vote in the off-
year special election; in the black wards this rose to 72.5 percent. Although the Acting Mayor 
won fifty-one percent of votes cast, it only amounted to eighteen percent of the city’s voting 
age-population. As hoped, Pucinski split the white wards, with the victor only taking a bare 
majority. Although Bilandic won less than fifty percent of the vote in the black wards, he 
nonetheless won the election there, because the Polish challenger did so poorly.149  
Washington won eleven percent of the vote cast, but his totals nonetheless improved 
dramatically on Richard Newhouse’s showing two years earlier, when he finished third 
behind both Singer and Daley in all the black wards. Washington won five of the middle-
class black wards and came close to taking a sixth.150  
Robinson learned many things from the election that made him more sanguine in 
retrospect, after 1983, and after those things had been put to good use. But in the aftermath 
of Bilandic’s victory, the election “was a disheartening experience.” In 1974, the city’s 
intransigence in litigation led him to believe that the electoral arena might provide an “easier 
and quicker” way win clout. Two election cycles in, the results were mixed: Metcalfe had 
succeeded, but he had experience, recognition, and martyrdom on his side. Neither the 
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League candidates nor Harold Washington had gotten very far. “Nothing comes easy,” he 
told Robert McClory.151 
* * * 
The League’s efforts to immerse itself in politics in the 1970s had a number of 
effects that were not readily apparent. On January 11, 1977, as the coalition to elect a black 
mayor began meeting to settle on a candidate, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
most of Judge Marshall’s opinion in U.S. v. Chicago, including his imposition of hiring and 
promotional quotas on the Police Department. Bilandic resisted the opinion and threatened 
to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. A number of black committeemen and Alderman 
convinced him that simply letting the case drop would deprive Renault Robinson’s political 
group of a potent issue.152 In October, only a few weeks after Judge Marshall’s ruling in favor 
of the Robinson plaintiffs’ harassment and discrimination claims and his award of monetary 
damages to the League Officers, James Rochford resigned as superintendent. The news was 
big enough to make Jet magazine, which noted, “insiders say that Rochford was fired by 
Michael Bilandic because he was becoming an increasing political liability as the police 
department has had to continually defend itself against changes of racial discrimination and 
harassing Black policemen of the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League.”153  
The League welcomed Rochford’s resignation, but the process of selecting a new 
Superintendent illustrated how the Democrats retained control over the politics of policing. 
As the Study Group research director described, the Department’s traditional position was, 
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“Trust us, we have the best police department in the country, we will pick the right man.” 
The Study Group joined with Citizens Alert in asking that selection process instead “be 
taken out of the secrecy of back rooms and put in the public arena.” 154 The Board refused, 
and so Citizens Alert held its own forum for the three finalists. Only the one outsider, 
Daniel Guido, presented himself. The two candidates from inside the Department, Sam 
Nolan and James O’Grady, questioned the propriety of answering questions about their 
policy positions. Sam Nolan, the highest-ranking black member of the Department and for 
many years the head of all programs related to police-community relations, declared, it was 
“not appropriate for ad hoc groups such as the coalition to be influencing Mayor Bilandic in 
his choice of a superintendent.”155  
Then there was Harold Washington. He did not formally break with the machine 
until after his loss to Mayor Bilandic in 1977. Roman Pucinski, who made noises about being 
independent throughout the 1977 race, returned to the fold thereafter. Not Washington. 
Following the race, he finally declared to black journalists that he was going to stay out of 
the Democratic Party.156 South Side Democratic committeeman James Taylor, at odds with 
Washington for years, used the opportunity to try to knock him out of the State Senate in 
1978. The Democratic organization slated a precinct captain (and two machine decoys, both 
named Washington) against him in his bid for re-election. The machine poured money into 
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the race. Washington prevailed by less than 250 votes.157 Two years later, following Ralph 
Metcalfe’s passing in 1978, he would capture swelling anti-machine sentiment to capture his 
old leader’s seat in Congress. Harold Washington was now a maverick. Totally.
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CHAPTER 9: THE MACHINE IS DEAD! LONG LIVE THE MACHINE! 
 
 
Chicago’s regular Democratic Party remained remarkably resilient into the 1980s, 
despite losing mayoral primaries in 1979 and 1983 to insurgent ex-members.1 In 1979, Jane 
Byrne beat Mayor Michael Bilandic in a one-on-one contest and became the first female big-
city mayor. A long-time employee of the Democratic party-state and Daley protégé, Byrne 
ran against “cabal of evil men [that] has fastened itself onto the government of the City of 
Chicago.”2 Luck, black resentment, and dissatisfaction with machine politics produced a 
winning combination, as middle-class black voters and to a lesser degree lakefront liberals 
delivered her the victory. Four years later, Byrne was the establishment candidate, as she, 
Congressman Harold Washington, and Cook County State’s Attorney Richard M. Daley 
faced off in a three-way race. The media billed the race as a clash between the two white 
Democratic titans for the future of the Party. Washington’s strong performances in the 
televised debates and the fervor that his candidacy inspired among black Chicagoans saw 
him replace Daley as the major threat to Byrne’s re-election. Washington benefitted from the 
splitting of white votes between the candidates in the primary. Nonetheless, black activists 
and black voters (with the assistance of large majorities from Latino/a voters and the savvy, 
more than the votes, of white liberals) earned his victory in the primary and his narrower win 
in the general election against little-known Republican Bernard Epton. 
Differences in Byrne and Washington’s campaigns and constituencies produced 
different outcomes for each of them once in office. Though Byrne broke with the machine, 
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she had no fundamental objections to the way machine politics worked. Moreover, she had 
no constituency, and though she initially made some gestures towards political reform in her 
appointments, she ultimately came to rely on the same white power brokers that she had run 
against. Washington on the other hand, was never given a chance to reach an 
accommodation with the machine. This was both because he felt a sense of responsibility 
towards his coalition, and because white ethnic alderman refused to countenance reaching an 
accommodation with him. Byrne did not govern well, but Washington’s opponents seemed 
not to want him to govern at all.  
 During and immediately after both elections, both Byrne and Washington signified 
their intentions toward reform through the politics of policing. Each insurgent made an 
example out of the Police Department. After a few tactical maneuvers in 1979, Byrne 
accommodated the status quo. The efforts that she did make to appease black discontent, 
such as appointing Renault Robinson to the Board of the Chicago Housing Authority, 
ultimately backfired and showed the shortcomings of her strategy. Washington saw some of 
his promises through, in particular, remaking the racial hierarchy within the police command 
staff. Nonetheless, federal austerity and local white backlash prevented him from achieving 
many of his campaign goals.  
“Only Jane Byrne” 
 Jane Byrne had one of the most remarkable histories of all Chicago politicians. Her 
father was an executive at Inland Steel; “In the parlance of the time, [he was] ‘lace curtain 
Irish,’ and his children ate with cloth on the table.”3 The Burke family’s two-story brick 
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home in Sauganash was far from Bridgeport, home to the four Democratic mayors between 
1933 and 1979 (even Bilandic, who descended from Croatians). The year Daley became 
mayor she entered society at the Presentation Ball for Catholic daughters. Following her 
graduate from Barat College, a Catholic women’s school in Lake Forest, she married a Notre 
Dame boy in the midst of a tour of duty in the Marines and had a daughter named Kathy.  
 Byrne entered political life under unusual circumstances. After her husband died in a 
plane crash in 1959, she volunteered for the Kennedy campaign. Her sister Carole was the 
assistant director of Kennedy’s Chicago headquarters, and when she went back to college in 
the fall of 1960, Jane was hired to take her place.4 Her relationship with Mayor Daley, to 
whom she was finally introduced in 1964, was nearly over before it began: why, he 
demanded, had she gone to work for Kennedy and not him? And how had they taken care 
of her? (Not at all.)5 Daley got over it, and by August, Jane had her first job with the city’s 
Head Start program. Shortly thereafter she moved inside the Democratic organization’s 
patronage operation, with a job in the personnel department at the Chicago Committee on 
Urban Opportunity. She quickly became one of Daley’s star protégés. Less than four years 
later, on March 4, 1968, Daley made Byrne the Commissioner of Consumer Sales, Weights, 
and Measures. “If I’m not mistaken,” he noted,” you will be the first woman commissioner 
in any major city in the United States.”6 She was his girl Friday. Daley named her to party 
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positions left and right, including a seat on the Democratic National Committee and, final, 
the co-chair of the Cook County Democratic Party in 1975.7  
 Daley’s death on Monday, December 20, 1976, stripped Byrne of her clout. “She had 
no ward, no group, no people,” biographer Kathleen Whalen Fitzgerald observed, “Just 
Daley and now she was alone.”8 Within a week of the Mayor’s death the new chairman of 
the County Democratic Party, George Dunne, unceremoniously discarded her as co-chair. 
Within a year, she orchestrated a showdown with Mayor Bilandic, accusing him of 
“greasing” a taxi fare increase. Embarrassed by the accusation and politically outplayed by 
Commissioner Byrne, he fired her.9 When she announced her candidacy for the mayoralty 
on April 24, 1978, Byrne sought a restoration and not a revolution. At her official 
announcement she declared, “Bilandic has lied to the people and is part of the evil cabal 
dedicated to the perpetuation of its own power, to the enrichment of its inner ruling clique, 
and the prostitution of the forces of municipal government to selfish and purely personal 
ends.”10 It was this betrayal of Richard J. Daley’s Party and government that she sought to 
rectify. 
Bilandic seemed invincible in the run-up to the February 27, 1979, primary. Earlier 
that month, two political scientists and close observers of municipal politics concluded a 
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long article on the historic development Chicago Democrats, “Bilandic is virtually without 
opposition”—a fact they considered remarkable. “In the days following Mayor Daley’s death 
two years ago, few would have predicted Bilandic’s current dominance of Chicago. The fact 
is that Bilandic is unbeatable in 1979.”11 Even if he had been vulnerable, Byrne did not seem 
the most likely candidate to defeat him. “It was not a candidacy to be taken seriously,” 
Milton Rakove reflected. “Byrne had no money, no precinct workers, no programs of any 
note, and no support from any of the elements of the power structure of the still extant 
machine … She was unknown in the black community, unwanted by the white-ethnic 
constituencies, and unpopular with the lakefront liberals who had known her to be part of 
the machine during the Daley era.”12 As an internal Bilandic memo underhandedly noted, 
“You cannot expect the media to ignore your opponent even if it is only Jane Byrne.”13 
Michael Bilandic’s seeming invulnerability made Jane Byrne’s victory possible. The 
Mayor received only a marginally smaller share of the vote in 1979 than he had received in 
the special election. The major difference between 1977 and 1979 was not that Bilandic did 
so much more poorly (in fact, he substantially increased his total number of votes). Instead, 
it was that voters only had one alternative.14 While insiders expected four or five candidates 
to challenge the Mayor when Byrne jumped in ten months before the election, no others 
                                                 
11 Colby and Green, “The Vote Power of Chicago Democrats from Cermak to Bilandic: The Consolidation of 
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12 Milton Rakove, “Jane Byrne and the New Chicago Politics,” in After Daley: Chicago Politics in Transition, ed. 
Samuel K. Gove and Louis H. Masotti (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 229. 
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did.15 Jane Byrne’s victory was possible only because no black independent, no white liberal, 
and no other disgruntled white ethnic politician thought it was worth taking on Mayor 
Bilandic.  
Jane Byrne was not a reformer, and “The Bilandic-Byrne struggle was not a contest 
between a Machine incumbent and an anti-Machine challenger committed to dismantling 
it.”16 But her skillful courting of the disaffected and her rhetoric allowed those disgruntled 
with the machine to embrace her as an alternative to the Bridgeport politician. Her desire to 
return the status quo ante under Daley went unnoticed. Public fixation was on the fact that she 
called Bilandic, Ed Vrdolyak, Ed Burke, and others, an “evil cabal.” Liberals were taken in: 
“Ah, we didn’t really know Jane Byrne,” Uptown activist and organizer Slim Coleman 
lamented, “some of us had only talked to her for five or ten minutes but we voted for her 
because she said she was out fighting the machine.”17 To run her campaign, she had little 
choice but to turn to the anti-machine forces. Who besides her campaign manager Don Rose 
even knew how to run—let alone win—a shoestring campaign against the machine? 
Byrne courted black voters and they brought her victory. White liberals were 
important to Byrne’s success, but she ran up by far her largest margins of victory in the 
middle-class black wards.18 Bilandic earned the ire of the black middle class when he stole 
the title of Acting Mayor from Wilson Frost; he exacerbated it by running unpalatable 
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candidates for office in black districts.19 But the terrible snowstorms of 1978-1979 provided 
a truly galvanizing event. For West Side activist Nancy Jefferson, “the great snow came an it 
was just like God had ordained it, you know. So that we could prove his, that he was not the 
person that respected the, the population.”20 Bilandic would not recover from the “blatant 
racist assault” of allowing El trains to bypass stations in black neighborhoods on the South 
and West sides to take commuters from white suburbs and periphery neighborhoods 
downtown more quickly.21 In the aftermath of her win, black political activists, such as Jesse 
Jackson, would meet with Byrne to remind her that she had debts to pay in black Chicago. 
But, “The black support that she had was black voters. On the street. Who did the 
unthinkable.”22 Black power brokers had not played much of a role in her campaign. “Her 
acceptance speech was made before total strangers because she had no committee. She had 
no workers. She had nothing.”23   
Byrne’s efforts to assemble a governing coalition in the aftermath of her election 
victory were erratic. She began by acting like a reformer. She assembled a transition team run 
by the Director of Northwestern’s Center for Urban Affairs (the longtime home of the Law 
Enforcement Study Group) and including only a single member of the old guard.24 She hired 
Don Haider, an assistant secretary of the Treasury, as her budget chief. Yet, signs that she 
was mending fences with the regular Democrats emerged even before the general election. 
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She courted her former adversaries, eventually coming to rely on long-time power brokers 
like Housing Authority chief Charles Swibel, and Aldermanic influencers Eddie Vrdolyak 
and Edward Burke. Between the “coalition crackpots and the party … the powerless or the 
powerful,” she ultimately chose the regulars.25 After four years, Don Rose concluded, “I 
think [her administration] was corrupt, morally bankrupt.”26  
Jane Byrne’s Police Politics 
Perhaps the most controversial issue in the aftermath of Jane Byrne’s victory was her 
stated intention to fire the Police Superintendent. During the primary, Byrne charged that 
James O’Grady politicized the Department operations on orders from City Hall and she 
pledged to fire him.27 Byrne vowed to hire an outsider without political ties to the 
Department and suggested the reformer Patrick Murphy, former New York City 
Commissioner under liberal mayor John Lindsey, as her favored candidate.28 These 
pronouncements unleashed widespread jockeying for power: The Council passed an 
ordinance giving itself the power to confirm the appointment of the Police Superintendent 
(previously the only cabinet position not subject to its advice and consent) and the right to 
overturn the Mayor’s decision to fire a Police Superintendent by a two-thirds majority.29 
Mayor Bilandic sought to make lame duck re-appointments of all five sitting members of the 
Police Board, the body charged with forwarding the names of three finalists for the 
                                                 
25 Fitzgerald, Brass: Jane Byrne and the Pursuit of Power, 205. 
26 Miner, “What Ever Happened to Mayor Jane?” 
27 One rumor, advanced by Bob Wiedrich, as that Byrne believed Bilandic had appointed O’Grady as a stalking 
mere stalking horse for Victor Vrdolyak, the brother of powerful 10th Ward Alderman Ed Vrdolyak. When the 
time was right, he would remove O’Grady and install Vrdolyak as Superintendent. Bob Wiedrich, “Perspective: 
Jane Should Have Listened to Dick,” Chicago Tribune, February 26, 1979, D4. 
28 “New Police Chief Will Be ‘Outsider,’ Byrne Vows,” Chicago Tribune, April 4, 1970, 10; David Axelrod, 
“Byrne Asks Murphy to Seek Cop Post: I Would Accept, Ex-N.Y. Chief Says,” Chicago Tribune, April 20, 1979, 
1. 
29 Robert Davis, “Aldermen Will Control Police Chief,” Chicago Tribune, March 8, 1979, 1. 
  
    345 
Superintendent’s job to the Mayor—an effort the Council rebuffed.30 Byrne responded by 
submitting an ordinance expanding the Board to nine members, which allowed her to avoid 
picking fights with the old members as well as the flexibility to name new ones.31  
  Byrne’s initial maneuvers in dealing with the Police Department touched on all of 
the themes of police reform. Indeed, Mayor Bilandic’s reaction to Byrne’s announcement 
that she would fire Superintendent O’Grady indicated that O’Grady was perhaps too close to 
politics. On his first day as the ex-Mayor, Bilandic and his wife walked from their house in 
Bridgeport to Police Department Headquarters at 11th and State to say hello to the 
Superintendent. “He told reporters: ‘I thanked Supt. O’Grady for the great job he did for the 
citizens of Chicago.’”32 In speaking out in favor of a reform minded outsider, Byrne signaled 
her desire that the Police Superintendent be independent of the machine. Police supervisory 
and command personnel took this as an affront. One claimed that it was a “slap[] in the 
face” that labeled them “all party hacks.”33 By contrast, the elevation of First Deputy 
Superintendent Sam Nolan to Acting Superintendent, “represented a powerful symbolic 
gesture by the mayor of a ‘a new day.’”34  
 Although Byrne went through many staffing revolutions, none of them matched the 
turnover at the top of the Police Department in importance. Elevating Nolan to Acting 
Superintendent “spark[ed] demands that he be given the job permanently. Nolan has had 
strong support in Chicago’s black community in the past.” Despite expressing great respect 
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for Sam Nolan, Renault Robinson backed Jane Byrne’s suggestion that Patrick Murphy was 
the man to hire. When it came to reform, Robinson suggested that independence trumped 
race, and that only a man from outside the Department could reform it. Byrne used 
Robinson’s support in moving Nolan out of the Superintendent office into a newly created 
position of City Director of Public Safety. Moreover, she seized on the new alliance with 
Robinson. On a Sunday, June 17, Byrne showed up an AAPL awards ceremony. “A 
standing-room-only crowed rose to give her a cheering ovation when she entered the room 
… flanked by Renault Robinson …” Vernon Jarrett marveled at the situation, “Who would 
have predicted that in 1979, Chicago would have a mayor who would even listen to a 
suggestion from Renault Robinson or Howard Saffold?”35  
 Byrne’s cultivation of Robinson was politically savvy, until she began to see that her 
interests were not aligned with the black grassroots but with the Democratic Party. 
“Robinson has always been hard to decipher,” declared the reporter who knew Robinson 
best, Robert McClory of the Chicago Defender, in early 1980. “He is not a racist, not a hustler, 
not an egoist, and not a personal-power-seeker. After 11 years in the public arena, the record 
is clear on these points. What he really is remains to be seen.”36 This was reinforced by his 
experience on the CHA Board, to which Byrne nominated him in July of 1979.37 Beginning 
in 1978, Robinson became particularly active in CHA politics. The League received a grant 
from the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission to undertake a community anti-crime 
project in one of the buildings at the Robert Taylor Homes. The project did not go well; 
Robinson did not have enough allies in the Taylor Homes or the political support among the 
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tenant leaders to make it work.38 Nonetheless, it did turn him into a vociferous critic of the 
Housing Authority and its Chairman Charles Swibel.  
 Byrne experienced changes of heart involving both the Police Department and the 
CHA Board. After moving Nolan out, she named Joseph DiLeonardi—a tough, Mafia-
busting cop—as Acting Superintendent. Although he was an insider, his promotion sent the 
signal that the Police were serious about cracking down on corruption. Less than five 
months later, the Mayor reversed course and settled on thirty-seven year old Richard 
Brzeczek, a lawyer and key aide to James Rochford.39 In response, Robinson “accused the 
mayor of breaking key campaign promises and consorting with ‘people of ill repute,’ and 
flatly predicted that she will be voted out of office.” Byrne “chose somebody from the 
inside,” Robinson protested. “She betrayed me and used me to help her block Sam Nolan 
from getting the job.”40 Moreover, the new CHA Board Member resented the Mayor using 
his appointment as evidence of her willingness to put blacks in policymaking positions. “I 
think the mayor uses my name in vain,” Robinson told Tribune political reporter David 
Axelrod in a front-page story. “I’m not one of her confidants, and I don’t have ready access 
to her.”41 
On the CHA Board, Robinson challenged administration policy at every turn. The 
CHA was an easy target because public housing in Chicago was in terrible shape, as nine 
separate studies conducted by independent consultants and auditors between 1978 and 1982 
                                                 
38 McClory, “Renault Robinson: The Constant Pilgrim.” 
39 On the sergeant’s exam, see “Profiles of Cops Named to Top Command,” Chicago Tribune, May 30, 1979, C1.   
40 Nathaniel Sheppard, Jr., “Chicago’s Blacks Say Byrne Broke Pledge on City Jobs,” New York Times, March 2, 
1980, 28. 
41 David Axelrod, “Byrne ‘One Term Mayor,’” Chicago Tribune, January 18, 1980, 1. 
  
    348 
repeatedly confirmed.42 When a team of auditors from the federal General Accounting 
Office came to Chicago and declared the CHA to be facing a crisis of immediate insolvency, 
kept afloat only by advances on the next year’s federal subsidy, Robinson was not shocked. 
“What did shock me,” he declared, “was that my screaming all these months about 
mismanagement, fraud, bribery, and theft went unheeded.”43 Once Byrne made up with the 
Party, Robinson claimed that Byrne asked him to back off—a claim that she would continue 
to dispute nearly a decade later.44 Whether she asked or not, Byrne backed Robinson’s target, 
Charles Swibel, as Robinson failed in his efforts to depose the noted power broker and CHA 
Board chairman.45 Nevertheless, by 1982, no one could really say that Byrne and Swibel 
prevailed. Rather, comprehensive review of the CHA conducted by Oscar Newman for the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development concluded, “the culpability of Swibel in 
his organization’s gross inefficiency and managerial incompetence was clear.”46 The losers 
were the tenants. 
 
Byrne’s handling of police brutality showed similar vacillations. She entered office 
amid continuing controversy over police brutality, which did not abate during her time in 
office. From the beginning, many police reformers considered Superintendent James 
Rochford’s Office of Professional Standards (OPS) to be insufficient. It is hard to know 
whether the Office was an improvement on its predecessor because of the lack of real data 
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about how either operated. Regardless, Rochford’s new brutality review did not make the 
issue of police brutality disappear. Indeed, conflict over the use of deadly force intensified, 
particularly after police killed six teens over the course five months in the latter half of 
1977.47 Citizens Alert and the Alliance to End Repression called upon the Police Board to 
revise the City’s Deadly force policy: “the groups charged that the police department 
protects police officers involved in shootings by labeling them as ‘justifiable.’ They also 
charged that the law governing police use of deadly force is ‘entirely too broad and 
ambiguous.’”48 While U.S. Attorney Thomas P. Sullivan did not indict officers in any of the 
killings, “He urged ‘vigorous public discussion’” of the prevailing state law rule that allowed 
officers to shoot fleeing felons, “and suggested several changes.” This call was reinforced by 
the Chicago Council of Lawyers, as well as Citizens Alert, which “issued a renewed call for 
federal and state guidelines that restrict police use of deadly force to occasions where the 
officer’s life or that of another is endangered.”49 
When a group of black legislators held hearings on police brutality, the Mayor 
declared her intention to get “to the bottom” of brutality accusations. On September 23, 
1980, she set up a six-person “blue ribbon panel.” Three months later, the panel dissolved. 
After weeks of petitioning the Mayor for funds and a staff to carry out investigations, the six 
members of the panel quit.50 The Mayor supported their actions, claiming that there was no 
money to fund the panel’s operation and that it “‘had served its purpose and done an 
excellent job,’ even though it had not conducted any investigations.”51  Despite not 
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supporting the panel, the Tribune’s editorial page noted, that the Mayor’s “‘blue ribbon’ 
committee has come and gone; with its only result increased alienation from City Hall on the 
part of both the police force and the minorities that provide most of the victims of alleged—
and actual—excessive police force.”52 
The controversy was not all for naught, for it led Superintendent Brezcek to order an 
audit of OPS. The four-month long audit was released to selected police officials in July of 
1981, along with a supplementary summary by Captain Joseph Mildice. In August, two 
investigators were fired from the Office, “for inattention to responsibilities, incompetence 
and inefficient work habits.”53 Someone leaked both the report and the supplement to the 
Chicago Tribune, which published their results on December 6, 1981. The reports led the 
Tribune to conclude that the department had personnel issues. Noting that four of the 
investigators were related to high police officials, the objectivity of the investigators had 
come into question. A good number were recommended by influential political figures; 
many were applicants to the police department; and others were related to police officers.54 
The Tribune’s editorial board concluded, “It has become a haven—or should we say a 
protective shield—made up of men clearly biased in favor of the police.”55 
The Office also faced operational problems: These included a backlog of 1,900 still-
open cases, some dating as far back as 1975, representing nearly a year’s caseload. (In 1980, 
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OPS completed 2,328 cases.56) In 318 of these cases, the investigations still remained 
incomplete. On average, cases were taking 224.3 days to complete.57 The backlog was the 
product of the slow rate of resolution: each officer cleared just four cases during a 28-day 
“police period.”58 Out of a sample of 105 police shooting case files, nearly “[h]alf … were 
misfiled and, for all practical purposes, lost.”59 According to Mildice, however, “the most 
glaring weakness … is the almost total lack of supervision of investigators and control of 
cases.”60 
 During Jane Byrne’s time in office, the worst police scandal of the previous three-
and-a-half decades festered. Beginning in the early 1970s, detectives in Police Area 2, 
associated with and then led by John Burge, had tortured suspects into confessions. Of the 
112 known victims who experienced torture by Burge and his compatriots, however, only 
five had the experience before 1979. It was only at the end of the decade that torture was 
regularly employed. Although some of the victims filed cases with OPS, they met with little 
success. The case that would ultimately be John Burge’s undoing occurred in 1982, following 
the murder of two Chicago Police officers by brothers Jackie and Andrew Wilson. The 
manhunt that led the Police to the Wilson brothers produced widespread brutality. Citizens 
Alert implored Jane Byrne in its aftermath, “The severity and frequency of police abuse is 
the worst in the 15 year history of Citizens Alert’s existence as a police watchdog 
organization.” Moreover, it argued, “The escalation of police abuse began prior to the 
unfortunate shooting deaths of two police officers.”61 Violence did not stop once the killers 
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were caught: rather, Andrew Wilson was tortured so badly by Burge and his men that the 
Cook County Jail refused to admit him. Wilson’s civil suit in the late 1980s would begin 
Burge’s unraveling. In the meantime—and long afterwards—torture continued unabated.62  
Police Politics in the Election of Harold Washington 
 Harold Washington’s election showcased the best and worst of the politics of race in 
America. “The central political dilemma confronting Washington,” according to the 
historian Manning Marable, “was the need to create a broad-based, progressive, radical-
reformist, multi-ethnic, multiclass coalition that would, in theory, embrace African 
Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, low-income working people, and the 
unemployed.”63 His election demonstrated how such a political majority could be 
constructed. Washington won because his coalition expanded the electorate significantly: By 
and large, individuals who four years earlier had not voted delivered his margin of victory. 
“[The] election was the result of the greatest grass roots effort in the history of the City of 
Chicago,” Washington declared. “It may have been equaled somewhere in this country. I 
know not where.”64   
The historian Jeffrey Hegelson argues that black Chicagoans built a “political culture 
antithetical to Chicago’s political machine” over decades and not just in the years before 
Harold Washington’s election. “From the beginning of the anti-machine movement, 
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electoral politics and the politics of mass mobilization intertwined.”65 While we can trace out 
the ways in which anti-machine activities continually used mass mobilization to mount 
political challenges throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the coalescing of an anti-machine 
coalition sufficient to win a citywide victory happened quite suddenly. Indeed, without 
Renault Robinson’s specific and immediate role in promoting both the cause of a black 
Mayor and in coaxing Washington into the race, it is possible that Washington would never 
have run. Long before Washington’s particular role, black activists including Robinson 
plotted exactly how a black candidate might win election in 1982. Lu Palmer’s Chicago 
United Black Communities was the central hub for electoral activism, and through 1982 
worked on multiple fronts. Repeating the experience of 1975 and 1977, Palmer, Robinson, 
and other activists held a plebiscite to pick a consensus candidate to represent black 
Chicagoans in the election. Washington was the runaway winner. Like activists had in 1977, 
they sought to register a critical mass of new black voters. This time they were successful in 
increasing registrations on a much larger scale. Although others ran the voting drive, 
Robinson negotiated the conditions with the Board of Elections by which this large-scale 
registration happened, including at unemployment and welfare offices.66  
 Robinson also convinced Ed Gardner, the owner of the hair care products company 
Soft Sheen to donate seed money for the voter registration drive. Gardner’s experience 
selling hair products in a segregated market pointed to radio as the most effective channel 
for advertising. As Robinson recounted, “Black people used, radio, not TV, not newspaper 
but radio. I picked up on that. Realizing that the only thing that was common to all of us, 
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rich, poor, middle-class, was that radio.”67 With Gardner’s advertising department putting 
together the ads, the “Come Alive October 5” campaign produced remarkable results. In the 
first five days of October, 135,000 new registrants put themselves on the election rolls, 
adding to the substantial numbers that had already registered during the summer campaign.68 
It was these numbers that made the 80-80 electoral strategy Robinson promoted feasible: to 
win, Washington needed to turn out eighty percent of black voters, and have eighty percent 
of them vote for him. 
 It was easier to convince Garner to part with his money than it was to convince 
Washington to run. As he declared, announcing his candidacy: “I prefer not to run.” A 
legislator at heart, the Congressman “love[d] representing Chicago in Washington, where we 
need courageous voices to speak out and act against [President Ronald] Reagan and 
Reaganomics. But I can’t watch the city be destroyed by petty politics and bad 
government.”69 At the time, Washington was in the middle of his sophomore reelection 
campaign. Moreover, he detested the idea of the plebiscite, because he did not believe that a 
successful candidacy for Mayor could be based on one individual’s personality. “It’s the plan, 
not the man,” he insisted. Washington was not close to Lu Palmer, and nearly refused to 
show up to give the keynote speech at the Chicago United Black Communities mass meeting 
where the plebicite was to take place. 70 “It took a lot of doing to get Harold to show up 
there,” Robinson remembered, “and only after a prearrangement between myself and Lu 
                                                 
67 Ibid. 
68 Dempsey J. Travis, “Harold”: The People’s Mayor: An Authorized Biography of Mayor Harold Washington (Chicago: 
Urban Research Press, Inc., 1989), 150–151; Gary Rivlin, Fire on the Prairie: Chicago’s Harold Washington and the 
Politics of Race (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1992), 96–97. 
69 Travis, Harold, 158. 
70 If this was not clear before the election, it became crystal clear in its aftermath, as the Mayor chose to 
endorse longtime ally Charles Hayes over Palmer to replace him in the First District Congressional race. Kevin 
Klose, “For Chicago Mayor, a Change in Fortune,” Washington Post, July 28, 1983, A8. 
  
    355 
that Harold would not be forced to declare his candidacy, did Harold finally agree to show, 
and, with great reluctance he came and made one helluva speech, absolutely electrifying 
speech.”71  
 
The racial revanchism of the city’s white Democrats contrasted with this multi-racial 
coalition. At a political rally a week before voters were to go to the polls, Ed Vrdolyak made 
the great political bungle of the race. Not realizing there were reporters in the room, he told 
a group of 200 northwest side precinct captains, “A vote for Daley is a vote for Washington. 
… It would be the worst day in the history of Chicago if our candidate, the only viable 
candidate was not elected. It’s a racial thing. Don’t kid yourself. I’m calling on you to save 
your city, to save your precinct.”72 It was not until the general election, where Washington 
faced little-known Republican Bernard Epton and his newly-minted white Democratic 
supporters, that the city’s racism bared its teeth. One of the most striking incidents occurred 
on March 27, as former Vice President Walter Mondale accompanied the candidate to St. 
Pascal’s, a Catholic parish at 3935 North Melvina Avenue, on Palm Sunday. The men were 
met by an angry mob of more than 200 protesters, “their faces red hot with hate.”73 The 
doors of the church had been freshly spray-painted with the words, “Nigger, Nigger, die.”74 
Conflicts over race in the Police Department shaped the mayoral contest. Leaders 
and much of the rank-and-file supported Byrne in the primary and opposed Washington in 
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the general election. Despite his close encounters with the machine over the years, and his 
long history of confronting racism in the Police Department, nothing prepared Washington 
for the opposition he faced from within its ranks. The skirmishing began with a television ad 
by incumbent mayor Jane Byrne starring Superintendent Brzeczek. The ad was, in his 
opinion, nothing more than “an honest and sincere statement” that Mayor Byrne “had been 
‘totally supportive of the police department[.]’” He later told his subordinate officers that “if 
you don’t go out and support the mayor, there has to be a deep sense of ingratitude in 
you.”75   
Byrne and Brzeczek put the police front and center in the campaign. But policing 
was a potent issue for potential Washington voters as well. The Congressman characterized 
Brzeczek as “the top cop who’s become a political prop.”76 As Byrne’s “minion,” Brzeczek 
became one in a long tradition of leaders who used the power of office to do the bidding of 
his political master.77 Washington did not stop there. He battered away at the police: 
accusing them of failing to protect Chicagoans and instead fudging crime statistics to make 
the Mayor and Police Chief look good; criticizing the Department’s review of police brutality 
cases; and arguing that it was still discriminating against blacks and Latinos in hiring and 
promotions.78 He promised to fire the Superintendent.  
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Police brutality was highlighted when NBC reporter Pam Zeckman—one of the four 
who had written the Tribune series on police brutality in 1973—ran a blockbuster four-part 
television series called “Beating Justice” on the failings of the Office of Professional 
Standards. Her investigative team spent six months pouring through every police brutality 
lawsuit they could find. Probably the two most salient facts that came out of the show were 
that 107 of the 435 policemen accused had two or more complaints of brutality against them 
(in the lawsuits), and that those who had three or more accusations were not referred for 
psychological evaluation as required. In court records, the OPS administrator admitted as 
much, but justified it by saying: “‘If I were to refer every police officer … who has three or 
more CRs, sustained or not sustained, within a period of two years, there would be basically 
no police protection or services or the restoration of order in the city.’”79 Washington 
responded by declaring of the Office of Professional Standards: “I will abolish it.”80 
 Brzeczek quit shortly after the primary. On his way out, he attacked Washington’s 
relationship with black activists—including the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League—
arguing that he was the marionette of these puppeteers. “No matter who the Superintendent 
is under Washington,” he declared, “the Department will be run by three men: Jesse Jackson, 
Renault Robinson, and Howard Saffold.”81 In fact, the Washington campaign sought 
continually to keep the “nettlesome Jesse factor” at bay. While Robinson and Saffold were 
deeply involved in the campaign, their struggles with the Department had kept them at the 
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bottom of the departmental hierarchy and without the managerial experience to play a 
command role.82  
 Bernard Epton’s campaign reinforced the implication that a black leader did not 
merit the city’s trust in matters of law enforcement. The essence of his and Brzeczek’s 
arguments were this: You can’t trust policing to a black mayor. Washington was a criminal, 
and his friends were anti-police (if not pro-crime) activists. Even the Tribune could not help 
but ask if the Superintendent was attempting to “whip up fears of a lawless rampage if Mr. 
Washington is elected?”83 On the day it endorsed Washington, the Tribune’s editorial board 
ran a second piece that highlighted the “Constituency of Fear” that was playing such an 
important role in the race. “For white city residents, crime and the black man have become 
synonymous: a belief justified by statistics. That the same statistics show most victims of 
black crime are black offers no solace.” But the underlying argument seemed to go beyond 
the mere widespread belief in black criminality to a conclusion that black people, and 
especially black political figures, were not interested in controlling crime. “That a black 
mayor could and would fight black crime as well as a white mayor is beyond their 
comprehension.”84 
 These arguments drove the deep discord that developed between black and white 
police officers over the election. As Washington’s first Police Superintendent would recall in 
retrospect, white officers’ dominance within the Department made their actions particularly 
notable. “We had detectives going to project buildings checking voting rolls. We had 
automobiles, police automobiles with stickers, Vote for Jane Byrne on, on—if you go into, 
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you went to a police station you saw election paraphernalia and posters and all like that, very 
politicized the police department was.”85 The intensity and omnipresence of politics within 
the city’s station houses in the aftermath of Washington’s primary victory smudged the line 
between racial division and paranoia. Did Republican Bernie Epton offer the president of 
the Fraternal Order of Police to give officers a five percent raise and free dental care?86 Did a 
poll of the more than 10,000 officers in the FOP bargaining unit show them to be 92.5 
percent in favor of Epton, as the FOP president declared? Was there a plot to make massive 
arrests of blacks on the South Side on election day?87 Would Washington destroy the 
Department’s morale?88 Reporters could not help but sum up the whole controversy by 
noting the response of some of Epton’s police supporters to a ban on politicking at work. 
They wore buttons that were plain white.89  
New Faces in High Places 
 Harold Washington’s election did not vanquish his white opponents. Taking power 
at a time of national retrenchment, Washington faced the same dilemma faced by nearly all 
of the black urban mayors who came into office in the 1970s and 1980s. He remarked upon 
these difficulties in a speech to the U.S. Conference of Black Mayors shortly after his 
election. Many of these mayors hoped simultaneously to transcend politics and to use 
politics as a tool of social transformation in frequently racially divided cities. But black 
mayors came to power only after “previous administrations ha[d] crippled the city through 
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mismanagement, cronyism, exclusive backroom deals, and lack of imagination and 
inadequate solutions to problems.” They had the political challenge of fighting a “city 
council they don’t control, making it more difficult to institute necessary changes.” Finally, 
they had to face those thorny problems amidst a conservative counter-revolution. There 
were no platitudes or easy solutions. Revitalization demanded cutting back spending and 
seeking new revenues, on renewing neighborhoods and reshaping industries. And, real 
change required the transformation of national politics through the development of a reform 
Democratic platform that could “channel present discontent with Reaganomics into a 
grassroots political movement, and then direct the energy of the movement into a catalyst 
for the severe crises we face.”90 
 Washington avoided head-on confrontation. Rather, in keeping with his criticism of 
his predecessors, he largely stayed out of the administration of policing. One of the Mayor’s 
two administrative assistants, Michael S. Holewinski, oversaw the relationship between City 
Hall and the Police Department.91 With his bushy mustache, Holewinski looked every bit the 
part of a Polish metal worker’s son from the Northwest Side.92 Despite his appearance as a 
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white ethnic Chicago everyman, he was a rare species: the first independent Democrat ever 
to win election outside of Hyde Park or the lakefront wards. As the Police Superintendent 
who served Washington for most of his first term attested, “He, he never, never called me 
and asked me for, to do these favors for anyone or anything like that, never did.” Instead it 
was “Mike Holewinski that was always on the phone wanting this and that and the other but 
not Harold.”93 The Mayor kept his “hands-off.” As the Superintendent speculated, “he 
didn’t want the adverse publicity of anyone saying that he was interfering in any way with the 
police.”94 
 Washington’s primary reform strategy involved putting new faces in high places. 
Often these faces were black—but not nearly so often as they had been white (or Irish) 
under Byrne or Daley. Hiring a Police Superintendent was an early test of the new 
administration’s fealty to its campaign promise to open up government in Chicago. During 
the campaign, Washington echoed Citizens Alert’s decade-long campaign to encourage 
citizen participation in selecting the Police Superintendent by calling for the appointment of 
a blue ribbon commission to make recommendations. Putting such a process in place was 
complicated, as state law and city ordinance tasked the Police Board with interviewing 
candidates and submitting three names to the Mayor.95 As they had with his predecessors, 
Citizens Alert demanded that the Mayor and the Police Board bring the public more fully 
into the process.96 While this was legal, Washington’s advisors nonetheless had 
                                                 
93 Interview with Fred Rice, HistoryMakers, session 1, tape 5, story 1.  
94 Timuel D. Black, Jr., “Interview with Fred Rice,” in Bridges of Memory: Chicago’s Second Generation of Black 
Migration (Chicago and Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press and DuSable Museum of African 
American History, 2007), 139. 
95 Robert C. Howard to Thomas P. Coffey, Al Raby, and Renault Robinson, Feb. 23, 1983, HWAC Campaign 
20-11.  
96 They wanted the Police Board to issue a description of its selection procedures; convene a ten-member blue 
ribbon committee to work with it in the selection process; to hold public hearings with the top half-dozen 
  
    362 
reservations.97 While not agreeing to everything Citizens Alert wanted, the administration 
asked the three finalists to appear before a public forum.98 
In contrast to Byrne’s pledge to hire an outsider as Superintendent, Washington 
campaigned on the promise, “I will find for this city, I guarantee you, from the ranks of the 
existing command structure in this city, the finest police superintendent this city has to offer. 
I know the talent is there. The reservoir is deep, broad and of quality.”99 The Police Board’s 
list included two black candidates, Fred Rice, the Chief of Patrol, and Rudy Nimocks, 
Commander of Harrison Area detectives; and one (half-Polish) Latino, Matt Rodriguez, the 
Deputy Superintendent for Technical Services.100 Each officer ticked the important boxes: all 
three worked their way up from the bottom, had few political connections, and had 
significant management experience. Alderman Ed Vrdolyak worked behind the scenes to 
maneuver support toward Rodriguez.101 Nonetheless, the core of Washington’s electoral 
coalition were not to be denied what they had long demanded—a black Police 
Superintendent. 
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Rice was the obvious, and safest, choice. While he had been a racial pioneer 
throughout his career, his “moderate and statesman-like” demeanor seemed to best embody 
the notion of a depoliticized force.102 He knew Washington from his time as the Commander 
of the Englewood District, which fell within the legislative district that sent the young 
representative to Springfield.103 During his time in Englewood, Commander Rice briefly 
captured headlines when he insisted on the integration of two-man squad car teams, almost 
fourteen years after Superintendent O.W. Wilson ordered the integration of patrol. Rice 
broke up a number of existing partnerships, much to the chagrin of officers who complained 
of “forced integration” and engaged in a ticket-writing slowdown.104 But this was his only 
outspoken stand in favor of racial equality. Otherwise, his career amounted to a steady climb 
through the ranks, leaving him as the Department’s most experienced administrator when 
Washington entered office. During their interviews for the Superintendent’s position, each 
of the other two finalists singled him out for praise as a top-notch administrator in their 
assessments of the Department’s leadership.105 Rice was a cop’s cop, a man whose “true 
color is loyal department blue.”106  
Like all of his predecessors, Rice picked the men who would run the Department 
with him. As he noted, “the key to, to I think to my ability to properly supervise the 
department is to bring my own people in.” Although all sworn officers are protected by civil 
service rules, these rules do not apply to the top 100 or so supervisory positions, the so-
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called “exempt” positions. Anyone, even civilians, can serve in these positions. Rank is 
irrelevant to these jobs, and being moved to an exempt position does not impact one’s civil 
service status. Using this relatively free hand, Rice undertook to remake the high command. 
Politics had everything to do with it: “I reduced, got rid of, transferred about eighty five 
people for the simple reason that I felt that I was exposed to the saboteurs …” after the 
divisive election.107 Even after Rice transferred many of the officers he suspected as being 
the most politically connected to the old regime, there were others in the Department whose 
loyalty to him remained suspect.  
Washington’s victory had personal implications for the men of the Afro-American 
Patrolmen’s League. 108 After years of languishing, their discrimination claims were finally 
settled by the Mayor, over the remonstrations of City Council Police and Fire Committee 
Chairman Ed Burke, who engineered a vote in City Council to appeal the settlement.109 The 
League and six League members received $593,705 in back pay, penalties, and interest, with 
$386,238 of that going to Robinson.110 For the AAPL chief, the settlement was actually more 
significant because the Department was forced to count all the years he had been in limbo 
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for his pension, allowing him to retire from the Department.111 AAPL officers moved from 
handing Washington’s security as a candidate to official roles as his bodyguards. 
Washington’s second press secretary, Alton Miller, noted “the mayor’s [security] detail, were 
literate, politically active men—and a few women—who enjoyed wide ranging interests.” 
Even as they formed a cordon around the Mayor protecting him, they, as individuals and 
men, kept him in touch with the real world. They were his “boon companions, sounding 
boards, people he could argue with about sports or Chicago history or politics. Full of 
respect—nobody called him ‘Harold’—they were also people who had known him when he 
wasn’t Mr. Mayor.”112  
 For Saffold, the transition was particularly significant as Washington named him 
chief of his security. During the Byrne administration, the supervisor of her personal police 
detail was elevated to the rank of commander, one of the exempt positions. This was a 
dramatic and unexpected reversal of fortunes, “the upside was that I immediately, after 
having had my whole career crushed as a result of being a representative of an organization 
that was bringing about social change, I catapulted to the rank of a commander.” The 
perspective this provided confirmed something that the men had intuited all along. At 
exempt meetings, “I could see the kind of pressure that was being placed on black exempt 
personnel.” Much of the pressure came from below, from the middle managers, the 
sergeants and lieutenants, who controlled so much of what went on in individual station 
houses. These individuals, who had been the spearhead of much of the hostility toward 
League members over the last fifteen years, also acted in “direct opposition” to the Mayor 
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and the black command staff. Such pressure was particularly intense over Superintendent 
Fred Rice’s efforts to confront the “entrenched control of upward mobility in the Chicago 
[Illinois] police department.”113 
Rice’s shakeup was large: eighty-seven of the Department’s 108 exempt officers were 
given new jobs. But it was hardly larger than the shakeups undertaken by his predecessors. 
He demoted twenty-six exempt officers back to their civil service ranking and eliminated six 
command posts. Race played a role in these decisions. In his words, “I brought quite a few 
blacks in because I had been familiar with a lot of the black command officers you know and 
so I made, and I trusted them.”114 That twenty-five of the twenty-six demotions were white 
(the other was Latino) reflects at least in part to the dominance of the upper management 
ranks by white officers prior to Rice. Moreover, his appointments of new officers into the 
echelons of the top command were more multi-hued than any of his predecessors: three 
were Latino, thirteen black, and nine white.115  
Rice framed a later description of the decisions in politically neutral terms: he 
“transformed the top echelon of the department and took the politics out of it …”116 This 
was, of course, the traditional ideal of police professionalism among Chicago police reform 
activists, both black and white. It had never been much practiced in the Department, 
though. Washington’s fealty to the maxim, his total unwillingness to meddle in the 
Department for political purposes, signified his commitment to these reform ideals. It also 
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sounded in the difficulty faced by all successful political reform movements: how do you 
succeed if you refuse to play by the same rules as your opponent.  
Policing Police Brutality Under Washington 
Mayor Washington’s efforts to address police brutality reflected a similar approach. 
In the aftermath of Washington’s promise to abolish the Office of Professional Standards, 
civil rights lawyer Bob Howard wrote a proposal describing how an independent fact-finding 
agency might be set up. He argued that Washington could take most of the necessary steps 
by executive order. An existing city agency that had a commissioner-level leadership, the 
Office of Municipal Investigation, could be reinvigorated by Executive Order; even without 
any new funds, the staff and investigators assigned to OPS could be detailed by the Mayor to 
this new agency. But by the time the campaign released The Washington Papers, a fifty-two 
page booklet of position papers, he seemed focused primarily on making OPS work better as 
an institution.117 Rice, too, was in accord with keeping the unit configured as it was but 
working to improve it.118  
Debate over the question whether to abolish the Office or try and remake it within 
the Police Department illustrates how, in the face of City Council resistance, governing 
demanded different choices than campaigning. Candidate Washington called for the 
abolition of the Office of Professional standards in order to clearly mark his opposition to 
the status quo. But the suggested alternatives to actually remake the Office—such as 
Howard’s proposal to locate the review of police brutality cases in the Office of Municipal 
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Investigations—did little more than take the office outside of the Superintendent’s control. 
But having the office under the Superintendent’s control when the man supplying the 
oversight was Washington’s ally rather than his adversary was quite different. Moreover, to 
meet activists demand that civilians be given real power to control the police would take 
more than simply moving the Office outside of the police chain-of-command. Even if it was 
possible to create such an institution in the face of City Council resistance, there were 
legitimate questions as to whether the massive expenditure of administrative and political 
resources might be better spent elsewhere, such as in addressing the more manageable 
problems with the Office’s personnel, training, structure, and management.  
Rice boldly hired David Fogel as the administrator of the Office of Professional 
Standards. After Walker lost the 1976 gubernatorial election, Fogek left the Illinois Law 
Enforcement Commission to serve as a professor at the University of Illinois, Chicago. His 
long experience in criminal justice and his record of sympathetic action in relation to 
Chicago’s police reformers tamped down criticism of the decision to preserve the institution. 
On multiple occasions, Fogel had demonstrated considerable bravery and independence 
from the influence of Chicago Democrats. He possessed the right temperament for a police 
watchdog, and OPS critics almost immediately sensed that things would change. Mary 
Powers of Citizens Alert effused in a Special Report in November 1984, “Dr. Fogel brings a 
breath of fresh air to a unit which has been riddled with inefficiency and patronage workers. 
We expect that his administration will mark a new era of sensitive and timely handling of 
complaints of police misconduct and are working with OPS to see that this happens.”119  
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 Over the first year of his tenure, Fogel proved that his appointment warranted the 
enthusiasm that had accompanied it. Taking on such a high profile director signified 
Washington’s commitment. The innovations Fogel brought cut across all aspects of the 
Office’s work. The administration gave the Office new office space outside of police 
headquarters. Victims of brutality and their advocates had argued for years that the need to 
go to Police Headquarters could be intimidating, particularly because of the thought of 
running into the officer who had committed the brutality. Intake was further improved 
through the opening of two satellite offices and a special intake unit. The dedication of 
additional resources to administrative review resulted in limiting the number of cases that 
languished for years; it also produced closer review of cases where the investigator did not 
think that the excessive force accusation should be sustained.120 A major case unit was 
launched. The administration created higher standards for the hiring of investigators and 
expanded pre-service training, improving the quality and competence of its personnel.121 The 
result was a greatly improved public reputation for the office and, ultimately, a decline in the 
number of excessive force cases.  
 Over time, Fogel would come to see this as an irony. The improvements to the 
reputation of the OPS reproduced some of the problems that Fogel hoped to undermine. 
The Office’s hard earned reversal of its reputation for neglect created a deception. By the 
end of 1987, the administrator would come to question whether Office had become an 
obstacle to justice. As he wrote in a memo to the Mayor, “The appearance of doing a 
thorough investigation with full due process (and endless unnecessary reviews) for all, 
actually operates to immunize police from internal discipline, increases their overtime, leads 
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to an enormous ‘paper storm’ and has institutionalized lying. … I have come to the 
conclusion that OPS gives the appearance of formal justice, but actually helps to 
institutionalize subterfuge and injustice.”122 
This openness about problems in the Office was the most important legacy of 
Fogel’s tenure. It began in late October of 1984, with the emergence of new reports that 
John Burge and other Area 2 Detectives tortured suspects using electric shock devices. On 
November 5, Fogel sent Superintendent Rice a memo listing the alleged victims. For 
unknown reasons the investigation lay fallow until the civil rights suit brought by Andrew 
Wilson was heard in federal court beginning in February of 1989. Although Wilson lost his 
case, despite presenting quite concrete and persuasive proof, his opened the path to 
revealing Burge’s misdeeds. During trial, his lawyers received a series of letters from an 
anonymous police informant (nicknamed “Deep Badge”), which pointed to a pattern of 
abuse by identifying another prisoner who suffered treatment similar to Wilson’s. The 
dogged efforts of Wilson’s attorneys at the People’s Law Office brought the case to the 
attention of Chicago Reader reporter John Conroy, and his reporting in turn renewed the 
interest of David Fogel.  
He assigned two of his top staff members to the case. The first investigation, 
undertaken by Francine Sanders, focused solely on the case of Andrew Wilson. She 
concluded that the only reasonable explanation for Wilson’s injuries were electric shocks 
administered by Burge. The second investigation, by Michael Goldston, looked at whether 
there had been a systematic use of torture and whether commanding officers were aware of 
it. This began from Conroy’s excellent legwork, and built a systematic taxonomy of known 
                                                 
122 David Fogel, “Proposed Revamping of Office of Professional Standards,” October 19, 1987, 2, HWAC 
Public Safety 16-10. 
  
    371 
techniques and participants. These reports were not complete until after Fogel left the Office 
of Professional Standards in 1990. The behavior of subsequent administrators revealed that 
his determination to see the case investigated was important in producing the “masterful” 
reports.123 Nonetheless, the release of these reports in the 1992 only happened because of 
the doggedness of the People’s Law Office. Without them, Commander Burge might never 
have been fired from the force, and the myriad black men locked unjustly behind bars, 
including on death row, might have languished for even longer. 
 
Police Politics in a Conservative Age 
Washington’s aspirations, though, went beyond merely putting new faces in high 
places. But it was much more difficult to undertake the fundamental reforms necessary to 
meet broader goals for crime prevention and police responsiveness. Although police 
brutality remained the more politically galvanizing issue, Washington did not ignore crime. 
Rather, he issued a position paper, arguing, “There is no place for violence in our great city. 
People should be able to walk the streets in any neighborhood without fear. Secure 
neighborhoods depend upon the active involvement of all our citizens and a relationship of 
trust between the people and the police.”124 This position was, perhaps, anodyne—who 
could disagree? It was certainly attuned to the politics of fear that had overtaken white 
Chicago. But, it also spoke to deep currents within black thinking about crime that extended 
back into the nineteenth century. As Vernon Jarrett, the Tribune’s long-time interpreter of 
black Chicago explained in a column entitled, “Why Black Gangs Fear Washington,” 
“frequent black protests against police brutality” did not mean, “people were soft on crime 
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in their communities when the criminals were black.” Rather, Jarrett argued the opposite was 
true: “If there’s any one squawk against the Police Department, other than unnecessary 
police excesses against law-abiding citizens, it is the disgust at the lack of police protection at 
the neighborhood level.”125 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many activists to took up the cause of community 
crime prevention. This was how Renault Robinson and the League ended up involved in 
programming at the Robert Taylor Homes. Similar efforts of other participatory citizens 
organizations dotted the city. As Warren Friedman, the director of the Chicago Alliance for 
Neighborhood Safety and a member of Washington’s “Crime and Community Safety Task 
Force,” noted in response to a draft position paper that promised to study crime reduction 
programs in other cities, “It seems important to acknowledge that there are organizations in 
Chicago that have, without city or police encouragement, been working on crime prevention 
programs (for instance Chicago does have the only multi-racial, multi-community crime 
prevention program deemed worthy of funding by the Ford Foundation.[)]”126  
Taking power presented the possibility that the Police and residents of black 
neighborhoods might become real partners in such anti-crime efforts. In theory, what 
Washington proposed was a whole new locus of accountability. This was characterized by 
how he wanted to redistribute police services, namely by justifying how they served the 
residents of each of Chicago’s seventy-five community areas. In part, this would require 
rationalizing police services in order to figure out which districts actually needed more 
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police. But it also meant the redirection of resources. In particular, the new Mayor hoped to 
locate more of the force in the city’s twenty-five Police Districts. “Because crime reduction is 
better achieved if local residents are more directly involved, the Washington administration 
will return much of the responsibility for day-to-day safety to individual districts.”127 In 
parallel to how Washington’s electoral victory radically reconfigured the center of power on 
the landscape of Chicago politics, the Mayor planned to redistribute police power.   
 Redistributing police power meant attacking the privileges white neighborhoods had 
long enjoyed. In his inaugural address, Washington attacked such inequalities—in policing as 
elsewhere—by turning Epton campaign’s slogan (“Vote Epton: Before it’s too late”) on its 
head. Epton alluded to preservation, and let the imagination of the voter fill in what was to 
be preserved.  Washington cast himself and his coalition as agents of renewal: 
“neighborhood involvement has to take the place of the ancient, decrepit, and creaking 
machine.” After listening to him describe the difficult fiscal problems the city faced during 
the campaign, Washington claimed, “A majority of the voters believed me and embarked on 
what can only be described as a great movement and revitalization labeled reform.” This 
reform would be rooted in a city government that “for once in our lifetime must be made 
equitable and fair.” But, merely being fair wasn’t enough. Rather, “The people of Chicago 
have asked for more responsibility and more representation at every city level.”128   
 
 The City Council never gave Washington a chance. Alderman Ed Vrdolyak, assisted 
by Ed Burke, led the resistance to Washington. While Vrdolyak did not openly campaign for 
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Epton in the general election like other white Democratic committeemen, he did not wait 
until long after Washington’s election to break with the Mayor.129 Washington’s political 
honeymoon was cut short only a few days after his inauguration, during his first City Council 
meeting. The meeting started well, opening with a standing ovation in the new Mayor’s 
honor. A Washington ally then moved to adjourn; Washington called a voice vote, and he 
adjourned the meeting. His supporters left the council chamber. In their absence, Vrydolyak, 
the embodiment of white resistance to black political power, strode to the podium. 
 Few in the audience at the Mayor’s first City Council meeting could have predicted 
just how complete—and just how audacious—Vrdolyak’s break would be. Because the 
council had not yet organized under Washington’s leadership, he remained the Council’s 
president pro tempore. Marshaling the twenty-nine party regulars remaining in the chamber, 
Vrdolyak asked for a roll call on the adjournment. With twenty-nine nays in his column, the 
party chairman proceeded to reorganize the Council along lines that the party regulars—
soon known to all as the “Vrdolyak 29” or simply “the 29”—had previously hammered out 
amongst themselves. The reconstructed Council consisted of enough committees so that 
each rebel held a chairmanship and got a staff. They also passed a set of resolutions that 
strengthened the Council vis-à-vis the Mayor. Burke, Vrdolyak’s chief ally took the 
chairmanship of the all-powerful Finance Committee. Each motion passed 29-0.  
 With city government divided between white backlash and black power, between the 
29 and Washington’s 21, Vrdolyak held nowhere near the commanding position of his 
illustrious predecessors as Democratic Party chairman. So he pursued a different strategy, 
trying to keep Washington consistently off-balance. The point was obstruction: the 29 
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opposed whatever the Mayor proposed, simply because he proposed it. But they could not, 
of their own accord, successfully pass alternative legislation. This came down to simple 
numbers: The 29 had enough votes to block legislation and substitute their own, but they 
could not override his veto. Because the split was along racial and political lines in a highly 
polarized electorate, there was little way for either side to convince any members of the 
other to defect. For three years, Chicago politics sat in an extremely uncomfortable 
equipoise. Every step Washington took required navigating this gauntlet. 
 The city budget proved among the most contentious of questions. Throughout the 
election, Washington spoke repeatedly about the coming budget deficit. The budget, he 
declared at one point, “ticks ‘like a fiscal time bomb set to explode after the election.’’130 
(Because of the timing of Chicago’s budgetary and auditing processes, there was no way 
during the campaign to verify the existence or size of the deficit.131) Following his 
inauguration, Washington made the highly unusual move of putting the budget deficit at the 
center of his inaugural address. With Jane Byrne sitting on the dais, Washington described 
the public’s mandate for him to “tell the truth” as guiding his decision to speak about 
budgetary matters.  “And so, without malice, even remotely connected with my statement … 
I must tell you what we have inherited. I must tell you about the City’s finances. As I said 
before, I have no good news. The immediate fiscal problem facing Chicago is both 
enormous and complicated.”132 He went on to list the truly staggering number of areas in 
which the city government and its coordinate but independent institutions, such as the CHA, 
CTA, and Board of Education, faced deficits. The shortfall was about $120 million on the 
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city’s $1.9 billion dollar budget.133 The lone consolation, he noted to the inaugural audience, 
“It’s a good thing that your philosophy prevailed, because otherwise I’m not sure that the 
City could solve the financial crisis at hand.”134 
  While Byrne undoubtedly mismanaged the city’s finances, the city’s fiscal difficulties 
rested on long-term trends that extended well beyond her administration and undermined its 
revenue collection. The first was the rapid decline of the city’s taxable property value during 
the 1970s. From 1970-1978, more or less the final two terms of Mayor Daley and the 
abbreviated term of Michael Bilandic, taxable property values declined about forty-five 
percent. The second was the city’s increasing dependence on intergovernmental revenues—
namely dollars from the federal government and the state of Illinois—to remain solvent. 
Strictly in terms of the composition of the city’s revenues (i.e., property tax, income tax, sales 
tax, debt, state money, federal money, etc.), the transformation in federal spending 
undertaken by the Reagan administration was significant.135 Bilandic’s two-year mayoralty 
ended “with 38 percent of the city’s budget reliant on intergovernmental revenues, the 
highest proportion in the city’s history.”136 Increasing inflows from the federal government 
continued until 1980, making up just over forty percent of the budget, until the Reagan fiscal 
revolution turned this trend right around. By the middle of Byrne’s term in office federal 
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revenues had begun to shrink fast.137 These trends only worsened during Mayor 
Washington’s tenure as Mayor. From 1982 to 1989 (when Richard M. Daley was elected), 
federal revenue dropped sixty-two percent. This was somewhat offset by a seventeen-
percent increase in state aid, but the overall trend was to leave intergovernmental revenue at 
only twenty-three percent of the total budget—only three-fifths of what it had been when 
Bilandic left office. While Washington was able to increase spending around twenty percent 
during these years, he did so by turning to debt and new taxes.138  
 The intersection of budgetary politics and police politics provided the terrain for the 
first consequential showdown between the Washington and Vrdolyak camps, when the 
Council refused to rescind a $22 million property tax cut to help plug the budget hole. 
Washington threatened that his only other option was to lay off 2,000 city employees, 
including 855 employees of the Police Department, 500 of whom were sworn officers.139 
Right up until the end, it appeared that neither party would back down. But the Council did, 
finally agreeing to repeal half the cut, enough to keep the workers on salary.140 But then 
again, the whole city lost, as the controversy caused the credit ratings agencies to lower 
Chicago’s bonds ratings to BBB.141 
 As part of its strategy in negotiating this budgetary gridlock, the Administration acted 
to take away one of the few perks that it controlled: the Alderman’s bodyguards, who might 
be more appropriately described as their drivers and personal escorts, provided at municipal 
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expense. Taking these away was a populist declaration, an attack on the sinecures of political 
power. This decision originated with the Mayor’s Budget Director and Chief of Staff, who 
had begun in the immediate aftermath of the transition to look at ways to put more police 
on the street. One thing they quickly realized was that 212 officers, at a cost of over $6.6 
million per year, were being detailed out of the Department. Some of these details were 
explicitly related to law enforcement, like the assignment of 17 officers to the federal Drug 
Enforcement Administration. But others, like many of the sixty-odd bodyguard assignments, 
were plainly political perks. In his interview for the job, Rice promised to eliminate them “in 
all but the most compelling circumstances.”142 Rice took all the bodyguards away and forced 
aldermen to submit written requests and documents to indicate a threat to themselves or 
their families.143 
Vrdolyak protested that cutting his own allotment to two from five guards was part 
of a political vendetta. Although politics played some role in the decision, they were not the 
kind of politics that Vrdolyak alleged. There was at least a little irony in his claim because, of 
all the council members, only Vrdolyak and Burke were allowed to keep any police detail at 
all. Although more of these bodyguards had been removed from Washington’s Aldermanic 
opponents, a healthy number were also taken away from his supporters.144 At Rice’s 
confirmation hearing, the council leader threatened him, “‘I am putting you on notice that if 
anything happens to my family, myself or any council member that is a result of 
nonprofessional actions and decisions on the part of the Police Department … rest assured 
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that we will do whatever is necessary to correct the situation.’”145 The new Superintendent 
was, nevertheless, confirmed without dissent.146 
A political point was made, but it was also a practical maneuver designed to bring 
efficiency to the police Department by paring down its workload in order to put more 
officers on patrol. During the period before his confirmation Rice also eliminated the twenty 
officers assigned to the Streets and Sanitation Department. This was not because the job 
they performed was not necessary. Rather, although police were needed to issue citations, 
civilians could do every other step. Police could be dispatched from district stations to issue 
citations, without those districts losing their services full time.147 Over the course of his 
tenure, Rice would seek to apply this principle in different ways: substituting civilian 
employees for sworn officers for clerical tasks; trying to privatize police towing of cars; and 
offloading responsibility to other jurisdictions. 
 Washington’s second city budget proved no easier to negotiate than the first. As had 
been true during negotiations over the 1984 budget, police staffing formed the issue over 
which the 29 battled Washington in 1985. The Mayor was not neglecting law enforcement: 
The proposed police budget of $474.5 million made up forty-two percent of the budget, as 
opposed to the thirty-nine percent share of 1984’s $467.7 million. Increasing personnel 
costs, however, made keeping the force at its current staffing of 11,952 officers too 
expensive without raising taxes and fees more than the $76 million Washington was already 
proposing. The Mayor’s budget cut the force to 11,500, despite the fact that he had 
campaigned on a pledge to put more officers on the street.  
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 The budget battles provided a concrete example of the kind of betrayal that 
Superintendent Rice experienced that his predecessors never had to face. A high-ranking 
police officer leaked an internal police memo that suggested possible cuts to get the force 
down to that level. With their secret document in hand, Burke and the other majority 
alderman “charged Chicago Police Supt. Fred Rice with harboring a ‘hidden agenda’ to slash 
police department units.’”148 The memorandum sought to find ways to cut police salaries and 
benefits out of the budget while still maintaining the same number of men on patrol. 
Accordingly, the memorandum that ended up in the hands of finance committee chairman 
Ed Burke proposed a variety of tweaks that left the staff of the twenty-five police districts 
alone. What it did propose was ten percent cuts in the number of officers assigned to 
communications and detective divisions, a reduction of the force at O’Hare Airport, a 
turnover of highway patrol within the city to the state police, privatization of the police 
department’s towing services in two of the six police areas, and an increase in the use of 
cheaper civilian employees to relieve officers of duties for which sworn personnel were not 
required.149  
 The memo brought out the worst instincts in the 29. The Tribune’s editorial board 
picked up on their strategy right away: “There’s no better way to turn people against a public 
official than to convince them that he is soft on crime. Before the 1985 budget fight is over, 
the assaulting Eddies—Aldermen Burke and Vrdolyak—will have suggested, in one way or 
another, that every new rape and mugging in the city resulted from Mr. Washington’s trims 
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in the police force. Including the crimes that haven’t occurred yet.”150 Alderman George 
Hagopian made this case to Rice when he appeared before the Council. He blistered, “It’s a 
crook, rapist, murderer’s holiday in Chicago, and they know it.”151 
 The reductions in staff levels were not much more popular with Washington’s 
supporters, who also refused to defend them. While some of Washington’s 21 City Council 
allies remained silent, none of them were willing to speak up for their mayor on this issue 
publicly.152 Still other members of Washington’s coalition were willing to oppose him. These 
aldermen, especially the black aldermen, faced an elementary problem. As the Don Rose 
explained, “‘The black community is so sensitive on crime. That’s one area where he has to 
tread very carefully.”153  
* * * 
To the extent that Washington changed policing, he did so where the authority lay 
squarely within his executive power. By appointing new faces, he achieved good government 
goals and limited political influence within the Department. This was precisely where the 
irony of black power emerged. Washington’s most successful reform was his renunciation of 
the privilege of power. Budgetary retrenchment, due to federal cutbacks and the continuing 
atrophy of the city’s tax base, joined with City Council intransigence to make any efforts to 
use the Police Department to build power for his electorate almost impossible. Washington’s 
election seemed to be a triumph over the racial domination that structured the city’s politics 
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and policing throughout the twentieth century. Yet, the conditions under which Washington 
came into power made action exceptionally difficult in his first two years in office. In 1985, 
the logjam over the relationship between the budget and policing would finally be broken. In 
its wake, Washington’s efforts to remake policing, by assigning police more fairly, by putting 
more police in the neighborhoods, and by addressing his constituents’ concerns about drug 
dealing and gang violence, would have disastrous consequences.  
383 
 
CHAPTER 10: THE LOCAL WAR ON DRUGS 
 
 
On November 20, 1984, sixteen-year old Billy Moore, fifteen-year old Omar Dixon, 
and two other friends skipped school at Calumet High School to head up to Simeon 
Vocational High School. They intended get back $10 that had been stolen from Billy’s 
cousin the previous day. Moore took a .22 caliber pistol his aunt kept hidden under her bed 
for protection. Learning that the dispute over money already had been resolved, Moore and 
Dixon hung out with a friend near the school. Just before lunch, seventeen-year old Benji 
Wilson walked up behind them, bumping Moore. Although Wilson usually ate lunch with his 
basketball coach, on this day he had been arguing with his girlfriend Jetun Rush about their 
young son. Walking Ms. Rush to the bus stop, he came up on Moore and Dixon.  
 Accounts of what happened next differ, but they all build to the same outcome: Billy 
Moore shot Wilson twice. Wilson would die from his wounds later that day becoming the 
669th homicide victim in Chicago that year; by the end of which the number would rise to 
741. More than eighteen percent of those murdered—137 victims—were youths under the 
age of nineteen. Yet, of all the terrible killings in 1984, Ben Wilson’s stood out in the 
collective response that it engendered.  
 Six feet, ten inches tall, Ben Wilson always stood out, especially on the hardwood. 
Under the tutelage of coach Bob Hambric, he was fast becoming a basketball legend. During 
his junior year, Wilson had led Simeon to its first-ever state championship. As his mother, 
Mary Wilson, described, “My son, my boy, was a star. Not only for the city but for the whole 
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nation.”1 During the summer of 1984, youth basketball guru Sonny Vaccaro ranked Wilson 
the top player in the country. His death hit hard. “I cried like a baby,” said Coodie, the 
director of a 2012 documentary about the killing. “The city cried like babies.”2 In Wilson’s 
excellence, many black Chicagoans saw their own aspirations—suddenly cut off by the 
conditions of urban life in the 1980s. As the reporter Scoop Jackson retrospectively noted, 
“He does represent a dream unfulfilled, you know, and that’s a hard pill to swallow.”3 
 Ben Wilson’s death galvanized political leaders and popular opinion in Chicago. 
Police response initiated what would be a two-decade long crackdown on black youth. The 
results were so attenuated from the actual circumstances of Wilson’s killing that they, too, 
were, “a hard pill to swallow.” Wilson’s death provided the justification by which Harold 
Washington, a liberal black mayor, launched a war on “gangs and drugs” that targeted the 
most vulnerable and excluded young people in the city’s most desolate landscapes. Wilson’s 
death sat at the juncture of a series of long-term changes in American life that had by the 
mid-1980s produced dramatic forms of social stratification within the geography of the city: 
federal austerity; punitive sentencing laws in Illinois; local political factionalism centered on 
race; and a set of emerging popular beliefs about the relationship of gangs and drugs to 
youth violence. Harold Washington made his choices as to how to address the concerns of 
his constituents over community safety—chiefly, the safety of their children—at this nexus. 
 This history, the launching of a war on gangs and drugs in Chicago, demonstrates the 
importance of the local in the development of punitive policing. The choices made in City 
Hall, in the City Council, and at Police Headquarters mattered for the lives of Chicago 
                                                 
1 Paul Weingarten, “For Love of Ben: When Her Son Died, Mary Wilson Vowed it Would not be in Vain,” 
Chicago Tribune, September 8, 1985, F12. 
2 “Director’s Take,” ESPN films website. Basketball coach Jimmy Collins echoed this, “It was unbelievable 
sadness, I mean, it was just … the whole city had this cloud over it.” Jimmy Collins, Benji, 46:53 
3 Scoop Jackson, Benji 3:29 
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residents. Neither state nor federal criminal justice policies produced this war on gangs or 
drugs, at least not in the way that later efforts, by Presidents Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton 
and by a series of Republicans in the Governor’s mansion downstate, would extend and 
intensify it. Nevertheless, changes in American social geography and politics that occurred 
between 1960 and 1985 structured and conditioned how and what could be done. Chicago 
was not the same city in 1985 that it had been in 1960. Mayor Washington had few 
resources, an intransigent opposition, and a public demanding that its children be protected. 
Their confluence set Chicago policing on a disastrous course. 
The Death of Benji Wilson 
 While Ben Wilson was still alive on a hospital gurney the initial television newscasts 
gave shape to the narrative that would dominate coverage of the shooting: Omar Dixon and 
Billy Moore were connected to the Black Gangster Disciples, a Chicago street gang. No one 
seemed particularly concerned about the nature of their involvement or cognizant that such 
facts might matter. Were they core gang members? Were they marginal affiliates? Once the 
media made the connection between the boys and the gang a single crude narrative 
dominated: Ben Wilson had been killed by “gang violence.” Only the Chicago Police, who 
classify a killing as a gang-homicide if it “exhibits qualities of a gang motive, such as 
retaliation, initiation, or defending gang turf[,]”openly dissented from this consensus.4 
 The narrative of the case that the prosecution presented at trial was probably not 
accurate. Three critical issues were in dispute: Was Omar Dixon involved at all? Relatedly, 
had Dixon and Moore tried to rob Wilson? Finally, what had Wilson done? Jetun Rush, 
                                                 
4 Richard Rosenfeld, Timothy M. Bray, and Arlen Egley, “Facilitating Violence: A Comparison of Gang-
Motivated, Gang-Affiliated, and Nongang Youth Homicides,” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 15 (1999): 498. 
For further elaboration of the Chicago definition, see Carolyn Rebecca Block and Richard Block, “Street Gang 
Crime in Chicago,” National Institute of Justice: Research in Brief, December 1993, 2. 
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Wilson’s girlfriend, was the prosecution’s star witness, and her testimony was backed up by 
the jailhouse confessions of Moore and Dixon. These stories disputed who bumped into 
whom first, Moore or Wilson, but they agreed that Dixon had tried to rifle Wilson’s pockets. 
Wilson’s only actions were defensive: pushing Dixon away. They also agreed that Dixon told 
Moore to shoot Wilson: “pop him,” according to Moore’s confession; and, “Let’s shoot this 
punk,” according to Rush.5 Sean Baylis, another Simeon student who witnessed the shooting 
from inside a video game parlor, testified that “he saw [Dixon] approach Wilson, grab his 
arm, say something to him and then push Wilson back toward the store window.”6 
 Dixon presented an alternative, if self-serving, version of the days’ events when he 
took the stand at trial and recanted his confession. In a pattern quite familiar in the literature 
of false confessions, Dixon claimed that he signed the prepared statement that detectives 
brought to the room where he was being held at 3:30 a.m., “because he had not slept, eaten 
or talked to anyone while at the police station and was very tired and afraid and ‘just wanted 
to get it over with.’”7 In Dixon’s version of the story, he was uninvolved with what 
happened that day. He had not rifled Wilson’s pockets, nor had he told his friend to shoot 
the basketball player. Rather, he had stood by as the altercation between the two boys 
developed. 
 Billy Moore, who did not testify at trial, spoke about the case for the first time more 
than twenty-five years later. His narrative (and that of the documentary film, Benji) was more 
                                                 
5 See Illinois v. Dixon, 169 Ill. App. 3d 959, 523 N.E.2d 1160 (Ill. App. 1988); Illinois v. Moore, 229 Ill. App. 3d 66, 
593 N.E.2d 771 (Ill. App. 1992); Linnet Myers, “How Ben Wilson Died: Jury Hears 2 Versions,” Chicago 
Tribune, October 9, 1985, 1.  
6 Illinois v. Dixon, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 963.  
7 Illinois v. Dixon, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 967. Linnet Myers, “Teen Denies Helping Kill Ben Wilson,” Chicago 
Tribune, October 11, 1985, A6. On false confessions, see Richard Leo, Police Interrogation and American Justice 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal 
Prosecutions Go Wrong (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).   
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complex. His father died and afterwards, Moore admitted, “I may have got a little out of 
control, certainly to the point to think that carrying a gun was acceptable.” Killing was never 
his intention, though. “I never wanted to shoot anybody. I didn’t think I could pull the 
trigger.” To Moore, Wilson’s death happened not because of “gangs,” but because he was 
carrying a gun and he got in an altercation. He described a fight that began when Wilson 
refused to apologize for bumping into Moore, moved through a repartee of “fuck yous,” 
before it escalated as Moore showed the gun in his waistband. It ended when Moore shot 
Wilson twice, just after Wilson asked him, “What you goin’ do, shoot me mother fucker?”8  
 The trial testimony raised questions as to whether what Jetun Rush saw and what she 
testified were the same. As to the matter of Dixon’s involvement, Detective Bosco, who 
interviewed Rush a few hours after the shooting, testified that “she did not tell him that 
[Dixon] told Moore to shoot Wilson,” although he believed that Rush related that to another 
officer. Moreover, Rush’s testimony on the stand and Moore’s in his confession each 
attributed a different statement to Moore, both of which were purported to be direct quotes: 
“Pop him”/“Let’s shoot this punk.” To the court that heard Dixon’s appeal the differences 
were significant. “Although the substance of the directives attributed to defendant are, 
admittedly, the same, the words used by Rush and Moore as purported quotes of him are 
notably dissimilar.”9 
Street Gang Intervention 
 It is difficult to come to any definitive conclusions about which story was true, or 
whether what actually happened was some third version of events. The point is that a 
                                                 
8 Benji, 1:06:05. 
9 Illinois v. Dixon, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 976. 
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narrative about “gang violence” took hold and dominated. In common conversation, the 
terms “youth violence” and “gang violence” were often used interchangeably. Following 
Wilson’s death little consideration was given to whether or not they described the same 
phenomenon. For example, although Mayor Washington spoke almost exclusively about 
gangs, when he set up a task force to address gang problems in the aftermath of the Wilson 
killing, he named it the “Mayor’s Task Force on Youth Crime Prevention.”  
  “Gang violence” provided a riveting, digestible storyline for public consumption, 
and an avenue for channeling public concern about the high rate at which young people 
were being killed. As the artist and intellectual Useni Eugene Perkins argued, it was this 
framing that caused “the city government, the police and other public officials” to finally 
listen to the community leaders, clergy and social service representatives” whose “annual 
denunciation of black street-gang violence … routinely went unanswered.”10 It was precisely 
the narrative of “gang violence” that produced policy changes. 
Insert Figure 15 
 The evolution in common understandings of gangs by the mid-1980s shaped the 
social meaning of framing Wilson’s death as an act of gang violence. Both youth violence 
and gang violence were problems with tragic consequences in Chicago. But their patterns 
were different than people remember. Homicide remained high by historic standards in the 
mid-1980s, but it had fallen dramatically from its peak of 962 in 1974 to a relative low of 667 
in 1985—a drop of more than thirty percent. Nor did the 1980s see a spike in youth 
homicides rates. As Figure 15 shows, homicide rates among youth aged fifteen to nineteen 
                                                 
10 Useni Eugene Perkins, Explosion of Chicago’s Black Street Gangs: 1900 to the Present (Chicago: Third World Press, 
1987), 15.  
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remained stable. By contrast gang-motivated homicides were high. As the sociologist Cheryl 
Maxson argues, “One media-driven image about gangs is accurate: gang-involved youth 
commit a lot of crime and violence—far more than their non-gang counterparts.”11 During 
Washington’s years, gang-related homicides remained at a sustained high level; they made up 
almost ten percent of all homicides, greater than at any previous point in Chicago history.  
 
 In the aftermath of Wilson’s death, Washington set up a variety of gang intervention 
programs, although the budget and the City Council made such efforts difficult. At the time 
of Wilson’s death, the Mayor was in the throes of trying to cut the Police budget. He quickly 
gave up. The Tribune described this move as “surrender,” but it seems more accurate to say 
that he responded to political reconfigurations. Even before Wilson’s funeral the City 
Council majority announced a program to put an additional 500 officers on the street and to 
develop an auxiliary police force.12 Washington took more time to articulate his anti-gang 
efforts: When he did they consisted of an approach that included both social welfare 
programming, which were planned by the Task Force, and suppression measures that were 
immediately undertaken by police. Although he announced a first wave of changes during 
the December following Wilson’s death, getting the City Council to pass the Task Force’s 
Plan took until the following year.   
 From the beginning, the vicious battles between the mayor and City Council over 
funding hamstrung efforts at youth crime prevention. Feuds over the funding of the Police 
                                                 
11 Cheryl Maxson, “Street Gangs: How Research Can Inform Public Policy,” in Crime and Public Policy, ed. James 
Q. Wilson and Joan Petersilia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 165. 
12 Thom Shanker and Jean Davidson, “Washington’s Gang Strategy Still in Pieces,” Chicago Tribune, December 
2, 1984, C1.  
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Department that dominated the last two months of 1984 meant that no funds were available 
to kick off the work of the Mayor’s Task Force.13 Even when the budget was finally resolved, 
it was done with the Council allocating only $1 million of the $4.5 million in city, state and 
federal funds that Washington had requested. Not only that, the Council created a new 
committee, the Special Committee on Youth Development and Employment, just to watch 
over the way that money was spent. 
When the Task Force got off the ground in early January 1985, it consisted of four 
separate subcommittees. Of the four, the Program Development Committee did most of the 
relevant work.14 By February 4, Washington’s administrative assistant Mike Holewinski had 
met with the director of the Department of Human Services and the Committee chair, and 
the three recommended a two-part “intervention program.” It would be based in the 
Department of Human Services, and would be modeled on the Crisis Intervention Network 
in Philadelphia. Its mission would be to “minimize gang violence and channel youth into 
constructive alternatives.” The second dimension of the program was to provide funding to 
private organizations for developing crime reduction capacity through victim assistance, 
neighborhood crime watch, and youth recreation.15  
                                                 
13 Thom Shanker, “Budget Battles Stall Start-Up of Anti-gang Efforts,” Chicago Tribune, December 25, 1984, 
A1.  
14 The mission of the Juvenile Justice Committee was to describe existing juvenile justice activity and identify 
areas for improvement. The Program Development Committee was to develop an approach to both 
intervention in gang disputes and to gang prevention efforts that would target fringe groups and marginal 
youth. The Resource Development Committee’s portfolio was to find funds and non-fiscal support currently 
being used in anti-gang programming. Finally, the Legislative Development Committee’s task was coming up 
with bills for the Mayor to send down to the state legislature. The other three other committees all committed 
something to the final plan. See documents in Mayor’s Task Force on Youth Crime Prevention, Report 
(Chicago: City of Chicago, the Task Force, 1985). 
15 Michael S. Holewinski to Mayor Harold Washington, February 4, 1983, 2, HWAC Public Safety 8-3; Linnet 
Myers, “Gang Task Force Offers a Plan: Philadelphia Model is Committee’s Choice,” Chicago Tribune, February 
8, 1985, A1.  
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The Mayor formally proposed the program, called the “Chicago Intervention 
Network” (CIN), to the City Council on March 6. Its funding consisted of one million 
dollars in city funds, with an additional nearly three million dollars coming primarily from 
existing federal and state funds.16 Just under a quarter-million dollars was to be spent on the 
street intervention component, which would have 60 employees. The rest would be 
distributed to agencies.17 Despite agreement in principle about the program and the level of 
funding, it nonetheless got hung up in the Council Wars discussed in Chapter 8.18 Rather 
than waiting for the Council, the Mayor simply diverted one million dollars from the city’s 
corporate fund to begin staffing the street intervention component of the program.19  
Compared to a program like The Woodlawn Organization’s War on Poverty era 
Manpower Demonstration Project, C.I.N.’s aims were limited. It sought only violence 
reduction and not social transformation. Neither political will nor funds were available for a 
more ambitious initiative. University of Chicago sociologist Irving Spergel described a gang-
violence reduction program he was running as “focused on reduction of gang violence rather 
than the more complex issue of delinquency. The program targeted things that gang 
                                                 
16 Community Development Block Grants ($2.2 million), Community Service Block Grants ($.4 million) and 
the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ($.35 million).  
17 Michael Holewinski, Testimony Before City Council Special Committee, May 2, 1985, in Mayor’s Task Force 
on Youth Crime Prevention, Report. 
18 The disputes actually reveal the true level of pettiness in the council wars. In the final action before voting on 
the Resolution, the 29 inserted language that gave the Council authority to “approve” and not merely “review” 
contracts awarded as part of the programs.  Committee Chair, Alderman Miguel Santiago (the Council lone 
Latino and a member of the 29), claimed that the Mayor “recognized” that the Council needed to approve all 
contracts as part of the entire Community Development Block Grant Program for the upcoming year. 
“Statement of Alderman Miguel Santiago,” May 28, 1985, in Mayor’s Task Force on Youth Crime Prevention, 
Report. In vetoing the Resolution, Washington claimed that the “approval” language was not “necessary for the 
proper functioning of this program. It is merely another attempt by this council to assert control over programs 
more properly handled by the executive branch.” Washington Rejection of Special Committee Resolution and 
Substitute Resolution,” May 6, 1985, in Mayor’s Task Force on Youth Crime Prevention, Report. Two days 
later, the Council re-passed the resolution, substituting “concur” for approve.   
19 Washington Rejection of Special Committee Resolution and Substitute Resolution,” May 6, 1985, Mayor’s 
Task Force on Youth Crime Prevention, Report.  
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members were concerned with: the inability to move from one street to another and the 
inability to control violence.”20  
C.I.N.’s high-risk intervention unit operated in five program areas: Cabrini-Green, 
Robert Taylor, Henry Horner, Pilsen, and Humbolt Park. The first three were almost 
exclusively black CHA housing projects, the latter two Latino/a neighborhoods on the city’s 
West Side. Over the first year the street intervention unit provided 1,567 street 
interventions.21 Overall, the program served 4,387 clients. Of 13,786 problems that C.I.N. 
workers identified these clients to be facing, by far the largest proportion was lack of 
employment, which was true in over half of all cases (2,727). Youth gang problems showed 
up with less frequency.22   
This was, as Spergel argued in a memo to the Chair of C.I.N.’s Coordinating 
Committee, a huge problem. In his six-page evaluation of the program a little more than a 
year into its life-span, he offered a comprehensive and devastating critique: C.I.N. was 
“plagued by a series of basic problems of design, structure, and program strategy.”23 
Foremost among these was the fact that it had too many goals. The program’s stated 
objectives were to “attack gang crime, prevent juvenile crime, treat delinquent behavior and 
nurture positive youth development.” How could one organization possibly do so much? 
Given that the program’s principle justification was the high level of gang homicide, Spergel 
thought that reducing gang violence ought to be the focus. But it clearly was not: “When 
only 12.2 percent of its services deal with conflict among gang members, threats by gangs, 
                                                 
20 Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, “Report on the Illinois Symposium on Gangs,” 
February 28 – March 1, 1985, 17, HWAC Public Safety 9-1 
21 City Of Chicago, Department of Human Services, “Chicago Intervention Network,” June 11, 1986, 2, 
HWAC Public Safety 8-5.  
22 City Of Chicago, Department of Human Services, “Chicago Intervention Network.”  
23 Irving Spergel to Ben Kendrick, August 8, 1986, HWAC Public Safety 8-5. 
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and pressure by gangs, then ‘attacking gang crime’ is not a primary goal.” While Spergel’s 
other criticisms touched on various aspects of the program, each was rooted in gang 
violence: the organizations contracted with had little experience or contact with gang youth 
likely to commit violent crime; its crisis teams were not composed of competent, streetwise 
personnel; and no adequate information system relating gang violence to C.I.N. activities 
existed.24  
Although the program was meant to focus on high-risk intervention, the failings 
identified by Spergel reflected the institutional structure of Chicago politics. Mike 
Holewinski explained this at the Annual Meeting of the Citizens Committee on Juvenile 
Court of Cook County, where he spoke on a panel entitled, “Gangs, Juvenile Court, and the 
Community: What Can be Done?” Two choices had been put before the Task Force: It 
could “deal with just the hard-core gang members or broaden the program so as to also deal 
with young people in general.” The decision to make the broader choice was based on 
politics: “It was our observation, from what we heard in Chicago’s communities and from 
what we have heard from the political establishment in terms of fifty City Council members, 
that a narrowly focused program would have, first of all, very little chance of success, and, 
secondly, would not get the allocation of resources.” Unless the program was broadly 
inclusive, so that every community could get money and services, the program would have 
been “a very difficult thing to sell to the Chicago City Council.”25 
 
The “Gangs and Drugs” Problem 
                                                 
24 Irving Spergel to Ben Kendrick, Aug. 8, 1986, HWAC Public Safety 8-5. 
25 “Statement of Mike Holewinski,” in Gangs, Juvenile Court, and the Community: What Can Be Done, 1985, 21, 21, 
22. 
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 Holewinski’s statement revealed the paradox faced by the Washington administration 
as it faced off with the Council majority: if it focused on “efficacy” it would not have any 
programs at all. It would be left with the Police Department. But, not basing its programs on 
efficacy, it did not end up much better off. In the end, Washington was just left with the 
Police, to whom he turned to address the problem of gang violence. And here, real change 
occurred. The tenuous connection between Ben Wilson’s death and gang violence 
nonetheless launched a revolution in the policing of illegal drugs in the city of Chicago. By 
the mid 1980s, the problems of gangs and drugs had become so linked in the public mind 
that it was a small step from trying to stop gang violence to targeting black youth for drug 
violations. Police targeted drug use and sales as a proxy for gang activity. Policing drugs 
became a day-to-day way of measuring progress in the effort to suppress violence. This new 
domain of police activity provides one way of understanding a broader shift in approach 
during the 1980s.26  
For most of Chicago’s history, the regulation of drugs had little to do with youth 
gangs. Prior to the 1950s, the Police Department’s Narcotics Bureau was a small time affair, 
with only four members.27 As we have seen, police and ward politicians channeled vice into 
black neighborhoods, where it was less conspicuous to white reformers. During the 1940s, 
the four man Narcotic Bureau made few arrests, and these were concentrated in the city’s 
skid row on the near west side and at the center of the historic Black Belt in the 
Douglas/Grand Boulevard neighborhood.  
Insert Table 7 
                                                 
26 It is particularly helpful because the Police Department did not collect other statistics that might reflect how 
their tactics changed over time. 
27 “Fight Increase in Teen-Agers’ Marijuana Use,” Chicago Tribune, September 29, 1949, B1.   
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By 1950, however, the Chicago Police had inaugurated the first of three distinct 
models of drug policing that would dominate for the rest of the century. These regimes 
existed in relationship to broader social currents, including changes in drug usage, as well as 
changes in the state and federal architecture of legal regulation. The first manner of policing 
was an effort to “contain users.” From 1950 until the middle of the 1960s, Police targeted a 
small core of drug users in a relatively restricted set of urban spaces. Thereafter, a new 
regime emerged to “stop the spread,” in response to the growth of recreational drug use. In 
place of concentrated policing, enforcement spread across the city and became more 
anonymous. This regime targeted blacks much more heavily than anyone else. Nonetheless, 
it was much less discriminatory than either the policing that came before or the policing that 
came after. The third change came during Harold Washington’s term in office, the “war on 
gangs and drugs.” The response to Benji Wilson’s death did not drive every aspect of the 
change, but a clear pattern emerges from 1985 to 1987, as police focused on drug arrests as a 
means to control youth.  
 
In the immediate postwar period, the construction of a robust apparatus to regulate 
and police drugs was created in response to changing conditions in cities, especially “a 
reported rise in drug addiction between 1947 and 1950, particularly in black and Puerto 
Rican ghettos of northern cities.”28 While the federal government made penalties for opiates 
and marijuana identical and severe with the Boggs Act (1951), Illinois merely enhanced the 
                                                 
28 David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control, Third Edition (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 230.  
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existing scheme of identical penalties it already employed. After 1951, a first possession 
offense carried a two- to ten-year sentence.29  
When heroin usage spiked in Chicago during the last three years of the decade, the 
Department created a new “narcotics section.”30 The new unit processed everyone arrested 
on a drug violation, no matter what precipitated the arrest, and kept centralized records.31 
Made part of the Vice Control Division, along with the regulation of gambling and 
prostitution, the narcotics section grew quickly and within two to three years included fifty-
nine officers.32 The tenfold increase in manpower in the 1950s increased arrests dramatically 
and while the old spots persisted as common places for arrests over the next two decades, 
the narcotics section expanded its net into many other parts of the city.  
The expansion of policing during the 1950s changed the role of race in drug arrests. 
Non-white and white arrest locales began to disaggregate, where they had once overlapped.33 
Non-white arrests achieved dramatic concentrations in some neighborhoods. Overall, 
greater targeting of non-white neighborhoods led to a dramatic transformation in the ratio of 
non-white-to-white arrests by the narcotics section from 1953 to 1958 averaging a 
remarkable 7:1. Moreover, a majority of the arrests made by the narcotics section had little to 
                                                 
29 Prior to November 1949. Patrick Hughes, et. al, “The Natural History of a Heroin Epidemic,” American 
Journal of Public Health 62 (1972): 996–97; George N. Leighton and Charles S. Bargiel, “A History of Illinois 
Drug Control Laws from 1818 to 1975,” John Marshall Journal of Practice & Procedure 9 (1975): 154–58. 
30 Hughes, et. al, “The Natural History of a Heroin Epidemic,” 996–97. On the new narcotics section, see 
“Chicago Police Close Net on Five ‘Big Time’ Dealers in Narcotics,” Chicago Defender, January 20, 1951, 4; 
James Doherty, “O’Connor Tells What He’s Done to Police Force: Counts Up Progress and is Still 
Ambitious,” Chicago Tribune, February 12, 1951, 17. The city created a special narcotics court as part of its 
Municipal Court. “Court Opened to Try Drug Traffic Cases,” Chicago Tribune, April 3, 1951, A7. The city 
opened a second branch in 1970. Barry Polsky, “News Briefs: Extra Narcotics Court Set Up,” Chicago Tribune, 
July 18, 1970, 3. 
31 Hughes, et. al, “The Natural History of a Heroin Epidemic,” 996-97. 
32 There were another 30 to 40 in the local districts. Lois B. DeFluer, “Biasing Influences on Drug Arrest 
Records: Implications for Deviance Research,” American Sociological Review 40 (1975): 99. 
33 DeFluer used the terms white and non-white.   
  
    397 
with drug use. Rather, the officers routinely sought to contain users, picking up non-white 
arrestees who were known to be involved with drugs on minor charges such as disorderly 
conduct or loitering.34  
In the 1960s, new patterns of regulation and policing were driven by the surprising 
reemergence of illicit drug use after it had been relatively well suppressed for four decades. 
At the beginning of the 1960s, according to the historians David Musto and Pamela 
Korsmeyer, “drug use was thought to be largely confined to the urban poor, criminal 
elements, and such small nonconformist groups as jazz musicians and ‘beatnik’ artists and 
intellectuals.” In most places and amongst most groups, less than two percent of the 
population used any illicit drugs over the course of their lifetimes. Across the 1960s, 
marijuana use grew dramatically; in 1967 it “seemed to explode.”  Heroin, which had been 
largely restricted to particular port cities in the Northeast, now crossed boundaries of class 
and race. 
Insert Figure 16  
 Public concern over increasing drug usage led to the collection of a wide array of 
new statistics.35 The largest and most famous, the Monitoring the Future study, represented in 
                                                 
34 Hughes, et. al, “The Natural History of a Heroin Epidemic,” 997. I believe this is the ratio of black to white 
arrests, without taking relative population size into account. Given the smaller black population the ratio of 
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people for non-drug offenses.  
35 Nationwide surveys of drug use, as well as programs to report hospital admissions for drug use and drug 
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Figure 16 above, established that drug use rose until the mid-1970s; underwent a deep and 
sustained fall during the 1980s; rose moderately in the 1990s; and stabilized in the late 1990s. 
Even though there have been variations in use among different ages and different drugs, this 
pattern holds true for the full range of illicit drug use.36  
 In the 1960s, marijuana use spread fairly uniformly across all youth cohorts.37 By 
contrast, heroin use was never widespread across the population as a whole and in the 1960s 
had a particularly distinctive geography.38 Its vast expansion in the 1960s was concentrated in 
five cities (New York, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.) and 
overwhelmingly in neighborhoods occupied by poor persons of color.39 Near the end of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Client Oriented Data Acquisition Process (CODAP) reports data on drug treatment. Nicholas J. Kozel and 
Edgar H. Adams, “Epidemiology of Drug Abuse: An Overview,” Science, November 21, 1986, 970–74. For 
example, people of different ages use drugs at different rates; use of particular drugs may skew heavily by age. 
The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse—now called the National Survey on Drug Abuse—contains 
data from which trends can be observed for the groups over time: 12 to 17; 18 to 25; 26 to 34; and 35 and 
older. These surveys were done triennially until the 1990s, when they became annual. Drug usage is greatest 
among people 18 to 25, both annually and within the last 30 days. After age 35, drug use tends be fairly low; the 
gap between yearly use and monthly use is quite small, making it likely that most users of drugs after age 35 are 
habitual users. Table 2, from the National Household Surveys and National Surveys, contains drug use (of any 
drugs) by frequency by age from 1985 to 2001. (Numbers refer the percentages of people in the corresponding 
age group using drugs during the particular period. Similar trends can be seen for marijuana annually since 1971 
and for cocaine, triennially since 1976. “Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health; 
Detailed Tables,” Tables 7.44B (marijuana) and 7.45B (cocaine), (accessed 12/12/2013), 
www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10ResultsTables/NSDUHTables2010R/HTM/LOTSect7pe.htm 
36 Excluding, of course, drugs not yet invented or discovered for recreational use in 1975.  
37 During this period of growth in drug usage, marijuana was often tied in public discussion to heroin. Two 
common linkages were used: partisans of marijuana decriminalization or legalization contrasted the 
harmlessness of marijuana with the harmfulness of heroin. On the other side of the debate, marijuana people 
desiring continuing regulation of marijuana through criminal law described it as a gateway to hard drug usage. 
38 Heroin is absent from Figure 16 because the level of use amongst 12th graders was not high enough to show 
trends. In part, this reflects that Heroin is the dominant question in the federal government’s debates over drug 
policy, particularly in the Nixon administration, but all the way until the Carter administration. Carter’s 
administration officials saw cocaine and marijuana as political problems; they perceived heroin as a genuine 
health problem. David F. Musto and Pamela Korsenmeyer, The Quest for Drug Control: Politics and Federal Policy in 
a Period of Increasing Substance Abuse, 1963-1981 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). 
39 Schneider notes that of 60,000 users in New York City, half were black, half were Puerto Rican, and a quarter 
were white. The neighborhoods with the greatest concentrations of users were Central Harlem, East Harlem, 
and Riverside (West Harlem and the Upper West Side). Eric Schneider, Smack: Heroin and the American City 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 118–20. This had much to do with the differences in age 
cohorts: the black population of cities was disproportionately young, and the youth population was 
disproportionately black. This density of young men, the population at greatest risk for use, precisely in the 
settings where use was most likely helps to explain some of why the first wave of heroin usage concentrated 
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1960s both the racial and spatial patterns began to change, as white initiates carried drugs 
with them into the suburbs.40  
 The growth of drug use in the 1960s led to the second model for policing drugs, in 
which police tried to “stop the spread.” The social and institutional mechanisms that had 
previously regulated the geography of drug use and sales broke down. They key metaphors 
employed to talk about the new reality were spatial: drug use was seen as having permeated 
both geographic and social boundaries. As Paul Hemphill, Assistant Director of Corrections 
for the Chicago Department of Human Resources declared in 1971: “The basic problem 
with drugs in recent years results from the sudden increase in their use on every socio-
economic level by our young people. What had once been a problem confined to the poor, 
to the chronically ill, and to various underworld subcultures has within the past 5 years 
virtually exploded out of the control of our institutions, including those of the family, the 
schools, the private and the governmental agencies.”41  
  Who used drugs shaped the way government actors perceived the change. Concern 
in the halls of government focused on the fact that middle-class white kids were now using 
drugs. Growing drug use in black neighborhoods did not fit this “stop the spread” narrative 
and, except in the black press, seemed to play a less prominent role. Within the black press, 
                                                                                                                                                 
heavily amongst blacks. In four out of five cities of the early heroin boom, the percentage of black men 
between 15 and 19 doubled. The number of white youth fell. Between 1960 and 1970, the percentage of black 
residents aged 16 to 24 grew from 40 to 55 percent of the population of central cities with more than one 
million residents. Schneider. 
40 White youth began to use heroin in larger numbers near the end of the 1960s. Intrepid white youth moved to 
locations where heroin markets existed and they could attain drug knowledge. They became conduits for this 
knowledge to filter out to the suburbs. Schneider. The age structure of users began to change as well. By the 
1980s, new initiates continued to be under 25, but an increasing number were older. Epidemiology of Heroin: 1964-
1984 (Rockville, MD: U.S. Dept. Oof Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Alcohol Drug Abuse 
and Mental Health Administration, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Division of Epidemiology and Statistical 
Analysis, 1985), 2, ex. 1.  
41 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Narcotics, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Part II, United 
States Senate, 92d Cong. 678 (1971) (statement of Paul Hemphill). 
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other narratives predominated, ones concerned with the role of drugs in stunting black 
community development rather than the way in which drugs had slipped the boundaries of 
the ghetto. 
 Drug reforms in the 1960s and 1970s reversed the impulse underlying the Boggs Act 
to punish marijuana and opiates identically. Marijuana was critical to campaigns to reduce the 
stigma of drug usage and to assess penalties in relationship to harm. Both the state of Illinois 
and the Nixon administration reformed their drug laws to rationalize policy by tying 
penalties to the potential harmfulness of the drugs.42 Congress eliminated existing mandatory 
minimums and made possession of a controlled substance a misdemeanor, giving judges 
discretion to give probation for simple possession. Illinois undertook similar reforms in 
1970.43 Each considerably limited the punishment for possession of marijuana.44 Federal 
funding for law enforcement skyrocketed, as did its investment in drug treatment.45  
Insert Figure 17 
  Like regulators, police tried to stop the spread of drugs. The resulting pattern of 
arrests had two primary characteristics.46 First, the police made more drug arrests. In 1964 
                                                 
42 Federal policy created five different schedules for regulated drugs in 1970, based on their potential medical 
usefulness and their potential for harm. Alcoholic and Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act, P.L. 90-574, 82 Stat. 
1006 (1968); Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970). 
43 Illinois’ “exhaustive and ambitious” Controlled Substances Act “sought to establish a uniform system for the 
control of the manufacture, distribution, and possession of what it defined as controlled dangerous substances, 
to provide enforcement procedures and penalties, to coordinate efforts against abuse and to develop a program 
to curb drug abuse in Illinois schools.” 
44 Lisa L. Miller, “The Invisible Black Victim: How American Federalism Perpetuates Racial Inequality in 
Criminal Justice,” Law & Society Review 44 (2010): 807. 
45 “Between 1968 and 1974 the federal budget for enforcement rose from $3 million to $224 million. At the 
same time the nation’s investment in treatment experienced equally phenomenal growth: from $18 million in 
1966, funding reached $350 million in 1975.” Kathleen J. Frydl, The Drug Wars in America, 1940-1973 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 364. 
46 I have based many of my observations here on drug arrest statistics, which do not speak for themselves. 
Rather they enact knowledge in accordance with institutional imperatives, cultural understandings, and political 
realities. The statistics for drug arrests are particularly bare bones. In reporting drug arrests, the CPD employed 
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the police made only 2,621 drug arrests; in 1976 they made 17,607. This growth in arrests 
correlated with increasing drug usage. If viewed nationally over the long term, changing drug 
usage patterns have little relation to police arrest activity. (This is particularly when 
comparisons between demographic groups are broken down.) But this does not mean that at 
particular times there was no correlation between growing use and growing arrests. In the 
1960s through the middle of the 1970s local data and national surveys suggest that marijuana 
and heroin usage was growing, and the increased arrest activity likely correlated with that 
increase.47  
Similarly, drug arrests dropped off after 1976, falling to a low of 13,612, which 
prefigured the national downturn after 1979 in drug usage shown in the Monitoring the Future 
statistics. Just as increasing drug usage correlated with the rise in drug arrests, their fall likely 
related to changing usage—in particular dwindling heroin use. New heroin initiates peaked 
outside of the northeastern United States in 1976. In Chicago, heroin-related hospital 
emergency admissions fell off dramatically from 1.15 of every 1,000 in 1976 to .24 by 1980.48 
                                                                                                                                                 
the categories of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as part of its Uniform Crime Report program. The nature 
of the arrest—whether for possession or distribution—for example are not recorded. Rather, arrests are simply 
categorized into four categories under “Narcotic Drug Laws”: Opium or Cocaine & Their Derivatives, such as 
morphine, heroin, codeine; Marijuana; Synthetic Narcotics, meaning manufactured narcotics which can cause 
true drug addiction (demerol, methadones); and Other – Dangerous Non-Narcotic Drugs, like barbiturates, 
benzedrine. Marijuana is regulated separately under Illinois law; all of the other arrests fall under the Illinois 
Controlled Substances Act. Because the categories are already such a smorgasbord of different drugs, their 
primary utility comes merely in distinguishing the changing level of marijuana arrests. 
47 Illinois Legislative Investigating Committee, The Drug Crisis: Report on Drug Abuse in Illinois (Springfield, Ill.: 
Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, 1971), 17–18; Mary Kloris, “Chicago, Illinois,” in Community 
Correspondents Group, Meeting Five Proceedings, Volume 1 (Rockville, MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1979), 
39–43; Mary Kloris, “Nature and Scope of Dangerous Drug Abuse in Chicago,” in Current Trends and Issues in 
Drug Abuse, Volume 2 (Rockville, MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1979), 38–67; Wayne Wiebel, “Nature 
and Scope of Dangerous Drug Abuse in Chicago,” in Community Correspondents Group, Drug Abuse Indicator Trends, 
Volume 1 (Rockville, MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1979), 150–173.  
48 Epidemiology of Heroin: 1964-1984, 41, tbl. 14B; 54, tbl. 2. 
  
    402 
Heroin arrests followed this same pattern, falling from 7,000 in 1976 to under 1,000 by 
1980.49  
Insert Figure 18 
 Second, police produced the increase in arrests by enlarging the geography of drug 
policing. The relatively large number of policemen dedicated to drugs during the 1950s 
intensively targeted black communities connected to the drug underworld; the growth in 
drug usage during the second half of the 1960s changed their priorities. Specialist drug 
officers stopped concentrating on containing users by harassing them on non-drug charges. 
Between 1966 and 1970, such arrests fell to less than ten percent of the narcotics unit’s total. 
Instead, the entire Police Department became involved in arresting people for actual drug 
offenses.50 The increased level of attention devoted to drugs across the force actually 
brought arrest rates closer to racial parity rather than the previous gross disparities of the 
1950s.51 During the 1960s, the ratio of non-whites to whites arrested by the narcotics unit 
fell to 2:1. Moreover, the patrol force, rather than the specialized drug unit, was now 
handling most of drug arrests.  
Arrest rates for both blacks and non-blacks grew massively during the twenty-year 
period between 1966 and 1985. For blacks, arrest rates rose from 233 per 100,000 to a 
temporary peak of 963 in 1976; for non-blacks, the shift was from 70 to 336. Nonetheless, as 
Figure 18 shows, despite the increases in arrests, a relatively stable ratio of around three to 
                                                 
49 These arrest statistics are for “heroin and cocaine,” but given usage patterns and an incredible public 
indifference to the harmful aspects of cocaine use at the time, the vast majority of them were likely heroin. See 
Chicago Police Department, Annual Reports.  
50 Over the five-year period from 1960 to 1964 drug arrests were very stable, falling from 2653 to 2621. In 
other words, the rise in arrests did not begin until 1965.  
51 DeFluer, “Biasing Influences on Drug Arrest Records: Implications for Deviance Research,” 100. Chicago 
Police Department, Annual Report (1969). 
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one emerged between these black and non-black arrestees, a grossly discriminatory ratio that 
bore no relation to usage rates. Nonetheless, it distinguished this period from the one that 
came before when blacks were policed even more intensively. CPD attempts to stop the 
spread of drugs preserved patterns of inequality in policing but they do not appear to have 
intensified them. 
Between 1965 and 1984, the massive increases in drug arrest rates did not lead to 
large increases in incarceration. This was in part due to the composition of arrests. While 
heroin arrests fell off in the 1970s, marijuana arrests grew consistently until they reached 
their maximum at 67 percent of all arrests in 1982. Even after Illinois implemented a 
determinate sentencing scheme in 1977, creating mandatory minimums, extremely long 
sentences, and eliminating parole release, and after the state past a drug-kingpin statute in 
1978, incarceration rates for drug offenses remained low. 52 In 1984, only 628 people were 
incarcerated for drug crimes, less than four percent of the total population of incarcerated 
persons.  
 
The Problem of “Gangs and Drugs” 
Harold Washington entered office with both gangs and drugs on his mind. When a 
Tribune reporter asked the new Police Superintendent Fred Rice what he learned about the 
philosophy of the Mayor during his job interview, Rice responded: “He was concerned with 
the gang problem. He was quite concerned with the narcotics problem.”53 Although 
                                                 
52 Illinois Public Act 80-1099 (1977); Pamela L. Griset, “The Evolution of the Determinate Ideal of 
Sentencing,” Law & Policy 19 (1997): 269–71. 
53 Phillip Wattley, “New Police Chief Changes Strategy to Fight Crime,” Chicago Tribune, August 28, 1983, C1.  
  
    404 
Washington took steps to address gangs and drugs in his first year and a half in office, they 
were halting; the Council Wars prevented the Administration from actively formulating new 
policies to combat crime. Rice described gangs and drugs serially, seemingly marking each 
off as a discrete policy area. Such a view accorded with the history of police regulation of 
both gangs and drugs during the 1960s and most of the 1970s. But a slow process of 
convergence between the two in public discourse around criminal justice policy had been 
occurring; by the mid-1980s, their merger accelerated. After Ben Wilson’s death, in both 
public discourse and policy, they had become a single “gangs and drugs problem.” 
Insert Figure 19 
 Drugs played no part in the narrative surrounding Wilson’s killing, but his death 
occurred when the link between gangs and drugs was the focus of conversations on criminal 
justice and neighborhood safety. In May 1985, seven months after Wilson died, Charles 
Rangel’s House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control held hearings on drug 
abuse and drug trafficking in Chicago. Congresswoman Collins opened the proceedings by 
noting that she had invited the committee to Chicago because of “a resurgence of street 
gang activity; and much to my alarm, we see more street gangs getting into the drug scene, 
not necessarily from the point of usage, but from the distribution and marketing end.” 
Washington added that the city had “limited resources … to deal with this large increase in 
drug use and gang/narcotic related crimes.” To put a fine point on things, Patrick Healy, the 
chairman of the Chicago Crime Commission, noted that in 10 months of operation, the 
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organization’s anonymous crime-tip line had “learned of the concerns of the inner city; and 
Mr. Chairman, they are predominantly drugs/gangs! Drugs/gangs! Drugs/gangs!”54 
The relationship between drugs (either trafficking or use) and gangs was not obvious, 
nor was it stable over time. Irving Spergel described the association in public discourse as the 
unfortunate “tendency to mix gangs, violence, and drug trafficking into one large ‘ball of 
wax.’”55 Many, if not most, researchers who studied youth gangs concluded that they 
generally did not have the organizational cohesion to engage in large-scale drug trafficking, 
even if individual gang members or smaller sub-unit of gangs (sets or crews) engaged in such 
activity.56 Although there are links between (1) gangs and drug trafficking, (2) gangs and 
violent crime, and (3) drugs and violent crime, there is no one-to-one relationship between 
them—at least not in any reliable correlation. As Spergel concluded, “The connection 
between drugs and (violent) street gangs is variable and a function of changing economic, 
cultural, racial/ethnic, and community factors.”57  
 In the mid-1980s, some Chicago gangs were heavily involved in drugs, and all 
engaged in violence. Nonetheless, the public connected the two in ways that are not borne 
out by the on evidence on the ground. Despite the growing number of drug-related 
homicides in Chicago, for example, there is little evidence at that these homicides were gang-
motivated. Even the Police Department, which invested more in the link between gangs and 
drugs than any other institution, classified only one homicide that was both “drug-related” 
                                                 
54 Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking in Chicago: Hearings of the Select Committee on Narcotic Abuse and Control, House of 
Representatives, 99th Congress 114-115 (statement of Rep. Cardiss Collins (D-IL)), 117 (statement of Harold 
Washington), 118 (statement of Patrick Healy) (1986). 
55 Irving Spergel, The Youth Gang Problem: A Community Approach (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 43. 
56 E.g., Malcolm W. Klein, Cheryl L. Maxson, and Lea C. Cunningham, “‘Crack,’ Street Gangs, and Violence,” 
Criminology 29 (1991): 623–50. 
57 Spergel, The Youth Gang Problem: A Community Approach, 49. 
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and “gang-motivated” from 1965-1974, eight from 1975-1985, and thirty-four from 1985-
1994. At their peak, gang-motivated, drug-business homicides were a tiny percentage of 
either gang-motivated homicides or drug-related homicides.58 
 The link between gangs and drugs was partially rooted in the depictions of the mass 
media and the efforts of the Reagan administration. Beginning in the mid-1980s, 
conservative political entrepreneurs began to use crime politics as an electoral strategy. As 
Katherine Beckett argued in her landmark book, Making Crime Pay (1997), politicians created 
the public opinion that crime was the most important problem facing the nation, rather than 
the other way around. In October 1982, when Reagan launched the war on drugs, two 
percent of people believed that drugs were the most important issue facing the country. 
Only when Reagan began giving speeches on the topic in support of the Anti-Drug Act of 
1986, did public concern rise above single digits.59 After 1984, electoral politics drove the 
passage of mandatory minimums, which Congress escalated biennially only in the weeks 
before an election.60 This pattern played out on a local level as well, as members of the City 
Council majority continually played upon notions of black criminality in order to 
delegitimize the Washington administration and to portray the Mayor as soft on crime.  
 This was about more than just conservative politicking.61 Black anti-crime activism 
over the past decade testified to the fact that key elements of Washington’s electorate did 
                                                 
58 Block and Block, “Street Gang Crime in Chicago,” 18–19. 
59 In 1982, 22 percent of Americans thought that reducing unemployment would be the most effective way to 
reduce crime; only three percent believed that cutting the drug supply would be more effective. Katherine 
Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 52–61. 
60 Naomi Murakawa, “Electing to Punish: Congress, Race, and the American Criminal Justice State” (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Yale University, 2005), 140–180. 
61 Most of the studies that have examined the relationship between crime and politics examine national data. I 
think this is driven both by easier the availability of data sets covering national political action and public 
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not see the “gang and drug” problem through the same lens as Ronald and Nancy Reagan. 
Many activists nonetheless intuited a link between gangs, drugs, and violence. Their concerns 
were local and immediate: they saw gang violence and drug-dealing in their neighborhoods 
and in the public spaces that made up the physical confines of their world. Even if gang 
members were not actually killing each other over drugs, the turf on which gang violence 
and the drug market flourished overlapped. This was not symbolic, as in the conservative 
ideology that placed black degeneracy at the center of both problems. Drug markets 
governed the routine activities of potential victims and offenders and shaped the likelihood 
of encounters between them; encounters that, while they might have nothing to do with 
drug distribution, could still get violent within the space of the drug market.62 
By the 1980s, those drug markets were dominated by cocaine sales. After 1981, 
cocaine use rose nationally, largely due to the innovation of crack cocaine. The process of 
making crack rocks was safer than freebasing from cocaine and delivered a similarly potent 
high. Moreover, it made it possible to sell cheap individual hits, opening up the market to a 
much wider spectrum of individuals.63 Although disaggregated usage data on crack versus 
other forms of cocaine does not exist for the 1980s, the best estimate of crack’s prevalence 
during this period comes from the work of Chicago economists. According to their model, 
“crack rose sharply beginning in 1985, peaked in 1989, and slowly declined thereafter.”64   
                                                                                                                                                 
opinion. It may also rely on presumptions bout the preeminence of national politics, which are persuasive in 
some cases but not others.  
62 Block and Block, “Street Gang Crime in Chicago,” 20–22. 
63 Roland G. Fryer, Jr. et al., “Measuring Crack Cocaine and Its Impact,” April 2006, 8, 
scholar.harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/fhlm_crack_cocaine_O.pdf?m=1358965646.  
64 Fryer, et. al, echo the work of Ansley Hamid, in finding a rise, fall, and stabilization cycle. Ansley Hamid, 
“The Developmental Cycle of a Drug Epidemic: The Cocaine Smoking Epidemic of 1981–1991,” Journal of 
Psychoactive Drugs 24 (1992): 337–44. 
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Local epidemiological evidence indicates that Chicago generally followed national 
patterns from the late 1970s through the mid-1980s—with one important exception. 
Epidemiologist Wayne Weibel noted in June of 1985, “[o]f the commonly abused illicit 
substances, cocaine remains the only drug to have shown consistent patterns of escalating 
abuse over the past half-decade. Depressants, stimulants, and hallucinogens, on the other 
hand, have shown decreasing patterns of abuse within the past year or two. … [H]eroin and 
marijuana, have remained relatively stable in recent years.”65 Chicago diverged from 
comparably large cities in the timing of the arrival of crack cocaine and in the nature of 
cocaine use. Although freebasing cocaine was popular by the mid-1980s and accounted for 
some of the rise in cocaine use that Weibel observed, crack cocaine was rare in Chicago 
before the very end of the 1980s. Police only reported tiny amounts of crack cocaine 
seizures as late as 1989 (twenty-two grams seized in January), and there were few emergency 
room mentions of crack overdoses. The Police Department formed a crack task force only 
in March 1989. In January 1990, they seized almost eight times as much crack as a year 
earlier.66 Even so, once crack took off, the Chicago economists argue that usage never 
reached the level of New York, Lost Angeles, and other northeastern and western cities.67  
                                                 
65 W. Wayne Wiebel, “Substance Abuse Trend Update for Chicago and Illinois,” in Patterns and Trends in Drug 
Abuse: A National and International Perspective, Community Epidemiology Work Group Proceedings (Rockville, MD: 
National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1985), II–23. In his report a year and a half earlier, Wiebel had said almost 
the exactly the same thing: “As has been the case in the previous few reporting periods, cocaine remains as the 
only drug which has shown a consistent pattern of increasing use.” W. Wayne Wiebel, “Substance Abuse Trend 
Update for Chicago and Illinois, December 1983,” in Trends, Patterns, and Issues in Drug Abuse: Community 
Epidemiology Work Group Proceedings, Volume II (Rockville, MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1983), 84. 
66 Police seized nearly eight times that amount (162.7 grams) in January of 1990. The growth in crack usage led 
the CPD formed crack task force unit in March of 1989, which may have led to the increases in arrests in 1990-
91. Chicago Police Department, Narcotics Section, “Crack Seizure Incidents -- Chciago, 1989 vs. 1990,” March 
1990, 32, CPL-MRC, Drugs and Crack in Illinois: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the 
Judiciary, United States Senate, 101st Cong. 28 (statement of Cmdr. Charles Ramsey) (1990). William E. Schmidt, 
“Crack Epidemic Missing Chicago in Urban Sweep: Authorities are Puzzled by the Drug’s Scarcity,” New York 
Times, February 10, 1989, A14. 
67 Fryer, Jr. et al., “Measuring Crack Cocaine and Its Impact,” 31–35, tbl. 1.  
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Policing the War on “Gangs and Drugs” 
A new emphasis on gangs and drugs combined with other bureaucratic imperatives 
to produce dramatic change on the streets. The first important change took place before 
Wilson’s death. This was the decision to disband the Special Operations Group. Those 700 
officers were routed back into Police District, but they did not become patrolmen. Instead, 
Rice transferred them to the Special Functions Group in the Patrol Division, where they 
were responsible for aggressive patrol of gang activity.68   
 Second was the Mayor’s reversal of his earlier plan to cut the number of police in the 
1985 budget.69 Instead, he preserved budget lines for 12,000 police officers. Because of 
retirements and dismissals this meant hiring nearly 500 officers. When seventy new recruits 
showed up at police academy in the first week of March 1985 for their seventeen weeks of 
training, they became the first class of officers to start training in more than two years.70 
Washington’s 1986 budget went even further, putting in place a plan for the total level of 
officer staffing to rise to 12,500—matching the increase of 1,000 officers that Washington 
had advertised on the campaign trail. Because the hires in 1985 barely kept pace with the 
number of departures, the Department planned on hiring 1,350 more officers to bring the 
police strength back up to 12,500.71 Getting enough officers through the academy in time to 
meet this threshold took a Herculean effort.   
                                                 
68 Thomas J. Lemmer, Gad J. Bensinger, and Arthur J. Lurigo, “Research Article: An Analysis of Police 
Responses to Gangs in Chicago,” Police Practice and Research 9 (2008): 420–21. 
69 Thom Shanker, “Mayor Rewrites Budget to Fund War on Gangs,” Chicago Tribune, December 4, 1984, 1.  
70 Robert Davis, “Police ‘Boot Camp’ Reopens: 1st Crop of City Recruits in 2 Years at Academy,” Chicago 
Tribune, March 3, 1985, B1.  
71 See 1986 Work Plan, HWAC Public Safety 21-1.  
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 This plan to hire more officers worked in tandem with the third change: the 
Administration’s attempt to reassign the patrol force more equitably. What Rice proposed 
was nothing less than exercising “the department’s responsibility to see that police 
protection is ‘distributed fairly’ throughout the city.”72 Simply put: primarily black districts 
received many fewer police man-hours per reported crime than white areas. Rice aimed to 
fix this by reconfiguring beats and redistributing personnel. On paper, the Superintendent’s 
plan was to reduce the total number of beats across the city from 1,261 to 1,000. However, 
this reduction was more theoretical than actual: Even as 1,261 beats existed on paper, only 
about 1,000 were manned, a holdover from the previous major reorganization of beats in the 
early 1960s.73 Rice’s plan, developed by the Research and Development Division of the 
Bureau of Administrative Services, used a complicated formula to measure the workload of 
each beat and apportion them equally. The formula put greatest emphasis on Part I Index 
Violent Crimes, then Part I Index Property Crimes, then Part II Crimes, and finally other 
calls for service.  
 After decades of asking for better protection, black neighborhoods might finally get 
it under Rice’s proposal. This irritated the Vrdolyak 29, who invoked the historic right that 
their neighborhoods had asserted to police protection—even in the face of evidence that 
those resources were not being fairly distributed. Even more police protection was needed in 
their neighborhoods, they argued, to prevent them from becoming victims of violent crime. 
They proposed an ordinance that would require any change in overall staffing levels to be 
subject to city council approval.74 In the Superintendent’s words, “that’s how they tried to 
                                                 
72 Strong and Galvan, “Rice Accused of Concealing Cutback Plans.”  
73 “Police Redeployment: Beat Lines and Battle Lines,” Chicago Tribune, January 20 1985, A1.  
74 Phillip Wattley, “Rice Slams Aldermen on Cop Plan,” Chicago Tribune, December 9, 1984, C11.  
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emasculate me … [T]hey were trying to strip me of power to, what power I had to run the 
department.” Rice argued that this would have worked a wholesale revision of the nature of 
the power to govern. Vrdolyak’s faction attempted to “usurp[] the responsibilities not only 
of the police superintendent but the executive branch of government.  Executive branch of 
government controls the police not the legislative branch so they backed off.”75 
 As a formal matter, the grab for executive power failed. But as a political matter the 
group was at least moderately successful in limiting the re-deployment of police resources. 
To cool neighborhood fears, the Mayor promised that, while high crime areas would get new 
officers, they would only come through new hires and the addition of more officers to the 
street through other strategies.76  
 
 Beginning on December 3, 1984, when Washington held a press conference to 
announce his intentions to do something about gangs, the policing of gangs and drugs began 
to change. In addition to announcing the creation of the Task Force, he announced three 
suppression measures designed to disperse gangs from congregating within Chicago Housing 
Authority buildings, deploy more policemen on the streets against gang crime and street 
violence, and use state and federal laws against guns and narcotics trafficking to put gang 
members in prison. Both the right and left hands of the state would play a role in 
confronting the gang problem.   
                                                 
75Interview with Fred Rice, Jr. (The HistoryMakers A1993.005), interview by Larry Crowe, June 27, 1993, 
session 1, tape 4, story 6, http://thmdigital.thehistorymakers.com/iCoreClient.html. 
76 “Editorial: Redeployment Defanged,” Chicago Tribune, January 26, 1985, 10. 
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Unlike the constant wrangling over the Task Force in the City Council, the Mayor’s 
instructions to the Police Department could be implemented quickly. By the end of 
December 1984, the Chief of the Patrol Division had written a special order, implementing 
two programs: The first provided for periodic checks of Chicago Housing Authority 
buildings by uniformed officers. Personnel for such checks would be drawn from Public 
Housing, Gang Crimes, and district tactical units, and coordinated by the Deputy Chief of 
the Special Functions Group. The Deputy Chief was also to coordinate a second set of 
inspections of licensed premises where gang members were known to congregate. These 
were to be performed by one uniformed sergeant and four uniformed police officers from 
Special Functions, as well as city inspectors from the appropriate department.77 
The Police Department’s management process helped the Police Superintendent to 
focus in on “gangs and drugs” through identifying yearly objectives, outlining the intended 
outcomes and major tasks necessary to meet those outcomes, and reporting each month on 
progress. One way of making the goals concrete was to assign numbers: for example, in 
1986, Rice declared that in order to increase the number of arrests, the Patrol Division that 
“one percent of [its] manpower will concentrate on narcotic enforcement.”78 In addressing 
gang-related crime, such plans directed the Patrol and Youth Divisions to “intensify curfew 
and truancy enforcement as a proactive measure to limit the opportunity for crime.”79 Gang 
Crimes Division personnel, by design, focused more intently on policing narcotics. For 
example, reporting on their output for the fall of 1986, the budget office noted, “Vice arrests 
                                                 
77 Chicago Police Department, Patrol Division: Special Order 84-15, Dec. 28, 1984.  
78A rough calculation: 7,000 patrolmen * 40 hours a week * 48 weeks * 1% = 134,000 man hours in the patrol 
division on drugs.  “Routine Objective #2,” 1986, HWAC Public Safety 20-4.  
79 “1986 Work Plan: Status Report for the Nine Month Period Ending Sept. 30, 1986,” HWAC Public Safety 
21-1.  
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for the quarter are up more than 10% due to increased emphasis on gang related narcotic 
operations.”80  
The creation of Work Plans by the Superintendent provided an avenue for turning 
“gangs and drugs” into a bureaucratically manageable problem. It could become a set of 
target numbers whose mere existence would justify the focus on “gangs and drugs.” Over 
time, the police became more adept at turning a desired outcome into a specific set of steps 
whose performance could be subjected to such measurements. Efforts to “increase and 
enhance enforcement of laws pertaining to narcotics,” yielded a set of highly specific, but 
arbitrary, goals; for example, increasing the number of “raids by the Narcotics Section by 
3%,” “arrests for delivery and sale of narcotic substances by 3%,” “arrests for possession of 
narcotic substances by 2%,” “narcotics seized as measured in pounds by 5%,” and “narcotic 
raids by the Patrol Division by 2%.”81 The Police Department translated the abstractions of 
the war on gangs and drugs into measurable numbers. 
The Results of Bureaucratic Goals  
The Washington Administration’s attempts to bring fairness to policing incorporated 
greater policing of gangs and drugs into the bureaucratic infrastructure. The mix was potent: 
There were more cops on the street; these cops were more likely to be in the local Police 
Districts—especially Police Districts in poorer, black neighborhoods—than they had 
previously been; black gangs were more involved in narcotics than other gangs; black people 
were more likely to be in the public spaces that the department had been ordered to target; 
                                                 
80 Sharon Gist Gilliam, Budget Director, to Michael Holewinski, March 9, 1987, Attachment: Fourth Quarter 
Variance Report (1986), 2, HWAC Public Safety 14-15.  
81 Rudolph E. Nimocks to Michael Holewinski, August 6, 1987, Attachments, HWAC Public Safety 14-15.  
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and patrolmen were instructed to make more gang and narcotic arrests, and the performance 
of departmental managers was judged on how well they met specific arrest targets.  
These bureaucratic changes drove drug arrests. The dramatic increase in the arrest 
rate for drug crimes during Washington’s tenure was product of patrolmen arresting more 
people engaged in small-time drug deals, rather than the narcotics section bringing in big 
cases. For example, in 1986, the Police Department’s Annual Report catalogued more than 
21,000 arrests for narcotics offenses.82 Of these arrests, the narcotics unit made only 1,791. 
As well, it executed 1,836 search warrants and seized more than 2,174 pounds of drugs. 
(Over the course of the year the department destroyed 6,401 pounds of drugs.) Such a 
conclusion is augmented by the massive increases in drug arrests as a total percentage of 
arrests, which reflected the greater emphasis on making drug arrests across the police force. 
The year before Washington entered office, drug arrests made up 4.3 percent of all arrests. 
By the end of his final year in office, they made up more than eleven percent of arrests. To 
put this in perspective, in 1985, the Chicago Police Department made 7,062 arrests for 
serious violent crime. These consisted of only 2.8 percent of all arrests.83 The policing of 
drugs became much more important to the general activities of the Chicago Police 
Department. Following Washington’s death this ratio would continue to climb until it 
reached 23 percent. 
                                                 
82 Chicago Police Department, Annual Report (1986), 12.  
83 Here I use the FBI’s definition of serious violent crime, which include murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery. See “Crime in the United States,” 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/violent-crime. This 
number may actually understate the number of serious violent crime arrests, either because Chicago was not 
properly counting aggravated assault arrests or because the definition of aggravated assault was changed to 
reflect a broader conception. In 1987, there were 447 aggravated assault arrests; in 1988, there were 8558. 
These number remained at levels much closer to the latter number. 
  
    415 
 In addition, arrests of black Chicagoans for drug crimes began to skyrocket while 
arrests of non-blacks remained relatively flat. By 1987, there were 18,777 black drug arrests 
(a rate of 1,758 per 100,000), while non-blacks were only arrested 6,155 times for drug 
crimes (a rate of 358). As discriminatory as 3:1 seems—and as we have seen, that was better 
than what came before—between 1985 and 1987 the black to non-black ratio escalated to 
4.9:1.  It continued to grow after Washington’s death, stabilizing at a ratio of more than six-
to-one over the 1990s. 
 The final important change concerned changes in arrest patterns. The proportion of 
arrests for marijuana fell slightly and the proportion for other controlled substances 
increased slightly during the Washington years. When the data is disaggregated by race, it 
shows a slightly different pattern. While non-black arrest rates continued climbing at 
comparable rates, even after the heroin boom ended, black arrest rates for the two different 
categories of drugs moved in opposite directions. Between 1975 (controlled substances) and 
1976 (marijuana) and 1978, rates of arrest fell for both. Between 1978 and 1982, black arrest 
rates for controlled substances continued falling while marijuana rates climbed. Over the 
period from 1983 to 1987, black arrests for controlled substances caught up to and, 
ultimately, overtook marijuana arrest rates.  
The fact that cocaine usage rates remained stable and even increased throughout the 
late 1980s and early 1990s demonstrates that in this moment there may have again been 
some relationship between the drug use and arrest rates. Whatever the veracity of this fact, it 
remains true that this applied almost exclusively to black Chicagoans, for cross-racial drug 
use rates have no relationship to arrest rates. As one longitudinal epidemiological study of a 
cohort of Woodlawn youths found that the drug use there matched that of the national 
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population.84 The belief that drug usage in poor and minority communities is high, therefore, 
is based on a mistaken set of assumptions. Neighborhood disadvantage, population density, 
and minority residents go far in explaining the location of drug markets. But, according to 
the authors, “visibility of drugs in particular communities does not necessarily imply drug use 
among residents of those communities.” 85    
By choosing to target black people for drug crimes, the Chicago Police Department 
drove the increase in the number of persons incarcerated for drug crimes. Despite a 
common legal framework and common drug usage patterns, differences in drug arrest rates 
between Chicago and the rest of the state skyrocketed during the 1980s. From its nadir in 
1978 to its peak in 1990, this ratio went from 2.3 to 8.4, an increase of more than three-and-
a-half times. Simply put, there is no reason to presume that the massive differences in drug 
arrest rates between Chicago and the rest of Illinois can be explained by differences in drug 
usage in any major part.86 
* * * 
                                                 
84 The youths who attended first grade in 1966-67 the study was done during the 1992-1994 period. Margaret 
E. Ensminger, James C. Anthony, and Joan McCord, “The Inner City and Drug Use: Initial Findings from an 
Epidemiological Study,” Drug and Alcohol Dependence 48 (1997): 182. Woodlawn residents were slightly more 
likely to have used drugs within the past year than US residents generally, possibly indicating more continuing 
drug use. Ibid., 180–183. Woodlawn appears to follow a general pattern: “[a]lthough African Americans are less 
likely than the general population to initiate substance use in adolescence, those who do so are more likely to 
continue and to progress to heavy use. These results are consistent with findings that African Americans have 
relatively low rates of lifetime use but high rates of recent use.” Leonard Saxe et al., “The Visibility of Illicit 
Drugs: Implications for Community Based Drug Control Strategies,” American Journal of Public Health 91 (2001): 
1987. 
85 In contrast to its high covariance with drug markets, when it came to drug usage, greater neighborhood 
disadvantage only predicted a slight increase. Ethno-racial identity had even less of a relationship with drug 
usage. With ethno-racial identity neighborhood disadvantage held constant, individual minority residents “are 
less likely to be users, and there is no relationship between ethnicity and drug dependence. … Proportion of 
minority residents has a small negative effect on use at the neighborhood level.” Saxe et al., “The Visibility of 
Illicit Drugs: Implications for Community Based Drug Control Strategies,” 1992. 
86 This argument has particular temporal dimensions that should be noted. During the early postwar period, as 
Eric Schneider argues, heroin use was highly geographically concentrated in particular neighborhoods: In NY 
80 percent of male heroin users came from 15 percent of the city’s census tracts; these tracts were largely poor 
and Puerto Rican or black. Schneider, Smack: Heroin and the American City, 43. 
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Washington’s desire to serve his constituents in poor, black neighborhoods led 
perversely to dramatically greater racial disproportionality in arrests. With the realignment of 
beats came more patrolmen into black neighborhoods; these patrolmen were specifically 
charged with ferreting out drugs. Similarly, the arrest data shows that black street gang 
members were more likely to be arrested for narcotics-related gang crime, so the increasing 
interest in gang crime only increased the racial disparity. Finally, renewed attention to the 
safety of public spaces, such as housing, schools, trains, and streets, made it more likely that 
black youth would be arrested, simply as a result of increased police presence. Altogether, 
the new attention produced a self-justifying but discriminatory cycle. Such dynamics were 
only accentuated by the police employment, by their own description, of more aggressive 
tactics, with confrontations between police and “suspicious-looking groups of youths” 
increasingly ending in “name checks, frisks, and a real possibility of arrests.”87 
In the first year of C.I.N.’s existence, the City spent spent approximately $16.5 
million on its Gang Crimes Section alone—about four times the price of C.I.N.88 Political 
considerations that were deeply shaped by the city’s racial divisions over issues of crime and 
punishment operated as a break on reallocating police funds to other functions. The police 
budget was jealously guarded both by Washington’s constituents and the Vrdolyak 29. If the 
city was to intervene against gangs and drugs, using the Police Department was politically the 
most feasible strategy.  
                                                 
87 Philip Wattley, “Police Crackdown on Gangs Cut Murder Rate,” Chicago Tribune, October 31, 1982, B8. 
88 “The $24 million includes $14m in personnel service costs for the investigations conducted by the violent 
crimes units of the detective division. In addition $10m has been identified for the costs associated with the 
Department’s overall responsibility for prevention, apprehension and prosecution of violent criminal offenders. 
The cost was estimated based upon the Part I Index Violent Crimes’ Percentage as computed from the total 
number of calls for service reported during Police Periods 7 through 13, 1983 and 1 through 6, 1984.” Dennis 
E. Nowicki to Leslie Jacobs, Enclosure, HWAC Public Safety 8-2. 
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Between 1983 and 1987 a full-blown strategy for policing drugs emerged that 
became the bedrock of the war on drugs in Chicago over the full course of Washington’s 
mayoralty. Over time, the state and federal focus on drugs exacerbated local policy choices, 
but local actors nonetheless remained important. As Mona Lynch put it: “Although 
sentencing statutes have been toughened at the state and federal levels, thereby creating the 
capacity for mass incarceration, mass incarceration has not been realized without local-level 
criminal justice actors transforming their daily practices to send more and more offenders 
away to state penal institutions.”89    
   
 
 
                                                 
89 Mona Lynch, “Mass Incarceration, Legal Change, and Locale: Understanding and Remediating American 
Penal Overindulgence,” Criminology & Public Policy 10 (2011): 676. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The history related in Policing, Race, and Politics in Chicago ended with the depressing 
reality of the rise of a race-based war on drugs in the mid-1980s launched by Harold 
Washington as Mayor and Fred Rice as Police Superintendent. This trend would only 
accelerate under their successors, as changes in state and federal laws goaded the city further 
down this path. If these experiences proved anything, it was that when police were given the 
job of targeting and arresting a particular kind of offender, they did it with great success. By 
contrast, the persistence of discriminatory and abusive police practices despite decades of 
activism provided a cautionary tale about successfully reforming the police. By late 1973, it 
appeared that the Mayor really could no longer ignore police brutality. Yet within half a 
decade, the occasional torture of suspects by John Burge and other detectives became a 
habitual practice, often used to coerce false confessions. Nor did complaints about routine 
street brutality, or shooting by police officers, ever decline to acceptable levels.  
The difficulty, as Robinson, the League, and many others repeated ad nauseum during 
the 1970s, was that the police were fundamentally part of the social order, despite the efforts 
of law and order proponents to set them apart. During the heyday of the League’s struggle, 
the most salient fact about that order seemed to be the role of the Daley machine in 
constituting it. By turning to electoral politics outside of the regular Democratic 
organization, Renault Robinson and other League members, as well as Harold Washington, 
hoped they could bring fundamental transformation. But even in the moment they achieved 
political success, the United States was undergoing a series of broader political, economic, 
and social changes that made it harder for Washington to deliver on this promise. The 
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ongoing social stratification of the metropolis during the 1970s and 1980s, left law 
enforcement with an expanded set of tasks even as available resources contracted. Harold 
Washington’s election did not change this. The Mayor and his Superintendent could only 
scratch the surface of the existing hierarchies of power within the Police Department, let 
alone transform the social role played by the police. For either task, he had fewer tools and 
fewer allies than his predecessors. 
Resources were not the only problem. As the tenure of Superintendent O.W. Wilson 
illustrated, police officers were social beings that brought their experiences with them onto 
the force, embedded both in their individual personas and in the collective culture and 
traditions of the Department. Reform programs did not eliminate or even necessarily 
attenuate pre-existing social ties or political perspectives; they even may have exaggerated 
them. In turning to law and order in the 1960s, police officers often sought to vindicate their 
vision of a social order in which black people were subordinate. By failing to grapple with 
these social visions, police reformers continually failed to recognize the humanity of their 
police officers. Neither Superintendent Wilson nor Rochford reckoned with the beliefs of 
their subordinates or the institutional culture of policing. Instead, each hoped that changes in 
supervisory and command personnel, better organization and oversight, or newer technology 
might render them irrelevant.  
The deep association between race and crime was the single most important obstacle 
to reforming the police during the 1970s and 1980s, and it continues to serve as a major 
impediment to reform today. Time and again during the 1970s, the efforts of black activists 
and politicians to make anti-crime measures a crucial element of their program proved to be 
a political liability. Raising the specter of crime nearly always produced intra-racial division, 
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as questions about the failure of the state to eliminate black people’s disproportionate 
vulnerability to violence were turned back onto black people and communities as evidence 
of their racial distinctiveness. Even as people have become more egalitarian in their 
conscious beliefs, “common sense” understandings of the relationship between race, drugs, 
and homicide continue to justify the targeting of black communities. Drug crime, rather than 
race, was made the target; yet the outcomes were, if anything, far more discriminatory as 
officers set out to eliminate the scourge. Police practices can improve, even if such 
associations remain operative. But problems of disproportionate violence and exclusion 
along racial lines will not disappear until police reformers acknowledge the fallacy of such 
illicit associations and seek to eliminate them for their logic by which their institutions 
operate.  
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APPENDIX I: TABLES 
 
Table 1: Black Policemen, 1900-1930, 19611 
 
Year Black 
Police 
Total 
Police 
Black 
Police 
Black 
Residents 
1900 21 2,825 0.74% 1.78% 
1910 48 4,226 1.14% 2.02% 
1920 89 4,631 1.92% 4.05% 
1930 137 6,163 2.22% 6.93% 
1961 1,188 10,065 11.80% 22.89% 
 
  
                                                 
1 The first three columns come from Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 253, tbl. X. The population data comes from the 
US Censuses for 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930.  
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Table 2: Democratic Primary for State’s Attorney (1972) 
 
Democratic Primary: State's Attorney (1972) 
 Moore Berg Hanrahan 
Countywide 28.3% 29.6% 42.0% 
Citywide 24.7% 36.5% 38.8% 
White Ethnic Wards 15.0% 31.6% 53.4% 
Black Wards 38.2% 45.8% 16.1% 
Lake Shore 40.5% 29.9% 29.6% 
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Table 3: General Election for State’s Attorney (1972) 
 
General Election: State's Attorney (1972) 
 Hanrahan (D) Carey (R) 
Countywide 47.1% 52.9% 
Citywide 52.6% 47.4% 
White Ethnic Wards 58.5% 41.5% 
Black Wards 39.6% 60.4% 
Lake Shore 39.9% 60.1% 
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Table 4: Chicago Police Department Personnel, 1972 
 
 Exempt  Capts Lts Sgts Investigs Youth Women Patrol 
Black 7 1 13 126 97 46 15 2003 
Total 78 94 299 1355 1222 226 89 9333 
Percent Black 9.0% 1.1% 4.3% 9.3% 7.9% 20.4% 16.9% 21.5% 
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Table 5: LEAA 3-Step Fund Suspension Regime 
Step 1: 
Trigger 
Finding of non-compliance by 
(a) a federal or state court, or a federal or state administrative 
agency, or  
(b) the Attorney General, leading to the filing of a lawsuit or  
(c) LEAA investigators,  
leads to notification of state governor to seek compliance 
Step 2:  
Voluntary 
Compliance 
The governor has 60 days to seek voluntary compliance. If  
(a) voluntary compliance is not achieved, or  
(b) an administrative has not absolved the recipient,  
payment of further LEAA funds is suspended.  
Step 3: 
Administrative 
Hearing 
Recipient has 120 days to seek an administrative hearing.  
The LEAA must grant this request within 30 days of receipt.  
Payment may be terminated permanently if after the hearing the 
recipient is found to be in non-compliance.  
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Table 6: Racial and Ethnic Categories Used in Arrest Statistics by the Chicago Police 
 
Years Race Ethnicity 
1966-1969  White, Black, Other None 
1970-1972 None None 
1973-1980 White, Black, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Other None 
1981-1986 
White, Black, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or 
Pacific Islander 
Hispanic 
1987-1992 
White, Black, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or 
Pacific Islander 
None 
1993-1997 White, Black, Asian, Native American, Other  Hispanic 
1998 
White, Black, White Hispanic, Black Hispanic, Native 
American, Asian, Unknown 
None 
1999-2000 White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, Other, Unknown None 
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Table 7: Drug Regimes in Chicago 
 
Years Metaphor 
Arrest Ratio 
(Black / Non-Black 
Drug Arrest Rates) 
Drug Ratio  
(Drugs /  
All Arrests) 
Marijuana Ratio  
(Marijuana / All 
Drug Arrests) 
1950 
- 
1965 
Containing 
Users 
Highly 
Disproportionate 
Many Arrests  
of Few Users 
Focus on  
Heroin 
1965 - 
1982 
Stop the 
Spread 
Steady Average 
3 : 1  
(1966 - 1985) 
Slow Rise and Fall 
4.3% to 6.1% to 4.3%  
(1970 - 1976 - 1982)  
Steady Growth:  
38.5% to 67.5%  
(1966 - 1982) 
1983 - 
1987 
Wars on 
Gangs and 
Drugs 
Rapid Increase 
3.1 : 1 to 4.9 : 1  
(1985 - 1987) 
Rapid Increase: 
4.3% to 11% 
(1982 - 1987) 
Decline: 
 67.5% to 58%  
(1983 - 1987) 
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APPENDIX II: FIGURES  
 
Figure 1: Racial Composition of the Chicago Police Department1 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1 Justin McCrary, “The Effect of Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas on the Composition and Quality of Police.” 
American Economic Review 91 (2007), 324 fig. 1A. 
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Figure 2: Homicides in Chicago, 1965-1995 
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Figure 7: Proportion of Total Government Expenditures and Revenues, 
1932 and 1970 
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Figure 4: Structure of Law Enforcement Assistance Agency Funding 
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Figure 5: LEAA Spending on Chicago Police, 1969-1971 
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Figure 6: Arrests for Part I Index Crimes in Chicago, 1966-1982 
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Figure 7: Public Order Arrests in Chicago, 1960-1979 
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Figure 8: Timeline of AAPL Administrative Compliance and Litigation 
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MAR. 9 
AAPL sued CPD 
(Robinson v. Conlisk)
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JULY 2 
AAPL filed LEAA 
administrative 
complaint
1972
MAR. 7 
LEAA consultants 
began study
SEPT. 6 
LEAA study released
1973
MAY 16 
Alliance sued CPD 
(Camacho v. Conlisk)
MAY 22 
LEAA referred AAPL 
complaint to DOJ
AUG. 15 
DOJ filed U.S. v. 
Chicago
SEPT. 15 
AAPL filed ORS 
administrative 
complaint
1974
FEB. 7
AAPL sued Treasury 
(Robinson v. Shultz)
APR. 4 
ORS orderd to notify 
CPD of non-
compliance
APR. 24
Discrimination suits 
consolidated (N.D. 
Ill.)
MAY 28 
Preliminary injuction 
hearing (N.D. Ill.)
JUNE 16
ILEC suspended 
grants to CPD
NOV. 7 
Preliminary injunction 
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DEC. 16 
Parties agreed to 
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DEC. 18 
General revenue 
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Robinson v. Shultz 
transferred to N.D. Ill
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Consolidated trial on 
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1976
JAN. 5 
Marshall ruled for 
plaintiffs
MAR. 31 
Release of revenue 
sharing funds 
scheduled
1977
JAN. 11 
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decision on the 
merits
SEPT. 23 
Marshall ruled in 
favor of AAPL 
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Figure 9: Chicago Police Department Demographics 
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Figure 10: Efficiency Ratings: Indices of Representation by Race 
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Figure 11: Index Crimes 
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Figure 12: Disorderly Conduct, Drunkenness, and “Other Arrests” by Race 
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Figure 13: 1975 Aldermanic Race 7th Ward 
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Figure 14: 1975 Aldermanic Race 28th Ward 
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Figure 15: Homicide Rates by Age 
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Figure 16: National Trends in Annual Use of Illicit Drugs by 12 Graders1359 
 
 
                                                 
1359 Data are from Monitoring the Future (2012), Data Table 16 (accessed 12/11/2013), 
http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/data/12data/pr12t16.pdf 
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Figure 17: Drug Arrest Rates 
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Figure 18: Drug Arrest Rates by Racial Group 
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Figure 19: Google ngrams for “drugs,” “gangs,” and “drugs and gangs” 
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